Results varied by decisions on the German side. In general there were no good choices for the defense.
1943: Allies landing in southern France instead of Italy
- Thread starter La Fin Absolue du Monde
- Start date
Primarily the Fortress Europa game. Familiarity with the rules and how the game system was designed made it a first choice. The Mighty Endeavor was the secondary, used to look for crude or significant differences in outcomes. There were not many deviations between the two in strategic terms. tho they have some clear differences at the tactical level. I also did some examinations of some specific operational situations with finer grained tactical games. Mostly looking at what happens with a reduced Op NEPTUNE/OVERLORD or those run earlier in May 1944 vs June.
First: Your understanding of the chronology is all messed up. The Allies landed in Italy and Italy surrendered (and in fact changed sides). It was as a result of that action that the Allies were able to occupy Sardinia and Corsica agaist minimal German resistance.
When Italy surrendered, the Germans decided almost immediately to evacuate their forces to the mainland. There was even some assistance from Italian forces in Sardinia, which did some fighting against the Germans. (Not a lot, but the Germans suffered a few thousand casualties.) Even so, it was not until mid-October that the last Germans left Corsica.
Second: you don't understand the strategic advantage of invading Italy. Italy would surrender, if protected from German retaliation. That meant that the Axis defenses of mainland Italy would be broken up immediately. It meant that the Allies could seize a major port without opposition (Taranto), and would probably capture other ports intact. (The Allies capured Bari intact, in part because the Italians there drove off German engineers sent to wreck the harbor.) Italy's surrender immediately subtracted hundreds of thousands of troops from the Axis, outside Italy, i.e. all the Italian occupation forces in the Balkans, the Italian garrison of the Dodecanese, and the Italian Eighth Army on the Eastern Front. And made Sardinia and Corsica untenable, so that as noted above the Germans withdrew and the Allies got them for minimal effort. But all this could happen only if the Allies landed in mainland Italy.
Third: you exaggerate the difficulties the Allies faced in southern Italy. Leaving aside the benefits of the surrender, by the time of AVALANCHE, the Allies had already crossed the Straits of Messina (BAYTOWN) and advanced a long way north; not long after that, this force (British Eighth Army) linked up with the Salerno force, doubling the Allied forces engaged.
What alternative strategy is proposed?
Instead of landing in mainland Italy... In early September, the Allies invade Sardinia. Sardinia is very similar in size and terrain to Sicily, so it should take the Allies about the same time to conquer it: five weeks. Allow a three-week pause for the Allies to recover and bring their logistics forward (there was a similar pause after Sicily).
Then late October, the Allies invade Corsica, which is smaller than Sardinia or Sicily, but more mountainous. It takes another five weeks for the Allies to conquer Corsica.Then another pause. Now the Allies can invade southern France - in late December. Yes, it's the relatively balmy Riviera, but winter is still winter. Winter rain and mud completely bogged down the Allied advance in Tunisia in December 1942, and Tunisia is 700 km south of southern France.
There is also the issue of the terrain. Northern France is rolling plains; southern France is the Alps and the Massif Central. One might try to advance up the narrow defile of the Rhone Valley, but it doesn't seem promising. There's another narrow valley running west toward the Atlantic, but it's not much better and it leads the wrong way.
Tl;dr: this strategy would be much more difficult to carry out than the invasion of mainland Italy, and would not offer the substantial immediate rewards of the latter.
La Fin Absolue du Monde
Banned
I KNOW what was the real chronology of the invasion of Sardinia and Corsica, but your arguments are completely wrong.
First, the Italian army was deprived of combat value and after Mussolini's defeat at all ceased to be a resistance at all. Secondly, fighting for Sicily lasted as much as 5 weeks, because the island was very well communicated with the continent and during the fighting the Germans could send new forces and supplies at all times. Sardinia and Corsica were isolated and under conditions of Allied dominance at sea and in the air, the Germans had no chance to support their defenders and their capture would not last longer than the Battle of Crete in 1941. Given the passivity of Italians, the fight for Sardinia would probably last even shorter. Thirdly, the problem during the Italian campaign was not only the mountainous terrain, but also the geographical shape of the peninsula, which is narrow, so the Allies did not have enough room to circumvent the German fortifications in the Apennines. The fighting conditions in southern France are different. Even if the Germans blocked the Rhone Valley, the Central Massif could have been circumvented from the west. The plains between the Massif and the Pyrenees are several dozen kilometers wide. Many times more than the narrow Liri valley that the Allies stormed in the first half of 1944.
