Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

Okay, but can they sustain the pilot and aircrew losses this would entail? Because the Germans need more aircrews if they want to sustain a Battle of Britain (an airplane mix more weight towards bombers), and they're going to be suffering a far, far worse rate of irrecoverable aircrew losses (both sides planes are going down over Britain; for a British pilot, that means a nice farmer patching them up and sending them to the nearest military hospital; for any Germans, said farmer is going to either call in MPs if they're lucky or stab them with his pitchfork/Home Guard spear if they're unlucky).

I think you're overlooking something here - the German pilot is armed too, probably with a service pistol. Being younger, fitter, and a trained military professional, he is highly likely to win the initial encounter with the British farmer, thus giving him access to the farmer's equipment too. He will be able to use this, plus his training, to live off the land, taking what he needs from the civilian population and attacking any targets of opportunity he comes across. As the air war intensifies, dozens - perhaps even hundreds - of these ersatz Fallschirmjager will be roaming the British countryside, terrorising the civilian population and making military movements almost impossible. Neutralising each one will take a far greater number of personnel, who will no doubt take casualties in the process.

Meanwhile, the invasion force is assembling on the other side of the Channel. Unable to move forces to counter it, unable even to defend their civilian population, the British government will be forced to seek terms of surrender. Personally, I give them a month at the absolute most before public pressure becomes overwhelming.
 

Garrison

Donor
Germany’s best bet was to pour on the pressure on Britain while telling the American public in every newspaper in the land that the war in Europe would end the day after the British kicked Churchill from office and made peace.

I thought the Isle of Wight gambit was the least plausible suggestion you could come up with but you've topped yourself.

Firstly you would need the American's to take Hitler's word, in 1940. Secondly You assume that the Americans are okay with Nazi hegemony over Europe. Thirdly the notion that after defeating a Sealion invasion the British are going to be willing to take any terms Hitler cares to offer and also see 'firstly' again. And after all that sooner or later |Hitler will decide to go east and then you end up with the Eurasian continent dominated by Hitler or Stalin.
 
I thought the Isle of Wight gambit was the least plausible suggestion you could come up with but you've topped yourself.

Firstly you would need the American's to take Hitler's word, in 1940. Secondly You assume that the Americans are okay with Nazi hegemony over Europe. Thirdly the notion that after defeating a Sealion invasion the British are going to be willing to take any terms Hitler cares to offer and also see 'firstly' again. And after all that sooner or later |Hitler will decide to go east and then you end up with the Eurasian continent dominated by Hitler or Stalin.

There's also a assumption there the US news papers and radio would carry Gobbels propaganda narrative unedited & uncommented.
 
@Glenn239

1) what peace terms should the UK have agreed to, when and why,?

2) The RAF grew in strength during the BoB, the Luftwaffe at best kept its existing OOB.

3) By May 1941 the Luftwaffe would have no margin over Fighter Command.

Especially given the loss of output from the economic disruption resulting from a failed USM. Remember the barges destroyed will need to be replaced and these Siebel Ferries built too. Plus the naval units available as escorts will be much reduced even from September 1940. While the Royal Navy will be stronger.

USM 2 could perhaps be an ostentatious bluff. But a viable military operation it is not.

The Mediterranean option is simply done in by logistics. And the Royal Navy of course.

More emphasis on the U-boat campaign is plausible but time consuming. How long between the Fuhrer order to step up U-boat construction and the first extra operational U-boat? 18 months, given training and working up seems right to me.

How long to force the UK to surrender? How long before it becomes impossible for Germany to invade the USSR?

IMHO the best option for Germany post the Fall of France is to tempt the UK to make a genuine Peace. By treating France etc. far more generously and even offer to restore "Poland" as a puppet state.

But that would require the "Notzis", not Hitler, to be in charge.
 
Just about anybody can be drafted into the army, but not everyone can be a sailor or airman. And skilled maintenance people e are worth their weight in gold, the Japanese learned that the hard way...
 
Sealion failing in 1940 might cost the Axis as many as 1,000 of the 4,000 ships assembled. At full stride assuming the highest priority (because there is no war in Russia) the Axis industry should be able to replace that level of losses in something like 3 to 4 months.

