How to get the Japanese to win in the Pacific

Could you have made their invasion of China more effective by changing their approach to the civilians? What if, instead of atrocities like the "Rape of Nanjing", they were more disciplined and benevolent in their dealings with civilians? Could they thus have taken advantage of the KMT/CCP civil war and established themselves better in China? And would this have given them the manpower and resources to be more effective in the western Pacific?

Poking the eagle in its nest is still a fool's errand, though.

It might have helped, but then you end up with a very different country that is probably at peace with its neighbours...

Not being at war with China would release manpower, but the real issue in the Pacific war is logistics and supplying various overseas locations. This meant that even more important than manpower was a larger merchant fleet and more supplies of oil/coal to keep them at sea.
 
Win at Midway, it's not as impossible as people like to believe. Or if you desire earlier victory, win at the Canal.

No, it really is as impossible as people believe, even if Yamamoto somehow rolls all sixes and sinks all three US carriers while keeping all of his own.

In fact, it might not even delay the end of the war.
 

Marc

Donor
A good win at Midway would give the Japanese time but not change the result. The US was fast building carriers and their naval air forces.

The Canal is way beyond the Japanese logistics ability.

Once, while considering doing a short story that was orthogonal to most riffs on World War 2, I contemplated the idea of a semi-kamikaze attack on the Panama Canal in close conjunction with the attack on Pearl Harbor, using a small battle group built around the first and elderly Japanese carrier Hōshō, and including a battalion or two of the Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai - Japan's elite special landing forces - trained to wreck the Canal locks before they were wiped out. To reiterate for those objecting to the logistics: the attacking forces would essentially be on a one-way mission. I was going to give the Japanese the nearly best outcome - with the obvious irony that it didn't really matter.
I concluded that the net effect of a disabled Canal would be perhaps as much as a 4-6 month delay in the final outcome of the conflict in the Pacific theatre, just that, no more.
 
Once, while considering doing a short story that was orthogonal to most riffs on World War 2, I contemplated the idea of a semi-kamikaze attack on the Panama Canal in close conjunction with the attack on Pearl Harbor, using a small battle group built around the first and elderly Japanese carrier Hōshō, and including a battalion or two of the Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai - Japan's elite special landing forces - trained to wreck the Canal locks before they were wiped out. To reiterate for those objecting to the logistics: the attacking forces would essentially be on a one-way mission. I was going to give the Japanese the nearly best outcome - with the obvious irony that it didn't really matter.
I concluded that the net effect of a disabled Canal would be perhaps as much as a 4-6 month delay in the final outcome of the conflict in the Pacific theatre, just that, no more.

And even for a one-way mission - not completely inconceivable - the IJN force has to roll more sixes than Nagumo did.

The Pearl Harbor mission was at least able to use low traffic approaches of the North Pacific. That won't be the case with the EastPac approaches to Panama, which sported a considerable share of global maritime shipping.

Nagumo only had to go about 3,800 miles. A one-way trip to Panama is 8,400 as the crow flies - considerably longer for the detection-minimization approach IJN planners would come up with.

All of which means far greater detection of the force, almost certainly at a distance. Which gives the Canal Zone defenses plenty of time to mobilize. And those defenses were formidable, as I am sure you know.
 
It wouldn't win the war for Japan but getting the US to go to war with Germany in the winter/spring of 1940/41 would help the Japanese substantially as the main strength of the US pre war professional military would be busy deploying to Europe and North Africa. It would at least delay the US's ability to at first resist and later to strike back against the Japanese Empire. It also gives the Germans and Italians several months to give the Americans a bloody nose like sinking a carrier or two in the Atlantic/Med.

The US being busy with the Germans might make them more cautious in their dealings with the Japanese perhaps even reducing/eliminating the oil embargo. They might even let their guard down more than OTL as commanders of quality do their best to get transferred to the war in Europe making the Pacific a command quality backwater.

Of course being at war for half a year means the US would already be starting to flex its industrial and manpower muscles so this might not be such a game changer as it first appears. Although if the Japanese could only wait until the Americans commit themselves to a major invasion followed by full on ground war in continental Europe then all bets are off.
 
It wouldn't win the war for Japan but getting the US to go to war with Germany in the winter/spring of 1940/41 would help the Japanese substantially as the main strength of the US pre war professional military would be busy deploying to Europe and North Africa. It would at least delay the US's ability to at first resist and later to strike back against the Japanese Empire. It also gives the Germans and Italians several months to give the Americans a bloody nose like sinking a carrier or two in the Atlantic/Med.

