TLIA(F)D: La Dauphine - The Short Presidency of Kiki Bokassa Deeb

LA DAUPHINE

THE SHORT PRESIDENCY
OF KIKI BOKASSA DEEB

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Another one, so soon?

Hey, you gave me the idea.

What, when?

In our last conversation, when you asked if I was doing one about the Central African Republic.

Only you would take me up on that.

Someone has to.

All right, enlighten me.

My first thought was to do one in which the 1959 plane crash didn’t happen…

Wait a minute – Buddy Holly, Ritchie Valens and the Big Bopper were in Central Africa?

Not that crash, the one a month later where Barthelemy Boganda was killed.

Oh, the day the Prime Minister died. But you had another thought?

Yes, I remembered Kiki Bokassa Deeb, children’s book author and conceptual artist… and in TTL, more.

Bokassa. That name sounds familiar.

She’s his daughter.

So it’s a redemption story?

After a fashion.

I notice you’re hedging your bets about how long this one will take.

I have a Malê Rising update to finish. Besides, with the last one, I ended up writing 8000 words in 48 hours. This one’s likely to be shorter, but I still want to space it out more and let the discussion unfold over a longer time.

Starting when?

Tomorrow.
 

L’IMPÉRATRICE


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Wherever Kiki goes, a crowd follows. “Dauphine,” they call her, and sometimes “princesse” or even “impératrice.” Few call her “madame la présidente.” Maybe it’s easier to think of her as a princess than a head of state.

Some call her father’s name as well as her own. “People heard of this place in the emperor’s time,” says a young woman named Solange who is far too young to have remembered that time. “There weren’t all the civil wars then,” adds a man in castoff army trousers and a black T-shirt, whose name I don’t catch.

That people are actually nostalgic for Jean-Bédel Bokassa’s reign is a sign of how far the Central African Republic has fallen. People did hear of the place during his time, but not at all in a good way. A distant cousin of the CAR’s founding father Barthélemy Boganda, Bokassa seized power on New Year’s Day 1966, and ten years later declared himself the first Emperor of the Central African Empire. He ruled amid absurd Napoleonic pomp, and his coronation, taking place a full year into his reign, would have bankrupted the country had not France footed most of the bill.

His fall began with a shockingly petty instance of financial peculation: the 1979 award of an school-uniform monopoly to a company owned by one of his wives. When schoolchildren protested the expensive uniforms on the streets of the capital, he had more than a hundred killed, and, if later court testimony is accurate, murdered several of them personally. Within a few months, French troops were on the streets of Bangui and Bokassa’s cousin David Dacko, who he had overthrown, was once again in power.

Dacko’s second presidency proved even shorter than his first: by the time Bokassa made his quixotic return to Bangui in 1986, the country was ruled by André Kolingba. A trial was hastily organized by a government that had never expected him to return, and he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but Kolingba commuted the sentence to life imprisonment and eventually let him go. He died alone in his home village in 1996, claiming that he was the thirteenth apostle of Jesus and that he’d had secret meetings with the Pope.

So much for the father, then, but what about the daughter?

Her background is easily stated. Marie-Ange Bokassa Deeb is the twenty-sixth of Bokassa’s forty-plus children, born in Paris in 1975 to his eleventh wife Alda Adriano Geday, herself the daughter of a naturalized Beirut casino director and his Egyptian Jewish wife. She spent her earliest years in Central Africa, but has few memories of that time; after the emperor’s fall, she lived in Paris again and eventually in her mother’s homeland of Lebanon, where she married and had a son. She talks little about her father except simply to say that he was her father: she doesn’t defend his memory, but asks the world to accept that a man who was a ruthless dictator might also be a loving parent.

Four years ago, Kiki, as she is universally called, was known largely within the Lebanese art scene. She is a self-taught conceptual artist who has worked in an eclectic range of media, perhaps best known for editing a celebrity children’s book and painting in public for 72 uninterrupted hours. She was a co-founder of a Beirut-based group promoting social change through art, and she traveled widely in Europe and the Middle East in support of that cause.

