The Confederacy

[Octosteel]

I imagine Columbia and the Pacific States are going to compete for position too. I know this TL aims to focus on the Confederacy, but I'm keen to see how the world reacts to the US's Balkanization. Any idea who is going to end up the world's big powers, or is that wait and see?

The big question is if the Franco Prussian War goes the same as OTL. If so, Germany will most certainly be a major power. Otherwise, Napoleon might continue investing in Mexico which could turn France into the most powerful country in the world.

This is the problem with a Confederacy timeline, it will always seem like it's a Lost Causer's world because the Confederacy itself exists. Sure, the Union is destroyed. Sure, this is probably exactly what a Lost Causer would want. It does not mean that all the issues go away, and the very real problems it has doesn't just magically poof away into the night. I've always been interested in the Lost Cause movement and the Confederacy [NOTE: Does not correlate to supporting it], and this is an exercise in what an independent Confederacy would look like, and what problems it would face. In the end, I don't think even the strongest neo-Confederate would look at the final update and say "This is what I want." Their fantasy of an independent Dixie has no place in my timeline.



Given that the United States was indeed the major power in the hemisphere, and warded off the European powers, the role of the Europe in the hemisphere will be drastically increased, meaning even more interaction with the Confederate States, as it holds the most coast, population, and "assets."

I know which powers will end up where, and because I have no intention of spoiling it, you're just going to have to wait and see. However, if I was you, pay attention to every mention of a certain naval power...

It's okay, CSA timelines will always get criticized about Lost Causing unless it's a total screw. Keep it up. You're doing great.

 

[Turquoise Blue]

Independent. ish

So like OTL? I would expect them to be swayed more by the British given no USA.

 

[Turquoise Blue]

Oh, I thought you meant up to the modern day. In that case, Hawaii has indeed had some changes over her OTL status, it won't go unnoticed in the next chapter.

I hope they're a democracy.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

If I may throw in a comment on a particular topic of my interest:

The Franco-Prussian War is not only unlikely to go the same way as in OTL, it is unlikely to happen at all. In OTL, in an environment where Prussia had already done most of the work defeating Austria in the Austro-Prussian War (a shock defeat where most people thought Austria would emerge triumphant and yet in fact it was a stunningly swift Prussian victory) Napoleon III issued a threat to Prussia seeking territorial concessions in return for staying out of the war. The Mainz threat was an unbelievably, incredibly stupid move (giving the lie to the popular presumption of modelling historical figures as game-theory-esque perfect rational actors; it was just a really dumb thing to do) because not only was it unenforceable given the current military situation, not only was the French army in the process of re-equipping its infantry weapons with the more advanced chassepot and thus it would have been better-timed to do it later, not only was it stupid because of the Prussian army's recently displayed mastery of mobilisation and logistics thanks to the reforms of Moltke, Roon and Wilhelm I, it was a tremendous foreign-policy facepalm moment because it drove the South German states, terrified of French aggression, into Bismarck's waiting arms. (That alignment of those states with the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation was far from inevitable, contrary to what nationalist historiography may lead one to believe. When the Franco-Prussian War began a lot of Bavarian peasants burnt their crops—a very serious thing to do, for a peasant—so that the enemy couldn't get them—the enemy being the Prussians, not the French. At the time the Emperor of Austria quite seriously contemplated entering the war on the French side if the French were advancing into Prussian-held and Prussian-allied lands and there was a sufficiently strong anti-Prussian reaction from the people there, and the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias took this prospect seriously enough that he threatened Austria with Russian mobilisation if Austria mobilised against Prussia.) If Napoleon III does not issue that threat, this diplomatic alignment of the South German states doesn't happen.

If Napoleon III is too tied up in the Americas, in addition to his other commitments in Europe, he probably doesn't feel that his position is strong enough to issue the Mainz threat in the first place, so there is no moment at which Prussia is in the supremely advantageous position which it enjoyed in 1870 in OTL: blatant French expansionism at the expense of the smaller German states had been shown to be a major possibility and Prussia had shown itself willing to stand up strongly against French expansionism just at the time that Austria had just been weakened and discredited as a force to protect the smaller German states and Prussian power had been recently demonstrated. The scenario sounds like it was tailor-made to achieve Prussia's goal of uniting itself with the smaller German states in a federal German polity that would exclude Austria and thus be dominated by Prussia, though I'd argue that it arose more due to Napoleon III's stupidity than to Bismarck's genius. That perfect scenario, in addition to the (fully justified) conviction of the Prussian government and army that this was a moment where they held a major military advantage, made Bismarck decide that now was the moment to aim for this ambitious Prussian goal, so he deliberately escalated the Spanish succession crisis into the Franco-Prussian War and the rest is history. In fact the Kingdom of Prussia enjoyed so many military advantages over France at this point, as much due to French incompetence (in particular the spectacularly bad mauvais numéro system of how to get soldiers and a grasp of logistics so poor that not long ago France sent an army into Italy and only then, after hearing about that army having to beg and work from the locals, thought to send some supplies!) as Prussian brilliance (an extremely swift mobilisation well-orchestrated by a highly organised general staff and enabled by an excellent railway network, thanks to Moltke and Roon, a far superior system of conscription which was later adopted by practically everyone in recognition of this, and the excellent artillery of Kruppstahl), that even without the supremely excellent diplomatic situation of alignment with the South German states the North German Confederation would probably have achieved a decisive victory over Napoleon III's France in such a war anyway, but the extent of Prussian victory in OTL took pretty much everyone by surprise and in OTL Bismarck was too cautious to risk such a scenario without this supremely excellent diplomatic situation.

This sort of concern is why TLs like "The Confederacy becomes independent and then it and the USA take part in the First World War" are so silly. If the Confederacy exists, even several of the major protagonists of the First World War (the German Empire, the French Third Republic) might well not exist (instead there'd be the North German Confederation plus independent Bavaria, Württemberg et cetera, and the French Second Empire), let alone the war itself.

It is of course not inevitable that the Second Empire would rule France indefinitely, as there was opposition to Napoleon III, but I think it likely that without such a disastrous defeat as in OTL it would have survived. Napoleon III was engaging in a degree of democratisation which reduced pressure on the autocratic elements of his regime, and he had conservative Catholics—who were probably the greatest threat to him if things went pear-shaped, judging by the fact that when France did have democratic elections in OTL, even after the dramatic failure and humiliation of a conservative royalist regime in the war, there was a majority of conservative royalists, and the only reason a monarchy wasn't restored is that they couldn't agree on which one due to the flag dispute and the Comte de Chambord's stubbornness—mostly on-side thanks to the Roman question. The widely vastly exaggerated chances of the Paris Commune aside, the Second Empire was likely to survive, absent its catastrophic defeat in war and personal humiliation of its emperor at Sedan.

