A Bridge Close Enough

Trying to supply a reinforced Corps up one two lane road is a huge gamble. And the whole operation depended on taking so many bridges intact; and yet the bridging equipment was all too often left behind by XXX Corps.

This is what you get when you try and plan an operation like that in a week.

Patton wanted to bounce METZ and reach the Rhine. If he had been given the supplies there is no reason to think it would not have happened.
And he was ready to attack right away-did not have to take a week to get ready.
That week was very important as the Germans were already starting to recover from their panic in Belgium.
The Brits blew a lot of intelligence calls in the war- if they were not reading Enigma they more often then not were wrong.

IMO the US forces were running into the Siegfried line and showed no sign of 'bouncing' anything . Look at the Battle of Achen and the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest for example. IMO there is no reason to think 3rd Army could 'bounce' Metz, which was one of the most heavily fortified areas in Europe. See this study for example which states that Third Army's capture of the province of Lorraine, involved an advance of only 40 to 60 miles, but required over 3 months fighting and 50,000 casualties.

I agree some of the Market Garden planning was poor, particularly the lack of priority for bridging equipment. However, the original plan called for the corps on either side of XXX Corps to advance to protect Hells Highway. Why didn't that happen? Because Patton, against orders had advanced into a precarious position and they had to cover the gap. The other corps also didn't get the supplies they had been promised by Eisenhower because of Patton's advance.

Eisenhower was also under pressure from the U.S. to use the Airborne Army for something having gone to the trouble of creating it. Not that organising an operation just to give your troops something to do is a good idea but I can see what the pressure was.
 
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Hawker Typhoons did tank busting with rockets in France, maybe some of those could be made available.

Not used as efectively as it could have been it seems, in his book 'Overlord', Max Hastings comments of poor air to ground co-ordination

"As a result of out inability to get together with the air in England, " wrote Bradley, "we went into France almost totally untrained in air-ground co-operation." Brigadier Richardson said, "In North Africa we seemed to have got the air business right, yet we had lost some of it in Normandy."
 
Originally posted by Shimbo
My scenario uses the OTL Allied OOB so logistics will be no better or worse than OTL unless I'm missing something? The parachute division's logistics should be better with the supply drop zones not being under German control/fire.

Well, you added at least one infantry division (52nd) and sent Guards Division farther than they had went IOTL. I'm also not so sure how far 50th Division went IOTL, but I think that in you scenario they go farther too. That makes it another infantry division to supply. Therefore, IMHO Allied logistics in your scenario is worse. Safe supply drop zones are enough for paras, but you must remember they were lightly armed units, so supplying them by air was easier. With full infantry division... I have my doubts. Not to mention the fact that airborne units are not able to fight very long on their own, especially against mechanized troops. To stregthen them you have to send more forces into corridor - another logistic problem. OTOH their position is much better.
 
Originally posted by Shimbo


Well, you added at least one infantry division (52nd) and sent Guards Division farther than they had went IOTL. I'm also not so sure how far 50th Division went IOTL, but I think that in you scenario they go farther too. That makes it another infantry division to supply. Therefore, IMHO Allied logistics in your scenario is worse. Safe supply drop zones are enough for paras, but you must remember they were lightly armed units, so supplying them by air was easier. With full infantry division... I have my doubts. Not to mention the fact that airborne units are not able to fight very long on their own, especially against mechanized troops. To stregthen them you have to send more forces into corridor - another logistic problem. OTOH their position is much better.

52nd Lowland Division was in the OTL plan In OTL it was slated to fly in to Deelan just north of Arnhem as soon as it was captured. Also, 52nd was an air portable division.

The final position of the Guards Armoured on the Dutch coast and pushing east is as OTL. I agree the logistics are precarious, but IMO they are no more precarious than OTL and the operation stands much better chance of strategic success, e.g. cutting off all the German forces in Holland and forcing a general retreat.

IMO the critical question in my alternate scenario is can the Poles hold the Grave bridge against attacks from the direction of the Reichswald forest (no attacks from the the West materialised in OTL so I'm assuming they don't in my scenario either). A point in their favour IMO is that the US parachute divisions will be on the flank of any attack. However, if they don't then a disaster is on the cards.
 
Regarding Nijmegen Bridge PMN is quite right. Guards Armoured had been fighting in Nijmegen town all day and would have needed reflenishment. Further, the road leading from the bridge was on an embankment, so any German panzerfaust team could have held up any further advance (especially at night) for ages.

