What if Julius Caesar is killed in one of his many battles during the Roman conquest of Gaul? Without him to depose the Republic who would, if anybody? Who would take control of the Roman legions in Gaul and more importantly would the Romans still be able to pacify the Guals as much as they did?
WI: Caesar Killed in Gaul?
- Thread starter ThatOneGuy
- Start date
The next 50 or so years are a lot less interesting than they might have been? Caesar dying in Gaul means a return to the status quo for a while (Rome had no major external threats by then) until the next round of civil wars start up a decade or two down the line (see lack of external threats).
I mean, the Parthians could match the Romans in the field, but they were only a threat to border provinces at worst.
I mean, the Parthians could match the Romans in the field, but they were only a threat to border provinces at worst.
Who is second in command, I suppose it depends on when Caesar is killed? On the top of my head, I remember there was Labienus (sp?), there was Decimus Brutus, a son of Crassus once served with Caesar at Gaul before he left to join his father at the ill fated Parthian campaign, Mark Anthony came later, right?
If Caesar killed after Crassus already met his fate at Parthia, then clearly Pompey is the undisputed number one in Rome, but I don't think he'll make any waves. Heck, most of teh optimates only support him to be against Caesar, without caesar they don't need Pompey anymore.
My guess is whoever attempts to complete Caesar's work may well be the one to finally give the dying Republic it's last kick. Likely a surviving general of Caesar's Gaul campaign, or maybe one of Pompey's sons. Or, ironically, someone like Cassius, who is OTL a competent comamnder who survived Crassus' fiasco at Parthia.
If Caesar killed after Crassus already met his fate at Parthia, then clearly Pompey is the undisputed number one in Rome, but I don't think he'll make any waves. Heck, most of teh optimates only support him to be against Caesar, without caesar they don't need Pompey anymore.
My guess is whoever attempts to complete Caesar's work may well be the one to finally give the dying Republic it's last kick. Likely a surviving general of Caesar's Gaul campaign, or maybe one of Pompey's sons. Or, ironically, someone like Cassius, who is OTL a competent comamnder who survived Crassus' fiasco at Parthia.
When does he die? at aleesia?
Interestingly, in 52 BCE, a law was passed with Pompeys backing that put in a 5 yea limit between when someone could take over a pro-magisterial command after leaving office. So say you are a consul in 50, you can't take a province until 45. It's how Cicero, for example, who never took a proconsular province after his consulate, ended up as governor of Cilicia after the law was passed.
Of course we never really got to see the effects of that law since the civil war started a couple years later. But it could have some interesting knock on effects-for starters, unless you run for anothe office in the meantime (and I would assume thus forfeit your promagisterial command) you will be a private citizen for 5 years after your consulship or praetorship meaning you can be prosecuted immediately afterwards if someone so wishes. Another important knock on erect is candidates are going to likely be far more conservative with spending money on campaigns-they don't have the promise of quickly getting a province and thus being able to quickly recoup their debts and pay off their lenders-which also means there's less incentive to extort provinces as much which leads to slightly less corruption in provincial management.
If Caesar dies at Alesia, then we will get to see how this law effects things moving forward. Also I should point out Pompey was essentially in retirement mode by the time the civil war broke out-aside from his dealings with Caesar he was far more interested in his personal life than in roman politics. Which isn't surprising given how he never managed to have much success politically speaking after the wave of military victories died down.
Interestingly, in 52 BCE, a law was passed with Pompeys backing that put in a 5 yea limit between when someone could take over a pro-magisterial command after leaving office. So say you are a consul in 50, you can't take a province until 45. It's how Cicero, for example, who never took a proconsular province after his consulate, ended up as governor of Cilicia after the law was passed.
Of course we never really got to see the effects of that law since the civil war started a couple years later. But it could have some interesting knock on effects-for starters, unless you run for anothe office in the meantime (and I would assume thus forfeit your promagisterial command) you will be a private citizen for 5 years after your consulship or praetorship meaning you can be prosecuted immediately afterwards if someone so wishes. Another important knock on erect is candidates are going to likely be far more conservative with spending money on campaigns-they don't have the promise of quickly getting a province and thus being able to quickly recoup their debts and pay off their lenders-which also means there's less incentive to extort provinces as much which leads to slightly less corruption in provincial management.
If Caesar dies at Alesia, then we will get to see how this law effects things moving forward. Also I should point out Pompey was essentially in retirement mode by the time the civil war broke out-aside from his dealings with Caesar he was far more interested in his personal life than in roman politics. Which isn't surprising given how he never managed to have much success politically speaking after the wave of military victories died down.
If Caesar died in Gaul, the most obvious candidate to replace him as proconsul is Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, his arch-enemy who hated Caesar because he considered he had some kind of hereditary right to command in Gaul (his grandfather was one of the first 2 conquerors of Galliano transalpina and had huge clientelaes there).
The point is what is Polpey going to do if he has no more potential rival. Will he let himself be made politically neutralized like he was in the late sixties or will he try to establish some kind of personal power ? In the late fifties, he was working for the second option.
The point is what is Polpey going to do if he has no more potential rival. Will he let himself be made politically neutralized like he was in the late sixties or will he try to establish some kind of personal power ? In the late fifties, he was working for the second option.
Depends when he's killed, especially for the situation in Gaul.
Campaign against Helvetians : The reality of the initial migration is...blurry at best. Caesar regularly points out that his ennemies wanted to "takeover the w̶o̶r̶l̶d̶ Gaul" and that he eventually only defended the gallic peoples.
Numbers involved are probably exxagerated, the nature of the helvetic alliance is probably twisted (maybe a defensive alliance rather than offensive).
Assuming that Labienus or Caesar fails to prevent the operations (or if Helvetians takes the northern road and reach Aquitania or coastal Gaul trough Volcae's country, Caesar being forced to intervene there and killed without the advantages of having blockaded passes), maybe a longer lasting Helvetian alliance, with Transalpina peoples being quite unruly or outright revolting, especially in western and northern part of the province (reaction of Rome being probably harsh on this regard, while I'm not sure of Roman reaction after having crushed these rebellions).
Campaign against Ariovist : The establishment of a Lower Rheinishhegemony is possible.
It's possible as well to see Sequani falling as client of Ariovist, making his domination directly neighbouring Rome. Eventually, I'd think the Senate would preserve his title to "friend of the Roman people" in spite of Caesar's campaign (especially with Pompey to discredit it).
