Rhineland Revisited
The cornerstone of French Rhineland policy was political flexibility and freedom of action. While Pichon followed Poincaré's advice and delivered clear and radical demands for an “independent” Rhineland it was always with an ulterior motive – to leave room to back down from the most controversial demands. As the conference went on Pichon, who had been somewhat sidelined during the war, became more and more used to his new position and therefore, more independent from Poincaré's influence. As the negotiations regarding Rhineland quickly bogged down due to Anglo-American opposition Pichon attempted to find alternative avenues to weaken Germany. Linked to the Rhineland question was the question of German reparations. American opposition to a joint financing of the costs of the war or a reduction of French and British debt put both France and United Kingdom in a tight spot. Reparations from Germany became the only avenue of both France and United Kingdom to pay for their own recovery and to pay off their American debt. American resistance to a Rhineland state, and their unwillingness to help economically coupled with their disinterest in punitive reparations, made American–French relations more than strained.
It was in this milieu of tired tension that the joint Anglo–American proposal of 18 March to France of an alliance guaranteeing France in the event of an unprovoked German aggression. Pichon was sceptical of alliances and he had all the reason to be. Guarantees of such nature constituted a clear break with classical British and American foreign policy and the question was whether they would fall through in the event of war. Further, even if USA and the British came to France's rescue in the event of war, there was a serious risk that it would be too little too late if Germany could not be delayed at the Rhine. A repetition of the Great War would be likely, or perhaps an even worse result. Depressed by an impossible choice of either controlling the Rhineland but standing alone or to let Germany keep the Rhineland but be guaranteed by their Allies Pichon and his closest advisers Tardieu and Loucheur came to the conclusion that they would attempt a little of both. The goal was to bind the Anglo–American guarantee by a second guarantee, that of a joint postwar occupation of the Rhineland. That coupled with steep reparations, German disarmament, army reduction and a demilitarisation on the east of the Rhine. The idea was to force their allies to act in accordance with French interests in the event of war while concurrently weaken Germany as much as possible. This change of policy, emphasizing occupation of the Rhineland with its ulterior motive of allowing a return to the old Rhineland strategy if needed, was however delayed throughout March. Pichon, who held the question of Poland very dearly, delayed any definite answer to the Anglo–American proposal until the question of Haller's army was all but solved. The question was also delayed by the strenuous negotiations about the Saar, which was characterised by Tardieu in a private conversation as an example of “silliness” in the way how hard the fight went compared to how a small question it was. It was not until 30 March Pichon gave his clear counter demands to the British and Americans. American and British responses to the French demands were quite cool. Lloyd George accepted demilitarisation but a permanent or long time occupation was out of the question. The British response proved not good enough and the negotiations about the Rhine cooled down once again.
Lorries handed over by the Germans to the Allies. Cologne, 26 February 1919
The more immediate effect of the Anglo-American proposal for alliance, and the French reorientated Rhineland policy was the ripples it created in French domestic politics. A week after the alliance proposal President Poincaré contacted Pichon to confirm whether the rumours of France backing down from their demands of a free Rhineland state was true. Pichon, while a friend of Poincaré, was also a guarded person playing his cards close to his chest, a strategy he learned during his attempts to improve German-French relations before the war, revealed little information to Poincaré. While Pichon' was less secretive than Clemenceau before him Poincaré grew more and more wary of his man at the conference, and started to regret his support to Pichon. As April approached fueled by rumours and the secretive nature of the conference domestic opposition against the policy shift increased throughout the French political establishment and the media. Foch, returning from his meeting at Spa with the German representatives, claimed that “To renounce the barrier of the Rhine would be to admit that unimaginable monstrosity of voluntarily granting Germany, soaked in the blood of her crimes, the possibility of beginning [the war] again.” Foch's high-strung criticism of what he perceived as a deeply irresponsible shift in policy was not limited to internal notes. When Pichon did not give him the opportunity to address the French delegation in person, Foch turned to the press. In interviews publish in the Daily Mail (which was outside the reach of French censorship) he espoused indirect criticism of his own government saying that “our peace must be a peace of victors and not of vanquished” and continued “We must stay on the Rhine. […] It is our only safety. […] Remember, those, 70,000,000 Germans will always be a menace to us. They are an envious and warlike people. Their characteristics are not changed. Fifty years hence they will be what they are today. Do not trust the appearance of the moment.” For people informed about the situation in Paris Foch's interview was not as much a criticism of British and American opposition to a Rhineland front, but against his own government. Foch's machinations did however not stop at using the media, but would in April reach levels comparable to treason, or at least gross insubordination.
A President Beaten
In April 1919 the Paris Peace Conference took a most unfortunate turn – it was almost as if God himself launched misfortune after misfortune on the great statesmen who gathered in Paris. The first of the recent misfortunes was the death of Georges Clemenceau, the lion who brought France through the end of the war, but was shot dead by an assassins bullet at the very start of the conference. The second misfortune was President Wilson's sudden incapacitating sickness following his physical breakdown on the evening of 3 April. Strained by the massive work of the conference, the hostility of his colleagues, Wilson was found in one of Quai d'Orsay's long corridors on his knees with a severe cough that left some small small spots of blood on his handkerchief. He was complaining about a severe headache and pain in the back and was after some quick deliberations taken back to his quarters were he was to rest guarded by the first lady, Edith Wilson. A physical examination of him the following morning concluded that Wilson had gotten some kind of flu, perhaps the Spanish kind that was bringing Europe to its knees in the aftermath of the war. However his symptoms were erratic and hard to pinpoint and he was given the advice to rest, possibly for as long as two weeks. Such news could not have come under worse circumstances for President Wilson. He had, more or less since the start of the conference in February, become more and more distrusting of his old comrade Colonel House, but was now forced to delegate important negotiations to him more and more. Wilson thought that House was too willing to give concessions to the other powers, especially France and did not trust him to be fully loyal to him. However, weakened by the illness President Wilson had no other choice but to ease his grip of the negotiations in Paris.
President Wilson together with the First Lady
The illness of Wilson threw the entire conference off balance. Edith Wilson's secrecy regarding the state of the president's health created a tense milieu filled with rumours and informal deals between American delegates and the European diplomats and statesmen. Although Wilson from time to time met with Pichon, Lloyd George and Orlando during his illness much of the negotiations among the victors during this hectic time was done by his underlings, primarily House. The unsatisfactory situation was made worse by the president's inability to give clear objectives to House who, in this power vacuum, continued to make his own decisions. During Wilson's visit to USA in February–March Colonel House had personally, without any support from Wilson, been acting in an unofficial and unsanctioned capacity as “deputy president” reaching what seemed as agreements with France, only to have them torn apart by Wilson on his return. With Wilson's illness the first weeks of April the situation of February–March returned with its ensuing confusion. In a time in need of quick, clear-headed and distinct decisions this would prove dire, not only for American diplomacy but the peace conference in large.