The absence of the Franco-Prussian War also has massive butterflies on all the militaries of Europe, as you take away the lesson that Moltke and Roon were basically right and everyone needs the general staff detailed planning of logistics that they supplied. Before that realisation, things like supplies being sent to armies by rail and then unable to be transferred out and waiting uselessly for the whole war were commonplace. It is almost impossible to overstate the military importance of such a PoD. I know very little of military history and I can't speak of such things in proper detail, but there are those on this board who can be helpful there.

So TTL has plenty of implications to have fun with, in Europe. I can't speak for the plausibility of the North American suggestions, lacking sufficient knowledge to do so (though I do enjoy reading it), but I hope I can be vaguely useful on the matter of my own continent.

 

[Octosteel]

Would at least the North German Confederation ever unite into one state with the Franco-Prussian War? And what would Bismarck do for the rest of the century with a position so much worse than OTL?

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Would at least the North German Confederation ever unite into one state with the Franco-Prussian War?

The German Empire's constitution was practically copied straight from the North German Confederation's. They even shared a flag. For almost all intents and purposes, the unification of Germany was just the absorption of Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt and Baden into the North German Confederation, the renaming of the latter and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine from France. If you count the German Empire as one state, you should definitely count the North German Confederation as one state too. In fact it would likely turn out considerably more de facto centralised than OTL's Germany, since the Kingdom of Prussia was only 60.1% of the German Empire (by population), going by the figures at the time of German unification in OTL, i.e. 1871; it would be 80.9% if Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden and Alsace-Lorraine, i.e. most of Germany that wasn't already part of Prussia, weren't part of Germany. (Calculations done on Excel from figures taken from here; the figures are in line with what I remember from earlier, but if I've made a numerical mistake then please do tell me.) OTL's Germany was, to a great extent, "Prussia plus a bit extra"; TTL's North Germany would be even more so, with Saxony, at only a tenth of the Prussian population, being the only remotely significant non-Prussian state in North Germany (I will call it that, instead of 'the North German Confederation', from now on). If Saxony doesn't join North Germany in the absence of the Mainz threat (which is possible given how it might weaken German-nationalist forces in Saxony) then that figure would be more like ~90%, but that's unlikely because the prime concern of foreign aggression in Saxony was the threat of annexation by Prussia, not any French threat.

And what would Bismarck do for the rest of the century with a position so much worse than OTL?

You're basically asking what would happen in Europe for a third of a century when presented with an incredibly large PoD, which is… non-trivial. Still, I do enjoy this sort of discussion, so I'll attempt to answer as best I can.

The first thing to note is that there might be a Franco-Prussian War anyway. It would require a different cause and it would be considerably later, but if Napoleon III, triumphant in the New World and able to withdraw troops from there to potentially fight a war in Europe, gets too belligerent towards the South German states, an OTL-esque scenario could happen. However, I would judge this as unlikely. Why? Because in OTL the Mainz threat was made in the context of a war whose outcome, especially its swiftness and decisiveness, was a great shock to Europe; it must not be forgotten that the Mainz threat was made during the Austro-Prussian War itself, albeit just a few weeks before it ended (but then again the entire Austro-Prussian War could be described as "just a few weeks", it was over so quickly). By the time Napoleon III has withdrawn his forces from Mexico and wherever else in the Americas they are, North Germany is an established new nation-state like the Italians whom Napoleon III made a habit of aiding, not a shocking new development which is in the process of being created by Prussian military might.

The second thing to note is that the Austro-German alliance of OTL can be written off at once. With North Germany and Austria-Hungary competing for influence in the South German states, they have a giant conflict of interest which it is difficult to imagine either of them giving up on. In OTL the Habsburg Monarchy had to accept her humiliating complete expulsion from her old sphere of influence in Germany; in TTL she will not. There will be a significant Franco-Austro-North German struggle for influence in the various states of South Germany, especially Bavaria as the most important of those states, both for its size and for its rule of the Palatinate which France coveted. Baden was broadly pro-Prussian in OTL but Imperial France's expressed desire to annex a lot of land right next to it might have had something to do with that; and even if it remains deeply pro-Prussian anyway, with Badners concluding that only Prussia can protect them from Napoleon III, there are still other South German states to contest for. The region would not necessarily end up all going to the same power; one can imagine for instance that Austria took what we could describe as 'territorially contiguous Bavaria', Prussia took Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt and France took Luxembourg and the Bavarian Palatinate. Succession disputes are likely to be the cause of wars in this region.

The third thing to note is that, depending on how things go in the Balkan peninsula, this may or may not result in long-term North German alliance with Russia; Austro-Russian enmity was not yet predetermined by this point in time. The absence of the Franco-Prussian War has significant butterflies on the reign of Emperor Aleksandr II in Russia, in particular his army reforms, but it also has the potential to alter affairs in the Balkans. If the Habsburg Monarchy hasn't been unceremoniously expelled from any influence in South Germany, depending on whether it still gets Gyula Andrássy the difference in confidence means that the Habsburg Monarchy might not reject (as it did in OTL) the Russian offer to beat up the Ottomans together, just like good old times y'know. If the Habsburg Monarchy rejects the offer, Balkan history isn't identical to OTL but it isn't dramatically different; the convergence of interest between the empires of the House of Habsburg and the House of Osman, both of them opposed to the ambitions of Russia, remains. If the Habsburg Monarchy accepts the offer, the Habsburgs and Romanovs divide the Balkans between them; at some point the British, for whom the idea of the Russians in the Turkish Straits is anathema, issue stern words trying to prop up the Ottomans, and all sorts of things could happen next. So soon after the Crimean War there probably won't be a war, but the future of Balkan international borders will depend on the extent of the Austro-Russian advance and what policy (unconstrained propping-up vs, more likely, controlled dissolution) the British take with regard to the Ottoman position in the Balkans.

The fourth thing to note is that Franco-North German enmity is not so utter and irreversible as Franco-German enmity was in OTL thanks to Alsace-Lorraine. On the contrary, the French Second Empire's traditional enemy was the Habsburg Monarchy. It is possible that Imperial France and the Habsburg Monarchy would ally together against North Germany, but that is far from certain, and the reverse is possible; France could aid in the unification of Germany as it did in the unification of Italy, spiting the Habsburg Monarchy and making territorial gains (in this case, France would presumably be looking at Luxembourg and the Bavarian-ruled Palatinate, judging by OTL) in the process. But it is also worth noting that European diplomatic alignments in this era, contrary to how standard historiography imagines them, were decidedly not rigid and monolithic blocs; they were actually quite fluid, and it is by no means sensible to guarantee that two powers hostile at one point will not be allies at another point, unless there is some huge conflict of interest between them, e.g. Franco-German enmity in OTL (apocryphal French response: "Alsace-Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine.") and Russo-Ottoman enmity in OTL. Even then it might not be completely certain; Anglo-Russian enmity in OTL looked tremendous and yet, for an admittedly short period of time, the British and Russians were outright allies, and that proved crucial because war broke out in that brief window of opportunity, thus, unfortunately, giving lots of people the impression that the British and the Russians were bosom buddies against Germany. One can even imagine an Austro-North German alliance if the French get too aggressive in South Germany, though Napoleon III (or perhaps his rather reckless son, who in TTL would be Napoleon IV) would have to spectacularly drop the ball for that one.