Campaigns against Belgians : If Caesar is killed at the Axona, Galba (and Suessiones) would keep the upper hand in Belgica and maybe in the Seine bassin (I'd think that Aedui would have to pay for supporting the Romans during these campaigns : it's not impossible to see the northern part of their confederation being lost either to locals or to Belgians).
Indeed, they had the lead in Belgica since decades, and while Bellovaci rivaled them at this time, it's possible to see them not only reinforce their lead on some neighbouring peoples, but as well in further places (as in Channel coast).
Would Sequani and Lower Rheinish people try to revolt and get back their independence? I'd think so, and I'm not too sure that the Senate would try to take back these territories immediatly.
Campaign against Veneti : At this point, Roman presence in Gaul is clearly established, if not firmly. In the wake of victorious campaigns against Belgians, Armorica (which may have been a political confederation of people, while more or less proteiform) was under Roman control and only the Venetian hegemony (southern Brittany) escaped it before what was a provincial rebellion.
I don't think it really had a possibility to be reversed : Venetian thalassocracy was indeed a formidable weapon, but wasn't enough when it comes to numbers (and even a naval victory wouldn't make Caesar killed).
Campaign against Brittons : I'm not really sure about the feasability. Not that Brittons couldn't have won, but we're in face of lesser numbers, with a firmly established Roman presence south of Channel...
The only really doable way, for me, is to have a worse -55 expedition, with Brittons managing to prevent Romans to leave the islands and to hivernate there. With Caesar dying of disease or anything else, the situation would be blurry.
His lieutnants would have clearly an hard time : possible re-revolt of Armoricains, Veneti, Belgians (revolting as they did in -54). I think they'd be able to maintain Roman rule in a good part of conquered places (especially the ones close to Narbonensis, but I'm less sure about their capacity to hold on Belgica or Armorica (maybe trough clientelisation, as they did to Volcae originally?)
-52 Revolt : Let's assume that Caesar dies at Alesia. Either Labienus doesn't manage to asset the situation correctly (maybe making him dying earlier as a PoD, during the Treviri campaign). Have then the Gallic army breaking the outer fortifications in conjuction of Vercevingetorix's army, and Caesar may end his career as a trophy head.
Arverni and Vercingetorix would be the obvious winners : the re-establishment of an Arverni hegemony over south-western Gaul is likely (with re-captation of former clients as Cadurci or Ruteni) and would beneficy from the victory prestige (though the mandate of Vercingetorix would definitely prevent him to have a that important lead in Gaul, after Romans being crushed).
Aedui would probably still keep their dominance while rivaled by Arverni, but geopolitically, the game would have changed. The use of Roman tactics by Gauls for instance, points out a different approach of these matters.
I wouldn't be extremly surprised to see one or two of re-emerging celtic hegemonies turning to a form of "tyranny" (in the ancient sense) supported by a popular base.
I'd tend to think it would be a similar trauma than Teutoburg : a province seemingly pacified, revolting and crushing Romans hard. That Romans may still keep control of some places is likely, but the revolt was generalized to almost the whole Gaul.
I could see these Gallic confederations being eventually as powerful than contemporary Dacia, but the romanization process was already a thing (the huge roman trade in Gaul exportated roman-way-of-life quite importantly, trough use of commodity goods, for exemple, up to civic magistratures).
Giving the lack of unity among Gallic states, or real power for Vercingetorix outside the mandate to kick Romans out, having them threatens even Transalpina would be wishful thinking. At best, some raids and return to -100 borders. At this point the Gallic confederations would essentially try to prevent an Arverni takeover, would it be at the cost of a compromise with Rome (critically with tribes that were traditionally allied with Rome, as Aedui)
Eventually, you won't prevent a roman takeover of the region (critically in the absence of clear natural and defensible borders), but Gallo-Roman culture would most probably keep a more important celtic background than IOTL
Revolt of -51 : If Caesar dies, little would change in Gaul (while it would certainly do in Rome. Roman Gaul and no Caesar makes Pompey happy). At this point the conquest was achieved, and his lieutnants would manage to crush revolts relativly efficiently.
Campaign against Helvetians : The reality of the initial migration is...blurry at best. Caesar regularly points out that his ennemies wanted to "takeover the w̶o̶r̶l̶d̶ Gaul" and that he eventually only defended the gallic peoples.
Numbers involved are probably exxagerated, the nature of the helvetic alliance is probably twisted (maybe a defensive alliance rather than offensive).
Assuming that Labienus or Caesar fails to prevent the operations (or if Helvetians takes the northern road and reach Aquitania or coastal Gaul trough Volcae's country, Caesar being forced to intervene there and killed without the advantages of having blockaded passes), maybe a longer lasting Helvetian alliance, with Transalpina peoples being quite unruly or outright revolting, especially in western and northern part of the province (reaction of Rome being probably harsh on this regard, while I'm not sure of Roman reaction after having crushed these rebellions).
Campaign against Ariovist : The establishment of a Lower Rheinishhegemony is possible.
It's possible as well to see Sequani falling as client of Ariovist, making his domination directly neighbouring Rome. Eventually, I'd think the Senate would preserve his title to "friend of the Roman people" in spite of Caesar's campaign (especially with Pompey to discredit it).
Campaigns against Belgians : If Caesar is killed at the Axona, Galba (and Suessiones) would keep the upper hand in Belgica and maybe in the Seine bassin (I'd think that Aedui would have to pay for supporting the Romans during these campaigns : it's not impossible to see the northern part of their confederation being lost either to locals or to Belgians).
Indeed, they had the lead in Belgica since decades, and while Bellovaci rivaled them at this time, it's possible to see them not only reinforce their lead on some neighbouring peoples, but as well in further places (as in Channel coast).
Would Sequani and Lower Rheinish people try to revolt and get back their independence? I'd think so, and I'm not too sure that the Senate would try to take back these territories immediatly.
Campaign against Veneti : At this point, Roman presence in Gaul is clearly established, if not firmly. In the wake of victorious campaigns against Belgians, Armorica (which may have been a political confederation of people, while more or less proteiform) was under Roman control and only the Venetian hegemony (southern Brittany) escaped it before what was a provincial rebellion.
I don't think it really had a possibility to be reversed : Venetian thalassocracy was indeed a formidable weapon, but wasn't enough when it comes to numbers (and even a naval victory wouldn't make Caesar killed).