OTOH, it would have immediately put the US economy on a full war footing, accelerating and extending existing military buildup plans (like the Two Ocean Navy Act) which were *not* going at max tempo before Pearl Harbor.
 
For number 4, would Ainu work? I doubt there would be any Americans familiar with it.

The first American-sponsored college in Japan was in Hokkaido, if I recall correctly, so there are likely to be some people with knowledge of it. Considering the number of languages the Japanese would have to pick from, it'd be easier to narrow down.

Not to say it won't be effective at first, but it has more of a risk of being broken.

Step 1: Cripple the everloving shit out of the US Navy. The Pearl Harbor attack could have gone on a lot longer and turned Oahu into a smoldering crater if the Japanese were up for it and had been better prepared. It would have been a week that lived in infamy, and no matter how pissed off America was, it would have taken a LOT of time to build up a counterattack.

So, use up all the Japanese fuel either station keeping or fleeing from American submarines and the American carriers who will be able to eventually find the Japanese carriers, who have been attrited of aircraft, munitions, and aviation fuel? The Japanese lost "only" 29 planes in the first two waves - and they will continue to lose more with every wave attack. That's not to mention the airframe casualties you'll experience by constant, round the clock attacks with maintenance issues and pilot exhaustion cropping up. So you will eventually destroy your premier strike force and lose the advantage it provided even if the American carriers don't find you. And if they do, then you'll have an exhausted CAP running on the last vestiges of fuel to defend the Kido Butai, which will probably go about as well as can be expected.

Step 2: Tojo makes sure Hitler slows his roll against the US. Keep the British, French and Russians busy with the Nazis and handle business against the Americans one-on-one.

Which doesn't help the Japanese at all, as the Japanese then are not getting access to any of the oil that they need. And this provides more time for the UK and Dutch to get their act together as well. So not only will the Japanese be dipping into its reserves earlier with no hopes of recovering it by driving the US out of the Philippines, they will

And in the end, this means that all US Naval Forces can be committed to Japan, at least at the start, which means more American flattops at the start being shifted west.

Step 3: Until the end, America always envisioned the war with Japan (which they expected in full) to be almost exclusively naval. So stymie the Americans in enough battles that the tide doesn’t turn and the Americans can go no further.

Which of course won't matter past late 1943, as by that point the US will have amassed a critical mass of new carriers that are better and carry more aircraft than the Japanese ones and are equipped with aircraft that are superior to Japan's aircraft, and in greater numbers. 32 Essex, 6 Midway, the 10 Independence and 2 Saipan, and that's just OTL numbers of planned vessels - if the war went South, you'd see some more conversions of the cruisers and battleships (both the Alaska class and Iowa class had plans drawn up just in case). And the Japanese would be doing what? Attempting to invade New Caledonia (not happening based on the Japanese planned numbers for the invasion and the number of defenders). Attempting to invade Port Moresby? Australia?

The Japanese, after the battle of Midway and by the end of 1944, would have built 3 additional fleet carriers and converted 2 light carriers - the US would have built 12 fleet carriers and converted 9 light carriers. You'd be talking about a 4-1 kill ratio, using subpar equipment and aircraft, just to break even.

Step 4: With America frustrated that they can’t even beat the fucking Japanese straight-up, wait for an isolationist to get elected and for isolationist GOP members to take Congress. End the war, watch America curl back up in its shell, and hope to hell the Nazis handles business against the Russians. If they did, skip to Step 6.

And the old fallback of Japan - hope you punch the Americans hard enough that they sue for peace, hope that our might ships can never be sunk, and defeat their huge submarine fleet from strangling the empire. You're conflating a Vietnam War-era America fighting a French colonial war vs a major strategic war against a geopolitical rival who has occupied American soil. I doubt they'd be so easy to fold.

Especially as these victories will require 100% success of the Japanese, every time. As trading 1 for 1 isn't an option. Trading 2 for 1 isn't an option. Even trading 3 for 1 isn't an option.

Step 5: Get ready for the Russians. Remember what worked in the dawn of the 20th century and use it. Plunder the mainland of Asia and keep the people out of the way as much as possible.

What worked in 1905 won't work in 1944, especially as the Russians will be mechanized to a larger degree than the IJN and will have better armor.

There is also the pesky problem of the Chinese, and you have created another two-front war for yourself. Oh, and you STILL don't have any oil, as the US hasn't ended their embargo and the Dutch and British territories haven't been conquered.