How does industry replace trained sailors? Are you under the impression there's a factory somewhere building them?

Breaking up one infantry division could crew 600 MFP’s. Training of new crews could be completed in months. Are you asking if the German military was too stupid to understand that it could break up one infantry corps to man 1,200 Siebel ferries and MFP's?

Ah, that well known source of trained and experienced sailors - the infantry x'Dx'D

Some squaddies thrown onto some floating Bailey bridges after watching the actual German navy slaughtered in a couple of hours should be fine going up against the Home Fleet.

Are you saying the German military was that stupid?

Germany’s best bet was to pour on the pressure on Britain while telling the American public in every newspaper in the land that the war in Europe would end the day after the British kicked Churchill from office and made peace.

No it isn't. Their best bet was to surrender before Bomber Command turned all their cities into untidy piles of bricks and burned kids.

Yes, the pattern is that you are conflating the outcomes of campaigns between Britain vs. Germany with the outcome to campaigns of the Anglo-Americans vs. Germany.

Talk me through the American involvement in the Battle of Britain?

The pattern for the whole war after the fall of France was mostly a string of German defeats against the western Allies and a few victories followed mostly by defeats in the east.
 
I thought the Isle of Wight gambit was the least plausible suggestion you could come up with but you've topped yourself.

Interesting slip on your part - the use of the word 'gambit'. That means you do understand how little strategically was at stake in undertaking such a venture as an attack on IOW.

Firstly you would need the American's to take Hitler's word, in 1940. Secondly You assume that the Americans are okay with Nazi hegemony over Europe. Thirdly the notion that after defeating a Sealion invasion the British are going to be willing to take any terms Hitler cares to offer and also see 'firstly' again. And after all that sooner or later |Hitler will decide to go east and then you end up with the Eurasian continent dominated by Hitler or Stalin.

Time enough to do what, launch multiple Sealions? Is that what are you talking about? We know for a fact that the American public 1.5 years after the fall of France historically was still OK with neutrality in the European war. We also know that had Japan not attacked Pearl Harbor that it easily might have gone past 2 years from the fall of France without the US in the war in Europe. That's Sealion 1940, 1941, 1942, then after that, who knows, right?
 
Oh boy. now we are quoting Wiki. But lets roll with that. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_aircraft_production

The chart at the top of that one shows 12,000+ for Germany, just over 20,000 for the UK. Toss in the Italians and the raw numbers there still give the Brits a 25% edge in aircraft. Never mind the additional purchases from the US. The numbers of air crew don't add up any better for the Axis either. 1941 was the year Axis pilot training problems started to emerge.

If the Battle of Britain rolled into 1941, the LW could afford about 3,000 aircraft shot down on that front over the course of the year. That would determine the tempo of operations over Britain. On the British side, they would be attempting their own air campaign over Germany, but from a position of disadvantage in terms of basing. Whereas the Germans could use twin engine bombers with fighter escort, the British would need 4 engine bombers and not be able to escort.

For 1940-41 the Wiki source production is 35,000+ for the UK & 22,000+ for Germany. Adding in US and Italian production used in the air war of those two years does not help the Axis any. Continuing a full on air war in the west & Mediterranean at the loss rates of 1940 referred to above gets the Axis Air Forces a lot faster to the situation they faced from early on in 1943. Add in the problem of aircrew training & improving & the trend may accelerate by a full year or more.

In 1942 the Germans could afford perhaps 5,000 aircraft lost in the Battle of Britain.
 
Assuming Germany can afford to lose 3,000 aircraft, is that going to allow them to fight at an intensity that will enable them win a second Battle of Britain?
Given the advantages the RAF had in terms of being able to return pilots into action and I understand better aircraft production numbers I can’t help thinking it will be another defeat in the air unless the Luftwaffe can somehow find a way to avoid an attritional campaign.

An ongoing battle over Britain isn't winning the war, any more than the RAF campaign over Germany would win the war. It's just one more inevitable facet of such a struggle. When Germany invaded the USSR the LW had to go fully over to the defense in France. That would not have happened in the alternative case, but the offensive tempo would have been subject to the pace of attrition.
 