Campaign against Brittons : I'm not really sure about the feasability. Not that Brittons couldn't have won, but we're in face of lesser numbers, with a firmly established Roman presence south of Channel...
The only really doable way, for me, is to have a worse -55 expedition, with Brittons managing to prevent Romans to leave the islands and to hivernate there. With Caesar dying of disease or anything else, the situation would be blurry.
His lieutnants would have clearly an hard time : possible re-revolt of Armoricains, Veneti, Belgians (revolting as they did in -54). I think they'd be able to maintain Roman rule in a good part of conquered places (especially the ones close to Narbonensis, but I'm less sure about their capacity to hold on Belgica or Armorica (maybe trough clientelisation, as they did to Volcae originally?)
-52 Revolt : Let's assume that Caesar dies at Alesia. Either Labienus doesn't manage to asset the situation correctly (maybe making him dying earlier as a PoD, during the Treviri campaign). Have then the Gallic army breaking the outer fortifications in conjuction of Vercevingetorix's army, and Caesar may end his career as a trophy head.
Arverni and Vercingetorix would be the obvious winners : the re-establishment of an Arverni hegemony over south-western Gaul is likely (with re-captation of former clients as Cadurci or Ruteni) and would beneficy from the victory prestige (though the mandate of Vercingetorix would definitely prevent him to have a that important lead in Gaul, after Romans being crushed).
Aedui would probably still keep their dominance while rivaled by Arverni, but geopolitically, the game would have changed. The use of Roman tactics by Gauls for instance, points out a different approach of these matters.
I wouldn't be extremly surprised to see one or two of re-emerging celtic hegemonies turning to a form of "tyranny" (in the ancient sense) supported by a popular base.
I'd tend to think it would be a similar trauma than Teutoburg : a province seemingly pacified, revolting and crushing Romans hard. That Romans may still keep control of some places is likely, but the revolt was generalized to almost the whole Gaul.
I could see these Gallic confederations being eventually as powerful than contemporary Dacia, but the romanization process was already a thing (the huge roman trade in Gaul exportated roman-way-of-life quite importantly, trough use of commodity goods, for exemple, up to civic magistratures).
Giving the lack of unity among Gallic states, or real power for Vercingetorix outside the mandate to kick Romans out, having them threatens even Transalpina would be wishful thinking. At best, some raids and return to -100 borders. At this point the Gallic confederations would essentially try to prevent an Arverni takeover, would it be at the cost of a compromise with Rome (critically with tribes that were traditionally allied with Rome, as Aedui)
Eventually, you won't prevent a roman takeover of the region (critically in the absence of clear natural and defensible borders), but Gallo-Roman culture would most probably keep a more important celtic background than IOTL
Revolt of -51 : If Caesar dies, little would change in Gaul (while it would certainly do in Rome. Roman Gaul and no Caesar makes Pompey happy). At this point the conquest was achieved, and his lieutnants would manage to crush revolts relativly efficiently.
I don't see how you can come to that conclusion. Care to elaborate? The only time you really see him active in the late 50s, to my knowledge, is when the debate involved Caesar.
This is a very important point! Without a major threat, there is no reason for big extraordinary commands like Caesars command with 3 provinces and 10 legions under his control.
The biggest threat rest are probably the germans still raiding the Belgica regulary. IRL the huge Gallia Comata was not touched anymore, due to the civil war, until Augustus reorganized it. I expect, that a senate would provincialize and divide the Gallia Comata sooner. We do not know how. But what would be reasonable?
A huge province Belgica including the military districts of Germania, like it has been until Domitian makes sense. But divided in Belgica superior and inferior with 2-3 Legions each. The other legions perhaps in the north-western province which might be called Celtica. And of course Narbonensis and Aquitania. This way the huge army of Caesar is split and the governors are controlling each other. Well, I bet, one of these governors would try to start an illegal war aginst the germans. Just in order to improve his personal military and political power.
In the East we still have the parthians after Crassus' defeat. As long as the senate can avoid a revenge, there is no need for a huge extraordinary command. From the senates point of view an extraordinary command is much more dangerous, than the parthians, which are busy in a civil war anyways. Therefore a revenge has to be avoided at all costs. I see the next battle between populares and optimates upcoming about exactly this question. Not because revenge is such important and honorable. Just because a huge extraordinary command in Syria is the last way to increase personal power to the maximum.
This is all, if Caesar dies at Alesia or afterwards. If earlier, there is a chance, that Gallia stays independent and becomes a bigger threat than it ever was. What happens with the Narbonensis and the Cisalpina, if Vercingetorix was the succesfull gallic hero, ruling a united Gallic empire? At least for some decades.
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This law is indeed very important and should have impacted political life in Rome heavily. For the normal roman politician things will change in election campaigns, later in the provinces and also in the central offices as consul or praetor because they could not avoid the courts directly afterwards by fleeing into a proconsulate.
But remember, there was no such thing like a protected constitutional law in Rome. Every law could be easily bypassed by a decsion of the comitia or sometimes even by a senatus consultum. The exception from the rule, was daily business of roman politicians.
One of the main reasons for the Fall of the Republic was still in place: The roman mindset. The roman aristocrats still tried to accumulate as much wealth and honor for their families and clients as possibly at all costs. The richer politicans will try to bypass laws and accumulate military power, in order to get more political power. And therefore they will exploit the provinces. 5 years sooner or later does not matter. The roman provincial administration is still heavily under-bureaucratized, amateurish and without an effective central control. I wonder how this could change, without a princeps. And what would it mean to the longterm stability of a huge roman republican empire?
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I fully agree, Pompeius never intended to implement an autocracy. He bended the law, in order to get more power, but he always respected the republic. Well he was never enforced to fight for his life against the republic like Caesar.
The mother of all questions still is, who was right:
Montesquie who was 200 years undisputed, when said in the 18th century. "If not Caesar and Pompeius, some other guys would have ruined the republic"
Or Erich S. Gruen in the 90ties of the 20th century, who said: "The decline of the republic did not cause the civil wars. But the civil wars caused the decline of the republic"
Whoever the senate appoints
Which is probably Ahenobarbus if he has had his consulship and the Senate gets a real say.
Except for temporary command until a proper magistrate arrives Labienus and P Crassus are too junior.
It also leaves both the populares and the Marian legacy without an heir and depending on the dates Julia still alive and marriagable.
