Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy
Banned
I can't think of any specific POD, but I'm pretty sure that with better planning Operation Market Garden might have worked out. WI it did?
A Bridge Close Enough
- Thread starter Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy
- Start date
Here’s my PoD: General Lewis Beretton, Commander of 1st Allied Airborne Army accepts General Frederick Browning’s threat to resign over Operation Linnet 2. Because of this, Matthew Ridgeway and US XVIII Airborne Corps is in charge of Market instead of Browning and British 1st Airborne Corps.
With his greater experience of airborne operations, Ridgeway modifies the Market plan:
In working on a timeline for this, which is not complete yet so maybe people can help?
The outline is:
It is the greatest Allied victory since the Falaise pocket and Montgomery is lauded as a military genius and for his ability to take a calculated risk.
With his greater experience of airborne operations, Ridgeway modifies the Market plan:
- The 101st and 82nd Airborne divisions are both to be dropped on The Island.
- The Nijmegen, Arnhem and Renkum bridges are to be taken by coup de main. One regiment is to be pushed over each bridge to secure the bridgehead. The rest of the divisions’ regiments will secure the island and act as reserves to reinforce any bridgehead that is threatened.
- Supplies for both divisions will be dropped at a central point on The Island, well away from German Flack.
- The Goesbeek heights are not to be secured until XXX Corps arrives.
- The larger British 1st Airborne Division is to be dropped North of Eindhoven to capture the bridges at Son and Veghel and secure the corridor.
- The Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade is to be dropped at Grave to secure the bridge over the Waal.
- There are to be two drops on the first day, Ridgeway persuading Beretton to override his air force commanders concerns about casualties due to tiredness.
In working on a timeline for this, which is not complete yet so maybe people can help?
The outline is:
- XXX corps advances on the original schedule.
- The US airborne divisions capture all the Waal and Lower Rhine bridges and are in a strong, defensible position on the Island.
- The SS armoured divisions attack the Arnhem bridgehead, Forces from 1st Parachute army attack Renkum and forces in the Reichswald attack Nijmegen but US reserves are available to defend threatened sectors.
- The Poles come under heavy pressure around Grave due to the Goesbeek heights not being secured but XXX corps arrives on day three, before the bridge is severely threatened.
- XXX Corps has to put in a major attack to clear the ground between Grave and Nijmegen but once there advances across the Island to Arnhem and Renkum.
- With the link up complete, a day is spent reorganising and consolidating.
- 50th (Northumbrian) Division attacks and secures the Groesbeek Heights.
- 43rd Wessex Division attacks out of the Arnhem Bridgehead tying up the SS Divisions while the Guards Armoured division breaks out from Renkum.
- Deelan Airfield is secured by the Guards Armoured Division.
- 52nd Lowland division lands at Deelan airfield and attacks the German forces around Arnhem from the rear.
- The Guards Armoured drives for the coast.
- The trapped German forces in Holland start withdrawing.
- Although some German units punch through the thin Allied defensive line, huge numbers are destroyed, captured or surrender.
It is the greatest Allied victory since the Falaise pocket and Montgomery is lauded as a military genius and for his ability to take a calculated risk.
The best bet for Market Garden to work is other than the SS Panzer divisions not to be in Arnham, then it is to land gliders on Arnhem brisge, something similar to which was done at Peagus bridge at D-Day.
Having been to Arnhem Bridge at the Museum, it was complete madness to alid the troops eight miles away from their target, and hope they get through on foot.
Having been to Arnhem Bridge at the Museum, it was complete madness to alid the troops eight miles away from their target, and hope they get through on foot.
Which museum?
As an aside, a friend and I spent a week once driving from the Belgium border up through the Netherlands along the route XXX Corps took. Fascinating. The bridge at Grave tends to get glossed over in the books because it was captured and held easily but it's at least as long as the Nijmegan and Arnhem bridges. How XXX Corps didn't have enough bridging equipment when they were going to have to cross 3 major rivers I don't know.
For me the highlight was crossing the Lower Rhine on the Driel ferry and then wandering around Oosterbeek. You can just see the top of Nijmegen Bridge from the high ground there. I was also surprised by how many British Airborne flags the locals fly - not much anti-war sentiment there.