In those days it was not practice for tank columns to move at night without very elaborate arrangements for artillery flares, artificial moonlght from searchlight batteries, etc.

I once saw Lord Carrington on TV and he was asked the direct question, Why did he not move on? His answer was categoric - "It would have been suicide to move along that road at night."
 
Regarding Nijmegen Bridge PMN is quite right. Guards Armoured had been fighting in Nijmegen town all day and would have needed reflenishment. Further, the road leading from the bridge was on an embankment, so any German panzerfaust team could have held up any further advance (especially at night) for ages.

In those days it was not practice for tank columns to move at night without very elaborate arrangements for artillery flares, artificial moonlght from searchlight batteries, etc.

I once saw Lord Carrington on TV and he was asked the direct question, Why did he not move on? His answer was categoric - "It would have been suicide to move along that road at night."

The US official history says

'At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegan, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry batallion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm AA guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegan'
 
Originally posted by Shimbo.
52nd Lowland Division was in the OTL plan In OTL it was slated to fly in to Deelan just north of Arnhem as soon as it was captured. Also, 52nd was an air portable division.
The final position of the Guards Armoured on the Dutch coast and pushing east is as OTL. I agree the logistics are precarious, but IMO they are no more precarious than OTL and the operation stands much better chance of strategic success, e.g. cutting off all the German forces in Holland and forcing a general retreat.
IMO the critical question in my alternate scenario is can the Poles hold the Grave bridge against attacks from the direction of the Reichswald forest (no attacks from the the West materialised in OTL so I'm assuming they don't in my scenario either). A point in their favour IMO is that the US parachute divisions will be on the flank of any attack. However, if they don't then a disaster is on the cards.

I still have my doubts about it. In OTL plan logistics sucked big time. Your scenario is better, but still - we have bigger force going farther and still dangling at the end of a single road. Also, I'm not sure if the Guards Division would have been able to do all those thing you want it to do. They have to reach the Island - IOTL reaching Nijmegen took them some time and costed considerable losses, no reason to believe it would be different in your scenario; then they have to break out from the footholds captured by US divisions - even with Paras support without some heavier artillery it would cost a lot, since Germans obviously would do their best to fortify their lines around footholds; then Guards would have to get to the sea, and it's still not a short trip. Another problem is protecting the flanks and supply roads of Guards division going north: I assume you want to give that honor to 52nd division and US Paras - light infantry, not to good against even relatively small group of German tanks on flat land of Holland. Also, somebody has to keep Nijmegen, Groesbek Ridge, Arnhem, Eindhoven etc. In other words, somebody has to keep that long, thin corridor. And those forces have to be supplied too. I doubt if it would work...perhaps with better air support (not only supply drops but also attack planes). Frankly, I believe that supporting a whole army with a single road is not enough.
 
Originally posted by Shimbo.


I still have my doubts about it. In OTL plan logistics sucked big time. Your scenario is better, but still - we have bigger force going farther and still dangling at the end of a single road. Also, I'm not sure if the Guards Division would have been able to do all those thing you want it to do. They have to reach the Island - IOTL reaching Nijmegen took them some time and costed considerable losses, no reason to believe it would be different in your scenario; then they have to break out from the footholds captured by US divisions - even with Paras support without some heavier artillery it would cost a lot, since Germans obviously would do their best to fortify their lines around footholds; then Guards would have to get to the sea, and it's still not a short trip. Another problem is protecting the flanks and supply roads of Guards division going north: I assume you want to give that honor to 52nd division and US Paras - light infantry, not to good against even relatively small group of German tanks on flat land of Holland. Also, somebody has to keep Nijmegen, Groesbek Ridge, Arnhem, Eindhoven etc. In other words, somebody has to keep that long, thin corridor. And those forces have to be supplied too. I doubt if it would work...perhaps with better air support (not only supply drops but also attack planes). Frankly, I believe that supporting a whole army with a single road is not enough.
You may well be right; it's impossible to be sure of course. The whole operation in OTL was based on the premise that the Germans were finished and just needed chasing, an assumption that was incorrect in hindsight.

IMO the fundamental problem for the allies was that there was no overall commander on the ground in Europe. Whether it was Montgomery or Bradley (presumably it would have been Bradley, although Montgomery was the man in possession during the Normandy battles) that was what was needed.

The lack of a single 'on the ground' commander lead to the 'broad advance', which was a political decision and not a military one. That lead lack of coordination, competition for supplies, no single operation getting the supplies it needed and ultimately lead to the allies running out of steam and the battle of the bulge.