A lot depends on dates
If its before 53 then the remaining Triumvirs probably carve it up ( and maybe add a third man) but I suspect Gaul as a whole would be too big for anyone but Caesar to want and need so there may be a carve up. If before 54 Pompey is married to Julia.
After 53 Pompey is the remaining Triumvir and has a decision - surrender to the 'power' of the senate and face prosecution for being too powerful or consolidate his position somehow.
Which is probably Ahenobarbus if he has had his consulship and the Senate gets a real say.
Except for temporary command until a proper magistrate arrives Labienus and P Crassus are too junior.
It also leaves both the populares and the Marian legacy without an heir and depending on the dates Julia still alive and marriagable.
A lot depends on dates
If its before 53 then the remaining Triumvirs probably carve it up ( and maybe add a third man) but I suspect Gaul as a whole would be too big for anyone but Caesar to want and need so there may be a carve up. If before 54 Pompey is married to Julia.
After 53 Pompey is the remaining Triumvir and has a decision - surrender to the 'power' of the senate and face prosecution for being too powerful or consolidate his position somehow.
Consolidate enough power, in order to not become a victim of prosecution should'nt be that difficult for him, without targeting autocracy. even if he retires, his family and clients are still senators and are commanding legions. Remember, nobody prosecuted Sulla, after he went to retirement.
I'm not too sure : I tried to guess the consequences in Gaul above, depending of the general context, and it would be something between "barely change" for most of the regions concerned (with the exception of Ariovist) to Rome keeping some ground in places near Narbonensis to me.
As for Alesia, at the contrary, it's for me the point where Gaul could have become a regional nuisance (a bit as Dacia became at the same period).
Narbonensis and Cisalpina would most probably be untouched, with at best some raids in upper Rhône, Provincial Ruteni (that may turn back to Arverni influence) and Volcae country.
Vercingetorix victorious would be a huge boost for Arverni prestige, granted, but I don't think it would be enough to unite Gauls politically. They allied themselves against Romans, and choose a war leader (not unlike it happened for Germans afterwards, or Saxons in the Early Middle Age).
Once the threat removed, powerful confederations as Aedui (meaning a good part of Comata) would turn back to a conciliatory policy (especially if Vercingetorix managed to convince them to burn out Bibracte ITTL).
Arverni would still be powerful : I think we can expect a return to the Arverni "empire" in Comata
The north of Gaul would be more chaotic : the dismentelment of existing hegemonies (as Veneti or Armorican) and disappearance of Roman presence would probably create a power vaacum.
I'd think that the Armoricain Confederation would be still re-established and then including weakened Veneti. In Belgica...Things are gonna be harder, but I'd bet on the maintain of (if weakened) traditional dominance : Suessiones, Eburones, Treviri, Bellovaci.
Even strong peoples as Pictones would have problems : relativly untouched by the war, they could replaced Veneti as the powerful entity in the region (at odds with Arverni, especially if they try to take on Santones), but were already IOTL knowing a civil war in -52 (about following or not the general revolt).
I'd think that these entities, or at least the strongest of these, would learn from the Gallic Wars (as they did in war IOTL) and would form more powerful structures, with "tyrans" appearing with a popular support against an oligarchy seen as responsible of the chaos (basically, a bit what Celtill tried to do IOTL, but successfully). Maybe akin to what existed in Dacia, with a more important roman influence (that was already quite present in Comata before the Wars to begin with).
An interesting consequence, if minor, would be the maintain of Massalia as an independent (technically) city in Gaul.
Caesar Imperator, Hero of the Republic: Rough Outline
I realize I was somewhat dismissive of this idea earlier, but I've been thinking about it for a while and I keep running into the issue that most outcomes of Caesar being killed in Gaul lead to a less compelling century of history afterwards.
However, I think I've stumbled into the beginnings of an interesting deviation. Specifically, I've been trying to think of a way to have Caesar die before he can cross the Rubicon while preserving the myth of Caesar. And I think I'M almost onto something.
The first point of divergence in this proposition would have to be during Caesar's time as First Consul. Specifically, I propose that Caesar, being a great admirer of the great lawyer and orator Marcus Tullius Cicero, chose to invite him, not to join with the Triumvirate like in OTL, but rather as a ''second pair of eyes and a sound mind'' to look over his policies throughout the course of his Consulship.
Now, I acknowledge this would be very unusual on Cicero's part but, I do think that, while something of a stretch, it would be within the realms of possibility for Cicero to accept such an offer with the reasoning that, in doing so, he could at least mitigate some of the ills he foresaw in Caesar's designs. Mind you, this would have to be at the very beginning of the latter's Consulship, as no force on earth could make Cicero cooperate with Caesar after his very public circumvention of the law whilst in office.
The reason I suggest this is that doing so would afford Cicero a great deal of insight into the reasoning behind Caesar's policies and give him some first hand experience of the Senate putting it's own interests before those of Rome. With him having been such a strong idealist, I imagine such an experience might well trouble the man greatly; perhaps even to the point of reconsidering some of his ideas which he had thought unassailable?
You see, the interesting thing about Caesar is that, unlike most politicians and/or statesmen driven primarily by ambition, he seemed that have possessed a strange sort of personal honour. He steadfastly refused to conceal either the existence or intent of his (public) actions and policies, he always kept his word once he had given it, he never betrayed or failed to come to the aid of an ally (often to his detriment) and, most importantly, made absolutely certain that, in addition to aiding his own cause, his policies served the public interest and actually improved the situation for Rome and its citizens.
Now, the above is, I fully admit, the result of a favorable predisposition on my part but its is, at the very least, not an untruth. I imagine you can see where I'm going with this at this point, but I'll connect the dots for the sake of completion. The notion I had was that Cicero's years of working with Caesar on the redrafting of half the Roman legal system might have given him a measure of appreciation for the man.
Once again, Cicero was a staunch idealist while Caesar was the essence of pragmatism, so I don't imagine they'd actually have agreed on all that many issues. Instead, I propose that Cicero might have come to admire Caesar's goals (his every move while Consul was directed at safeguarding the welfare of Rome and, most importantly, its people) while still disproving of his motives. However, this new found respect for the man, while not bringing him to the point of supporting Caesar's actions, would possibly suffice to convince him not to publicly condemn them and perhaps, if those presenting the arguments were to be particularly tasteless in their accusations, defend them to some degree.