How she went from there to the presidency of the poorest country on earth is, perhaps, another sign of how far that state has fallen.

In 2011, Kiki was invited to Bangui by the then-minister of youth, sports and culture – her half-brother Jean-Serge, newly elected to the National Assembly – to promote cultural links between the CAR and Lebanon. She arrived in the midst of protests over the re-election of President François Bozizé, who had originally taken power in a military coup and who had fought bush wars in the hinterland for most of his time in office. Something – as with many of her inspirations, she still isn’t sure what – impelled her to join the protests, and she did so in the most public manner possible: she staged a performance-art piece in the Place de la République depicting the nation symbolically bound and gagged. The result was a two-month prison sentence and the beginning of her involvement in Bangui civil society.

As in Lebanon, her primary focus was human rights through art. This would seem a quixotic enterprise in a nation where artistic expression is several steps up Maslow’s hierarchy from the needs of a great majority of people – but, she says, this is exactly why she did it. “The only way to convince people there is more,” she explains, “is to show them what that more can be.”

Maybe she is right, at least after a fashion. Art did little to stop the CAR’s downward spiral, but one would have to be a cynic to say it did nothing. When the mostly-Muslim Séléka militia drove Bozizé from power and the nation descended into civil war between them and the Christian Anti-Balaka (anti-machete) factions, she held artistic “peace camps” to which fighters from both sides were invited. Few attended, but of those who did, most renounced violence.

“People say I was foolish for focusing on one person at a time – they say that was less than a drop in the ocean,” she admits. “Maybe I was. But we can never discount the soul of one person. The nation is nothing but the people in it.”

She would ultimately prove that in ways that went beyond art. By late 2013, with hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Christians forced to flee their homes, the African Union was warning of an incipient genocide, and in December, sectarian riots convulsed the capital. Kiki, a Christian like the majority of people in Bangui, opened her home to Muslim refugees, sheltering hundreds, and made an appeal to Beirut that raised more than a million dollars to protect and house others.

That was a far more dangerous enterprise than protesting Bozizé’s fraud and repression: her life was in danger on several occasions before the riots finally subsided. But unlike her performance art, she knows exactly why she turned her house and garden into a sanctuary. “I’m part Lebanese,” she says. “I know what civil war is like, sect against sect. I grew up on stories of people who hid from men with guns and knives. When it happened here, what I had to do was obvious.”

Obvious or not, it made Kiki a political actor in the CAR. And when Séléka leader Michel Djotodia resigned the presidency in January 2014, leaving the country without a leader, she learned exactly how much of an actor she had become: to almost everyone’s surprise, not least her own, she was named interim head of state in his place.

One might well ask why. As I speak with her in the garden of the presidential palace, it becomes clear that her artistic idealism has made her politically naïve – something that was proven early in her presidency when a mob lynched a suspected Séléka militiaman just blocks from where she was making a speech about peace. I sense that she is mostly a symbol, and that the African Union is doing the heavy lifting of brokering a peace deal, just as troops from the African Union, France, and amazingly Lebanon are patrolling the cities and keeping what fragile peace exists.

Still, as a symbol, Kiki is a powerful one. She is undeniably popular, and even her strongest detractors acknowledge that her actions during the 2013 riots were heroic. With the Bokassa name, she is forgiven even for being half-Lebanese. Few Central Africans love the Lebanese, who are a merchant minority in the CAR as they are throughout the region, but they acknowledge Kiki, who speaks fluent Sango and Mbaka, as one of their own.

Maybe the National Assembly believed that a symbol was what the country needed: that the conflict had progressed to the point where it could no longer be resolved by ordinary politics.

If so, Kiki would agree. She freely acknowledges her Lebanese heritage and mentions it often in speeches, again emphasizing the similarities of her two homelands’ conflicts and insisting that the lessons of Lebanon are applicable in the CAR. “If we could make peace even while fighting an occupation,” she says, “anyone can make peace. But we also have to be sure not to make a temporary peace. Temporary peace is only another word for permanent war. We have to settle everything, or we settle nothing.”

