I previously referenced Dreadnaught by Massie, but it is also recorded in the reference you so kindly provided:
According to Grey’s memoirs, in a conversation around 29 July, Law told him: it was not easy to be sure what the opinion of the whole of his party was. He doubted whether it would be unanimous or overwhelmingly in favour of war, unless Belgian neutrality were invaded; in that event, he said, it would be unanimous.
Also in the reference which I kindly provided, if you would have directed your eyeballs a page down.
A letter Balfour wrote to his sister on 8 August explains:
Last Saturday I was the only ex-Minister in London and spent much of my time in conveying to the French and Russian Ambassadors that the rumour of Unionist reluctance to take our share in depending [sic] France and Belgium was totally unfounded. I sent to the country for Bonar Law and Lansdowne, and on Sunday they communicated our views to the Prime Minister.72
No, I understand a couple of doves resigned on principle - in any case:
As some commentators note it makes no mention of Belgium, the supposed casus belli for London. However, in 1923 Churchill reproduced a letter sent to him by a front bench Unionist, F.E.Smith, on 31 July after consulting Law and others:
I have spoken to my friends of whom you know and I have no doubt that on
the facts as we understand them – and more particularly on the assumption
(which we understand to be certain) that Germany contemplates a violation of
Belgian neutrality – the Government can rely upon the support of the Unionist
Party in whatever manner that support can be most effectively given.
Churchill said he quickly showed this to Asquith, implying the latter was assured of Unionist support before the key cabinets of 1-2 August.
The reference you provided (above) confirms Conservative support for war was dependent on the German violation of Belgium neutrality.
Refer to the paragraph directly above it.
Of central importance to the analysis are two letters. The first, upon which most existing accounts focus, Law’s to Asquith on 2 August:
Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion as well as in that of all the colleagues with whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.4
You fail to cite the first letter, but choose to mention the second. Context is relevant, you know. Also of extreme note, since you don't seem to know of all the actual players involved in those busy days.
In fact, evidence from the 1911 Agadir crisis, the last time that a Franco German war seemed possible, suggests Unionist leaders were always likely to support British involvement. In the House of Commons their then-leader, Arthur Balfour, offered the Government full support.11 Since then, although he opposed much of the Liberals’ domestic programme, Balfour was largely content with their foreign and defence policy. He sat on a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence and had regular contact with Churchill at the Admiralty.In contrast Law, who became leader in 1911, had poor relations with Liberal leaders and, while he supported the entente, showed limited interest in foreign affairs: as Robert Blake says, ‘he left such matters largely to Balfour, and to Lansdowne.’13 The last was the Unionist leader in the House of Lords and, as Foreign Secretary in 1904, had forged the entente with France. Another leading Unionist, loyal to the entente was Austen Chamberlain who wrote a contemporary account of crisis. It will be argued below that, while the radical Right did indeed help galvanise Chamberlain (who they saw as their flagbearer) into action, Unionist leaders consistently supported war and gave serious consideration to a coalition as a way to ensure Britain entered the war.
Why exactly is the 1911 crisis any different, in your mind? In 1911, Unionist leaders were more than willing to go to war over the interior of Morocco, but now they don't want to go to war over Serbia three years later?
Further:
Here CharlesRoux, the First Secretary, confirmed what Wilson had already heard from Nicolson at a pre-breakfast meeting: Germany had declared war on Russia, invaded Luxembourg and had refused to give the British government a guarantee of respect for Belgian neutrality. Despite all this, with the Cabinet was still divided; Grey had seen Cambon but refused to give any firm undertaking to fight.
In context, the interventionists were concerned about the British Cabinet's decisions even if Germany was to violate Belgium neutrality. Elsewhere I have read Churchill was concerned a minor violation of Belgium neutrality would not be enough to get Britain into the war.
The policy statement was hardly encouraging, beginning as it did by insisting, ‘We are under no obligation, express or implied, either to France or to Russia to render them military or naval help.’ In fact, it was based on a paper that Asquith had drawn up for the morning’s Cabinet, which was in tended to keep the Government together and therefore included points designed to please the pro-peace ministers.
It was difficult to reconcile its tone with the fact that ministers, at their second meeting that day, effectively decided in favour of war should there be ‘a substantial violation’ of Belgian neutrality – and had there by removed any immediate need for a coalition.
The above confirms the covert discussions about a coalition government were driven by a concern the British Liberal government would not decisively respond to a German invasion of Belgium, not war in every conceivable circumstance. The machinations were undertaken with the explicit expectation of German violation of Belgium neutrality, which does not happen with this POD.
Bit of a contradiction when the Cabinet decided to uphold its naval obligations with the French then, dont you think? If you're going to base an argument on that policy statement, don't you think its worth mentioning that the British upheld their agreements all the same?
The following extract from your reference reinforces this:
Asquith’s account also reveals that during this meeting the Unionists‘ laid great stress on Belgian neutrality. ’While it would be pointless to deny that the Unionists strongly supported the entente with France, it is clear once again that Belgium loomed large in their thinking.
So Asquith said that the Unionists strongly supported France, but Belgium was also on their mind. In what way does that reinforce the point that the Unionist would abandon France while she is fighting for her life? Would it not be wise, in their strong support of France, to enter the war before the Russian bear in the East dies and France is left on its own against the might of Germany?
In relation to the passages you quoted, the talk of mass resignations clearly refers to the doves, not the 2-3 hawks lurking in Cabinet. If Grey and Churchill alone rage quit, no one will mind too much.
If Churchill and Grey "rage-quit" the liberal war-hawks in parliament will form a coalition with the Conservatives and go to war. See, this is why you are so adamant on making the Unionists appear to have been non-supportive orf entrance into the war. If they want the British to support France and join them in a war against Germany, which they did, the doves in the liberal party have no position with which to bargain, and they either accede to the liberal war-hawks, or destroy the liberal party. The doves didn't care if Belgium was invaded or not, they just didn't want to join the war. The only reason the liberal party stayed together, and again I will refer to the final paragraph of that article, is because
Far from being a personal fad of Churchill’s, quickly written off by the principals, coalition was a serious option in early August 1914. The main reason it was not pursued was that its very possibility helped unite the Liberals behind war.
As an aside, your reference is interesting - I recommend you actually read it.
If you're going to be a condescending asshole, at least be right when you do it.
