Riain
Banned
Why not? Is there an iron law of nature that says only tanks less than 50 tons can be landed over beaches, or is it merely an engineering problem that needs to be solved?
Mulberry
WI more Allied heavy tanks in World War II?
- Thread starter Pennsylvania
- Start date
Why not? Is there an iron law of nature that says only tanks less than 50 tons can be landed over beaches, or is it merely an engineering problem that needs to be solved?
Mulberry
thorr97
Banned
Riain,
40 tons was about the limit then of most shipboard cranes. Trying hauling anything much above that and you'd need to find specialized dockside cranes. 40 tons was about the limit at most ports as well. It's one of the reasons why RORO (Roll On Roll Off) ships are the preference for US logistics these days - so long as there's a dock or pier to pull up to, the cargo can be quickly moved ashore. They didn't have those ships back then and the US Army was pretty studious about limiting the weight of its weapons to be within their logistical ability to get them overseas and deployed.
40 tons was about the limit then of most shipboard cranes. Trying hauling anything much above that and you'd need to find specialized dockside cranes. 40 tons was about the limit at most ports as well. It's one of the reasons why RORO (Roll On Roll Off) ships are the preference for US logistics these days - so long as there's a dock or pier to pull up to, the cargo can be quickly moved ashore. They didn't have those ships back then and the US Army was pretty studious about limiting the weight of its weapons to be within their logistical ability to get them overseas and deployed.
marathag
Banned
Floatation on the M6 was superior to the M4, ground pressure was slightly less
For LSTs, the Marines ran their 63 ton M103s from those WWII era ships.
marathag
Banned
The difference was unlike Nazi Germany, the US really didn't have shortages of workers, factories or raw material.
The real limits was political. The US was starting to wind down production in 1944
Need more 37mm guns? extend the length of the contract.
The British had to force Caen, which so they ended up facing the majority of the German heavy armour (Panthers and Tigers).
Got a book ages ago from library but can't remember it's name . It was about tank recovery . One thing I do remember was emphasis on how allies could recover a Sherman get it back to engineering workshops and turn it around and how the Germans struggled with their heavy tanks because they needed a bigger trailer , more powerful prime mover , heavier recovery tank , bigger crane etc. Which used up more resources and was therefore scarce .
marathag
Banned
21st Panzer was the only one close on D-Day, and had lost many of it's tanks by June 8. The big problem was not gaining Caen on time, before the area was reenforced by Panzer Lehr and 12th SS, that had more of the Big Cats.
That did mask the problem that 7th Armoured Division underperformed in Normandy.
In wargaming terms, they had hit their preservation limit early on.
Yes. Caen was always going to be tough to take on D-Day but the British took too long to clear the beach and then send a Brigade forward with only one tank supporting armored regiment (tank battalion). Possibly too little urgency and the infantry weren't mechanized. IIRC correctly when they met the 21st Panzer counter attack they were driven back a bit but unbroken. While the lead elements of 21st Panzer found a gap and reached the shoreline between Sword beachhead and its neighbor (Juno?) it was never in a position to roll up the landing zone. And had to withdraw with heavy casualties after being flanked by British forces with anti-tank guns (possibly M10s with 17prs or Archers) and tanks.
The performance of 7th Armoured at Villiers Bocage was appalling. All credit to Wittman and his comrades but while they had superior tanks to the Cromwells the lack of flank security or watchfulness was dreadful. It never seemed to get how to fight in the bocage rather than the desert. TBF it hadn't trained in similar terrain, which reflects badly on British preparation. But it did seem war-weary and unimaginative in tactical handling by the senior officers. The division and at least one brigade commander were removed by end-June or thereabouts IIRC.
Nonetheless, for most of the Normandy campaign, the majority of German armour and mechanised formations faced the British Second Army front. As a breakout there looked more dangerous to the German position. Of course, what actually happened showed the US threat was just as bad and Hitler's obstinacy led to the near complete destruction of two or more German armies.
The WWII Lst and Lct weren't designed for 40 ton tanks, hence the need for dockside cranes. The more heavily built postwar ships were more expensive and took longer to build.
Not exactly - 21st Panzer Division's tank units were stopped dead with c25-30% losses. The units that found the gap to the coast were a separate task force of Panzergrenadier battalions, with IIRC armoured car support; these retired near twilight when the reinforcing glider lift landed to their rear. The rest of the division was failing to make any headway against the paratroops east of the Orne.
Thanks for correction and details. I remembered elements of 21Pz got to the coast but not which units. The division's performance overall was about as effective as the British 7th Arnoured! IIRC (happen to be corrected again!) its commander was AWOL with his mistress in Paris at the start of D-Day. Though, I suppose TBF, it did prevent the British taking Caen.
Riain
Banned
There is no iron law of nature regarding the weight of tanks, it's an engineering problem to be solved. Nor is particularly difficult given the small scope of the planned production of the M6: 5000 compared to 49,000 Shermans, so some 10% of LSTs or cranes or whatever need a bit of strengthening to handle the extra weight.