That is a tall order for a president whose term is limited to one year and whose remit is only to make peace and organize elections. But she has ideas: a truth and reconciliation commission, staged return of refugees, jobs and counseling for demobilized soldiers, support for displaced children, a professional and nonpartisan gendarmerie to take the place of the army, and art, always art. She is willing to let the African Union handle the nuts and bolts of the peace process, but she is determined to be its soul.

She may get her chance. Three and a half months ago, the Séléka and Anti-Balaka signed a cease-fire, and thus far, it has mostly held. Little has changed on the ground – the militias haven’t yet disarmed, and refugees are too frightened to return to villages under the fighters’ control – but the African Union troops have begun to collect weapons, and Kiki has secured promises of international funding for some of her initiatives.

Looking out on the streets that surround the presidential palace, it’s hard to imagine that such things might make a difference. Kiki may believe in fighting for one person at a time, but there are four million desperately poor ones in the Central African Republic, and scarcity and hopelessness will always fight against their better natures no matter what food for the soul is offered. Nothing has saved the CAR yet, and many would say that nothing can.

But by that token, maybe Kiki has as much of a chance as anyone else.
 
Oh... Oooooooooooooooooohhh.... :eek:

This TL is... well, just saying that it is a JE's TL sums it up I guess.
I had no idea of who Kiki Bokassa is and... well, that's on of these life stories that appear more fitting to a novel than to reality. Fascinating.
 
First of all, thanks again to everyone who expressed interest. The reason I write about these things is that I like to talk about them.

This is amazing. Had no idea who this woman was

I had no idea of who Kiki Bokassa is and... well, that's on of these life stories that appear more fitting to a novel than to reality. Fascinating.

Few people have heard of her - the former Central African Emperor married women from Europe, Vietnam and the Middle East as well as Africa, and I suspect that even AH.com's royal historians would have a hard time keeping track of all the branches of the House of Bokassa. And yes, her life story is amazing and, from all appearances, she seems to be a genuinely good person.

At any rate, her obscurity is sort of the point. The POD involves her coming to stay in the Central African Republic in 2011, resulting in her becoming a civil society figure and political actor in spite of herself, and then being chosen as a compromise president on the basis that she's at least above the fray.

She's filling the shoes filled by Catherine Samba-Panza in OTL, and where she doesn't have Samba-Panza's political experience, she also has less of an ego.

There are limits, of course, to what she or anyone can accomplish. The CAR is desperately poor, its infrastructure is bad to nonexistent, and it has endured a decade of bush war, so with a 2011 POD, and even a second coming of Boganda would find that situation hard to handle. Any changes to the country are likely to be either minor or prospective. On the other hand, the changes to individual lives could be profound - and as Tractate Sanhedrin says, a person who saves one life is considered to have saved the entire world.

EDIT: I should add, just for clarity, that everything the update says that Kiki did in the CAR is fictional - I have no doubt that she would have done such things, but in OTL she hasn't. She has visited the CAR but has never returned to live there, and continues to do artistic and civil society work in Lebanon. Everything up to 2011 is true (at least as far as I can ascertain) but from 2011 on, her biography is completely different.

On the other hand, the overall political picture in the Central African Republic is the same as OTL up to January 2014, with only slight variation due to Kiki's participation in events. The real political changes begin with her election as interim president.
 
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Subscribed before the real post just because I knew it was you doing this; I've also been looking at other threads you've started behind my back. Your talent is exceeded only by your modesty!:rolleyes: I did see a few of them but didn't notice they were started by you, and I missed the French Gabon story completely.:(

Is this a timeline in a single post then? Or will there be more story? When the title said the Presidency would be "short" I feared the worst for Kiki, now I see that those are the terms she takes her symbolic "power" under, and makes the most of them. But that doesn't rule out something happening to curtail it even shorter.:eek: Knowing it's your story, I can hope not.

