A Lost Peace

The Winter Before the Peace
It is all too clear that the negotiations in the small railway carriage in the forest of Compiègne did not bring lasting peace to Europe. The armistice agreement at Compiègne presented to and in the end accepted by Germany ended the fighting which had torn and ravaged not only Europe but also Asia and Africa for more than four years. After the armistice Germany started to withdraw their troops from Belgium, Luxembourg and France and the then German province of Elsass-Lothringen. The bridgeheads over river Rhine was also to be evacuated allowing the Entente to occupy them during the negotiations for a lasting peace. Germany was also forced to withdraw its troops from foreign fronts such as Austria-Hungary and Romania among others. The armistice also included substantial material transfers from Germany to the allied powers. Germany was to surrender all their submarines, numerous artillery pieces, small arms, locomotives and rail cars. All in all the armistice denied Germany close to all of its fighting power. The armistice was however deemed necessary in Germany as Germany lacked most means to keep fighting. The Entente forces boasted by newly arrived American troops had made rapid advances in northern France and while they hadn't entered German territory it was only a matter of time. These rapid advances combined with the increasingly unstable situation within Germany forced the new chancellor of Germany Friedrich Ebert and his delegate to Compiègne, Matthias Erzberger, to accept the terms. All Germany could hope for was that the following peace would not totally shatter the German state.

The hopes for a lenient honourable peace were quite common among both common Germans and the very elite. A positive reading of the American president Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points made many Germans fairly sure that they would not lose too much after the war, especially since the armistice had been agreed upon before the total breakdown of the German army. The fact that no German territory was occupied at the time of the armistice further increased German hopes for an “honourable peace”. But Germany was in no position to negotiate a peace. Germany was on the brink of civil war with left wing revolutionary movements filling the streets. Not only Germany was about to shatter into a civil war but all major allies of Germany was in similar situations. Austria-Hungary which had signed an armistice earlier the same month was very unstable. The Aster revolution of 1918 originating in Hungary had forced the Austrian emperor Charles IV to accept the coup of social democrat count Mihály Károlyi but the instability continued. The Ottoman Empire was far from its former glory. In Armenian and Arab territories separatist movements controlled large tracts of land. The Ottoman state had throughout the war relentlessly and without any discernment attacked and deported Armenian civilians killing more than a million Armenians. Similar policies against the Greece population was under way further plunging the Ottoman Empire into destruction. The Kurdish people also became more and more political active with the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan formed in 1918 as a clear example. The society promoted Kurdish independence and quite rapidly gained support in Kurd dominated areas formerly quite calm. All in all there was no stability in any of the Central Powers and none of the Central Powers had anything to negotiate with. In the end they were at the mercy of the Entente.

The Initial Peace Negotiations
The peace proposal would instead be negotiated between the members of the Entente and then one peace settlement pleasing all of the Entente members would be imposed upon Germany. The negotiations among the five important victors; France, United Kingdom, Italy, United States of America and Japan started in Paris on 18 January 1919 in what would be called the Paris Peace Conference. Although the Conference hosted delegates from 27 nations it soon became clear the the five victors called the shots and the other nations were mostly there to give the conference legitimacy. Japan was influence in the discussion was very limited and in the end it was the “Big Four”, France, United Kingdom, Italy and United States that negotiated the Peace proposal. These victors while united in their opposition against the Central Powers held widely different ideas on how the postwar world would look. France took a strong stance against Germany demanding significant territorial concessions, disarmament and reparations. The war had trashed French and Belgium territory leaving industries, mines and farmlands destroyed. Massive military losses, significant civilian deaths combined with material losses and infrastructural destruction drove France to make fairly heavy demands for economical reparations. Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France, had to carefully juggle between both United Kingdom and USA but also internal factors. The President of France Raymond Poincaré, a conservative with a deep rooted interest in foreign policy, demanded loudly an even harder stance on Germany than Clemenceau dared to propose.

United Kingdom held some tough demands on Germany but were still more lenient than France. Unlike France United Kingdom had only faced the Germans on the battlefield. France had suffered about 40 000 civilian deaths as a result of direct military action while United Kingdom suffered only about 2000 civilian deaths from military action, mostly from bombardment and German submarine activity. It was therefore not strange that United Kingdom sought a more lenient peace than France. British economic interest in Central Europe also partly explain the disparity between French and British goals for the European peace. One should however not think of United Kingdom as strangely kind towards Germany. Much like France they wanted reparations and put a limit on perceived German militarism and expansionism.

USA and its President Wilson waged politics of idealism during the Paris Peace Conference. Far from Europe they did not care much for revanchism. Instead President Wilson wanted to bring democracy and freedom to Europe allowing as many nation states as possible to emerge. He tried to limit French demands on Germany in order to keep Germany as stable as possible. His failing health did however limit his influence over the negotiations but his Fourteen Points for a new Europe did have a large influence in Europe. The very idea of idealism in a peace process rather than strategic Realpolitik was quite a break from previous diplomatic tradition and influenced how the Germans thought the peace would look like.