The fifth thing to note is that Italy now is in the difficult position of wanting Trieste and Trento from the Habsburg Monarchy but also wanting the papal states which are protected by Emperor Napoleon III for internal political reasons. (There were people in France so fiercely Roman Catholic that they stated they would rather see the Prussians in Berlin than the Italians in Rome!) This leaves the Italians in an uncomfortable diplomatic position.

The sixth thing to note is that it cannot be guaranteed that the United Kingdom will oppose Imperial France. British foreign policy, contrary to popular historiography, was very definitely not as simple as opposing the most powerful country on the Continent; there were in fact times when the United Kingdom quite deliberately sided with what it believed to be a greater Continental power, against what it believed to be a lesser one. (I have gone into this point in considerably greater depth elsewhere.) In fact the United Kingdom got on rather well with Napoleon III's France, especially as regards Russia. That might, of course, have changed; as I said, alliances were fluid.

The seventh thing to note is that, as I said, there were several aspects of Prussia's preparation for war that were absolutely exemplary, mostly thanks to Moltke the Elder, Roon and King Wilhelm I rather than the much-lauded Bismarck, and whenever North Germany does go to war against someone those are going to be dramatically revealed.

I have no doubt that one could say more—this PoD in Europe is hugely important and far-reaching—but that will be it for now!

 

[Perfidious Albion]

The implications upon European affairs is not lost on me, however a point that I do believe is poignant to raise about European affairs, as well as conjecture of my own on the subject of future European history with this PoD. [Which I had already considered prior and have been in the process of hashing out, which - to the thanks of the detailed analysis above, as been much easier]

Fair enough. It is interesting to talk about.

The first issue I wish to address is the idea that Otto von Bismark et al would not seek a continued drive for the unification of Germany - whereas they had sought and driven to goad their enemies into attacking them in the drive towards unifying Germany on the Kleindeutschland model, case in point being the Austrian attack in 1866 and the French attack in 1870. I find it hard and unlikely to believe that a stronger France, one with large investments and a vested interest in an overseas puppet, would automatically mean the drive towards the absorption of Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden would simply end - instead I believe it would take a different turn along a similar crisis that was concocted by Berlin in the drive to annex some, if not all, of these territories. What I will not contest is the fact that the German Empire as known to us today, will not exist in any form. The conquest of Alsace-Lorraine is indeed nothing more than a small dream, let alone a viable military operation.

This is where we get into a question of historiography.

Mostly from what has been said by Otto von Bismarck himself, a lot of people have got the impression that Otto von Bismarck was some kind of super-foresighted genius with a master plan who planned out the unification of Germany in advance, with successive Prussian victories over Denmark, Austria and France, and things only went wrong for Germany once the Germans abandoned his master plan. There is little reason to believe this.

Bismarck certainly wasn't a pan-Germanist who wanted German unification from the start; he first made his name fighting against pan-Germanists before he came to power. First and foremost he was a Prussian reactionary. His main achievement was to help King Wilhelm I of Prussia to place the power of the King above that of the Landtag, thus essentially neutralising the democratic gains he had hated and distrusted in the first place (and I do not use that word 'hated' lightly or without thought; it was indeed a profound and irrational hatred that was major in his character; more on this later). After that, Prussia did indeed successfully improve its army… mostly due to Wilhelm I, Moltke the Elder and Roon, not Bismarck in particular, and to a great extent due to Prussia reacting to lessons from previous wars, not in any sort of grand plan. The Second Schleswig War was caused by internal Danish events that were not caused by Bismarck or by Prussia at all. The German Confederation (principally Austria and Prussia) responded to this with war against Denmark, merely an opportunistic move by two great powers to take advantage of a weakerp ower, and the neutrality of Russia in this conflict cannot reasonably be attributed to Bismarck either; Russia was reasonably well-disposed towards Prussia since the Revolutions of 1848, especially to do with Poland. In Prussia those reactionaries supporting the King over the Landtag did of course have reason to want a victorious war to distract people from that, but that search for distraction from domestic political difficulties by means of war was hardly unique to Bismarck or to Prussia, even within the Austro-Prussian War, let alone in warfare in general. The subsequent Austro-Prussian War was caused not by some master plan but, well, by the very thing that appeared to cause it: two great powers both had claims on a piece of territory (the Prussians by virtue of proximity to it and participation in the war, the Austrians, via the German Confederation, by virtue of their leadership thereof) and Prussia's excellent performance in the previous war made it unattractive to submit to Austria. The Austro-Prussian War was merely a direct consequence of the Second Schleswig War. Following that, the only one of the great wars that led to the unification of Germany which can be placed squarely on Bismarck's shoulders is the Franco-Prussian War, which was undertaken after a conversation between a cabal of Prussian reactionary militarists including Bismarck and Moltke, taking advantage of (a) a pretext created by a conversation about the Spanish succession crisis that was deliberately distorted in order to insult France, and (b) an extremely convenient diplomatic situation which Napoleon III had caused by issuing the Mainz threat in the environment of the Austro-Prussian War where Austria had been proven weak and Prussia strong in the protection of the South German states.

In short, I do not believe that it is reasonable to suggest that there was any sort of grand plan or continuous effort leading towards the unification of a Kleindeutschland; on the contrary, it was a useful series of historical events that was exploited, opportunistically, by Prussia, and worked so well for Prussia because of an excellent army which was due to people other than Bismarck. Even if one does believe, in spite of all this, that the unification of Germany was the product of some grand plan, Bismarck would not have been capable of creating it. In spite of the popular impression of him as some super-intelligent master-schemer, in fact he was, at times, extremely impulsive. Most importantly, in the negotiations ending the Franco-Prussian War he went on a long rant towards the French negotiators expressing how he believed that the entire French nation was utterly untrustworthy because it wasn't an authoritarian monarchy and going on about how evil democracy and republicanism were, and he permitted the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine for short-term political reasons to do with placating the South German states by not having to station Prussian troops within them (a move that they, in particular Bavaria, would definitely not have liked). His stupid, impulsive antagonisation of the French was a mistake so tremendous it turned France against Germany for decades and thus caused a situation where for the rest of his career Bismarck had to work to clean up his own mess by trying, and of course failing (because it could never reasonably have succeeded in the long run), to keep France diplomatically isolated. These are not the actions of a super-intelligent long-term schemer, they are the actions of an impulsive opportunist who seized chances when they were handed to him on a silver platter.