While this might happen on a number of occasions, I have something specific in mind that could serve as a useful catalyst. You see, Cicero was, in spit of his brilliance, a very straightforward man who saw things in an almost completely Manichean manner, and two wrongs don't make a right. As such, when the Senate sees fit to try and sentence Caesar without the latter being present to defend himself, I can see a man such as Cicero being incensed at the Senate casually disregarding Republican institutions at least nominally in order to punish another for doing so. In fact, in this sort of context, I can see such a scenario convincing the man that the Senate, in its current form, did not have the best interests of Rome at heart.
After such a change of heart, I can conceive of Cicero (who was held in very high regard by the Optimates) persuading those Senators who were sincere in there motives (such as Cato the Younger) to, at the very least, allow Caesar to account for his actions and defend himself in person before any sanctions were applied. Mind you, there would be no suggestion of simply letting the matter drop, merely that judging the man with a kangaroo court in his absence for excessively bending the law while in office would be hypocritical in the extreme.
Any, that's the set-up in Rome taken are of: no public accusations against Caesar are made in his absence and the Senate, as a result, does not put him in a position where he has no choice but to, if you'll forgive the phrase'' cross the Rubicon. While this would make Caesar's position less perilous than in OTL, it would still leave him with the necessity of accomplishing something extraordinary as political capital for his defense (Cicero having sent him a letter detailing the situation out of respect for his former colleague). This would mean that he would still need to conquer Gaul.
At this point, I propose that the war in Gaul proceed as in OTL (it is instrumental to the myth of Caesar), with one minor exception: on the ast leg of his campaign, while he was preparing for his (half-hearted) assault on Britain, he meets with a son of the chieftain of the Cornovii (based in modern day Cornwall) an through speaking with the young man, learns of the substantial tin deposits located in the region. Now, before learning of the presence of massive amounts of tin being present in Britain, it had been regarded as largely worthless (which is why Caesar let the matter drop OTL). However, substantial tin deposits are quite rare, wars are fought over them to this day, and the presence of such a thing in Britain change things completely.
As such, due to his legal status being ever so slightly less shaky than in OTL, Caesar (never being averse to risk), pens a missive to the Senate explaining his discovery, along with a request for a short (6 months or so) extension of his pro-consulship to allow him to capitalize on his momentum and finish off his campaign without any loose ends. Now, seeing as Caesar had already conquered Gaul at this point and that tin (and by extension bronze) really was that valuable, I can see the Senate indulging such and extraordinary request, the Optimates because it would clearly add to Rome's strength (Caesar had, if nothing else, proven beyond a shadow of a doubt his capabilities as a general) and the Trimuvirate's (or at least, what was left of it) supporters because, in Rome, you backed your patron in politics and that was that.
With this extraordinary extension being granted, Caesar would have the time to plan his invasion of Britain properly and would have no need for a rough naval assault. This extra allotment of time would allow him to enlist the assistance of locals familiar with the difficulties involved in crossing the Channel and thus allow he and his men to adequately prepare for the crossing. As a result, he successfully lands at the head of a substantial force and, given the he is Caesar is now fighting land battles, successfully subjugates and occupies Britain according to his usual modus operandi (with his good friend and ally, the new chieftain of the Cornovii (let's call him Artorius for the cheek of it) being appointed as governor of the new province of Brittania.
Having succeeded in his conquests, Caesar returns to Rome armed and ready to face the Senate (he, unlike Cicero, rightly does not believe he had any chance of seeing a fair trial). However, Caesar was hardly a young man at this point and, on the way bay to Rome, tragedy strikes. One morning, his generals note that he is uncharacteristically late to rise and decide to investigate. They find him lying in his tent, quite dead from having suffered a stroke during the night.
With this sequence of events, Caesar would quickly turn into a semi-mythic, larger than life figure. You see, while the Senate would never have backed down while Caesar was alive, it would have been in poor taste at best and political self-mutilation to publicly condemn a man who conquered the Gauls, the ancient enemies of Rome who had once sacked the Eternal City itself, in an extraordinarily short time and even added the province of Brittania, with it's rich tin deposits, to Rome's sphere of influence. As such, I think it is plausible that, in this scenario, the Senate would let the matter drop and, in a display of comical hypocrisy, proceed to heap honour after honour on the memory of a man of which they had spoken naught but ill for the past several years.
However, no chapter Roman history is incomplete without a good civil war. Thus, I propose that Caesar's generals elect to pick up where Caesar left off. As I find it exceedingly unlikely and very much out of character that he would choose to conceal what he was doing from his generals (or the rest of his men, for that matter). Therefore, given what we know of Marc Antony's temperament, I find it quite plausible that he would find the idea of installing himself as Dictator with his colleagues serving as his lieutenants appealing for it's own sake. And, being that he was quite popular with the rank and file, I suspect he would have relatively little difficulty convincing men who had spent the last couple of years going from victory to victory on a consistent basis that his was a grand and glorious plan. And so, it would not be Caesar, but Marc Antony who would cross the Rubicon.
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This is very rough, and much of it is based on supposition, but I think it's a decent starting point for something interesting. I realize this is probably not what the OP had in mind when he asked what the outcome of Caesar being killed in Gaul would be, but I got stuck on how to make such a situation, in my own words, ''interesting'' and got stuck on the idea.
In any case, I have a half formed idea on where to go from here. Mostly, this would involve a civil war with both sides claiming to be Caesar's heirs and using his name as a battle standard. As you might imagine, Octavian (better known as Augustus), being Caesar's actual legal heir (he had, in fact, been raised by Caesar's sister Julia Caesaris) would not stand idly by while someone else claimed his inheritance.
In any case, I'm sure I got a few things completely wrong, so, thoughts?
I realize I was somewhat dismissive of this idea earlier, but I've been thinking about it for a while and I keep running into the issue that most outcomes of Caesar being killed in Gaul lead to a less compelling century of history afterwards.
However, I think I've stumbled into the beginnings of an interesting deviation. Specifically, I've been trying to think of a way to have Caesar die before he can cross the Rubicon while preserving the myth of Caesar. And I think I'M almost onto something.
The first point of divergence in this proposition would have to be during Caesar's time as First Consul. Specifically, I propose that Caesar, being a great admirer of the great lawyer and orator Marcus Tullius Cicero, chose to invite him, not to join with the Triumvirate like in OTL, but rather as a ''second pair of eyes and a sound mind'' to look over his policies throughout the course of his Consulship.