But not be certain. All I'm sure of is, if something nasty happens to her, there will be a deeper meaning to come out of it.
 
I missed the French Gabon story completely.:(

That story's over, but that doesn't mean the conversation is. As I said, I write about these things because I like talking about them, and if you have any thoughts, it's certainly not too late to share them.

Is this a timeline in a single post then? Or will there be more story? When the title said the Presidency would be "short" I feared the worst for Kiki, now I see that those are the terms she takes her symbolic "power" under, and makes the most of them.

A Timeline In A Post is a nice TL :D

This won't be a timeline in a post - as presently planned, there will be four more, taking the story to various parts of Bangui and the CAR. The next one, for instance, will take place at Bangui km5, and we'll get a visit in to Bouar and its nearby pre-Bantu megaliths as well as a couple of other locations.

As for the short presidency: Kiki is time-limited the same way Catherine Samba-Panza is IOTL, in that her term is set at one year and she isn't allowed to run in the upcoming elections. The story will take place over just a few days of time.
 
K-CINQ

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Bangui has two centers. There is the civic center near the river where the banks and parliament are, the place the French built for themselves when they ruled Central Africa. And there is the real center, the old native quarter three miles up the Avenue Boganda, a zone of street markets and bars and shabby stores that is called Kilometre 5 on the maps but which Bangui’s citizens call K-Cinq.

K-Cinq was a rough neighborhood in the best of times, and the past two years have been far from good. When Séléka took power, militiamen roamed these streets committing robbery and extortion, sacking shops and even the nearby Church of the Fatima. The fall of the Djotodia government was payback time: mobs enacted harsh reprisals on anyone suspected of being a member of Séléka, which in practice meant any Muslim. Mosques were put to the torch, lynchings were carried out in broad daylight, and the Church of the Fatima – now a shelter for Muslims fleeing from their homes – came under attack again, this time by Christian Anti-Balaka fighters. The building still bears the scars of the assault, in which twenty people were killed – something that might as easily have happened to Kiki Bokassa had she not lived in a more fashionable part of town and had money to hire private guards.

Now, the ethnic violence has mostly subsided and the victims’ bodies have been buried, but the legacy of the conflict remains. As I enter the main roundabout, accompanied by a guide – I’ve been told that K-Cinq isn’t safe for foreigners even in the daytime – there are wounded beggars crouched in the marketplace and the minibus lot, and charred hulks of stores that were abandoned during the troubles and never reoccupied. The beggars, and others made homeless during the fighting, live there.

And as Marie-Laure, one of the market-women, confides, there are also many fewer Muslims. “There was a butcher who sold chickens to me,” she says. “He killed them the right way so I could sell them as halal. But he’s gone. When Séléka fell, the Anti-Balaka killed his cousins, and he took his family and went north.”

I ask whether the butcher himself was Séléka, and Marie-Laure shrugs. “What difference is there?”

But, like many others, she has no desire for revenge. What the market-women want is for things to return to normal, or at least as normal as they were before the civil war. She greets both Christian and Muslim customers cheerfully – there are still some of the latter, as evidenced by a battered mosque just visible on a side street – and banters with them about rising prices and politics and the foreigners who have become rife since the African Union intervened. “Look!” she calls as an armored vehicle full of Senegalese soldiers pushes its way through the square. “The police!”

The customers laugh with her, but there’s an edge to their merriment. Actual police are as rare as diamond rings in this part of Bangui – most of them fled during the troubles, and the chain of command collapsed altogether. The African Union soldiers are all the police that exist; they break up mobs and stop lynchings, but the market-women have to defend themselves from thieves.

That may not be true much longer, though, as I find out when Marie-Laure draws my attention to a group of young men jogging in formation through the square, dressed in black T-shirts and fatigue pants of mottled black, white and gray. “Police auxiliaries,” she says. I’ve heard of them: unemployed youths recruited from the streets, working for food and clothing and a little pocket money, hoping that the best of them might get hired when the professional police force is rebuilt.