The differences in goals and world view between the three most important states was an obstacle, hard but not impossible, to bypass. All in all they shared the same goal of limiting Germany and create a lasting peace in Europe. If it wasn't for a tragic event at the very beginning of the Peace Conference Europe would look much different and the 20th century might have been peaceful rather than a chaotic era of political extremism, revolutions and wars.

A Tragic Turn
Although the three most important powers at the Peace Conference held incompatible opinions on how to deal with Germany after the war these differences were not impossible to reconcile. Although Clemenceau wanted to end German dominance on the continent he also intended to keep the Entente alive and could not see a safe France without close relations with United Kingdom, and preferably with USA. With time the negotiations between France, United Kingdom and USA most likely would have created a joint and balanced proposal to Germany and the other losing powers. Instead one of the many unpredictable events changed the course of history. On 19 February 1919, during the conference, history took a quite an ironic turn. Just like the war had started due to an assassination the armistice was welcomed the same way. On his way to a meeting with British, Italian and American diplomats Clemenceau's car was attacked by the anarchist assailant Émile Cottin. Cottin fired numerous shots hitting Clemenceau in the chest. Clemenceau was quickly transported in the car along the Seine to Hôtel-Dieu‎, the oldest hospital in Paris, where he later the same day passed away due to his chest wound. The Tiger had fallen and his death created waves reaching far from Paris. Cottin, after being severely beaten by bystanders, was apprehended by Parisian police. He boastfully claimed that he acted alone and that his goal was to kill Clemenceau, “the greatest enemy of humanity”. The police investigation quickly concluded that this was true. There was no large anarchist plot against the French government but many Parisians did not believe such claims. The event was seen by many as a revenge for the killing of Jean Jaurès. Jean Jaurès was a leading socialist pacifist who was murdered by the French nationalist Raoul Villain right before the Great War. This time it was the left who used violence to reach their political goals.


The funeral of Clemenceau was a calm affair. He had in his testament stated that he did not want any funeral procession, flowers or speeches during his funeral. His will was partly upheld after his death. While the funeral was just for the closest friends, painter Claude Monet being the most famous, there was a procession in Paris before his body left for the small village of Mouilleron-en-Pareds near Mouchamps in Vendée. Later Monet would paint a memorial painting of the grave and its surroundings. The painting lacked any of the few funeral visitors and instead showed the steep wooden slope were Monet's long time friend laid to rest. Painted in the manner of the Weeping Willows it was later donated to the French state and put up in a special room at Musée de l'Orangerie. With the death of Georges Clemenceau France entered a post-war in the most tragic way imaginable. Who was to rule France and keep her strong after the death of “Le Tigre”? Dire times for France and the world laid ahead.

So a new timeline! Who do you think will take over after Clemenceau? Which path will France, Europe and the World take? What will Poincaré do?

With Clemenceau's death, Poincaré will have little opposition to take more power in the French government, at least in the short-term. He may make an emergency decree to take over the French peace delegation. If so, the French position on a number of issues will change.

Poincaré will be much more opposed to collaboration and negotiation with the Americans and the British over everything, especially Germany. In Africa, he would argue that if the British receive the entirety of German South-West Africa and German East Africa, then the French should receive the entirety of German Togoland and German Kamerun, instead of having those territories split between them. I don't see him conceding on that point any time soon.

He will also argue for a longer French occupation of the Rhineland instead of only fifteen years, if he can't have it detached completely from Germany.

In addition, Poincaré supported Ferdinand Foch's plan that post-war Germany would keep a standing army of 140,000 one-year conscripts with very few exceptions, to prevent the development of a powerful class of life-long military professionals, who were blamed for pushing Germany into the war in the first place. IOTL, Clemenceau argued that instead of preventing the development of such a class, the establishment of a revolving-door conscript army would militarize the entirety of German society over the long-term. He ultimately won on this point and other military limitations were accepted for the Treaty of Versailles.

Poincaré would also insist on more French aid to the Greeks in their war against the Turks.

But, if the peace is "lost" these divergences may not matter all that much.

Poincaré does not need a emergency decree to take over the negotiations. In accordance with the laws of 1875 it is the Presidents role to negotiate treaties which then has to be voted on by both chambers.

Le président de la République négocie et ratifie les traités. Il en donne connaissance aux chambres aussitôt que l'intérêt et la sûreté de l'État le permettent.

Les traités de paix, de commerce, les traités qui engagent les finances de l'État, ceux qui sont relatifs à l'état des personnes et au droit de propriété des Français à l'étranger, ne sont définitifs qu'après avoir été votés par les deux chambres. Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire ne peut avoir lieu qu'en vertu d'une loi.