I don't doubt that the North German Confederation would seek to make further territorial gains if it had the opportunity, simply as any great power would, but I do not think it is reasonable to say that there was a "drive towards the absorption of Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden". I do not believe that it was at all inevitable that these territories would be gained by North Germany. Nor do I believe that Berlin was in the habit of "concocting crises"; the only crisis that can reasonably be said to have been "concocted" by the Prussians was the Austro-Prussian War, and even then it's pretty dodgy, since there were already two convenient events (the results of the Austro-Prussian War, namely the discrediting of Austria as a plausible protector of the South German states in the immediate wake of its great defeat and the South German states' adhesion to North Germany in the wake of the Mainz threat, and the Spanish candidacy crisis) which were operating at the same time and which were not caused by Berlin; Bismarck merely took advantage of this excellent situation by distorting one conversation. I do not contend that Bismarck didn't cause the Franco-Prussian War; he did. But he didn't cause it out of the blue, and he wasn't in the habit of causing wars out of the blue; he was an opportunist, but not a crazy one, a fairly cautious one. He triggered a war when the pretext was already there, merely needing to be twisted/lit to set off the war, and at a time when Prussia was in a supremely excellent position already.

Another point of issue I hold is the United Kingdom, which I do not fall into the assumption that it always sided against the strongest power on the continent, but instead I believe London would not, under any circumstances, be comfortable with any form of friendship between France and North Germany - which I contend is possible so long as issues up and down the Rhine are settled -

A big if, but yes.

and this would bring London to support one side or the other eventually

Why?

The United Kingdom does not wish France and North Germany to forge an alliance. Does that mean that France and North Germany are going to be opposing each other, and desirous of an alliance with the United Kingdom against the other? The United Kingdom is powerless to force two great powers which do not particularly hate each other to fight each other for its own sake.

One cannot emphasise enough that without Alsace-Lorraine the relations between Paris and Berlin are not destined for hostility. Look at 1866 and the events that caused it, in a TL without the Mainz threat (like TTL), and what one sees is that Prussia, an old enemy of Austria, has just inflicted a great defeat on Austria while France, which has recently been fighting Austria a lot, watches. Once one takes away the artificial, retrospective perception of inevitability that Prussia was going to fight France as the next step in some master plan to unify Germany, this doesn't particularly look like a recipe for "Prussia and France must then be hostile to each other". They are two great powers, both of which have more reason to be hostile to Austria than to each other.

and not sit around attempting to make an alliance with the Tsar. (While not impossible, the icy relationship and territorial combat taking place in the East is a bone of contention between both parties)

I certainly don't dispute that Anglo-Russian relations are decidedly not pleasant at this point. Indeed, the Anglo-Russian alliance of OTL was a fluke.

However, that could change. The alliances of this period were very fluid even in OTL; in TTL, with two of the great constants of European diplomacy (Franco-German enmity and Austro-German amity) vanished, they will be even more so.

On this same vein of subject, Italy, with the intention of holding both the Papal States and the coveted Austrian territories in the region, would be overwhelmingly supportive of any power that stands against both of these two countries. The drive for an Italian-British partnership would be extremely strong, on the Italian side, as it offers them one of the few alliances that could threaten both of these countries, but it does indeed put them in a very awkward position moving forward.

Why precisely is the United Kingdom likely to support Italy against Austria? (Also, Italy doesn't yet have the papal states, and isn't likely to while the French Second Empire stands.) The only reason I can imagine is if Austria were pro-Russian, and even then the British would probably stay neutral. Splendid isolation would not end without good reason. An existing Franco-North German alliance would undoubtedly be scary enough to end it (two great powers positioned such as to make the Channel ports likely to fall to them, plus France's colonial position), as would an OTL-esque Franco-Russian alliance (due to the general vast overestimation of Russia, plus France's position on the Channel and France's colonial position); an Austro-French alliance would not be.

And why is the United Kingdom likely to attempt to weaken or distract Imperial France when in OTL it sought the opposite: a strong France in alliance with the United Kingdom and able to focus on the Russian threat? (To that end Disraeli lamented the unification of Germany in OTL on the basis that it prevented the French from being able to concentrate on Russia, and thus strengthened Russia's hand against the United Kingdom.)

For Austria, their enemies would remain to be North Germany and Italy, but should there be a lack of Franco-N. German partnership, they could very well become allies of France to oppose the North Germans and the Italians. This avenue would bring us to a French-Austrian alliance and a N. German-Italian alliance almost by default of one another. The two key factors on the outskirts of this being the Tsar and the United Kingdom, both of whom would have their own pragmatic reasons for supporting one side or the other.

Hmmhmm.

The big thing I see is that you seem to be leading us towards some supposed rigid system of alliances as is alleged to have existed in OTL, leading up to an alt-First World War; but the problem is that in truth that didn't exist in OTL; European diplomatic alignments were far more fluid than that. The Franco-Russian Alliance, for example, was initially directed as much against the United Kingdom as against Germany, and even included provisions for how Franco-Russian forces should be organised to the defeat of the British Empire; it was created in an environment where Anglo-German partnership was widely believed. The United Kingdom deliberately sought alliances with both Russia and France not out of fear of Germany but out of the wish to dismantle this threat, as the relevant British decision-makers in question thought of the Russian threat as a very great threat; the British, like many in this era, dramatically overestimated the strength of the Russian Empire and the threat it posed to them, even after the Russo-Japanese War should have taught them better. The Anglo-Russian Convention was an exceedingly uncomfortable partnership which would almost certainly have dissolved in 1915 if the First World War hadn't erupted when it did. British decision-makers were nowhere near as worried about the German navy, which they consistently outnumbered by an extremely great degree, as popular history would suggest; they certainly recognised it as the biggest naval threat in Europe but didn't hugely. There were attempts at Anglo-German rapprochement just a few years before the war began. The Ottoman Empire going to war on the German side was to a great extent due to British high-handedness rather than some fixed alliance bloc. The Balkan states (by which I principally mean Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia) shifted their allegiances multiple times and had factions supporting various alignments. There were powerful people in France who thought of the United Kingdom as more of an enemy than Germany. Even the Franco-Russian Alliance wasn't unshakeable; at one point the Russian and German emperors even signed an alliance together, though their officials didn't agree and quietly buried it. And as I have argued earlier, in TTL diplomatic alignments will be even more fluid than in OTL, not less.