I point to the swarthy officer leading them, and Marie-Laure identifies him as Boutros, “from the Beirut police brigade.” Her voice shows none of the disdain ordinarily given to Lebanese; she’s seen him training the men, and has nothing but respect for him and the African Union officers who fill out the rest of the police cadre. She expresses that respect in a typically ironic way, though. “Kiki’s three miracles,” she says: “a Senegalese teaching discipline to the police, a Nigerian teaching them honesty and a Lebanese teaching them peace.”

The customers and neighboring market-women laugh at that sally and I take my leave, following my guide to where Boutros is putting his recruits through calisthenics. He waves at them to fall out and get a drink of water and sits on a nearby 55-gallon drum, inviting me to make myself comfortable on another one.

He is, he explains, a Lebanese Internal Security officer with family in the United States, who has studied American community policing theories and was the liaison for one of the art classes that Kiki brought to the Beirut youth prison. He began his career here by walking the streets alone, offering recruitment to skeptical street youths and ex-militiamen, and now has a force of over a thousand.

“The first recruits are almost done with their training,” he says. “I have them patrolling quieter areas, but I should start sending them out here in a couple of weeks. I want to make sure I leaven them, though, before I send them out on their own.”

“Leavening,” as Boutros calls it, consists of making sure the auxiliary units have a moral compass. He’s already decreed that Christian and Muslim recruits will train and patrol together – “in my country, we know what happens when you get sectarian forces” – but he also wants to add older men and even women.

“Young men together – you know what they can be,” he says, and indeed, patrol units have been accused of supplementing their low pay with robberies. “Put someone in with them who can stare them down, though, and it’s another story. Umaru and I” – he’s referring to Umaru Manko, lately commander of the Lagos police battalion and a fellow auxiliary commander – “want to attach a couple of soldiers to each unit when they go out to make sure they don’t get into trouble. But when the soldiers leave, the units need to have fathers – men who they respect. I make them eat meals with the people and the shopkeepers already, but they need fathers of their own. Women too. They won’t gang up on a woman if one of their own women is watching.”

Boutros seems somewhat optimistic. Two meals a day and a pocket-money allowance twice a month appears unlikely to stave off corruption, especially since many of the auxiliaries are no strangers to street crime. What might happen to the people they arrest, with no functioning courts to try them, is also a problem, and one that Boutros himself admits must be solved later. But on the other hand, he knows his men better than I do.

Maybe he sees the skepticism in my face, because he waves his squad up and leads me, with them, onto a back street. I jog along with the squad, wishing I was twenty years younger, and realize he’s leading me to the battle-scarred Church of the Fatima.

There’s another group of men outside, dressed identically to the unit Boutros is leading. They surround the building, watchful, while others help unload a food truck under the supervision of a Central African nun who’s been there for every fight since colonial times. “They know the nuns, and they protect the refugees,” Boutros says. “They eat meals with them, too. And since they took charge, there have been no attacks.”

I consider that for a moment and my eyes drift to one of the men, holding a nightstick and surveying the street in a way that suggests he’s a military veteran. There’s no doubt about the resolution in his eyes: if anyone attacks the church, they’ll get in over his dead body. And, looking at the next man and the one after that, I can tell he isn’t the only one.
 
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THE STANDING STONES

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The morning after my tour of K-Cinq finds me with Kiki in Bouar, a forty minute flight from the capital. The town is in the northwest of the country, a provincial capital of thirty or forty thousand, and like most such places is more an enormous village than a city. There is a cluster of government offices, banks and general stores on the main road, a secondary school and a small hospital near the central market, and beyond that, endless rows of one-room clapboard and sheet-metal houses.

What sets Bouar apart is the seventy megaliths in and around the town, groups of standing stones that recall a crumbling Stonehenge on the savanna. They are believed to predate the Bantu migrations, which would make them one of the oldest constructions in Africa, contemporary with Middle Kingdom Egypt. No one knows who built them, or which of central Africa’s modern-day peoples are descended from their builders. Quite possibly all of them are.