I mean the Airborne Museum, (i Mis-typed it),.
I did the same with two dutch friends who drove me from Endihoven, along the XXX Corps route, over the Son Bridge and the Gave Bridge, which is a very spectular structure. I have my picture taken by the bridge.
What gets me is why XXX corps after crossing the Nijmegan bridge they stopped. Horrocks should have "driven like hell" (as he said he would) to cover the 6-8 miles to Frosts men at the bridge. I still think if XXX Corps had driven all out they could have battered through the Panzer corps attacking the bridge, trapping them from behind.
A common objection, however the idea was to cut off the whole of Holland causing a massive German surrender/rout/massacre similar to the Falaise Pocket, one byproduct of this would have been the opening of Antwerp.
There were several other factors:
- Political pressure to use the 1st Allied Airborne Army for something, anything.
- Political pressure to move the V weapons that were firing at London from the Netherlands out of range of London.
- Simply liberating the Netherlands.
- A mistaken belief that the Germans were finished and ending the war was just a matter of keeping them on the run (see the uterly insane Operation Comet which would have tried to do Market Garden with one airborne division).
- Nobody came up with a better plan, Patton's attack on Metz was just more of the same and wouldn't have opened Antwerp either.
Any thoughts on my alternate Market Garden plan?
Yes. The area between Nijmegan and Arnhem bounded by the Waal and the Lower Rhine was known as The Island by the allies because it was mostly surrounded by water.
I'd have to look at a map, also is Ridgeway going to have gretaer concerns about the roads in and reports of German armour in the area?
I'm working on maps. The idea though is that the Island is almost indefinitely defensible by two combined and well supplied paratroop divisions even against armour. The German armour won't be able to get over the rivers and won't be all that much use trying to attack the bridgeheads, which are in built up areas. Fighting a purely defensive battle, the airborne divisions will take far fewer casualties.
Not sure what you mean about the roads in.
I'd say the danger with my plan is: can the Polish Airborne Brigade hold the Grave Bridge? However, they only need to do so for two days (XXX Corps arrived at Grave early morning on the third day).
XXX Corps will need to fight two set piece battles, one to break out of the Grave bridgehead and reach Nijmegan and one to break out of the Arnhem/Renkum bridgeheads and secure Deelan (so 52nd Lowland Division can fly in).
Without big changes, they could had better chancesl:
- Listen the advises from "resistence" about panzer in the area end provide the troops with (more and better) anti tank weapons.
- Test the radio comunicantios before to go, it just does not work and the troops losse line o command.
- Plan ahead how to send suplies, and define the "marks" comunication betwen ground troops and air force.
- Listen the advises from "resistence" about panzer in the area end provide the troops with (more and better) anti tank weapons.
- Test the radio comunicantios before to go, it just does not work and the troops losse line o command.
- Plan ahead how to send suplies, and define the "marks" comunication betwen ground troops and air force.
Robin Neilland’s ‘The battle for the Rhine 1944’ has a number of chapters on Operation Market Garden, he goes through each bridge in turn and describes the operations to capture them pointing out the mistakes made during the planning of the drops on them.
The chapter on Nijmegen is interesting
In his book, he suggest that Generals Gavin and Browning became obsessed with the capture and retention of the Groesbeek Ridge and regarded them as their first priority, rather than the Nijmegan Bridge and so missed the chance to both ends of the bridge at the same time.
The Groesbeek heights lie just south of Nijmegan overlooking the country between the Einhoven-Nijmegan road and the vast forest of the Reischwald, which lies to the east, just across the German border.
He says that according to Gavin, the problem at Nijmegan and the need to take and hold the Groesbeek Ridge arose from intelligence reports claiming that large German armoured forces were building up in the Reischwald. Should these forces surge west to cut the Einhoven-Nijmegan road, only the Groesbeek Ridge provided ground where they could be resisted. According to Gavin, to defend the road and the Nijmegan bridges against an attack from the Reichswald, it was essential to take and hold the Groesbeek Ridge.
Gavin claims these intelligence reports came form the British but Neilland has been able to find nothing to suggest that the British were concerned about the Reischwald at this time or had reported the presence there of ‘considerable German armour’.
