WI: Caesar Killed in Gaul?

Aside from LSCatilina's comments, I was fine with everything up until this point. This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Marc Antony, aside from not having all that much power in Caesar's army at this point (at best he was just one of many legates), was much more interested in pursuing a legitimate career up the cursus honorum. Anyway, I think he wasn't even in Caesar's army by 49, instead after Aleesia he was too busy running for the augurate of 50, and then the tribuneship in 49. Besides that, Caesar's right hand man at this point is still Titus Labienus-a Republican who was a staunch Pompeian ally (which is likely how he even ended up as a legate in Caesar's army in the first place). Another legate of course is Quintus Cicero, and I think you can see why he would not want support marching on Rome.

Further more, none of the legates have anything to gain from this and everything to lose. It should be noted that from all perspectives, Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon at the time was an enormous gamble that seemed like a suicide move. Even after taking Italy Caesar's chances of ultimate success were slim to none. Even he required a lot of luck to pull through. And he did that only when, in his mind at least, there was no other option. He had been desperate to reach some kind of compromise with Pompey and the Senate, but (moreso than the likes of Cato even) the tribune Curio was instrumental in preventing that (I don't buy that he was working for Caesar, since it doesn't make sense given Caesar's goal was to reach some sort of political solution). While the possibility of marching on Rome might have been in the back of Caesar's mind, it was a possibility he clearly wanted to avoid at all costs.

Keep in mind also, in only 2 instances in the Republic did Roman soldiers march on Rome-both for similar reasons. I.e. They felt their commander had been wronged and was being punished by political enemies for no good reason. It takes a lot to get an army to march on Rome-Marc Antony of all people, who really doesn't rise above being one of many Caesarean legates until the civil war, and then happened to be lucky enough to be consul during Caesar's assassination (which was likely the major reason he had so much post-assassination power in the Caesarean camp), doesn't have a prayer of convincing the Roman army to march on Rome even if he wanted to. Antony may have been eccentric and disrespecting of institutions, but he was not a power hungry mad man.

I'm not sure how true that is, but I'm not particularly attached to that part, so I'm perfectly willing to jettison it. Like I said earlier, I wrote the scenario in one burst, so most of it is going to, at the very least, need a lot of tweaking.

EDIT: I feel that I should probably mention that I'm quite aware that my scenario is so outlandish that it borders on the impossible: that was the point of the exercise. As I wrote in my first response, what I think would actually happen is a return the status quo of the Senate gradually reducing the franchise. I imagine this would continue until they pressed just a little bit too far and whole provinces (along with half of Italy) start rise up in opposition to what I imagine would be increasingly hard line nativist policies on the part of the Senate.

If the Senate were to win in that scenario (which I find unlikely as they will have been stepping on the toes of most of the legions at this point), I imagine it would have to loosen their policies somewhat for such a victory to have any persistence. If the forces rising up against the Senate were to win, I doubt they would afford them the indulgence of adopting an existing Republican title like Dictator. Instead, I suspect that the result would be some form of despotism not overly dissimilar to how the Emperors would operate after the crisis of the third century. I must admit, I'm quite unwilling to speculate further and I've already done quite a bit more than I'm entirely comfortable with without further research.
 
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I'm apparently still stuck on this idea

So, I've been thinking about a more plausible aftermath to Caesar dying from that stroke after defeating Genseric's army. I've alluded to it before but, with Caesar no longer being alive to cause trouble and given how popular a figure he is likely to be with the masses after not only conquering the ancient enemies of Rome (the Gauls) but defending Rome itself from the barbarian hordes, I tend to think it's fair to assume that most Senators would (in public, at least) pretend they never had a problem with Caesar at all and quietly put the matter of arresting him to rest.

Now, with that minor matter not being a problem, the subject of who was to be Caesar's heir would have to be addressed. Now, legally, this is open and shut: Octavian is not only Caesar's adopted son, but he is explicitly named in his will as his heir. However, we know from history that this is something that Marc Antony would be willing to press his disagreement with such a decision with force of arms, if necessary. He wouldn't be fighting against Rome, of course, just the sickly boy who had the sheer gall to claim the be the heir to the mighty Caesar Imperator.