That is Kiki’s theme as she speaks to a motley crowd gathered in front of the Hôtel de Ville. “We are all the standing stones,” she says. “Whatever storms may come – colonialism, oppression, poverty, war – we stand. And we will stand long after the storms are gone.”

The storms came hard to Bouar last year as the Djotodia government crumbled. The town was in Séléka hands, but most of the nearby villages were controlled by the Anti-Balaka, and s the army melted away, both sides committed atrocities and massacres. In this prefecture, the conflict between Christian and Muslim is tied in with the Cain and Abel hatred between the Gbaya farmers and Fulbe pastoralists; competition for land is intense, and the Gbaya, who are the local majority, haven’t forgotten the Fulbe slave raids of the nineteenth century. The old rivalries combined to give the bush war an added touch of bitterness here, although as often happens in the CAR’s civil wars, much of the violence missed its intended target: most of the nomadic Fulbe were able to flee, so the Hausa in town took the brunt of the anti-Muslim pogroms.

And now, with a local African Union post at the old army base and an uneasy peace settling over the prefecture, Kiki is testing whether the people can indeed be standing stones. She is speaking to the local truth and reconciliation commission, one of dozens set up around the country to try to make peace while sporadic fighting still rages. In the outlying provinces, the commissions have had to do much more than that: with the courts and local government having virtually ceased to function, they have taken on the functions of both, and are trying to keep the roads open and sort out property rights of returning refugees at the same time they hear confessions.

To Kiki, the confessions are still the most important part – confessions, after all, are stories. A recent Journal de Bangui editorial charges her with trying to organize a country the same way she organized a children’s book, and typically, she doesn’t disagree. Restorative justice as practiced in South Africa and Rwanda, and as she wants to practice here, is ultimately the sharing of stories, and the granting of pardons in exchange for surrender of the soul.

In Bouar, incredibly, the commission is mostly functional. Most of the ex-militiamen are in cantonment, and the bitterness of last year’s fighting has made the people so hungry for normalcy that they’ll grasp almost any straw. The group of sixty men and women chosen as a cross-section of the town has become, for all intents and purposes, a city council, and they oversee subordinate commissions at the neighborhood level. They impose penance – a former Anti-Balaka fighter, for instance, might be required to help rebuild the mosque in the Hausa quarter, while an ex-Séléka might have to unload food packets for displaced Christians – but those who do that penance are brought back from outlawry and returned to the community.

“We can’t simply count on soldiers being disarmed,” Kiki is saying. “You can take guns away, but everyone will still have machetes and hoes, and we of all people should know what a weapon a hoe can be.” She’s referring to the War of the Hoe-Handles, an anti-colonial rebellion during the 1920s that had a profound effect on her family.

“Our neighbors will always be armed,” she continues, “so the only way to live together is to make peace.”

It isn’t always that simple. In Ouham-Pendé prefecture, just east of this one, the local commission collapsed into factional fighting after some of its members were found to be collaborating with ex-Séléka bandits, and in Bangassou, the commission and the mayor have formed rival governments. There are more prosaic problems as well. Petty corruption is a constant threat, and although the commissions were chosen without regard for local power structures, the elites have found ways of asserting themselves. The requirement that decisions be unanimous, which was intended to encourage consensus and prevent majorities from imposing their will by fiat, resulted instead in gridlock and widespread bullying of holdouts: several of the commissions, including this one, have quietly begun making decisions by a three-fourths majority.

And the international community has proven surprisingly unwilling to help the commissions through their difficulties – or maybe their reluctance isn’t really surprising. The International Criminal Court has opened investigations of crimes against humanity, and many of the CAR’s foreign sponsors want international trials. Amnesties granted at the city level make them uncomfortable, and some have hinted that funds may be withheld if the national government refuses to hold perpetrators accountable.