If Market Garden had been given full priority (which could only have happened if there was one commander) it would have worked IMO even with the OTL plan. For one thing, the two corps on either side of XXX Corps were supposed to advance too, but just didn't have the supplies to do so. With them advancing too, XXX Corps would have secure flanks, the salient would be far wider and the road would not be cut so regularly.
 

Markus

Banned
I can't think of any specific POD, but I'm pretty sure that with better planning Operation Market Garden might have worked out. WI it did?


Ok, if I have the choice I kill M-G and open the approaches of Antwerp instead. But I don´t, so here is what can be done without hindsight.

The bridges have first priority. They need to be secured ASAP.

-US gilder infantry lands right next to the bridge at Nijmegen
-Similar attacks by the Commandos on the smaller bridges if air transport capacity permits it
-Planning for dropping the Polish Paras on the same day, if losses of transport planes are light
-Contacting the Dutch resistance about Arnhem, asking specifically about the terrain on the opposite(allied) side of the river

Effect: Far fewer delays due to destroyed and enemy held bridges. More allied paras at Arnhem, they are closer to the bridge and the river separates them from the SS-units.

Chances are good they gain a foothold for a follow up offensive and even if not the 6th AB could hardly be destroyed given their much securer position.
 

Markus

Banned
Ain´t that obvious? If you have gained a foothold for a follow up offensive at Armhem you are an hours trainride away from the heart of the Ruhrgebiet: Oberhausen, Duisburg, Essen and Gelsenkirchen are all within reach.

The Germans will throw anything they have at you, which won´t surprise you at all. So your troops can sit in their trenches while your air forces delay the arrival of german reinfocements and your artillery blows many attackers into small pieces. Your infantry will handle the rest. And once the Germans are bled white your start your offensive. It might be difficult at the start, but once you have chewed your way through the german lines the Ruhrgebiet is yours for the taking.

Of course the effect will be felt all over the western front, like no BoB for example.
 
Was this ever actually considered?

IIRC the information the British had was that the ground on the South side of Arnhem bridge was too boggy for gliders and the area to the North too built up. There was also a lot of flack both around the bridge and just North of Arnhem around Deelan, which was a major German night fighter base.

There were lower level Airborne officers who wanted to jump in the centre anyway and take the casualties from landing on roofs etc, in order to get straight on target, but they were overruled. The Air Force were particularly unhappy about dropping in the middle of a flack 'hot zone'.

Also some historians have argued that dropping in the centre of Arnhem wouldn't have helped that much as the SS were bunked right in the middle of town, so the British would have been dropping right on top of them.

A precision operation, Pegasus Bridge style, was not on the cards because of the lack of time to prepare. The whole operation was rushed because so many previous operations had been canceled due to the landing grounds being reached by ground forces and the Airborne officers were desperate to get into battle.
 

burmafrd

Banned
An operation that ambitious - just no way you could plan it that quickly and do it right. With the problems already outlined I frankly doubt that it would ever have worked.

By the way Shimbo in Early September of 1944 there was very little in front of 3rd army- that was why Patton wanted to attack right away.
Its the same with Market Garden- if the attack had happened just one week earlier it would have had a much better chance of sucess. The window of oppurtunity to get across the Rhine beforee the Germans had recoveered from the rout in France was very narrow- from the last week in August to about the 3rd week in September; and even that depended on where you were attacking.
 

Markus

Banned
I got another POD:

They pre-assault air raids intended to prevent reinforcements from being send in are delayed by 24hrs. Effect: The two SS division have withdrawn to Germany and can´t return in time.
 
I got another POD:

They pre-assault air raids intended to prevent reinforcements from being send in are delayed by 24hrs. Effect: The two SS division have withdrawn to Germany and can´t return in time.

I'm not sure I understand what you are suggesting. Air raids intended for interdiction stop the redeployment of the SS units? Had the Allies enough detailed intelligence on such strategic movements to be able to intervene?
 
The Brits blew a lot of intelligence calls in the war- if they were not reading Enigma they more often then not were wrong.

Has any one got any clear examples of when the British fucked up regarding intelligence, specifically regarding Op Market Garden?

:)
 
I'm not sure I understand what you are suggesting. Air raids intended for interdiction stop the redeployment of the SS units? Had the Allies enough detailed intelligence on such strategic movements to be able to intervene?

I think he means the Allies blasting the railroads and whatnot to hell before the Airborne dropped, which was intended to stop the Germans from charging reinforcements in but instead kept the 9th and 10th SS from moving OUT of Arnhem.
 
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