Now, I've put quite a bit of thought into slydessertfox's objection and I've come to the conclusion that he's almost certainly right: Marc Antony openly marching on Rome is not something that would happen. Brutally violent partisan infighting, however? That had been the norm in Roman politics ever since Marius had come and gone. Yes, I tend to think that any civil war taking place here would be at least partially clandestine.

See, while neither Ocatvian or Marc Antony could expect to get themselves named dictator for life (especially considering how young they both were), being publicly recognized as Caesar's heir would be just the sort of asset one might use to say, get elected Consul and never stop running. I mean, the precedent had been set at this point (If I've got my figures straight, Sulla was Consul 7 times); this was something a Roman politician could conceivably do.

In this scenario, I have to imagine that, with his claim being the legal one, Octavian would likely draw support from the Optimates and the upper class in general while Marc Antony, who would likely be making a claim on some easily farmed for political attacks matter of principle and draw support from the Populares and the Plebs.

If the above supposition is applied, I can see Octavian not initially anticipating that his claim could be questioned (because legal, it couldn't) and I could see Marc Antony taking advantage of that to voice his opposition to the succession somewhere nice and public, with lots of plebs around.

After publicly contesting Octavian's status as the heir of Caesar, Marc Antony would be very unlikely to back down on the issue (he didn't in OTL). But, as was mentioned earlier, Octavian would almost certainly have the backing of the Optimates in such a scenario. This would mean that Marc Antony would be forced to look for other possible power bases.

Now, with the position h'es backed himself into, I tend to think that Marc Antony's best option would be populism. Campaigning for the restoration of some (or all) of the powers of the Tribunes of the Plebs, arguing against the revocations of citizenship the Senate had been indulging in for the past few years (I imagine this would be a nice popular issue), arguing against Senators being required to belong to a Patrician family and so on.

Now, normally, demagoguery along these lines would get a man stabbed (see the Grachii brothers), but Marc Antony is likely to have a hell of a lot of support in the legions at this point (we know that quite a few of Caesar's men agreed with the idea that he was the more appropriate successor in OTL, so he must have been quite popular among the rank and file). This means that he'd have a fairly easy time acquiring a fairly effective and substantial bodyguard of ''retired'' legionnaires who just happen to live in the same house as him.

Anyway, I'm unwilling to go any further than this tentative set-up before running it by a bunch of people (I fully admit that I'm pretty much brainstorming), so I'll stop here for now. Thoughts?
 
I'm not entirely sure Octavian was in Caesar's will at this time (or, rather, I should say not in Caesar's will as the main recipient). Actually, I'm not sure there was a main recipient at this time. I don't remember where I read this, but IIRC, Pompey may have been in Caesar's will, at least until Julia's death. I'm pretty certain the Decimus and Marcus Brutus would also be in the will and Octavian will probably receive a much more minor part of the will.

That said, Caesar's will is much less important this time around. It was so crucial at Caesar's death OTL, because by then he had already established himself as dictator, and of course he had been murdered-whoever was the main recipient of his private will could use that to win over the support of the army against the murderers and use it to their advantage for establishing control themselves. Here, it's main use is just the prestige of being an heir of Caesar (I guess in a similar light, it can be compared to, say, the prestige of being a child/stepchild of Sulla).
 
During the invasion of Gaul, would Caesar even have met Octavius??? He has so many other relations, including Mark Antony (a distant cousin) and Quintus Paedius (a nephew methinks, actually named alongside Octavius in the OTL will) who both served in Gaul. Either one of them could have been named in the will at the time, aside from the likes of Decimus or Marcus Brutus.

Gaius Octavius would be just another aristocrat if Caesar died in Gaul, his career will depend on his mother Atia's husband, his stepfather. Likely his friend Agrippa will end up as just a minor equestrian, unless he finds a patron who can exploit his military talents.
 
Except that this region borders Italy, unlike Dacia, which makes it a bit more serious in my estimation.

Well, Dacia was on the verge of bordering Italy in the early -50's, and it's one of the reason why Caesar may have been appointed in Illyria in first place, before Burebista turned back to east and Black Sea.
Even after the fragmentation of his kingdom, you had regular Roman campaigns in the region : under Crassus the Younger, Augustus, Domitian, Trajan, etc.