I don't object to there being some sort of major European war along the lines of the First World War, as long as there isn't the (false) suggestion that it would be because of rigid alliance blocs. In this case, where I understand that there will not be an extremely long and detailed description (quite understandably), an approach of "less is more"—merely detailing who is siding with whom at the beginning of the war, and why, without examining the inevitable shifts and dances of diplomacy beforehand—would be better than an approach of "so this event caused (e.g.) France to sign an alliance with (e.g.) Austria in 1895, and then they were allied for the next x years until the war broke out; and this event caused (e.g.) the United Kingdom to sign an alliance with (e.g.) Italy in 1902, and they were allied for the next y years until the war broke out" et cetera. The latter approach is popular, but lazy; it's not how the real world worked. What I would object to is the impression that there are long-lasting, rigid diplomatic alignments created by one alliance signed on paper at one time, because European diplomacy was a lot more complicated than that.

On the more specific point of French policy, although Austria obviously has an interest in allying itself with France against both North Germany and Italy (France's traditional ally against Austria), it's difficult to see what is good for France in making North Germany and Italy enemies of France, unless Austria looks like it would beat them anyway. We don't need hypotheticals to know what Imperial France was interested in conquering; we already know that Napoleon III's government wanted to seize Luxembourg and the Palatinate. France would ally itself with Austria if it felt that such an alliance would be useful to those ends, but not otherwise. From an author's perspective it does make the diplomacy "neat" to have Imperial France and Austria, the two powers Italy wants something from, on the same side, but there's no reason why France should desire this; on the contrary OTL Imperial French behaviour was pro-Italian and anti-Habsburg, and it would be to France's advantage to focus Italian nationalist ire on Austria rather than the papal states. (Of course, that's not to say that Italy would necessarily do what France wanted it to, just as France wouldn't necessarily do what Austria wanted it to.)

Regardless, I can attest that this timeline lacks the Franco-Prussian War (as we know it), and this will be explained in the next chapter (albeit briefly). The evolution of European alliances, however, will only be mentioned in passing, and only when it has some sort of tangible influence on the Confederate States. A detailed look at European History, however, would be the subject of a completely different timeline within the same universe. It is not something I would rule out, and I am wholly open to writing one upon the completion of this timeline.

It's absolutely fair enough to focus on the Confederate States given the circumstances of the timeline; as for what little I do request, see above.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

First of all, I would like to apologise in case I came across as too nitpicky and as trying to take control of the timeline from the author. The only reason I am spending so much time talking about TTL here is that I'm very interested in it because I so highly appreciate the quality it has shown already.

This was full of wonderful insight, I will certainly be saving it moving forward when I seek to structure the nature of European politics and how it evolves.

You're very kind; thank you.

As for why I have so much to say on the likely European situation in your timeline, it's because, quite by chance, it bears some resemblance—not total resemblance, but some—to the course of events in Europe in a European-focused timeline that I have been planning, albeit purely coincidentally since I haven't published any of it and likely won't for quite a while yet.

I do not think I was clear with my point, I blame the lack of caffeine when I wrote it for this. My comments were merely supposed to suggest that if, under the circumstances that Berlin and Paris have unfavourable relations between each other, then the United Kingdom would find it advantageous to side with one of them against the other.

Hmm. Perhaps, and perhaps not. In OTL the United Kingdom's response to the Franco-Russian Alliance, as an alliance targeted to a great extent against the United Kingdom, was to attempt (successfully) to forge separate alliances of its own with both of those powers.

The United Kingdom was already friendly with the French Second Empire before your PoD, in particular in its cooperation with France against the expansion of the Russian Empire—although that may very well change if Napoleon III concludes that the situation in Western Europe is too dangerous for him to be focusing on Russia, i.e. the same effect that the Franco-Prussian War had on France in OTL. The British position on North Germany is neither especially hostile nor especially friendly, but it is certainly in the British interest that France faces just the right amount of opposition in Western Europe: enough to mean that it cannot just dominate Western Europe and therefore threaten the United Kingdom, but not enough to make it forced to concentrate on Western Europe and unable to concentrate on helping the United Kingdom against Russia. British policy in regard to North Germany will be shaped by that, and also by British policy in regard to the Habsburg Monarchy (which is likely to spend more time opposing North Germany than acting in concert with North Germany, though that doesn't translate to rigid, perpetual opposition that prevents them from acting in concert if their interests so dictate); that in turn may depend on the Habsburg Monarchy's position on Russia, since if the Habsburg Monarchy refuses Russia's offer (as in OTL) then the British can be either friendly or unfriendly with it at different times but if the Habsburg Monarchy accepts Russia's offer it has made itself opposed to British interests in the Turkish Straits, in which case the United Kingdom might even actively seek to create a Franco-Italo-North German alliance in order to prevent Russia from gaining the Turkish Straits.

But that does not mean Berlin and Paris are automatically destined to be opposed to each other, infact I believe the converse is the more likely outcome. The knowledge of fluid alliances are not lost on me here, so this does not mean an absolute "North Germany will hate France" or "North Germany will love France" ad infinitum.

That's entirely reasonable.

I do not doubt it could change, but I do not see it as anything more than an alliance of opportunity. Nothing formal per say, but an arrangement that is brokered towards the advancement of one common goal. To this I need to add the modifier of "in the short term," where anything could indeed be possible far into the future around the turn of the century.

This was a miscommunication on my part. I was attempting to say that it is Italy would be the one that is chasing after an alliance with the United Kingdom, not the other way around. Obviously it would require a very specific amount of threat from other nations to motivate the United Kingdom towards an alliance with Italy.

Fair enough in both these cases; thanks for the clarification, I think I understand now.

Oh, please do not take my position as the author, and the theories I have set forward, as the future for this timeline. All of what I have said is pure conjecture and speculation, for the sake of conversation and intellectual debate, not for planning a pathway towards the European political landscape for this timeline. With your recent interjection (which was extremely informative for me, my European history is less than stellar), I have been brought to re-think my entire plans for post-Confederate independence Europe, which was based around a mostly otl structure, with minor changes. Now that I see the fallacy behind this assumption, all of it has been scrapped and I have returned to my scratchpad which I keep with me, jotting down ideas and dates, along with potential alliances (of course, not rigid whatsoever). The main idea behind European diplomacy at the moment is not having any outright antagonism against the "classic" hatreds of France-United Kingdom / France-Germany and so forth, instead a clearer look at roughly the political climate of the 1860s, and begin to extend that out further, taking fully into account the differences and evolution that would take place as the years pass.



I hope what I offered above in response would be sufficient to ensure the trope of rigid European alliances is well and truly dead. However, while this will focus on the Confederate States, I believe it is very poignant to explore the roll of European statesmen and businessmen in interacting with the new nation, which is in desperate need of both diplomatic and economic support. An obvious and flawed cliche that is constantly brought by Lost Causers and Alternate Historians alike is the idea of a British support of the Confederate States, which I find repugnant and quite nearly impossible - as anything beyond recognising the state exists and conducting trade with it. The moralist hold over the United Kingdom is something that I do not believe can be ignored for the sake of giving the Confederacy an ally, which is why in this timeline they have been such a distant and cold observer of the Confederate States, and most certainly did not spring to assist it, unlike it did with both New England and the Midwestern Confederacy. New England, which at this time remains the most closely related to Canada and the British Isles, was the first that the United Kingdom offered aid to, and will be the focus of the first major incident in North America following the United States' collapse. The Midwestern Confederacy's aid was done wholly for the importation of foodstuffs, something that any good scholar of British history would understand was the overwhelming need of the Isles over cotton.