Comparing 20% unit losses in vast formations to 100% losses in smaller formations and claiming that they are comparable morale-wise shows how little glenn knows about about how one determines success. The latter constitute a complete loss for 0 gain with no appreciable casualties influcted on the enemy. Latter units are still operational and capable of functioning while having actually achieved something (not to mention having inflicted 5 times the losses ob the enemy.)

I'm sorry glenn but barbarossa came a lot closer to achieving its objective than sealion ever had a miniscule chance of getting.
 
Yes. How many times did the Germans fail in Barbarossa? As opposed to not succeeding as much as they would have liked?

The Germans made 4 attempts in Russia before too weak to try again - Barbarossa, Typhoon, Blue, and Kursk. Each of them failed at a cost far beyond a failed Sealion. That's the idea - once a strategy is set, a real Great Power continues on that course regardless of losses until it fails or its exhausted.
 
What’s to stop the British getting the USSR to attack the largely tankless Germany as they’re throwing Kampfgeschwader after Kampfgeschwader at the British Isles and sinking their Merchant Marine in the Channel?

Now it's down to Stalin's Anglophile sympathies? I think Britain might want a better plan than that, don't you?
 

Deleted member 94680

Now it's down to Stalin's Anglophile sympathies? I think Britain might want a better plan than that, don't you?

Not at all. Stalin had no sympathies as far as I can discern.

It’s a simple case of realpolitik. The enemy of my enemy, etc. The British Empire, in the midst of a War for Survival, has a lot more to offer the USSR than the openly anti-Bolshevik NSDAP-led Germany. If Germany persues your no-sleep-‘til-Sealion idiocy, then how long until a Whitehall mandarin comes up with the blindingly obvious stratagem of encouraging the USSR to strike at Germany’s eastern flank?
 
If the Battle of Britain rolled into 1941, the LW could afford about 3,000 aircraft shot down on that front over the course of the year. That would determine the tempo of operations over Britain. On the British side, they would be attempting their own air campaign over Germany, but from a position of disadvantage in terms of basing. Whereas the Germans could use twin engine bombers with fighter escort, the British would need 4 engine bombers and not be able to escort. ...

Classic fan proposition here. The Germans get to change their strategy, but there is a implicit assumption the enemy does not adapt, but has to follow a historical decision with no allowance for changed circumstances. In this case the German AF is continuing a bombing campaign against the UK, but the Brits must ignore that and mount their historical action however irrelevant it is to the changed situation. Whats really silly in this is a implication that the readers here are so dim witted they will accept frequently repeated examples of this technique, they can't see simplistic and obvious ewpwated presentations.

The logical conclusion is the RAF will use its advantages & experience to defeat these repeated attacks, focusing on the destruction of the German air forces at hand. The historical record is thats what they did. Thats what they practiced over the Western Desert in 1941, & repeatedly executed through 1943. Larger numbers, better ground support, better pilot training, better aircraft development programs, better aircraft resulted in unsustainable losses for the Axis & later the German air force in 1943. Whatever losses the Germans could afford in 1943 the several campaigns in the Mediterranean exceeded those limits & each time the Germans had to break off the air campaign to mitigate disaster. The main thing that prevented this from happening earlier was the limited size of the air campaigns over the Med in 1941-42, A significantly larger air war from repeated air attacks on the UK into 1941 plays to RAF strengths in learning from experience and to weaknesses of leaders like Udet or Goering in learning anything at all. The German affordable limit looks a lot smaller than the RAF & would appear to arrive much faster. Either the German leaders admit defeat in this, as they did in October 1940, or they press on to further severe erosion of strength in machines and aircrew.
 
Now it's down to Stalin's Anglophile sympathies? I think Britain might want a better plan than that, don't you?
Stalins Anglophile Tendencies? Probably not. Sheer Opportunism? Yeah, that's more likely. A Red Army that isn't in the middle of reorienting itself and a Germany that is obviously chucking lead paint and throwing away anyone qualified for something other than holding a rifle? Yeah, Stalin is going to be in Berlin before Hitler can say"But I meant to do that"
 
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