On the other hand, I don't think Gallic confederations would have bordered Italy at all. Even Helvetii (if they don't remain in Roman control or clientele) didn't have access to alpine passes would have they wanted to threaten the Cisalpina.
Narbonensis would remain as a relativly efficient and wealthy buffer region, not mentioning the still likely possibility to see Rome playing one confederation against another (as Aedui against Arverni).

Do you think a greater will to attempt to deal with at least some of the Germanic tribes might be more plausible?
Depends how you put it. Germans, as clearly distinguished from Gauls (Belgians or not) is essentially a Cesarian conceptual product, in order to present Gaul as a pretty much geographically determined cultural entity and to pose himself as the defender of Gallic peoples rather than their conqueror.

It's why he presented Ariovist presence as a foreign invasion, definitely disregarding how these Suebi (whom it's not sure that they were the same than later ones to begin with) had important celtic features (it can be argued that German peoples knew a huge influence from Celts).

While transrhenan entities weren't the norm, they existed and transrhenan contacts even more : a powerful "German" (in the geographical sense that, again, Caesar was the first to really formalize) entity would certainly be present on both sides of the Rhine, with the general limitating himself to the Rhine.

You could arguably see more transrhenan expeditions, but essentially as establishing clientele as in Britain IOTL.

I've close read Da Bella Gallica more than once, but I'm afraid I was foolish to loan it to a friend of mine and haven't seen it in years, so I'm a bit rusty on the details.
De Bello Gallico should be taken with a grain of salt to say the least. Caesar doesn't make a work of history, sociology or ethnography. It's an account of operations, heavily loaded with political points and hugely hagiographic.

Later historians accounts, if less complete, should be as much as possible used in conjunction.

meaning that Caesar the idea would completely eclipse Caesar the man
In the order of things in Late Republican context, that would be the case anyway after his death : but as long he's successful, he'll survive and raise again.
An anti-climatic death, à la Alexander, is still possible though. But there you'd need someone to pull the same hagiography Tacitus did for Africola, to defend its legacy in order to counterbalance the lack of "master of the known world" aura.

EDIT: I was merely referring to the fact that he had, by this point, large defeated most of the Gallic armies in the field and thus, by extension, more than proven his aptitude for command.

I must again temper by pointing out he didn't defeated either allies as Aedui or Pictones or more neutral groups as Arverni and Trevirii. That he demonstrated his abilities and prestige in Gaul is out of question of course, but the situation wasn't that overwhelming as it was proven by the succeeding rebellions after -55.
 
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I take that you are less than fond of Caesar. It's just that you seem to systematically adopt the worst possible interpretation of his actions. Mind you, I fully acknowledge that I (for the most part) do the opposite, but I'm beginning to suspect that you just don't like the idea.

Which is entirely sensible, because this is a silly, outlandish premise based entirely on the fact that I was trying to find a way to make Caesar dying in Gaul have consequences anything like as interesting as what actually happened.

Actually, I find this is a fairly consistent problem in timelines involving the Late Republic and early Principate. Frankly, I find that period of history so compelling that I'm to fiddle with it too much as I tend to find doing so to be a bit of a waste of time and energy.
 
I take that you are less than fond of Caesar. It's just that you seem to systematically adopt the worst possible interpretation of his actions. Mind you, I fully acknowledge that I (for the most part) do the opposite, but I'm beginning to suspect that you just don't like the idea.

Ah, the famous "you don't agree with me because you don't like my idea/character/everything safe acknowledging that you may disagree on non-personnal grounds" argument.

I don't really see what makes you think that pointing out Caesar didn't tried to make an unbiased account is "you systematically adopt the worst possible interpretation" (critically when it's a very generalized position on this), except trying to picture me (and not my points) as "systematically opposed" to you.

I could point a similar prevention in Roman authors, such as Dio Cassius, but frankly I don't want to debate against ad hominem argumentation.

So, if it makes your day : yes, I'm "systematically" opposed to your idea because I don't like Caesar. :rolleyes:
 
Ah, the famous "you don't agree with me because you don't like my idea/character/everything safe acknowledging that you may disagree on non-personnal grounds" argument.

I don't really see what makes you think that pointing out Caesar didn't tried to make an unbiased account is "you systematically adopt the worst possible interpretation" (critically when it's a very generalized position on this), except trying to picture me (and not my points) as "systematically opposed" to you.