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And indeed he would feel more comfortable to use his power now in a dire situation. Poincaré often had goals and was quite vocal about them but in his diaries one find that he was deeply afraid to break the traditions of his position. He was thrown between gratefulness regarding his position and desperation from the lack of political power he had. Now maybe he can try to enforce his views on how one would deal with Germany and the rest of the Central Powers whether it meshes with United Kingdom and USA or not. Or will he find that he is still limited by his office and the wills of his allies in war?

Clemenceau argued that instead of preventing the development of such a class, the establishment of a revolving-door conscript army would militarize the entirety of German society

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I think it would depend on how thoroughly you dismantle the previous military.

Make them restart with nothing and eventually you should have nobody who can take any kind of leadership position with only a year of training, or even know how to train new recruits. In fact there should be nobody in a position to train new recruits, every new conscript class having to sort itself out and learn on its own.

An extremely large military, but hopefully a massively incompetent one. Unless they can figure out how to train longer covertly.

Pesterfield said:

I think it would depend on how thoroughly you dismantle the previous military.

Make them restart with nothing and eventually you should have nobody who can take any kind of leadership position with only a year of training, or even know how to train new recruits. In fact there should be nobody in a position to train new recruits, every new conscript class having to sort itself out and learn on its own.

An extremely large military, but hopefully a massively incompetent one. Unless they can figure out how to train longer covertly.

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If OTL is any indication Germany has no interest to adhere to an eventual limits on its military, nor will France have any ability to force them to. Maybe this POD will change it, maybe it will not.

If France is going to harden TTL her positions, and Wilson will remain obstinate as well, the Versailles conference is going to be screwed. OTL the negotiations holded when the Italians left, but if the French are going to do the same move? I smell the failure of the LoN TTL even before its birth, and Wilson will never get his own avenue in Paris...

RyuDrago said:

If France is going to harden TTL her positions, and Wilson will remain obstinate as well, the Versailles conference is going to be screwed. OTL the negotiations holded when the Italians left, but if the French are going to do the same move? I smell the failure of the LoN TTL even before its birth, and Wilson will never get his own avenue in Paris...

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Indeed. Many in France will argue for harder measures. Few will understand the implication of such maneuvers.

Creating Stability in Unstable Times
The assassination of Clemenceau came at the worst of times. The 1919 legislative election was coming up in November and stability was needed in the meantime. The Paris Peace Conference was also deeply disturbed by the event and France needed a new Prime Minister fast to repair any damage to their position in the negotiations. Poincaré, President of France, frightened by the unwillingness of United Kingdom to support French demands on Germany, thought that any delay would only strengthen the position of United Kingdom and USA against France. Not only that, time would also strengthen Germany. A new Prime Minister was needed quickly but the question was who could fill the shoes of the fallen giant. As president, it was Poincaré's role to designate a new Prime Minister of France. The role of the Prime Minister wasn't really handled in any satisfactory way in the Third Republic and was not mentioned in the constitutional laws of 1875. The President was given the power to appoint civil and military offices and from that power he appointed the Prime Minister and the cabinet. These appointments did not need to be confirmed in the house of representatives and the senate but common practice demanded a conformation of support from the elected representatives. Although the Presidency was given quite a lot of power through the laws of 1875 his ability was in reality was quite limited. The National Assembly limited the power of the President and the well ingrained tradition of republicanism further impaired any ambitions among Presidents to take a more active role in the politics. It was instead the Prime Minister who held the most power. His influence in the Cabinet and the National Assembly often exceeded the influence of the President. Poincaré did however not lack any political ambition and would do the uttermost to increase his power, if only by a small amount, in order to save France at this moment of tragedy. The choice of who was to rule France was a hard one. Poincaré had fairly many suitable candidates but none of them could fill the shoes of Clemenceau. Poincaré did not intend to find a figure as uniting as Clemenceau however. The war was about to end and Poincaré was no longer forced to appoint political rivals to unite France but appointing a weak successor also had its downsides. It would be obvious to his rivals that Poincaré wanted to run the affairs himself.


The current foreign secretary Radical-Socialist Stéphen Pichon was one suitable politician to take on the role as Prime minister. With the Paris Peace Conference as the main political event for a foreseeable future, at least until the elections in November, Pichon's diplomatic experience could prove vital. Pichon was already involved in the Conference and therefore there would be no lengthy interruption of the negotiation process. Pichon, although a friend of Clemenceau, had befriended Poincaré and was seen as loyal to both. This mixed loyalty would serve fine in the delicate situation after Clemenceau's death and make the transition from one cabinet to another stable and calm. Pichon was widely regarded as a loyal but unambitious politician and would not gain the hearts of France.