“Hold them accountable like the Rwanda tribunal has, where it’s been twenty years and people are still awaiting trial?” is Kiki’s answer. “Do we want our prisons to be like Rwanda’s, with so many suspects that there’s no room to sit down? I’ve worked in prisons. They won’t heal this country.” She does think there are lessons to be learned from Rwanda, but she prefers that they be taken from the informal gacaca courts rather than the ICTR. This has won her the support of Bouar, but has put her in conflict with the country’s donors, and her successor will come under pressure to scale back the truth and reconciliation structure.

Kiki is hoping that, by then, the system will have taken root. “There’s a saying of Boganda’s,” she says. “’Zo kwe zo’ – a person is a person. But the governments here have never given the people the chance to be people. If they take that chance now, they won’t give it up for the people with money.”

That’s a bold statement for the president of a country as dependent as the CAR, and with the difficulties the commissions are having, it’s far from certain what the outcome will be. Perhaps the nation would be better off if it concentrated on rebuilding the regular courts, which the opposition says is going far too slowly.

But on the other hand, Central Africans are standing stones.
 
Beautiful. And the War of the Hoe-Handles, hmm? I always enjoy learning more about Africa from your work, and I've been meaning to get around to CAR in particular, so this is quite a treat.

“Kiki’s three miracles,” she says: “a Senegalese teaching discipline to the police, a Nigerian teaching them honesty and a Lebanese teaching them peace.”
Your excellent writing has done many things to me emotionally over the years, but I don't think I've ever laughed like that before. Keep it up!
 
Beautiful. And the War of the Hoe-Handles, hmm? I always enjoy learning more about Africa from your work, and I've been meaning to get around to CAR in particular, so this is quite a treat.

You'll hear more about that rebellion in the next update, because the conflicts of the 1920s were tragically formative for the Bokassa family. The colonial authorities tried to keep the rebellions quiet, because they didn't want it getting out that French concessionaires used the same methods that had been used in the Congo Free State, but they did cause some outcry at the time and led to some improvement in conditions.

Your excellent writing has done many things to me emotionally over the years, but I don't think I've ever laughed like that before. Keep it up!

Glad you liked it. For the record, Soyinka's Opera Wonyosi lampoons the CAR a lot better than I could - most of the characters are thinly disguised Nigerian stereotypes, but he wrote a Bokassa who was even more over the top than the emperor himself.

I'll try to post the last two updates today, although I can't promise I'll finish both of them; in the meantime, I'd be grateful for one more comment so that the next one won't be orphaned.
 
BOKASSA COUNTRY

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To understand why the Central African Republic is the way it is, it is necessary to go to Bobangui. This small town in Lobaye prefecture, fifty miles from the capital, was the birthplace of two of the country’s leaders – its founding father Barthélemy Boganda, and his cousin Jean-Bédel Bokassa – and David Dacko, who was born in a nearby village, was also a distant relation and a fellow M’Baka. And it was here, in the southern provinces of what was then Ubangi-Shari, that the conflicts of the 1920s shaped a nation’s destiny.

The bulk of the Central African Republic is savanna, shading to semi-desert in the far north, but the southernmost strip running from Bangassou to the border with Cameroon is jungle. This was the part of the country most valuable to early twentieth-century colonialists – it was where the wild rubber and hardwood were – and in the 1920s, the concessionaires to whom much of the colony had been parceled out were eager to make up for lost time. The First World War had interrupted their profits, and they saw its aftermath as a chance to recoup.

To anyone who knows the tragic history of Central African colonialism, the results were entirely predictable. The concession holders, backed by French authorities, didn’t cut off hands, but they used most of the rest of the Congo Free State playbook: crushing forced labor, the threat of jail or flogging for missing quotas, collective responsibility of villages. And these conditions inevitably bred rebels, prophets and messiahs.

One of them was named Karnu, and in 1928 he would lead the largest uprising ever to take place in France’s African colonies: a three-year conflict called the War of the Hoe-Handles for Karnu’s insistence that enchanted hoes would protect his followers from bullets. But even before the revolt broke out, Karnu’s message was abroad in the land, and the concessionaires were nervous. They were primed to make an example of the slightest resistance – which is why, when Bokassa’s father refused to supply any more slave labor to the forestry companies, they seized him and publicly beat him to death in the town square. His mother, overcome with grief, killed herself a week later.