I could point a similar prevention in Roman authors, such as Dio Cassius, but frankly I don't want to debate against ad hominem argumentation.

So, if it makes your day : yes, I'm "systematically" opposed to your idea because I don't like Caesar. :rolleyes:

What? I'm not accusing you of any wrongdoing, I was just getting the impression that you genuinely didn't think much of the premise. Which would make sense, because the premise is silly. If I caused offense, then I apologize.

Listen, I'm not about to attack someone for finding fault with something I wrote in a single sitting while making things up as I went along. That would be stupid. Of course the scenario doesn't work: I came up with it in less than an hour while waiting for my next class to start with nothing but google for a reference. I can hardly expect to have produced something decent when I haven't actually, you know, worked on it.

P.S. As I write this, it occurs to me that this could be read as my attempting to deflect blame for the faults in my writing with the ''I didn't really try'' excuse. I promise you, this is nothing of the sort and merely an admission of sloth an impatience.

EDIT: In retrospect, I shouldn't have used the word ''systematically'' in my post earlier. I didn't mean to imply that you were anything less than sincere in your criticisms, but I can easily see how it could be read that way. I apologize again for my poor choice of words.

EDIT 2: Also, in regards to your point about Caesar not being a historian, one could easily argue that a good portion of the Roman historians were closer to gossip mongers than the modern understanding of a historian, so I tend to think that documents intend for internal consumption (like Caesar's report of his time in Gaul, for example) more interesting and that they tend to offer a good deal of unintended insight into the thought process of those who wrote them. I seem to recall that Cassius Dio usually made a good faith attempt at accuracy, but he was writing centuries after the fact, so...
 
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Fair enough, then.

I assure you, I don't think your idea is stupid or anything that I could judge entirely, especially the part on Late Republican Rome that I carefully avoided to comment (simply because I don't know enough to really contradict you or other posters), while I focused a bit on Gaul because I know a bit more than the other part of your TL.

I'm sorry if you took my posts as dismissing of your idea as such, but it wasn't the case : I tried to comment it as "This precise part may not work, because..."

It's not that I like or dislike Caesar (to be honest, I've no hard feeling one way or another on him, safe an interest for the man and historical aura) but simply that his work is not to be taken as a genuine account.

It does avoid huge misinformation on details or battles, mostly because these would have been immediately pointed out by his political enemies (some where, so it may be that the general took some liberties with reality anyway), but Caesar is a skilled orator, and his mastering of literary devices to picture himself on favourable light show this.

For example, he inflates the number of Gauls in really impressive proportion (at least ten of thousands) while everytime pointing that's according someone else. If he's wrong, it's not his fault.
In the same time he prevents to really give numbers for Romans, whatever in order of battle or casualties, hand waving them quickly.

Suetonius said:
Asinius Pollio thinks that they were put together somewhat carelessly and without strict regard for truth; since in many cases Caesar was too ready to believe the accounts which others gave of their actions, and gave a perverted account of his own, either designedly or perhaps from forgetfulness; and he thinks that he intended to rewrite and revise them.

Even later roman historians wondered about the "not my fault, they forced me to do it" and rather saw a more...active responsibility.

Dio Cassius said:
Now Ariovistus was the ruler of those Germans; his authority had been confirmed by the Romans and he had been enrolled among their friends and allies by Caesar himself during his consulship. In comparison, however, with the glory to be derived from the war and the power which that glory would bring, the Roman general heeded none of these considerations, except in so far as he wished to get some excuse for the quarrel from the barbarian, so that he should not appear to be in any way the aggressor against Ariovistus.

Therefore he sent for him, pretending that he wished to have a conference with him. Ariovistus, instead of obeying, replied: "If Caesar wishes to say anything to me, let him come to me himself. I am not inferior to him, anyway, and the man who has need of another should himself go to that person."

Thereupon Caesar became angry on the ground that he had thereby insulted all the Romans, and he immediately demanded of him the hostages of the allies and forbade him either to set foot on their land or to bring any reinforcements from home.

This he did, not with the idea of scaring him, but because he hoped to enrage him and by that means to gain a good and plausible pretext for the war. And this was what happened.

