Aside from LSCatilina's comments, I was fine with everything up until this point. This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Marc Antony, aside from not having all that much power in Caesar's army at this point (at best he was just one of many legates), was much more interested in pursuing a legitimate career up the cursus honorum. Anyway, I think he wasn't even in Caesar's army by 49, instead after Aleesia he was too busy running for the augurate of 50, and then the tribuneship in 49. Besides that, Caesar's right hand man at this point is still Titus Labienus-a Republican who was a staunch Pompeian ally (which is likely how he even ended up as a legate in Caesar's army in the first place). Another legate of course is Quintus Cicero, and I think you can see why he would not want support marching on Rome.
Further more, none of the legates have anything to gain from this and everything to lose. It should be noted that from all perspectives, Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon at the time was an enormous gamble that seemed like a suicide move. Even after taking Italy Caesar's chances of ultimate success were slim to none. Even he required a lot of luck to pull through. And he did that only when, in his mind at least, there was no other option. He had been desperate to reach some kind of compromise with Pompey and the Senate, but (moreso than the likes of Cato even) the tribune Curio was instrumental in preventing that (I don't buy that he was working for Caesar, since it doesn't make sense given Caesar's goal was to reach some sort of political solution). While the possibility of marching on Rome might have been in the back of Caesar's mind, it was a possibility he clearly wanted to avoid at all costs.
Keep in mind also, in only 2 instances in the Republic did Roman soldiers march on Rome-both for similar reasons. I.e. They felt their commander had been wronged and was being punished by political enemies for no good reason. It takes a lot to get an army to march on Rome-Marc Antony of all people, who really doesn't rise above being one of many Caesarean legates until the civil war, and then happened to be lucky enough to be consul during Caesar's assassination (which was likely the major reason he had so much post-assassination power in the Caesarean camp), doesn't have a prayer of convincing the Roman army to march on Rome even if he wanted to. Antony may have been eccentric and disrespecting of institutions, but he was not a power hungry mad man.
I'm not sure how true that is, but I'm not particularly attached to that part, so I'm perfectly willing to jettison it. Like I said earlier, I wrote the scenario in one burst, so most of it is going to, at the very least, need a lot of tweaking.
EDIT: I feel that I should probably mention that I'm quite aware that my scenario is so outlandish that it borders on the impossible: that was the point of the exercise. As I wrote in my first response, what I think would actually happen is a return the status quo of the Senate gradually reducing the franchise. I imagine this would continue until they pressed just a little bit too far and whole provinces (along with half of Italy) start rise up in opposition to what I imagine would be increasingly hard line nativist policies on the part of the Senate.
If the Senate were to win in that scenario (which I find unlikely as they will have been stepping on the toes of most of the legions at this point), I imagine it would have to loosen their policies somewhat for such a victory to have any persistence. If the forces rising up against the Senate were to win, I doubt they would afford them the indulgence of adopting an existing Republican title like Dictator. Instead, I suspect that the result would be some form of despotism not overly dissimilar to how the Emperors would operate after the crisis of the third century. I must admit, I'm quite unwilling to speculate further and I've already done quite a bit more than I'm entirely comfortable with without further research.
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