The Confederate States, while the de facto strongest nation in North America, would be very interested in establishing itself internationally, as well as finding a patron for itself, which would extend to some form of an alliance. This, of course, would mean investigating European politics in detail, and how they deal with this new, and awkward, nation.

Thank you for the clarification and the acknowledgement, and I'm glad to have been of use.

Rest assured that, poor as you may think that your knowledge of European history is, it's far superior to my knowledge of American history (or indeed practically any non-European history), so in this thread I'm learning a lot more than you are.

 

[traveller76]

Mexico

What is the Confederacy's policies towards refugees and immigrants, particularly from Mexico? Would they look to Mexico as a source of labor?

 

[Johannes Parisiensis]

How the sending of Dixie cotton to Spain and the Netherlands instead of the North will influe on the industrialisation of these regions? And will the demand in weapons from Mexico will set a Southern industry, which will made an argument for removing some constitutionnal clauses?

What is the Confederacy's policies towards refugees and immigrants, particularly from Mexico? Would they look to Mexico as a source of labor?

Texas could use Latino migrants to complement slave work.

 

[Unknown]

Good update.

Waiting for more...

 

[traveller76]

Economics

How the sending of Dixie cotton to Spain and the Netherlands instead of the North will influe on the industrialisation of these regions? And will the demand in weapons from Mexico will set a Southern industry, which will made an argument for removing some constitutional clauses?

Most of the northern states like New England and Laurentia will focus on reconstruction and industrialization. Cotton is important but not as important as say twenty years ago. Britain will have Egypt and India for cotton supplies. Spain and the Netherlands may act as middlemen between the Confederacy and the world.

The Confederacy will need to have an arms industry along with infrastructure. Eventually that money will find its way into the state and national legislatures.

 

[Alex1guy]

Welcome back New England, the Empire has missed you...

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Good stuff. I do look forward for updates from this; it's a nice TL.

I'm going to be my usual Germanophile-nitpicking self and make three comments, none of them of great significance to your plot but merely as minor matters of precise accuracy:

1. Saxony, too, was not part of the North German Confederation immediately, and only joined in 1867, whereas the Austro-Prussian War and the North German Confederation Treaty took place in 1866 (though the constitution of North Germany was made in 1867)—so it would be listed as one of the later-joining states
2. Hesse-Darmstadt is an informal name applied by historians because there were multiple states called Hesse; it was the Grand Duchy of Hesse, and, confusingly, part of it was in the North German Confederation and part of it was not
3. Baden was closely allied to Prussia but could not join the North German Confederation because it wasn't North German, and there was no real enthusiasm for a 'South German Confederation'; I can easily see it becoming de facto part of North Germany (indeed, one could argue that in OTL it already was; in the OTL Franco-Prussian War Baden's army was more harmonised with Prussia's than can be said for any other South German state) but explicitly joining would be problematic on this basis

I also have three more serious comments to make. One of them is that, while the idea of New England as a parliamentary democracy is great, I do have to question why you think it would adhere to the United Kingdom instead of becoming a de facto protectorate but de jure fully separate state and thus satisfying domestic radical, republican (small-r) and Radical Republican (big-r) sentiment. Is there a lot of revanchism from Columbia or Laurentia to prompt that? I'd also say that Anglo-Canadians, fearing Franco-Canadian (crucially, Catholic) dominance would probably be unhappy with removing English-speaking parts of Canada to add them to New England; it seems easier for those territories to become part of New England only after Quebec separates as you intend it to. Finally I would comment that in OTL a great part of the motivation for Russia selling Russian America to the United States was fear that otherwise the British would just take it in the next Anglo-Russian war (at this point in time the idea that there would never again be an Anglo-Russian war would not have been considered sensible); it's difficult to see how this motivation would apply to selling it to the British. However, as I've said, I know little about the history of anywhere outside Europe, and if there's some explanation anyway I'm quite prepared to accept the possibility I might be completely wrong.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

This is something that I missed, thank you for that. I was under the impression that it was from 1866 on that Saxony was part of the NGC.

You're welcome.

Oh course - but it should be remembered that this TL is written as if it was looking back from the year 2015, by the United Kingdom's expert on Confederate history. Naturally, the exact names would not be used and the informal name applied to it would be the commonly accepted way of communicating the statues of the Grand Duchy of Hesse.

I fear that you misunderstand me. There were not multiple states of the Grand Duchy of Hesse, which was also known as Hesse-Darmstadt. Hesse-Kassel was a separate state, the Electorate of Hesse. There were multiple states called the ____ of Hesse. It is the northern regions of Hesse-Darmstadt, or the northern regions of the Grand Duchy of Hesse if one prefers to call that state by its proper (but less obviously clear) name, that were part of the North German Confederation, whereas its southern regions, the half south of a river whose name for the moment escapes me, weren't. Hesse-Nassau was a different entity entirely, and was a Prussian province created after the annexation of Hesse-Kassel from territories including Hesse-Kassel. Your text, on the contrary, says "Darmstadt, which was part of Hesse, was added to the confederation" which not only implies that there was some greater body called Hesse (which there wasn't—it's like claiming that the Kingdom of Saxony, Sachsen in German, was only part of some greater concept of Sachsen just because there were various other states named Sachsen-[something] such as the Grand Duchy of Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach) but also suggests that the whole of Hesse-Darmstadt was added to the Confederation when it wasn't.

Sorry, all this stuff with names based on various medieval dynastic separations is complicated.

I had included this to show that the situation in Germany transformed from the North German Confederation towards a more informal "Germany." While still North German by all intents and purposes, the de facto name of the country would be Germany, with the states Luxembourg, Württemberg, Liechtenstein, Austria, and Bavaria not a part of Germany, similar to our own universe where Austria, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein, while wholly German (discounting the non-German ethnic groups in Austria) were outside of the German Empire.

It sufficed for why Baden wasn't part of the North German Confederation in OTL; any expansion of the North German Confederation to pan-Germanist aspirations was considered by Bismarck (ironically given the retrospective image of him as a German nationalist just because of how things turned out—in fact nothing could be further from the truth) to be too provocative to other powers and provide them, in particular France, with an excuse for war. A North German annexation of Baden could well be considered war-worthy by Austria.