Gaston Doumergue was another suitable Prime Minister. He had held the post before, in 1913-1914, and was deemed political skilled. Doumergue held the post of Foreign Minister during the early phase of the war, and the post of Minister of Colonies in 1914-1917. His ministerial career spanned back to 1902 when he started out as Minister of Colonies. Gaston Doumergue was a member of the Radical party known for making arrangements both to the left and right placing him comfortably in the centre of the political spectrum. A position from were he should be capable of keeping the Union Sacrée until the election. Doumergue wanted, like many French politicians, to separate the Rhineland from Germany while the reparations was paid back. This opinion was publicly known as the Bolsheviks in Russia had published war goal discussions between Czar-led Russia and France.


Georges Leygues of the Republican Democratic Party represented the moderate right together with Poincaré. In 1919 he held the post of Minister of Marine which he had gained in 1917. Before that he had a fairly long, although interrupted, ministerial career starting as Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts in 1894. In 1895 he gained the more prestigious post of Minister of the Interior and in 1906 he held the post of Minister of Colonies. Leygues had from time to time clashed with Poincaré, most importantly in 1915 when Poincaré was made aware that Leygues blamed the war on Poincaré. While Leygues and Poincaré had their differences they were members of the same party and shared the same goals. However Poincaré had to cooperate with the Radical Party as they held substantial power in the chamber holding 195 of 601 seats. The rest of the centre from which Poincaré gained his support, Republican Union and the Republicans of the Left, held 88 and 66 seats respectively. Throughout the Presidency of Poincaré most Prime Ministers had either been independent or left leaning in order to gain the support of the chamber and it might be hard to gain support for a member of the Republican Democratic Party in the chamber.


Louis Barthou had like a surprisingly large number of senior politicians in France held the post of Prime Minister for a brief time. In 1913 he had held the post for eight months but given the political tradition of France that was more of an asset than a burden. Barthou had continued Poincaré's and Briand's work in introducing a three year service in the French army. His longtime interest in limiting Germany's power was valued by Poincaré and showed dedication to the French cause during the early phase of the Paris Peace Conference.


Moderate Paul Deschanel had a quite eccentric past, especially considering that he was thought-about as a possible candidate to replace Clemenceau. He had been humiliated by Clemenceau in a duel where Deschanel had been forced backwards by Clemenceau's thrusts until Clemeanceau boastfully said “Monsieur is leaving us”. This anecdote apart Deschanel was quite a good candidate for the post. Skilled and idealistic politician with an aptitude for the written and spoken word alike. In the chamber he had fought for both peace and patriotism before the war and then, when war was upon France he had defended France with as much as patriotism as before the war. When the hostilities ended he had like most French politicians made it clear that one would need a suitable peace guarding France for the coming German aggression. A friend of both United States and United Kingdom he could also manoeuvre in the heated negotiations that would end the war. He was well liked in many quarters but perhaps he was a bit too idealistic going through the big phrases in a time when cruel realism was needed.


Alexandre Millerand had a long and twisted road behind him. Once a socialist he was now one of the most important politicians of the right, perhaps second only to Poincaré. A friend of Poincaré since law school Millerand might be the bridge between the growing labour movement and Poincaré's conservative vision. Millerand had a long history of negotiating between radical and moderate unions with varying results. His reputation was tainted by his steady steps towards the right but he still held some influence in the moderate unions and the less radical socialists. In the end he might be enough to end the influence of radical socialism. Poincaré thought that many of the complaints of the working class was legitimate but he was also sure that conservatism and brotherly support would be enough to solve the dire situation of the worker.

A more hardline France can really make the negotiation much more difficult for Wilson, not only regarding Germany (whatever will be the negoatior i image that the annexation of the Saarland and some support for any existing separatist group will be a given) but other nations.
Italy was diplomatic isolated in her request and after the 'coup de theatre' of OTL of leave Versailles was basically humiliated in returning without obtaining any concession (plus between Wilson and Orlando there were little love lost for using an euphemism), with France dragging her feet some accomodation between Paris and Rome can be reached (creating a lot of butterfly).

More heated negotiation can take a tool over Wilson general health and we can have an earlier stroke.

lukedalton said:

A more hardline France can really make the negotiation much more difficult for Wilson, not only regarding Germany (whatever will be the negoatior i image that the annexation of the Saarland and some support for any existing separatist group will be a given) but other nations.
Italy was diplomatic isolated in her request and after the 'coup de theatre' of OTL of leave Versailles was basically humiliated in returning without obtaining any concession (plus between Wilson and Orlando there were little love lost for using an euphemism), with France dragging her feet some accomodation between Paris and Rome can be reached (creating a lot of butterfly).

More heated negotiation can take a tool over Wilson general health and we can have an earlier stroke.