It wouldn't win the war for Japan but getting the US to go to war with Germany in the winter/spring of 1940/41 would help the Japanese substantially as the main strength of the US pre war professional military would be busy deploying to Europe and North Africa. It would at least delay the US's ability to at first resist and later to strike back against the Japanese Empire. It also gives the Germans and Italians several months to give the Americans a bloody nose like sinking a carrier or two in the Atlantic/Med.

The US being busy with the Germans might make them more cautious in their dealings with the Japanese perhaps even reducing/eliminating the oil embargo. They might even let their guard down more than OTL as commanders of quality do their best to get transferred to the war in Europe making the Pacific a command quality backwater.

Of course being at war for half a year means the US would already be starting to flex its industrial and manpower muscles so this might not be such a game changer as it first appears. Although if the Japanese could only wait until the Americans commit themselves to a major invasion followed by full on ground war in continental Europe then all bets are off.

This is pretty much OTL; the US committed the majority of their forces to fighting the Germans, as they were by far the most dangerous enemy. The Japanese were, at best, a thorn in the American's side from a strategic level, because they could never do anything to threaten the American industrial base that was pumping out more material than the Japanese could dream of. And the Germans and Italians did not have a sufficient fleet to tie down major fleet elements (and the elements used in support of landing operations would, for the most part, be obsolete warships).

At best, you'd catch them out of position. But already mobilizing a year or two earlier, so troop levels would not differ.

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The best way for the Japanese to win is by attacking Pearl Harbor with a Publicity Blitz after successfully negotiating a ceasefire with China at 1931 borders, with Japan only maintaining Manchukuo after coming to terms with a new leader to form an anti-comintern pact in East Asia to fight the Chinese communists and keep them from subverting both Japanese and Chinese territory.

Then the War for American Support, the code name for Japan's publicity drive, gets under way.
 

Marc

Donor
And even for a one-way mission - not completely inconceivable - the IJN force has to roll more sixes than Nagumo did.

The Pearl Harbor mission was at least able to use low traffic approaches of the North Pacific. That won't be the case with the EastPac approaches to Panama, which sported a considerable share of global maritime shipping.

Nagumo only had to go about 3,800 miles. A one-way trip to Panama is 8,400 as the crow flies - considerably longer for the detection-minimization approach IJN planners would come up with.

All of which means far greater detection of the force, almost certainly at a distance. Which gives the Canal Zone defenses plenty of time to mobilize. And those defenses were formidable, as I am sure you know.

Quite right, it would have been an act of desperation (come to think of it, maybe circa 1943-4 more likely if ever?).
As it happens, I'm passably familiar with the Zone back when we still ran the joint (truly surreal place, but that is another tale), and heard stories about it during WW2; it would take just about everything to break right, and even then, a thin chance - although I played with the idea of truly bad weather, which does happen now and then.
As for distance, well they might, with some extra oilers, arrive on fumes but that would be enough, and enough time to scuttle or just maybe surrender to Guatemala? (Ironically the US Navy doesn't have much of presence at the time, Canal defense is an Army thing)
Then, given the extreme long shots popular on this board...
 
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I had posted these numbers in a thread about Japan winning at Midway. As far as getting the US to agree to peace, I doubt it. Go back and watch film of people talking about the Pacific war. Or talk to some vets. They hated, hated the “Japs.” See SECNAV say “The Japs started this war, we are going to finish it.” The US built 24 Essex class carriers and scrapped several more being built. 19,000 B-24, 12,000 EACH F6F & F4U and around 9,000 B-29s. 2,700 Liberty ships, around 60,000 Sherman’s, etc. IMHO agree with the above. They lost the second the first bomb dropped on Pearl. All that remained was figuring out how long their defeat would take.
 
I had posted these numbers in a thread about Japan winning at Midway. As far as getting the US to agree to peace, I doubt it. Go back and watch film of people talking about the Pacific war. Or talk to some vets. They hated, hated the “Japs.” See SECNAV say “The Japs started this war, we are going to finish it.” The US built 24 Essex class carriers and scrapped several more being built. 19,000 B-24, 12,000 EACH F6F & F4U and around 9,000 B-29s. 2,700 Liberty ships, around 60,000 Sherman’s, etc. IMHO agree with the above. They lost the second the first bomb dropped on Pearl. All that remained was figuring out how long their defeat would take.

With a slight reminder: the US never actually maxed out its economy during the war. They were taking their foot off the gas as early as 1944 as the production simply wasn't needed.
 
They can’t. Literally can’t. The war was completely unwinnable.