I suppose Napoleon III could have issued a guarantee to help the North Germans as he did in TTL. It would not be out-of-character for him to seek to strengthen France by forging a new European order of nationalist-based (rather than historic dynastic-based) states, at the expense of Austria and other elements of the post-Vienna old order crafted by Metternich after the defeat of the previous Bonaparte emperor. But it would be out-of-character for him to do so without expecting anything in return. When doing this sort of thing with Italy he demanded Savoy and Nice as his price. If he were to do so with Germany I expect he would demand, at the very least, North German support for a French annexation of Luxembourg by purchasing it from the King of the Netherlands (who was also Grand Duke of Luxembourg, who regarded Luxembourg as more-or-less personal property and who needed the money)—in OTL he even sought to annex Belgium too, but that would have been unacceptable to the British and judging by that and the outcome it was probably just a demand added in to be conceded as a negotiating ploy—and very likely would demand either the Palatinate outright or, at very least, North German recognition that he would get the Palatinate in the event of a war of German unification between France and North Germany on the one hand and Austria, Bavaria and Württemberg on the other hand. If we're not just looking at what he would demand at least, he might well go for Mainz (presently part of North Germany in TTL) too. Napoleon III made a policy of facilitating national unifications in accordance with his ideal of Europe's future, but not for free!

The situation with New England is very complex, far more than I wrote about. I will address this issue today, and pen a chapter from a separate book to explain New England's most peculiar situation.

While the fear of Catholic domination is not lost on me, the idea of removing the provinces allocated to the Kingdom of Canada and transferring them to New England was done on the basis of ensuring a stronger New England, which has a serious need for manpower and an economic base, but also for future British plans to ensure a significant large influx of a Protestant, English-speaking population, which might - or might not - be successful.

The collapse of the United States ended any avenue the Russian Empire had towards selling the territory. The only nation with the ability to purchase the territory would be Laurentia - its only avenue to the sea being through the Great Lakes - a poor proposition for maintaining a vast swath of territory clinging to the Arctic circle. New England, with access to the sea, and the money needed to purchase the territory, was now de jure beholden to London, while de facto it could have - yet it expressed no interest in doing so. Columbia, the shell of the former United States, and a prime ally of the Russian Empire, refused purchase of the territory, viewing it to be unfeasible. With the Russian Navy still maintaining a presence in New York City, it's important to note that the Royal Navy was now holding station a mere 170km away in New London, and 240km away in Newport. The fear of the next Anglo-Russian war would be very prevalent at this junction. With the British now far more invested and interested in North America, along with France, it would be foolhardy for anyone in St. Petersburg to believe there was a chance to continue to hold onto Russian America. The sale of Alaska to the United Kingdom, while wholly not preferable and wholly frowned upon, was done in order to extract some modicum of wealth from the barren wasteland, before British settlers found there way up and down the coast and the Royal Navy decided to position themselves into the ports Novoarkhangelsk.

Fair enough, on all three points.

To my admittedly uneducated ears, that sounds reasonable.

I would question, though, whether in the future a new Russian emperor might decide that Columbia is no longer a useful ally. It is, after all, fairly small and stands no chance of gaining a Pacific coast and being anything other than isolated from Russia, and for the sake of pragmatism the Russians may seek another North American ally in addition or in replacement. The Pacific States, with the potential for a lot of trade from Vladivostok, sound likely to my ears, though this is the height of back-of-the-envelope speculation rather than any particularly educated opinion.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

This is such an amazing TL. It's divergent enough to be interesting, keeps enough of a broad sweep of history to avoid being bogged down in extreme details, and is detailed enough to feel really real.

(By the way, I'd note that you probably mean 'Rogue Island' rather than 'Rouge Island', unless it is an association of radicalism with the colour 'red'.)

I suppose I'm especially inclined to be favourable here because I have a soft spot for Sumner and the other radical abolitionists for the same reason why I suppose many people do. For all that they may have been decried as uncompromising ultra-radicals at the time, to me they're far more sympathetic than moderate abolitionists and free-soilers like Lincoln, who cared more about preserving the Union than ending slavery, openly spoke against racial equality and even said that he would rather see the Union preserved and slavery preserved than the lack of either. Perhaps that sort of idea, placing the preservation of a country over the freedom of its citizens, was seen as moderate at the time, since viewing black people as the actual equals of white people was such an extremist notion in those days; but to my modern eyes it makes them heroes. So to see them getting a chance to run a country and make what they will of it, in association with my own country, is emotionally pleasing in the same way as I suppose it is for anyone to see their country aligned with what they believe to be right.

One thing I would note is that, with Canada no longer an option for obvious reasons, Newfoundland is likely to either adhere to the United Kingdom perpetually (which many Newfoundlanders wanted to do in OTL, rather than join Canada—Newfoundland resisted Confederation for quite a long time) or join New England (which it would do either at once—it would surely be offered the option when the Maritimes were—or later after a period of resisting Confederation, more like what happened in OTL), rather than being part of Quebec, which I can't imagine it doing unless it was subdued by force.

Phew, and I thought I knew the various states of Germany well enough. I guess not. This was certainly informative, and I can see where the confusion comes from now. I'll attempt to address things in this context in the future, but I find the HRE/German States so wholly foreign a concept it is difficult to wrap my mind around.

Pre-unification German history is a trial to the best of us, but it's a fun trial.

Apparently in the past on this board it's been said that one of the users here called Susano is one of only two people in all of history (the other being Metternich) to understand how the Holy Roman Empire worked.

In my particular opinion the unification of Germany is such a shame because it put an end to all the fun, but that is a very particular opinion.

It would be noteworthy that during this time, Austria was still embroiled in separating Hungary and establishing the Dual Monarchy. A very public showing of French support for the annexation of Baden would have more than easily dissuaded any Austrian ideas of attacking North Germany over this territory. You are very correct in pointing out that Napoleon III did not simply hand out guarantees and assistance without something in mind in return. While I do wish to leave the events in Europe to latter chapters where politics of Europe will be returned to and explored, it should go without saying that France's borders in Europe will not be static, and Berlin won't be on the losing side of it.

Indeed that's so, but I don't think that Napoleon III would have given his own acquiescence, let alone sufficient support to render Austria's obvious lack of acquiescence (North Germany's incorporation of any South German state is obviously opposed to Austrian interests) irrelevant, without getting something he wanted in return, especially given his brazenly opportunistic nature as displayed with the Mainz threat in OTL. Mainz (more specifically the part of Hesse-Darmstadt west of the Rhine which included Mainz as its principal city and fortress) and the Palatinate could plausibly be suggested as targets for a future war against Austria for the sake of unifying Germany, where North Germany's loss of Mainz (and perhaps also a further strip of land in the Rhine Province of Prussia, southeast of the Moselle river and south of Oldenburg's enclave, between the Palatinate and Luxembourg) to France would be rendered palatable to the North German Confederation/Germany (as with Savoy and Nice for the Kingdom of Sardinia/the Kingdom of Italy) by the gain of Württemberg and of Bavaria proper. However, the potential French purchase of Luxembourg is a matter that would be resolved at once, since the King of the Netherlands would have sold it to get much-needed money if the international situation permitted. To picture all this, this map provided by Wikipedia might help.