‘Considerable’ in this case is 1,000 tanks…
Neilland goes on to say
‘According to the US official history, the 505th PIR, having sent a patrol into the Reischwald, reported that ‘no tanks could be seen’. This report confirmed other information, obtained from Dutch civilians, that ‘the report about the 1,000 tanks in the Reischwald was false’.
What if both ends of the bridge had been taken at the same time?
The chapter on Nijmegen is interesting
In his book, he suggest that Generals Gavin and Browning became obsessed with the capture and retention of the Groesbeek Ridge and regarded them as their first priority, rather than the Nijmegan Bridge and so missed the chance to both ends of the bridge at the same time.
The Groesbeek heights lie just south of Nijmegan overlooking the country between the Einhoven-Nijmegan road and the vast forest of the Reischwald, which lies to the east, just across the German border.
He says that according to Gavin, the problem at Nijmegan and the need to take and hold the Groesbeek Ridge arose from intelligence reports claiming that large German armoured forces were building up in the Reischwald. Should these forces surge west to cut the Einhoven-Nijmegan road, only the Groesbeek Ridge provided ground where they could be resisted. According to Gavin, to defend the road and the Nijmegan bridges against an attack from the Reichswald, it was essential to take and hold the Groesbeek Ridge.
Gavin claims these intelligence reports came form the British but Neilland has been able to find nothing to suggest that the British were concerned about the Reischwald at this time or had reported the presence there of ‘considerable German armour’.
‘Considerable’ in this case is 1,000 tanks…
Neilland goes on to say
‘According to the US official history, the 505th PIR, having sent a patrol into the Reischwald, reported that ‘no tanks could be seen’. This report confirmed other information, obtained from Dutch civilians, that ‘the report about the 1,000 tanks in the Reischwald was false’.
What if both ends of the bridge had been taken at the same time?
According to Niellands,
'The Guards Armoured Division were not ready to advance up the road to Arnhem on the evening of D plus 3 because for the past two days they had been scattered all over Nijmegan and the south bank of the Waal, an area of some twenty five square miles, assisting the 82nd Airborne Division carry out a task General Gavin had neglected to complete on D-Day.
Only 5 tanks - part of Carrington's sqaudron - were north of the bridge and they were engaged in supporting Tuckers men; it is surprising that Colonel Tucker did not know this. The bridge fell to the Guards at around 1900hrs when duk was falling. Before pressing on to Arnehm the Guards Division tanks must be collected overnight, reformed, rearmed, refuelled and their crews briefed for the next phase of the advance - always assuming they could be spared from the fighting that was still going on south of the river, and defending thr narrow Allied bridgehead on the north bank.'
Originally posted by Shimbo
Query did the allies have tactical aircraft with an effective anti tank capacity that could have been deployed?
Hawker Typhoons did tank busting with rockets in France, maybe some of those could be made available.
My scenario uses the OTL Allied OOB so logistics will be no better or worse than OTL unless I'm missing something? The parachute division's logistics should be better with the supply drop zones not being under German control/fire.
burmafrd
Banned
Trying to supply a reinforced Corps up one two lane road is a huge gamble. And the whole operation depended on taking so many bridges intact; and yet the bridging equipment was all too often left behind by XXX Corps.
This is what you get when you try and plan an operation like that in a week.
Patton wanted to bounce METZ and reach the Rhine. If he had been given the supplies there is no reason to think it would not have happened.
And he was ready to attack right away-did not have to take a week to get ready.
That week was very important as the Germans were already starting to recover from their panic in Belgium.
The Brits blew a lot of intelligence calls in the war- if they were not reading Enigma they more often then not were wrong.
This is what you get when you try and plan an operation like that in a week.
Patton wanted to bounce METZ and reach the Rhine. If he had been given the supplies there is no reason to think it would not have happened.
And he was ready to attack right away-did not have to take a week to get ready.
That week was very important as the Germans were already starting to recover from their panic in Belgium.
The Brits blew a lot of intelligence calls in the war- if they were not reading Enigma they more often then not were wrong.
IIRC, he said give me the gas and i'll be in Germany in three days, well three month later he was not that much closer.
The Allies advanced because as one German General is aleged to have said, 'we are retreating faster than they can advance'.