Now, I acknowledge this would be very unusual on Cicero's part but, I do think that, while something of a stretch, it would be within the realms of possibility for Cicero to accept such an offer with the reasoning that, in doing so, he could at least mitigate some of the ills he foresaw in Caesar's designs. Mind you, this would have to be at the very beginning of the latter's Consulship, as no force on earth could make Cicero cooperate with Caesar after his very public circumvention of the law whilst in office.
The reason I suggest this is that doing so would afford Cicero a great deal of insight into the reasoning behind Caesar's policies and give him some first hand experience of the Senate putting it's own interests before those of Rome. With him having been such a strong idealist, I imagine such an experience might well trouble the man greatly; perhaps even to the point of reconsidering some of his ideas which he had thought unassailable?
You see, the interesting thing about Caesar is that, unlike most politicians and/or statesmen driven primarily by ambition, he seemed that have possessed a strange sort of personal honour. He steadfastly refused to conceal either the existence or intent of his (public) actions and policies, he always kept his word once he had given it, he never betrayed or failed to come to the aid of an ally (often to his detriment) and, most importantly, made absolutely certain that, in addition to aiding his own cause, his policies served the public interest and actually improved the situation for Rome and its citizens.
Now, the above is, I fully admit, the result of a favorable predisposition on my part but its is, at the very least, not an untruth. I imagine you can see where I'm going with this at this point, but I'll connect the dots for the sake of completion. The notion I had was that Cicero's years of working with Caesar on the redrafting of half the Roman legal system might have given him a measure of appreciation for the man.
Once again, Cicero was a staunch idealist while Caesar was the essence of pragmatism, so I don't imagine they'd actually have agreed on all that many issues. Instead, I propose that Cicero might have come to admire Caesar's goals (his every move while Consul was directed at safeguarding the welfare of Rome and, most importantly, its people) while still disproving of his motives. However, this new found respect for the man, while not bringing him to the point of supporting Caesar's actions, would possibly suffice to convince him not to publicly condemn them and perhaps, if those presenting the arguments were to be particularly tasteless in their accusations, defend them to some degree.
While this might happen on a number of occasions, I have something specific in mind that could serve as a useful catalyst. You see, Cicero was, in spit of his brilliance, a very straightforward man who saw things in an almost completely Manichean manner, and two wrongs don't make a right. As such, when the Senate sees fit to try and sentence Caesar without the latter being present to defend himself, I can see a man such as Cicero being incensed at the Senate casually disregarding Republican institutions at least nominally in order to punish another for doing so. In fact, in this sort of context, I can see such a scenario convincing the man that the Senate, in its current form, did not have the best interests of Rome at heart.
After such a change of heart, I can conceive of Cicero (who was held in very high regard by the Optimates) persuading those Senators who were sincere in there motives (such as Cato the Younger) to, at the very least, allow Caesar to account for his actions and defend himself in person before any sanctions were applied. Mind you, there would be no suggestion of simply letting the matter drop, merely that judging the man with a kangaroo court in his absence for excessively bending the law while in office would be hypocritical in the extreme.
Any, that's the set-up in Rome taken are of: no public accusations against Caesar are made in his absence and the Senate, as a result, does not put him in a position where he has no choice but to, if you'll forgive the phrase'' cross the Rubicon. While this would make Caesar's position less perilous than in OTL, it would still leave him with the necessity of accomplishing something extraordinary as political capital for his defense (Cicero having sent him a letter detailing the situation out of respect for his former colleague). This would mean that he would still need to conquer Gaul.
At this point, I propose that the war in Gaul proceed as in OTL (it is instrumental to the myth of Caesar), with one minor exception: on the ast leg of his campaign, while he was preparing for his (half-hearted) assault on Britain, he meets with a son of the chieftain of the Cornovii (based in modern day Cornwall) an through speaking with the young man, learns of the substantial tin deposits located in the region. Now, before learning of the presence of massive amounts of tin being present in Britain, it had been regarded as largely worthless (which is why Caesar let the matter drop OTL). However, substantial tin deposits are quite rare, wars are fought over them to this day, and the presence of such a thing in Britain change things completely.
As such, due to his legal status being ever so slightly less shaky than in OTL, Caesar (never being averse to risk), pens a missive to the Senate explaining his discovery, along with a request for a short (6 months or so) extension of his pro-consulship to allow him to capitalize on his momentum and finish off his campaign without any loose ends. Now, seeing as Caesar had already conquered Gaul at this point and that tin (and by extension bronze) really was that valuable, I can see the Senate indulging such and extraordinary request, the Optimates because it would clearly add to Rome's strength (Caesar had, if nothing else, proven beyond a shadow of a doubt his capabilities as a general) and the Trimuvirate's (or at least, what was left of it) supporters because, in Rome, you backed your patron in politics and that was that.
With this extraordinary extension being granted, Caesar would have the time to plan his invasion of Britain properly and would have no need for a rough naval assault. This extra allotment of time would allow him to enlist the assistance of locals familiar with the difficulties involved in crossing the Channel and thus allow he and his men to adequately prepare for the crossing. As a result, he successfully lands at the head of a substantial force and, given the he is Caesar is now fighting land battles, successfully subjugates and occupies Britain according to his usual modus operandi (with his good friend and ally, the new chieftain of the Cornovii (let's call him Artorius for the cheek of it) being appointed as governor of the new province of Brittania.
Having succeeded in his conquests, Caesar returns to Rome armed and ready to face the Senate (he, unlike Cicero, rightly does not believe he had any chance of seeing a fair trial). However, Caesar was hardly a young man at this point and, on the way bay to Rome, tragedy strikes. One morning, his generals note that he is uncharacteristically late to rise and decide to investigate. They find him lying in his tent, quite dead from having suffered a stroke during the night.
With this sequence of events, Caesar would quickly turn into a semi-mythic, larger than life figure. You see, while the Senate would never have backed down while Caesar was alive, it would have been in poor taste at best and political self-mutilation to publicly condemn a man who conquered the Gauls, the ancient enemies of Rome who had once sacked the Eternal City itself, in an extraordinarily short time and even added the province of Brittania, with it's rich tin deposits, to Rome's sphere of influence. As such, I think it is plausible that, in this scenario, the Senate would let the matter drop and, in a display of comical hypocrisy, proceed to heap honour after honour on the memory of a man of which they had spoken naught but ill for the past several years.