While this is an interesting argument, it begs the question on what any future Russian Emperor would seek to get out of an alliance and a foothold in North America. Like Alaska, the Pacific States of America is sparsely populated and the route to Russia is a long one. (After all, goods imported to Vladivostok are good for Vladivostok, while goods imported to St. Petersburg are good for western Russia.) The Confederacy is a slave-holding autocracy, worse in some cases than the Russian Empire itself, while Laurentia lacks a route to the sea. New England, now a defender of London, would have if not animosity, lukewarm disapproval of the Emperor.

It does indeed! I love this era of history; national interests stretching across the globe in the time of competing industrial great powers are fun.

I'm honestly not sure what an Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias would want that Columbia could give, other than generic "nation that likes us".

It's also worth noting that Aleksandr II's Russia, having recently abolished serfdom, is not going to look on the Confederacy as a road towards the sort of nation it itself intends to be; and the Confederacy for that matter might not look too kindly on Russia, for this, either!

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Thank you very much for those words of support, they do mean a lot - as does anyone who reads this timeline and enjoys it. I've so far attempted to make it as specific as it needs to be, and as broad as it has to be in order to not get bogged down in ensuring the needed accuracy of every small detail.

And no, Rhode Island has not developed a surprising affinity for the colour red, that was an error on my part, thank you for pointing it out. A valuable lesson for proof reading something twice for me!

On both points, you're welcome.

Newfoundland, as it where, had the option to join New England at its time of annexation, but instead opted to remain itself ruled by London. They had to strong attachment to the "Yankees" of Boston, just as they have no strong inklings towards the Kingdom of Canada.

Mmhmm. The only reason I said so was because it was portrayed as Québécois on your old map of 2015 North America.

This map is indeed helpful, and will assist in how "Germany," as we know it, takes shape moving forward.

It's just the OTL German Empire, but I'm glad it's of use to you.

For a map of Europe in general, there's one of 1900 Europe that I often use, here.



I will work on providing you a variant for TTL in particular, though I won't put the labels back in (that's far too much effort for something provisional; I'll only do it if I end up making a map for you properly, rather than just concept-art).

Admittedly, I had intended for France to have effected the purchase of Luxembourg in the latter portion of the 1870s, which explains its absence in the map of the previous chapter, but I shall instead retroactively have it stated that the purchase was in the early portion of the 1870s. A minor map error that can be charged to the oversight of the printer!

Fair enough.

To me as well, this period in history reigns as my favourite. I always felt that should the United States have collapsed (as it did here) world history would never be the same, and it would bring in a whole host of issues and events that would be unthinkable had the United States been able to reign supreme as it did in OTL. The effects of the collapse is already being seen, the United Kingdom and France have started to re-establish their old American Empires, Russia seems far more involved than before, and the Dutch and Spanish have made their appearances.

It is indeed very interesting. The Davis Administration of the Confederate States has been very statesmanlike and intelligent in its treatment of Maximilian's Mexico.

It's also worthy to note that having a militant, generic "nation that likes us" is useful, should the Tsar ever have any plans - such as naval bases or the like. While the common spirit of the United States still rests in the hearts of its former citizens, it by no means makes them immune from conflicts against each other.

Let me guess: Adirondack?

Please don't tell me whether I'm right.

 

[Umbric Man]

As Albion said, Newfoundland in that 2015 map would never be willingly put into Quebec. It was an Anglo nation.

Secondly! I'm impressed New England's Adirondack state didn't extend southward to the Hudson Highlands and thus include Albany, Poughkeepsie, etc. - the original Dutch settlers having very quickly been overwhelmed by a mass of Yankees pushing west in the colonial and early republic period.

Finally... what an interesting timeline. I'm a Northern regional-nationalist a la the way you have people into Southern Pride and to see the 'North' - IE the Midwest and Northeast, which really do have so many common links in blood, culture, dialects, values, and economics as the American metropole - split up breaks my heart, and I do find it a bit weird it happened compared to the CSA, Deseret, and Pacific states splitting off. Yet it is fascinating to read as this happens. I'm glad that you did note many in Columbia, New England, and the Midwest still felt ties to the Union (and presumably, each other).

I do like a large New England if it had to happen though, so go Yankee-land! I certainly hope my own home region of Columbia gets itself together as well. I am surprised the CSA didn't snag West Virginia back somehow since once the Civil War ended it swung back to its native southern views very quickly. But then again, if Kentucky and Missouri didn't jump ship to the Southland as the Union split up I suppose West Virginia wouldn't either.

I am reading with interest. Keep up the good work.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Voilà!


I have no idea what you're doing with the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of the Russian Empire, so that's left happily blank, and I haven't bothered to fill in the labels, but this can be fairly simply transferred onto another map where the requisite changes can be made if ever you've decided enough about the history of the whole of Europe for it to be appropriate to make a map of the whole continent.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

I am happy to make a proper European map, complete with proper labels for cities and provinces as well as nations and without the mysterious disappearance of Africa and of everything east of Prussia, Sweden-Norway and Austria-Hungary, if I am provided, on a certain rather than merely provisional basis, of the territorial disposition thereof.

Finding good base maps is non-trivial, but it doesn't take too much work, and it's definitely worth it considering the amount of time it takes to properly edit a large-scale map. That edit, which was really pretty small compared to far larger ones I've done in the past, took me well over an hour; in the past I've taken multiple full days. (Worlda maps, with their tiny scale and with the fact that we have the OTL map base to provide the shapes of so many eras of history that I've used them so often I've actually memorised significant chunks of borders, are different.)

One thing that struck me, when the writer was speaking of the Republicans in Columbia, was that in TTL there is no proper two-party system in many of the states recently formed from the collapsing Union, excluding the Confederacy and perhaps Laurentia. New England is essentially dominated by the Radical Republican government-in-exile, one could call it. Columbia, in turn, by the Republicans and the remnants of their increasingly authoritarian nationalist regime, which is, let's say, unlikely to be very friendly with the Democrats. (Probable source of trouble.) The Pacific States, it's hard to be sure. This is… alarming… to the future of democracy in those regions. New England might have a get-out-of-jail-free clause with new political factions forming within the existing party due to conflict over whether to accept the deal with the United Kingdom, thus preventing a de facto one-party state, but Columbia has no such protection.

I have to say, for both this and other reasons I think Columbia would be a lot better-off if it just joined Laurentia, though I imagine most Columbians would think that Laurentia should join Columbia instead.