There are a number of geographical limits on this invasion route.
First - to keep Spain neutral - WALLIES need to avoid entering Spanish territorial waters.
Secondly, Italian/German ships and aircraft could harass WALLIES all the way to the French coast.
Capturing Sardinia and Corsica would help, but invasion those islands will still take a few months.
The biggest hassle is the narrowness of the Rhone and Saone River Valleys. These valleys make it ridiculously easy - for Germans - to predict the WALLIED advance. Germans were damned good at fighting withdrawals. WALLIES could expect slow progress and heavy casualties until they passed the Massif Central.
Scurrying off the the west - between the Massif Central and the Pyrennes might be easy and might distract Getman defenders ...... BUT it would divert WALLIED efforts away from the primary goal: crushing Germany.
Next, how would Vichy French troops react?
Oh!
What about the Vichy French fleet rusting in Toulon?
First - to keep Spain neutral - WALLIES need to avoid entering Spanish territorial waters.
Secondly, Italian/German ships and aircraft could harass WALLIES all the way to the French coast.
Capturing Sardinia and Corsica would help, but invasion those islands will still take a few months.
The biggest hassle is the narrowness of the Rhone and Saone River Valleys. These valleys make it ridiculously easy - for Germans - to predict the WALLIED advance. Germans were damned good at fighting withdrawals. WALLIES could expect slow progress and heavy casualties until they passed the Massif Central.
Scurrying off the the west - between the Massif Central and the Pyrennes might be easy and might distract Getman defenders ...... BUT it would divert WALLIED efforts away from the primary goal: crushing Germany.
Next, how would Vichy French troops react?
Oh!
What about the Vichy French fleet rusting in Toulon?
A few hasty notes
A look at the map suggests that won't be a problem.
The same as they did on the approach to the African coast in November 1942, the Sicillian Coast in July 1943, the Italian Coast in September 1943, The Sardinian coast in October 1943... I could go on but examining what the Axis or German air forces accomplished then would be useful.
From November 1943 through the surrender in September 1943 the Italians maintained on Sardinia a single corps of one division of reservist, and a second under equipped division of mixed local militia and reservists. Corsica which was occupied by the Italians in November 1942 had a mixed bag of military police, assorted infantry units and a HQ from a reserve division. The Germans sent some replacement battalions to Sardinia, which were retraining as a motorized division, but lacked a complete kit. A SS brigade of new battalions was also training as a embryonic division. Both of those first appeared there as raw replacement battalions in the spring of 1943. In November 1942 approximately 130 Axis aircraft were based on Sardinia. When Op TORCH was executed that was surged up to approx 300 aircraft. the number varied monthly but seldom went over 300 aircraft.
A single US infantry Corps managed to hustle a German army, with a panzer division out of this area in 1944.
It is possible use this terrain to confine th Allied army to the area south of the Masif. The down side it requires a fair robust force to do so. The Central Massif is just as vulnerable to the sort of infantry force the French used to run the Germans out of the Arunnci Mountains in April & May 1944. To prevent this requires a fairly hefty infantry force. To the west any German corps or army positioned to prevent the Allies from swinging off the Bourdeux needs to keep a eye over its shoulder lest a Allied army lad at Bourdeux and ccut it off..
The French troops were at home. The Vichy Army had been disbanded at the end of 1942.
that exactly what it was doing. The French fleet at Toulon had been scuttled in November 1942.
A look at the map suggests that won't be a problem.
The same as they did on the approach to the African coast in November 1942, the Sicillian Coast in July 1943, the Italian Coast in September 1943, The Sardinian coast in October 1943... I could go on but examining what the Axis or German air forces accomplished then would be useful.
From November 1943 through the surrender in September 1943 the Italians maintained on Sardinia a single corps of one division of reservist, and a second under equipped division of mixed local militia and reservists. Corsica which was occupied by the Italians in November 1942 had a mixed bag of military police, assorted infantry units and a HQ from a reserve division. The Germans sent some replacement battalions to Sardinia, which were retraining as a motorized division, but lacked a complete kit. A SS brigade of new battalions was also training as a embryonic division. Both of those first appeared there as raw replacement battalions in the spring of 1943. In November 1942 approximately 130 Axis aircraft were based on Sardinia. When Op TORCH was executed that was surged up to approx 300 aircraft. the number varied monthly but seldom went over 300 aircraft.