The barbarian, angered by these demands, made a long and harsh reply, so that Caesar no longer bandied words with him, but straightway, before any one was aware of his intentions, seized on Vesontio, the city of the Sequani.

(Yes, Dio Cassius is a later author, but he bases himself on other contemporary authors, or at least close to the era concerned, whom copies are lost nowadays.)

And for what mattered fields largely ignored by Romans, Caesar could break free (while Poseidonios made an account about independent southern Gaul that he personally travelled in some decades before the conquest, and that Caesar extensively used and systematized even where it was not that relevant).

The whole distinction between Germans and Gaul, for example, doesn't really exist before Caesar, and seems at least partially contradicted by toponimy, onomastics or material culture (as in in the sense of at least, a not that noticable difference, if not outright Celtic looking features)
There was probably some form of distinction, of course, but the Celtic world didn't ended at the Rhine and Germanic peoples were essentially seen as defined geographically : once Caesar defines arbitrary Gaul as bordered by the Rhine, everything outside becomes German and some peoples inside Gaul pictured as "from German origin"

(Romans would still be at odds with ethnographic situation later, assuming that Vandals were Celts by the IIIrd century)

Again, it's not being not fond of Caesar for me (if something, I think it's admirable : I don't know many people whom can be said that they made up an entire regional entity from scratch and made it a reality for centuries. He was a mix of Cecil Rhodes and Pericles).

But when we writes DBG, he does make it in a particular perspective : justifying the cost of the conquest, presenting Gaul as a relatively unified, wealthy and semi-civilized (then proper to be romanized) province; compared to "true" Barbarians as Germans, endlessly threatening Gaul whom Romans should be the benevolent and interested protectors (giving the fortunes Romans made in Transalpina before the conquest, it's surely found an echo).

Caesar simply tends to not talk about more complex situations, for example the presence of Vercingetorix among Romans (as auxiliary) before -53/-52.
Or (and again, proving his literary skills), using similar vocabulary and phraseology against the -52 revolt than Cicero used against Catilina (introducting it as a conjuration, led by powerful and ambitious men).

Taking the work genuinely as such may be unwise, at least confronting it with ancient authors may be more useful.

Now I know that you had to make your TL quickly : I don't expect anyone to swallow up Caesar, Dio Cassius, Strabo and fragments of Pollonios, Poseidonios, etc. overnight just for writing a paragraph on a thread with a short life expectancy

I'm just pointing out (having ran on these relativly recently), to answer your concern regarding your idea, that Caesar could have certainly did more in Germany but that it should have been coherent with his IOTL perspective (or either butterflying it, but that may provoke too many unwanted changes IYTL) and to a more complex situation than he describe.

You have another possibility, as with a skilled hagiographer : having one of the Julio-Claudian turning scholar, and writing a favourable account of Caesar as did Tacitus for Agricola, especially if it's made in the wake of another campaign in Gaul.
I don't know if it's why you search though, and as I said above, I won't go in the Late Republican consequences that I simply don't know enough to comment.
 

Honestly, I tend to be skeptical of accusations that Caesar will have been either deliberately deceitful or even outright lying in his accounts, if only because that would have been rather uncharacteristic of him. This is a man who refused to obfuscate his intent and actions to the point where it may well have been his greatest flaw.

It's quite likely that the numbers of the enemy forces are exaggerated (if only because that was standard practice for ancient historians), but I tend to think we can be reasonably confident of his sincerity when he describes the reasoning behind his decisions. For one thing, he's quite candid about the fact that ''driving off the foreign invaders'' line was a fabrication of his. Divide and conquer and all that.

I also admit that, when writing even trivial fiction in historical settings, I tend to find excessive historical rigor unnecessary. In fact, for the most part, I find that a pronounced focus on accuracy tends to be a medium for pretensions of intellectual credentials where what is actually being done is the writing of a work of fiction and not a scholarly work. Naturally, this perspective tends to colour my opinions on most alternate history propositions; especially the silly ones.

Also, it's not like Caesar's actions in Gaul were the hastily done rush job you might expect under his time limit. In fact, my understanding was that it was often held up as a rather extraordinary military achievement.

Either way, I'm probably done with this scenario as going any further would almost certainly turn into work.
 
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