However, no chapter Roman history is incomplete without a good civil war. Thus, I propose that Caesar's generals elect to pick up where Caesar left off. As I find it exceedingly unlikely and very much out of character that he would choose to conceal what he was doing from his generals (or the rest of his men, for that matter). Therefore, given what we know of Marc Antony's temperament, I find it quite plausible that he would find the idea of installing himself as Dictator with his colleagues serving as his lieutenants appealing for it's own sake. And, being that he was quite popular with the rank and file, I suspect he would have relatively little difficulty convincing men who had spent the last couple of years going from victory to victory on a consistent basis that his was a grand and glorious plan. And so, it would not be Caesar, but Marc Antony who would cross the Rubicon.
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This is very rough, and much of it is based on supposition, but I think it's a decent starting point for something interesting. I realize this is probably not what the OP had in mind when he asked what the outcome of Caesar being killed in Gaul would be, but I got stuck on how to make such a situation, in my own words, ''interesting'' and got stuck on the idea.
In any case, I have a half formed idea on where to go from here. Mostly, this would involve a civil war with both sides claiming to be Caesar's heirs and using his name as a battle standard. As you might imagine, Octavian (better known as Augustus), being Caesar's actual legal heir (he had, in fact, been raised by Caesar's sister Julia Caesaris) would not stand idly by while someone else claimed his inheritance.
In any case, I'm sure I got a few things completely wrong, so, thoughts?
Didn't. Even not mentioning the regular revolts that welcomed Caesar's back in the continent and that plagued the latter part of the wars, a good part of the region was spared direct Roman control, especially some of the strongest peoples (Arverni, Aedui, Trevirii, Eburones, etc.).
Problem is that Caesar crushed Armoricans and Veneti in -56. Trusting them (while they mastered exchanges on the Channel) would be...unwise.
You'd always have Pictones able to do it, but the numbers would certainly not do it.
And again, handwaving the Gallic hostility (even among Aedui, while they were long-time allies) at the point no revolt seems to appears is somewhat dubious, critically giving that Caesar would certainly need to take Roman troops from Gaul to make numbers on professional soldiers.
Your idea isn't bad per se, but I'd think an harsher -55 campaign (with Caesar forced to hivern in Britain, with limited numbers and near-starvation) may do it with less implausibilities on these regards.
I realize this idea has more holes than cheese but,in my defense, I made it up on the spot as I went along and didn't check my dates with much in the way of rigor. Honestly, the practical specifics of the campaign aren't critical and, on a second reading, the conquest of Britain is quite superfluous.
The thing is, I put it in for a reason: I needed something nice and glorious to turn into myth in less than a generation. Do you think a greater will to attempt to deal with at least some of the Germanic tribes might be more plausible?
I know he was convinced (almost certainly rightly) that dealing with them was an exercise in futility, but do you suppose a slightly more unified Western Germany might change his mind? Say, for example, if a charismatic chieftain with dreams of glory managed to unite all or most of the lands along the eastern bank of the Rhine?
I've close read Da Bella Gallica more than once, but I'm afraid I was foolish to loan it to a friend of mine and haven't seen it in years, so I'm a bit rusty on the details.
Mind you, additional conquests aren't actually necessary, I just thought they'd give things a little extra ''oomph'' as I wanted the sequence of events to turn Caesar into some sort of hybrid of Cincinntus and King Arthur, meaning that Caesar the idea would completely eclipse Caesar the man.
EDIT: Oh, right, an I forgot. When I wrote that Caesar had ''conquered Gaul at that point'', I didn't mean that he had finished securing the occupation. Rather, I was merely referring to the fact that he had, by this point, large defeated most of the Gallic armies in the field and thus, by extension, more than proven his aptitude for command.
Except that this region borders Italy, unlike Dacia, which makes it a bit more serious in my estimation.
Alternate Proposal
It occurs to me that I can solve all those problems by having the second conquest happen due to events taking place while Caesar is on his way back to Rome. Yes, that way, the conquest of Gaul is as close to secure as it's going to be in this quite narrow time frame.
For this to work, however, it needs to be in regards to something in Germania, as it's the only place even close to being on the way between Gaul and Rome. Suppose that the hypothetical charismatic young chieftain who would unite most or all of the tribes along the eastern bank of the Rhine that I alluded to in my earlier post were to lead his powerful new army in a campaign of conquest against the know Big Fish of the region: Rome.
So, this Chieftain (I'll call him Genseric because it amuses me) leads his host south and into Italy intent on ravaging the north of Italy and acquiring as much loot as he and his men can carry. Suppose that this Genseric, in addition to being a charismatic leader of men, proves to be an exceptionally capable commander.
Thus, when the Senate learns of the approach of the Germanic host, it dispatches a full Consular army, under the command of Marcus Claudius Marcellus (who was Consul at the end of Caesar's Pro-Consulship) to defeat the barbarian horde just as Marius had done with the Gauls the last time Rome was attacked by such a force.
However, Marcus Claudius Marcellus was no Gaius Marius, and the arrogant Consul severely underestimated both the size and effectiveness of the Germanic army. As such, not only was he defeated in the field (on open plains on a mild sunny day, no less) but, being a rather inexperienced commander, did not have the sense to order a retreat when the battle turned against him and instead ordered his men to ''fight harder'' (I'm willing to be particularly uncharitable towards a man who was so incensed at the idea of people not born in Rome being citizens that he revoked previously granted citizenship and had a ''foreign'' Senator forcibly stripped his position and scourged; mostly for not being Roman enough).
As a result of Marcellus' stubbornness, not only is the battle lost, but most of his army is destroyed, with himself numbering among the casualties as he had refused to retreat because ''Rome does not flee before barbarians''. Now, as you might imagine, this rather alarms not only the Senate, but the general populace as well. You see, due to the extend of the Roman hegemony, there weren't all that many legionaries on standby in Italia proper as, under most circumstances, they could be put to much better use in the provinces. And they had just lost a full Consular army's worth of soldiers.
So, despite an undertone of panic, it occurs to the Senate that there is a rather substantial Roman force on its way to Rome. Reasoning that they have no need to keep their word, a dispatch is sent to Caesar requesting his intervention as soon as possible, with false promises of amnesty sweetening the pot. Of course, Caesar was as Roman and the rest of them and would have intercepted the Germanic force as soon as he heard of it anyway, so he accepts the Senate's offer (while holding no illusions that it is made in good faith).