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Indeed. That was what made me explore this timeline. It is still early in the negotiations and many things can change all over Europe based on some decisions in Paris.

New and Old in Germany
The end of the war had not ended the dire situation Germany was in. The whole country was in a chaotic upheaval. The revolution in November 1918 had more or less ended the monarchy but stability was no where to be seen. Germany was now a republic in name but not in law and different political powers vied for power. On the left the Communist Party (KPD) and the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD) made every effort to create a republic up to their standard – A Worker's Republic. The Social Democratic Party directly to the right of USPD made every effort to gain control of Germany in order to create stability. Frightened by the development in Russia they perceived their leftist colleagues more frightening than their other political enemies on the right. The SPD also had the questionable honour of handling the peace and armistice negotiations with the Entente and had to juggle demands from every side, all while dealing with a war torn Germany. In the centre of the political spectra the old Zentrum (Centre Party) found itself weakened. In December 1918 the Bavarian branch of the party had left the Centre Party and taken a more conservative approach. The damage from break was not irrecoverable but it left the Centre Party weak in the critical months around the armistice. The Social Democrats had, especially since the split with its radical members, started to become the dominant party in German politics holding most important posts. The far right was in the greatest upheaval of all political movements after the war. The old conservative elite found their power diminished and their advice unwanted but they still held prestige and was seen by many as an important part of Germany. On their right however more populist movements without the burden of tradition started to grow. The most important during the winter of 1918/1919 was the Freikorps. Former soldiers gathered in paramilitary units roamed both cities and countryside. These units held anti-communist and anti-republican tendencies and fought communists and civilians alike in Germany. They also acted outside Germany proper most importantly in the Baltic region. The driving people in these units held both radical and reactionary views. The paradoxical nature of the Freikorps, a reactionary modernism, would spread and develop all over the world in the following years. The Freikorps and other nascent German far right organisations was an indication for what awaited Europe and the world; Something archaic and radical at the same time.


In early January the so-called “Spartacist Uprising” started over a fairly minor matter. The dismissal of police chief Eichhorn, a member USPD, provoked large demonstrations mainly in Berlin. These demonstrations soon escalated and became more and more violent. Friedrich Ebert, Prime minister and leader of SPD entered negotiations with the communists and USPD but at the same time ordered his colleague and friend Gustav Noske to approach the Freikorps units to through violent means suppress the revolt. The fighting was fast and brutal leaving more than a hundred demonstrators dead. Most importantly was the death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the two most important members of the Communist Party. The “uprising” was fairly unplanned and not inherently violent. The demands were, both from the demonstrators and its leaders, fairly limited and did not initially demand the end of the Ebert regime. However SPD and its leader Ebert felt more threatened by a coup from the left similar to the Bolshevik coup in Russia than a rightist coup and therefore supported and cooperated with the anti-republican Freikorps to disperse the masses. This decision would increase the distance between the communists and the social democrats making any future cooperation close to impossible.


A League for the Future
President Wilson was a tired yet pleased President. His intervention in the Great War had brought peace to the world and now he would bring a new world order to Europe. His Fourteen points would change the very fabric of Europe. It would remove the revanchism from diplomacy and replace it with self-determination and cooperation. A more natural way to handle conflicts than the arbitrary and punishing border changes of the past. This new way of diplomacy, fair rather than punishing, would be handled through a “League of Nations”. A stable institution directly aimed to deal with international conflicts covering war and peace but also disarmament, labour conditions, colonial politics, human and drug trafficking. Wilson presented on 3 February a joint American-British draft written by Cecil Hurst and David Hunter Miller. He had no real intention to work with Italian or French drafts also presented. This railroading of the process did upset non-Anglo-Saxon members of the peace process but Wilson got his way and the French and Italian drafts were quite quickly dismissed. The Italian proposal was a quite hasty put together draft but the French draft written by Léon Bourgeois was more complete. Bourgeois stressed the need of an international military that could enforce whatever decision to future League of Nation decided. This proposal was quite radical and might be partly a reason for the quick dismissal of the French draft. After the the dismissal of Léon Bourgeois proposal the main difficulties during the discussion was the “Race Equality Clause” presented by the Japanese delegation on 13 February. Japan wanted to truly enter into the international sphere leaving the era of unequal treaties behind. Added as an amendment to the Religious Equality Clause their proposal it read:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

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Presented right before the end of the draft discussion it, together with the Religious Equality Clause, was quickly removed from the draft. The proposal was simply too radical and even though the Japanese delegation had mostly intended it to levitate their own position in the international arena the implications of the clause was to far reaching for most of the other parties to accept. It was the United Kingdom and United States that was most vocal in their opposition while France and their delegate Léon Bourgeois gave the clause a heartily support. The day after on February 14 the first public draft was released after ten days of discussions. It was not only the Religious Equality Clause and its potential amendment that had been removed but also a clause on a clause handling an abolishment of conscription, unacceptable to the continental power of France. Clauses handling general disarmament was also watered down to placate the continental allies. The Wilsonian idealism had to make way for the continental Realpolitik while the Japanese dreams of a fair inclusion in the international community had to make way for the British and Wilson's racism.