I find it strange that people take a general position that the US can do virtually anything in WW2, except handle a few heavy tank units, that's the line the US can't cross.
Pennsylvania
Banned
An industrial power so great that it makes up literally half of the world's economy, and it can't even make or deploy a few decent heavy tanks?!
RamscoopRaider
Donor
We aren't arguing that the US can't do it, we are arguing that it is very inefficient for the US to do it, there is a difference
thorr97
Banned
Riain,
You keep stating that the US could have done it. Agreed, the US could have fielded heavy tanks during WWII. But you've not answered why.
The US and the Western Allies were winning the war without fielding those heavy tanks. As has been pointed out, developing, fielding and then supporting those heavy tanks would not have been a trivial exercise and would have consumed resources otherwise spent on fielding even more mediums and other weapons.
As the Western Allies were already winning the war without the use of heavy tanks - why bother with them?
Sure, they spent some efforts on developing prototypes on a "just in case" basis but beyond that the Western Allies never saw the need to get them to the field. Commanders in the field were screaming for more mediums - not heavies. And those commanders were also screaming for more high explosive rounds for those mediums, not anti-tank rounds, as HE was better at the infantry support missions those tanks were more frequently employed in.
Thus there's no compelling answer to "why" the Allies should have bothered fielding heavy tanks.
You keep stating that the US could have done it. Agreed, the US could have fielded heavy tanks during WWII. But you've not answered why.
The US and the Western Allies were winning the war without fielding those heavy tanks. As has been pointed out, developing, fielding and then supporting those heavy tanks would not have been a trivial exercise and would have consumed resources otherwise spent on fielding even more mediums and other weapons.
As the Western Allies were already winning the war without the use of heavy tanks - why bother with them?
Sure, they spent some efforts on developing prototypes on a "just in case" basis but beyond that the Western Allies never saw the need to get them to the field. Commanders in the field were screaming for more mediums - not heavies. And those commanders were also screaming for more high explosive rounds for those mediums, not anti-tank rounds, as HE was better at the infantry support missions those tanks were more frequently employed in.
Thus there's no compelling answer to "why" the Allies should have bothered fielding heavy tanks.
Riain
Banned
Yep.
Very inefficient? We're talking about a small fraction of US AFV production here, 5000 tanks. That's pocket change to the US.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Except for the US losing over 10,000 Shermans for 5000 heavy tanks is not a good trade, and in theater the logistic requirements of a Heavy Tank Battalion is going to be several times that of a Sherman Battalion, it is going to be more limited in employment and not very much more useful
Riain
Banned
Why replace the P40 or the Wildcat with better planes when these types could handle the Axis fighters?
Why update ship designs? Why bother with the M46, or M4E8/Firefly?
These are basic questions that get answered with sophistry and long winded dives down rabbit holes to come up with complex answers that are not really answers at all. I've seen this argument many times before and it always comes down to up is down and black is white and Ockhams Razor is actually a teaspoon.
Riain
Banned
I did a post earlier breaking down what it would take to build 5000 M6s, 10,000 M3/M4/M10-M18 all up, was that wrong? Why does it take over 10,000 40 ton Sherman's to get 5000 55 ton M6s; is it the steel, the guns, the engines?
Why 'several times'? The M6 is about 1/3 more tank than the Sherman, why does it require 3 times the logistical footprint: is it the fuel consumption, the ammo consumption, the spare parts consumption?
No doubt it will be more limited, there are 10 Shermans for every 1 M6, but the usefulness is an essentially contested concept. I'd say that heavy tanks battalions at the Corps or Army level would find no shortage of work to do, far beyond the limits of thinking when IOTL it was decided not to pursue that development path.
Because a new model of plane doesn't impose the same sort of constraints on logistics a heavy tank does. Also, they were in fact more necessary since aircraft advanced more rapidly than tanks, a tank with a 75mm gun was sufficient most of the time, but a P-40 didn't have the capability to do a job the USAAF needed: escort bombers over Germany. And Germans were coming up with faster and better performing fighters made well after the P-40, they didn't however make tanks US armor wasn't able to respond to somehow.
Ships float, outside of some of the more absurd ideas there weren't any severe logistical problems. M46 was a postwar tank and the M26 didn't have a great impact, not just because its late introduction to the war but also because it had some issues with the engine, and despite being called a heavy tank at first it was really just a medium by 1945's standards. And the M4A3E8 are just variants of Sherman which don't help your point at all since they show the basic Sherman model was very adaptable and upgradeable. Although the Firefly was lacking in practicality, the 76mm was almost as good an AT gun as the Firefly's 17pdr but more accurate and fit much better inside the turret, also didn't blind the crew either.
And I haven't seen any answer for why heavy tanks were necessary besides "but History Channel said so" or "they're so cool, though".
And they'd still be doing nothing a Sherman couldn't do.