Anyway, let's say that Genseric's host get's occupied besieging (maybe sacking) a northern Italian city (Ravenna?), so Caesar has time to catch up to him before he can reach Rome. The result would be a set piece battle on the plains of northern Italy waged by Caesar with the entirety of his force at his disposal. Anyway, Caesar's legions decisively defeat Genseric's army (the man himself counts among the casualties) with relatively minimal casualties sustained on his end. That night, he prepares for the confrontation that he knows cannot be avoid.
Here is where I would place the stroke in this alternate scenario, with the following events being as in the original scenario. That being Marc Antony taking command and deciding to continue with the ''take over Rome'' plan despite it no longer being necessary
It occurs to me that I can solve all those problems by having the second conquest happen due to events taking place while Caesar is on his way back to Rome. Yes, that way, the conquest of Gaul is as close to secure as it's going to be in this quite narrow time frame.
For this to work, however, it needs to be in regards to something in Germania, as it's the only place even close to being on the way between Gaul and Rome. Suppose that the hypothetical charismatic young chieftain who would unite most or all of the tribes along the eastern bank of the Rhine that I alluded to in my earlier post were to lead his powerful new army in a campaign of conquest against the know Big Fish of the region: Rome.
So, this Chieftain (I'll call him Genseric because it amuses me) leads his host south and into Italy intent on ravaging the north of Italy and acquiring as much loot as he and his men can carry. Suppose that this Genseric, in addition to being a charismatic leader of men, proves to be an exceptionally capable commander.
Thus, when the Senate learns of the approach of the Germanic host, it dispatches a full Consular army, under the command of Marcus Claudius Marcellus (who was Consul at the end of Caesar's Pro-Consulship) to defeat the barbarian horde just as Marius had done with the Gauls the last time Rome was attacked by such a force.
However, Marcus Claudius Marcellus was no Gaius Marius, and the arrogant Consul severely underestimated both the size and effectiveness of the Germanic army. As such, not only was he defeated in the field (on open plains on a mild sunny day, no less) but, being a rather inexperienced commander, did not have the sense to order a retreat when the battle turned against him and instead ordered his men to ''fight harder'' (I'm willing to be particularly uncharitable towards a man who was so incensed at the idea of people not born in Rome being citizens that he revoked previously granted citizenship and had a ''foreign'' Senator forcibly stripped his position and scourged; mostly for not being Roman enough).
As a result of Marcellus' stubbornness, not only is the battle lost, but most of his army is destroyed, with himself numbering among the casualties as he had refused to retreat because ''Rome does not flee before barbarians''. Now, as you might imagine, this rather alarms not only the Senate, but the general populace as well. You see, due to the extend of the Roman hegemony, there weren't all that many legionaries on standby in Italia proper as, under most circumstances, they could be put to much better use in the provinces. And they had just lost a full Consular army's worth of soldiers.
So, despite an undertone of panic, it occurs to the Senate that there is a rather substantial Roman force on its way to Rome. Reasoning that they have no need to keep their word, a dispatch is sent to Caesar requesting his intervention as soon as possible, with false promises of amnesty sweetening the pot. Of course, Caesar was as Roman and the rest of them and would have intercepted the Germanic force as soon as he heard of it anyway, so he accepts the Senate's offer (while holding no illusions that it is made in good faith).
Anyway, let's say that Genseric's host get's occupied besieging (maybe sacking) a northern Italian city (Ravenna?), so Caesar has time to catch up to him before he can reach Rome. The result would be a set piece battle on the plains of northern Italy waged by Caesar with the entirety of his force at his disposal. Anyway, Caesar's legions decisively defeat Genseric's army (the man himself counts among the casualties) with relatively minimal casualties sustained on his end. That night, he prepares for the confrontation that he knows cannot be avoid.
Here is where I would place the stroke in this alternate scenario, with the following events being as in the original scenario. That being Marc Antony taking command and deciding to continue with the ''take over Rome'' plan despite it no longer being necessary
Aside from LSCatilina's comments, I was fine with everything up until this point. This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Marc Antony, aside from not having all that much power in Caesar's army at this point (at best he was just one of many legates), was much more interested in pursuing a legitimate career up the cursus honorum. Anyway, I think he wasn't even in Caesar's army by 49, instead after Aleesia he was too busy running for the augurate of 50, and then the tribuneship in 49. Besides that, Caesar's right hand man at this point is still Titus Labienus-a Republican who was a staunch Pompeian ally (which is likely how he even ended up as a legate in Caesar's army in the first place). Another legate of course is Quintus Cicero, and I think you can see why he would not want support marching on Rome.
Further more, none of the legates have anything to gain from this and everything to lose. It should be noted that from all perspectives, Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon at the time was an enormous gamble that seemed like a suicide move. Even after taking Italy Caesar's chances of ultimate success were slim to none. Even he required a lot of luck to pull through. And he did that only when, in his mind at least, there was no other option. He had been desperate to reach some kind of compromise with Pompey and the Senate, but (moreso than the likes of Cato even) the tribune Curio was instrumental in preventing that (I don't buy that he was working for Caesar, since it doesn't make sense given Caesar's goal was to reach some sort of political solution). While the possibility of marching on Rome might have been in the back of Caesar's mind, it was a possibility he clearly wanted to avoid at all costs.
Keep in mind also, in only 2 instances in the Republic did Roman soldiers march on Rome-both for similar reasons. I.e. They felt their commander had been wronged and was being punished by political enemies for no good reason. It takes a lot to get an army to march on Rome-Marc Antony of all people, who really doesn't rise above being one of many Caesarean legates until the civil war, and then happened to be lucky enough to be consul during Caesar's assassination (which was likely the major reason he had so much post-assassination power in the Caesarean camp), doesn't have a prayer of convincing the Roman army to march on Rome even if he wanted to. Antony may have been eccentric and disrespecting of institutions, but he was not a power hungry mad man.
Easy. You need another Sulla-and by that I mean a conservative dictator whose main aim is improving the Republic (whatever your opinion of Sulla, that was his aim with the reforms). Or you at least need a dictator very amenable to conservative politicians such as Cato and Cicero, who can do most of the suggesting for him.
So, paradoxically, you might need a civil war.