If the premises for TTL LoN are those, I can't wait to see the discussion of the peace terms...

I'm wondering if there could be a more accese and early American-Japanese competition over China... Waiting to see when Tokyo will pose the Ten Questions to the Chinese, especially if Japan will not enter the LoN...

If the premises for TTL LoN are those, I can't wait to see the discussion of the peace terms...

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With a more militant France expect to see term who will make look OTL Versailles as a slap in the wrist, at least as a heavily debated proposal...as in the end both UK and USA will not want a too draconian peace for Germany; but in all probability Paris will really push for annexing the Saarland, supporting Belgium in his demand of some part of Zeeland, support the creation of a Rhenish Republic (not happening but it will create some really bad feeling).
The big diplomatic 'coup' will be probably an alliance between Italy and France as a mean to contrastate the Us-Uk one that can last even after the signing of the treaty.

RyuDrago said:

If the premises for TTL LoN are those, I can't wait to see the discussion of the peace terms...

I'm wondering if there could be a more accese and early American-Japanese competition over China... Waiting to see when Tokyo will pose the Ten Questions to the Chinese, especially if Japan will not enter the LoN...

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Those are all pre-POD developments and fully according to OTL. Most of the information is gathered from the now quite ancient The Origin Structure And Working Of The League Of Nations (1928) by C. Howard Ellis. As it is old enough it is free to read. Japan have not given up yet regarding inclusion of a "Racial Equality Clause" and might try again (they did IOTL) with some or none success. That is, if the negotiations is still going on at that moment.

lukedalton said:

With a more militant France expect to see term who will make look OTL Versailles as a slap in the wrist, at least as a heavily debated proposal...as in the end both UK and USA will not want a too draconian peace for Germany; but in all probability Paris will really push for annexing the Saarland, supporting Belgium in his demand of some part of Zeeland, support the creation of a Rhenish Republic (not happening but it will create some really bad feeling).
The big diplomatic 'coup' will be probably an alliance between Italy and France as a mean to contrastate the Us-Uk one that can last even after the signing of the treaty.

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France great problem is keep enough allies while still limiting Germany enough to placate the worries of the establishment. Italy and France share more common goals than France and United Kingdom. France and USA share close to nothing and, as OTL show, American guarantees to France meant nothing. All in all France and Italy are more "natural" allies but United Kingdom is a better allied.


BTW, do you have any preference for whichever Prime minister candidate? I'm fairly sure on who to chose but I would love some input.

France great problem is keep enough allies while still limiting Germany enough to placate the worries of the establishment. Italy and France share more common goals than France and United Kingdom. France and USA share close to nothing and, as OTL show, American guarantees to France meant nothing. All in all France and Italy are more "natural" allies but United Kingdom is a better allied.

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Sure the UK is the better ally, but the difference of opinion between the two delegation over the treatment of Germany can create a wedge wide enough to make Paris consider other option.
At the conference, the italian and French delegation will be probably bring together at first by their common 'distate' for Wilson and immediately after by their attitude.

BTW, do you have any preference for whichever Prime minister candidate? I'm fairly sure on who to chose but I would love some input.

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IMHO Pinchon is the better choice for Pointcarè, he know the situation, already experienced and seem not a political menace for him but just some high ranking burocrat.

lukedalton said:

Sure the UK is the better ally, but the difference of opinion between the two delegation over the treatment of Germany can create a wedge wide enough to make Paris consider other option.
At the conference, the italian and French delegation will be probably bring together at first by their common 'distate' for Wilson and immediately after by their attitude.

IMHO Pinchon is the better choice for Pointcarè, he know the situation, already experienced and seem not a political menace for him but just some high ranking burocrat.

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Indeed on both points. The question is just how hard United Kingdom can press France though. United Kingdom perceive a need for a foothold on the continent or the wouldn't placate France as much as they in fact did. Will someone gets scared and back down or will both parties continue until the gap between them is too large to overlap?

kung Zog said:

Indeed on both points. The question is just how hard United Kingdom can press France though. United Kingdom perceive a need for a foothold on the continent or the wouldn't placate France as much as they in fact did. Will someone gets scared and back down or will both parties continue until the gap between them is too large to overlap?