At around the same time, Boganda’s mother was also beaten to death – she wasn’t a village chief like the elder Bokassa, but rubber collectors were expendable and company overseers often vicious. Remarkably, he refused to be defined by it, and would go on to become a priest, a grass-roots organizer and a wise and moderate political leader. His tragic and suspicious death in a 1959 airplane crash robbed the CAR of its Senghor, and sealed the country’s fate: it was instead destined to be ruled by people like Bokassa, who had been hardened and embittered rather than ennobled by colonial oppression. And that could be taken as a description of the nation as a whole: a country that has, for the past century, known little but abuse and that must struggle with the consequences of being used and then cast off.

Possibly that is why Kiki is greeted with such hope here. This is one part of the CAR where the Bokassa name is still revered – whatever else the emperor may have been, by God, he was from here – and many believe that Jean-Bédel’s daughter has made the rest of the country feel as they do. The laborers and market-women I talk to all say the same thing: “she’s made Bokassa a name to be proud of again.” They look at her and see a Bokassa who hasn’t been hardened, who teaches the lessons of a Boganda rather than a Dacko or Bozizé, who for a brief year has brought the nation the gentler form of governance that it has so long been denied. She is speaking at the Boganda memorial today, and nearly the whole town is there, cheering her as if she were a savior returned.

How ironic, then, that this is one of the places where her peacemaking has had the least impact and her policies have been most quixotic. There is still fighting in Lobaye: the jungles give ex- Séléka fighters a place to hide and the Anti-Balaka organizations in the villages have resisted giving up their arms. Few of the Muslims who fled during the bush war have come back, and those who do risk being dragged out in the night and killed. The local truth and reconciliation commission is faction-riddled and has been accused of extreme favoritism in doling out pardons.

Bobangui mocks Kiki’s insistence on developing a grass-roots gendarmerie rather than rebuilding the army – a military presence is necessary to root out the ex-militiamen, and until they’re rooted out, there will be no peace for the gendarmes to keep. It also mocks her attempts to build governing structures based on a community consensus, because the community is made up of the people who committed ethnic cleansing, and their consensus is not to allow the refugees to return. Bobangui, and all Lobaye, will need force to pacify and return to the rule of law, and force isn’t something Kiki understands or does well.

And, most of all, Bobangui mocks Kiki’s focus on governance rather than infrastructure. Little has been done to repair the damaged roads to the Dzanga-Ndoki National Park, which is the source of what little tourist trade the CAR gets. And Kiki’s economic development plan for Lobaye – artisanal artwork and wood-sculpture production, marketed through her contacts in the Middle East and Europe – is something that might be suitable if Bobangui were on a tourist corridor, but has limited potential on the export market given shipping costs and competition from elsewhere in Africa. Kiki’s view of art as healing might be correct where the soul is concerned, but it runs into obstacles when applied to the economy.

What may save matters, if anything can, is that the people here want Kiki to succeed. As I’ve seen already, they’re proud of her, and when she speaks, they listen. When she asks them in person to pardon each other and let their neighbors return, they respond thoughtfully rather than with rejection as they would if anyone else were doing the talking.

But they want Kiki to listen to them as well. “She’s lived in another country, she knows everything, she’s full of ideas,” says Jean-Claude, a woodcutter in his fifties who is standing at the edge of the crowd. “But we’ve lived here all our lives. We know what we need most. We’ll listen to her, but she needs to hear us, and build the small things first.”

It’s as if both Kiki and the people of Bobangui are trying to figure out how to do participatory government – another thing that was cruelly denied to the Central Africans, and which the president has only a few months left to perfect. She does listen – I know that. But can she listen to everyone, and can she do so in enough time to make a difference even in a place as unforgiving as Lobaye?

I don’t know what the answer is, but it will determine the country’s destiny every bit as much as Karnu’s rebellion did.
 
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