A single US infantry Corps managed to hustle a German army, with a panzer division out of this area in 1944.
It is possible use this terrain to confine th Allied army to the area south of the Masif. The down side it requires a fair robust force to do so. The Central Massif is just as vulnerable to the sort of infantry force the French used to run the Germans out of the Arunnci Mountains in April & May 1944. To prevent this requires a fairly hefty infantry force. To the west any German corps or army positioned to prevent the Allies from swinging off the Bourdeux needs to keep a eye over its shoulder lest a Allied army lad at Bourdeux and ccut it off..
The French troops were at home. The Vichy Army had been disbanded at the end of 1942.
that exactly what it was doing. The French fleet at Toulon had been scuttled in November 1942.
marathag
Banned
"USS Corsica" was not an airfield, but the nicname for a number of airfields on the french island of Corsica during World War II, much like the airfields on the Foggia Airfield Complex. They served the Allies as an unsinkable aircraft carrier off the French south coast and as such, they supported the Allied landings and tactical operations in the south of France.
After the collapse of France to the German Wehrmacht in 1940, Corsica came under the rule of the Vichy French regime, which was collaborating with the Nazis. In November 1942 the island was occupied by Italian and German forces because of the Anglo-American Landings in North Africa. Following the Italian armistice in September 1943, Italian and Free French Forces pushed the Germans out of the island, making of Corsica the first French Department to be freed. Subsequently, the US military established 17 airfields there, nicknamed "USS Corsica", which served as bases for American tactical bomber groups attacking targets in German-occupied Italy.
There were 17 airfields in Corsica that were part of USS Corsica.
Those built by the French before the war were:
Ajaccio Campu del Oru
Borgo (Bastia)
Corte (Still in use)
Casabianda
Calvi
Ghisonaccia-Gare
Others built by the Americans were
On the east coast:
Bevinco
Poretta (Bastia) (Still in use)
Serragia
Alto
LINK
Alesani
Aghione
Solenzara (Still in use)
On the west coast:
Calvi Sainte Catherine (Still in use)
Calenzana
Fiume Secco
In the center:
Ponte Leccia
And finally, there were a few small golf link sized airfields for Piper Cub:
Abbazia
Propriano (Still in use)
Porto Vecchio
for today.
US had great luck in making airbases on islands very quickly in the Pacific, which worked just as well in the Med.
Bulldozers and Marston Matting made things a snap, one of the reasonsl those airstrips based eight different fighter and bomber groups there after 1943
Deleted member 9338
I lived on Sardinia for about a year and the WWII costal defense were still extensive in the 1980s.
Now this was mostly around the ports.
Now this was mostly around the ports.
The fact that the Germans were getting rekt in Northern France probably had at least a slight influence on this.
Some influence. Still, a intact coastal defense, fortified ports, three static fortress divisions, three field inf divisions, a armored division, & assorted army level formations ect... Failed to hold the 6th Army Group at any point.
To stop and hold a Allied force of a dozen veteran Infantry divisions & reinforcements a sizable portion of the German stratigic reserve in western Europe must be used. Stopping this early invasion of south France seriously weakens the defense at other points. Whatever the Germans choose this early invasion accelerates the attrition of German field forces.
To stop and hold a Allied force of a dozen veteran Infantry divisions & reinforcements a sizable portion of the German stratigic reserve in western Europe must be used. Stopping this early invasion of south France seriously weakens the defense at other points. Whatever the Germans choose this early invasion accelerates the attrition of German field forces.
Mussolini would stay in power longer and there would be fewer Italy memes. But seriously, If we managed to liberate France in early or mid 1944, we might be able to secure more land In Germany from the Soviets.
The collapsing economy is the Italian incentive at this point. In early 1943 the wealthy realized their well being was in serious doubt. When the millionaires start suffering regime change becomes certain.
Securing Sardinia/Corsica & the establishment of airbases there is just as much proof as the loss of Sicilly, that Italy has lost its part of the war.
La Fin Absolue du Monde
Banned
Mussolini was overthrown on July 25, 1943. The head of the new government was marshall Pietro Badoglio.
Would there be a chance of ending the war in Europe before the end of 1944? How would the earlier liberation of France affect the activities of anti-Nazi conspiracy in Germany? Will the Hitler strike be earlier and more successful?
If we did occupy France, we could possibly push into Germany from their Border with France. Actually, thinking about that now, that probably wouldnt happen. Unless we were to fool Germany into focusing their armies somewhere else