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This is the question, honestly i will say that in the end the UK will give France what she wants but much depend on the personality involved and even an hard fought concession can sour relationships.
Not counting Wilson 'knack' for diplomacy, basically if he try to treat the French as he treated the italians (as both are too headstrong for his taste) things can become physical

lukedalton said:

This is the question, honestly i will say that in the end the UK will give France what she wants but much depend on the personality involved and even an hard fought concession can sour relationships.
Not counting Wilson 'knack' for diplomacy, basically if he try to treat the French as he treated the italians (as both are too headstrong for his taste) things can become physical

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Wilson will also have a hard time keeping the Senate back home content. With a shaky Paris Peace Conference he will spend more time abroad, something nobody in USA like.

Pichon to the Post
It had been a hard decision for Poincaré but in the end it made sense to appoint Stephen Pichon to the Prime minister post. His long experience with foreign affairs, especially diplomacy, was essential to the future of France. While the Paris Peace Conference had just begun it also made perfect sense to make the interruption as brief as possible. Pichon, continuing as Foreign Minister, had not only been active in the early weeks of the Conference but also been France's Foreign minister during the end of the war. During the war Pichon had gathered substantial contacts with the allies and could hopefully continue in the same direction. While Poincaré often complained about the scheming of Pichon in his diary Pichon was loyal to Poincaré and Poincaré was aware of that. With Clemenceau gone Pichon was grief stricken but also determined to keep France strong and thought that close cooperation and discussion with Poincaré was essential to reach that goal. Poincaré, of course, shared that sentiment. Clemenceau's plan during the negotiations had been to appease and play kind early in the negotiations to create goodwill and only later put forward the more drastic French demands. Poincaré did not agree and quickly manoeuvred Pichon into his position. He argued that France must quickly regain any ground lost during the short but critical interruption. Pichon himself must show that French demands must be listened to. The steady stream of French intelligence reports pointed out that Germany did not feel beaten after the war and would not respect any treaty unless it was enforced on them by might, be it economic or military might but preferably both. France did not have the ability to launch any large offensives so it was essential for France that the treaty in itself guaranteed the safety of France. An occupation of industrial and strategic important land would save France from German aggression, and if Germany would attack it would save France from military defeat. The Rhineland held a substantial amount of German coal and iron mines and would increase French industrial might while denying Germany of vital industrial assets. Not only that, it would create a more defensible situation for France. While Clemenceau's plan had been to create goodwill and then make clear demands for an independent Rhineland acting as a buffer Poincaré and his new Prime Minister went the other way. After the hectic week of Clemenceau's assassination the Council of Ten reconvened in Pichon's office just like the week before but the air was different. After condolences had been expressed Pichon showed initiative and presented his suggestion to the border problem, a creation of an independent Rhineland in custom union with France whose security would be guaranteed by the Entente. Further there would be a permanent presence of troops in the area in a way most similar to the current occupation. Germany would also be prohibited to merge with the Rhineland unless previously approved by the League of Nations. The Saar basin together with Landau would also be annexed into France much like Alsace-Lorraine giving France broadly the borders of 1814 rather than 1815. This position was all in all compatible with late Clemenceau's views but Pichon stressed them with a strength that Clemenceau had not dared.


Pichon, upset by the death of Clemenceau, held an unusual emotional speech that France was the bulwark that defended Europe against German aggression. Without the Rhineland as a strategic border France would fall against German aggression that could be expected within years, or even less. Pichon further stated that Germany neither felt defeated nor threatened and would take no time to rebuilt itself, especially once foodstuff started to flood in. Germany's industrial hinterland was not damaged by the war and once the soldiers returned Germany could rebuilt faster than any other state. Neither France nor Europe could feel safe unless the Rhine-border could be defended. Pichon took also up the plight of Belgium which had played the ungrateful role of battlefield during the war. It was clear that Germany had no scruples and would attack wherever they wanted. The goal of the Entente was to limit areas possible for attack and make such an attack as hard as possible on Germany. Hopefully it would dissuade Germany took attack at all, and if not, it would make the war winnable for the Entente.

Around the same time Konrad Adenauer, mayor of Cologne and member of the Centre party, had on 1 February made a speech on Rhenish separatism proposing that the Rhineland should become an autonomous state within Germany but with wide-ranging rights and powers. Adenauer meant that this would save it from complete annexation of the Rhineland by France. Hans Adam Dorten, a somewhat more radical proponent of Rhenish separatism, also sought to avoid both French and Prussian dominance over the Rhineland. France perceived this separatism as latent pro-France and immediately seized on the opportunity. Since the armistice French occupation troops stationed in Germany had spread pro-French propaganda and made great effort to diminish and influence from Berlin in the region. These manoeuvres had the latent approval of government officials including Clemenceau. This policy continued with Pichon and Poincaré slightly intensified.