Actually, on this question, some quote by Yamamoto is worth considering


https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto

  • Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.
    • As quoted in At Dawn We Slept (1981) by Gordon W. Prange, p. 11; this quote was stated in a letter to Ryoichi Sasakawa prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Minus the last sentence, it was taken out of context and interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would conquer the entire continental United States. The omitted sentence showed Yamamoto's counsel of caution towards a war that would cost Japan dearly.
  • A military man can scarcely pride himself on having "smitten a sleeping enemy"; it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.
    • Reply made to Ogata Taketora, the Editor in Chief of Asahi Shimbun (9 January 1942) as quoted in The Reluctant Admiral (1979) by Hiroyuki Agawa
  • In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.
    • Statement to Japanese cabinet minister Shigeharu Matsumoto and Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe, as quoted in Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan(1985) by Ronald Spector. This remark would later prove prophetic; precisely six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese navy would suffer a major defeat at the Battle of Midway, from which it never recovered.

Clearly, even the Japanese military leadership thought the war unwinnable if it continued. Makes you wonder why they picked this path?
 
Actually, on this question, some quote by Yamamoto is worth considering


https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto

  • Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices.
    • As quoted in At Dawn We Slept (1981) by Gordon W. Prange, p. 11; this quote was stated in a letter to Ryoichi Sasakawa prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Minus the last sentence, it was taken out of context and interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would conquer the entire continental United States. The omitted sentence showed Yamamoto's counsel of caution towards a war that would cost Japan dearly.
  • A military man can scarcely pride himself on having "smitten a sleeping enemy"; it is more a matter of shame, simply, for the one smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack.
    • Reply made to Ogata Taketora, the Editor in Chief of Asahi Shimbun (9 January 1942) as quoted in The Reluctant Admiral (1979) by Hiroyuki Agawa
  • In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.
    • Statement to Japanese cabinet minister Shigeharu Matsumoto and Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe, as quoted in Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan(1985) by Ronald Spector. This remark would later prove prophetic; precisely six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese navy would suffer a major defeat at the Battle of Midway, from which it never recovered.
Clearly, even the Japanese military leadership thought the war unwinnable if it continued. Makes you wonder why they picked this path?

Yamamoto seems to have thought the war was unwinnable.

But Tojo and his inner circle really seem to have thought that the US could be brought to the bargaining table.
 
(a) Have Japanese find oil fields in Manchuria in mid-1930s not found until after WWII in OTL.

(b) Avoid need for oil imports from US.

(c) finish the conquest of China or be very close to it before moving against the other Allies

(d) When China is conquered, move South and avoid Philippines while further developong and refining/developing I-201 submarines, Homare/advanced aircraft engines, G8N aircraft or equivalents, and <i>Shimakaze</i> class destroyers et al.

(e) keep the US out of the war
 
Yamamoto seems to have thought the war was unwinnable.

But Tojo and his inner circle really seem to have thought that the US could be brought to the bargaining table.

Japan was running out of oil without US imports and its navy would be dead in the water. At that point it would have very little negotiating power or ability to resupply its troops in China and elsewhere. They apparently felt the only negotiations were going to force them back to the pre-Marco Polo Bridge borders *at best* and they felt that was unacceptable.
 
Japan was running out of oil without US imports and its navy would be dead in the water. At that point it would have very little negotiating power or ability to resupply its troops in China and elsewhere. They apparently felt the only negotiations were going to force them back to the pre-Marco Polo Bridge borders *at best* and they felt that was unacceptable.

Hard to say without a serious negotiation, which Konoye was never in a position to offer.

Hull was certainly hardline. But if Tokyo had put, say, a full withdrawal from Indochina on the table, with a fig leaf promise to open talks with Chiang, Roosevelt might have bent a little. His focus was on Europe. Keeping Japan on the sidelines for a while longer could have had sufficient value. And Churchill would certainly have gone along, since Britain had more to lose in any Pacific War.
 
Hard to say without a serious negotiation, which Konoye was never in a position to offer.

Hull was certainly hardline. But if Tokyo had put, say, a full withdrawal from Indochina on the table, with a fig leaf promise to open talks with Chiang, Roosevelt might have bent a little. His focus was on Europe. Keeping Japan on the sidelines for a while longer could have had sufficient value. And Churchill would certainly have gone along, since Britain had more to lose in any Pacific War.

Of interest.
https://adst.org/2013/11/the-failed-attempts-to-avert-war-with-japan-1941/
 
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