Anglo-Saxon Opposition
The reaction to the proposal was not all too positive. While there was some restrained happiness outside Pichon's office that France at least stated what they wanted, there was no happiness with the honest proposal itself. The British informed France that the proposal may be supported as long as it didn't “leave a legacy of injustice which would rankle as Alsace-Lorraine had rankled”, something easier said than done. An independent Rhineland would be pill very hard to swallow for Germany and would most likely cause even more problems than the situation of Alsace-Lorraine had done prior to the war. Finding a solution which was acceptable to Berlin and did not create any revanchist feelings was an unsolvable problem for even the best of diplomats. The British response was all in all a very polite “impossible”. Regarding the Saar-region the British Prime Minister David George Lloyd was more sympathetic, for quite unclear reason. The region was not that large compared to the Rhineland or the proposed changes of the German eastern borders briefly discussed the week before. While France could not count on British support they could hope for an approval. It was instead the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, that was most vocal in his opposition against a French Saar and Landau citing self determination and the Fourteen Points. Wilson was indifferent to the size of the territory to be annexed into France. There would be no unjust changes of the borders. What constituted an unjust border change was fairly hard to determine but Wilson was sure. He appealed to Pichon in a flattering speech on the French sentiment of justice some days later.

There is no nation more intelligent than the French nation. If you allow me to explain my point of view frankly to her, I have no fear of her judgement. Undoubtedly, if they saw that we were not applying the same principle everywhere, the French people would not accept a solution which appeared unfavourable to them; but if we show them we are doing our best to act justly everywhere similar problems arise, the sense of justice which is in the heart of French people will rise to answer me: ‘You are right.’ I have such an exalted idea of the spirit of the French nation that I believe she will always accept a principle founded on justice and applied with equity.

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Wilson's idea of France as the most intelligent of nations, while flattering, did nothing to change the ideas of France and her leaders. Pichon stressed Realpolitik of peace and the infeasibility of any other form of peace. He stated the Germany would only know distaste and distrust of France no matter how large the territory concessions were. What was important was the defence of France and ultimately Europe. Only through denying Germany means to lay waste upon France like they had done in 1870 and 1914 could Europe be safe. The historical claim to the territory was downplayed in favour for economic arguments. The economic value of the Saar region was mentioned often, not only by Pichon, but also Wilson and Lloyd George. When discussing the mines of the Saar-region as a possible payment to France for the damages to their northern coal mines Wilson held quite a more cordial attitude towards France. He said: “What is just is to assure France the compensation which is due her for the loss of her coal mines and to give the entire Saar region the guarantees it needs for the utilization of its own coal. If we do that, we will do all that could reasonably be asked of us.” indicating that while he gladly supported a transfer of ownership of the mines it was also the very limit of what he could support. Anything more would mean an end to the adherence to the Fourteen points which all of the negotiators had accepted as a common ground for the Peace Treaty. Pichon made an effort to show how hard, to not say impossible, it would be to create clear borders without trampling over the different nationalities. Drawing example from the situation of Poland, discussed around the same time at the conference, Pichon tried to show how one had to combine idealism and the political reality.

You will never be able to create a safe Poland without some Germans in it. You will never be able to create a safe France without some Germans within her borders. Germany has spread her arms long outside her natural frontiers. Should the numerous Germans in Transylvania form a nation with the Germans of Prussia? Should the Germans in Riga be a part of the German state and nation? One has to know the limits of abstract principles because in the end it is the rule of common sense that counts. The Saar-basin needs to be French or we will too soon see a Germany once again dominating and bullying Europe and nobody will be strong enough to end the rampage.

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At the end of the week following Clemenceau death the Great Victors had drifted far apart. It is not clear whether it was the death of Clemenceau that shook the former allies so or if it was doomed to happen anyway. Pichon's quick and sudden foray into the question of Rhineland had showed just how isolated France was. Only Italy and Japan, who did not have any clashing goals, could count as an ally, but neither had any political power to speak of at the conference. It was with the help of United Kingdom and USA a peace could be enforced. Italy's approval of French policy might be helpful but it would not give France troops to guard the Rhineland. Nor could Italy help France in her demands for reparations after the war. In the end France needed the help of United Kingdom and USA but if neither of these powers would help France in her rightful quest for safety, what would one do? Pichon had to decide just how far he would stress the question of an independent Rhineland and as always in diplomacy there was no way of knowing just how far one could go. The other powers also had their troubles. President Wilson had been forced to delay his trip to USA after the death of Clemenceau and had serious troubles at home were he did not enjoy full support for his conduct during both the war and the peace process. George Lloyd shared some of Wilson's problems although to a lesser extent. His Liberal Party was in an alliance with the conservative party that while stable at the moment it may not be a permanent solution. In January 1919 Ireland had declared independence and George Lloyd's position as a link between conservatives and liberals became harder and harder to maintain. In the end all of the negotiators in Paris had their own problems back home and the question was which party would dare to stress their position in the negotiation the most.