AHC\PC\WI:More territory taken from Germany post-WWII

Would it have been feasible for somewhat more territory to have been taken from Germany in the immediate aftermath of WWII, along the following lines:

  • Bavaria independent (perhaps with minor border adjustments in favour of Czechoslovakia, plus southwestern Lindau panhandle to Baden-Württemburg [see below]), under Allied occupation and committed to permanent neutrality (as with Austria);
  • Saxony to Czechoslovakia, perhaps with Görlitz and other areas east of the Spree to Poland instead;
  • Saar annexed directly to France, rather than OTL's Protectorate (plus perhaps a border strip in the southern Palatinate, or maybe even the entire Palatinate, all the way up to Worms);
  • Rest of Pomerania east of the Ücker to Poland (instead of just Stettin-Swinemünde as OTL), along with rest of Usedom and all of Rügen;
  • Thuringia to West Germany and Schleswig-Holstein (including Hamburg) to East Germany, with permanent Soviet naval bases at Kiel and Lübeck and the Kiel Canal itself an international waterway with ships of all nationalities having the right of innocent passage into and out of the Baltic (perhaps with a permanent joint Allied occupation authority to ensure this, a la Berlin);
  • Rhineland and Ruhr re-occupied;
  • Rhineland west of the Saar (river) to Luxembourg;
  • Heligoland back to Britain, plus Trischen, Scharhörn, and Neuwerk;
  • East Frisian Islands (Borkum to Wangerooge) to Netherlands (plus perhaps Lower Saxony west of the Ems);
  • Sylt and Fehmarn to Denmark;
  • Berlin an independent city-state but under permanent joint Allied occupation;
  • Baden-Württemburg either French protectorate (as OTL Saar) or independent but French (+American?)-occupied and committed to permanent neutrality (as OTL Austria and TTL Bavaria)?

In the event of these additional border changes occurring, what would have been their knock-on effects?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
With a Soviet presence and the DDR?

No. The FRG was a reaction to the Soviet presence in Central Europe.

"Keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out" was the point...

Now, if the Soviets are not present west of the Vistula?

Possibly. I could see a Polish federal state encompassing western Poland and what became the DDR, becoming the "frontline" state...

Best,
 
No. The FRG was a reaction to the Soviet presence in Central Europe.

"Keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out" was the point...

Now, if the Soviets are not present west of the Vistula?

Possibly. I could see a Polish federal state encompassing western Poland and what became the DDR, becoming the "frontline" state...

Best,

We're talking about the immediate aftermath of WWII here, mid-to-late '45 and early '46, the period in which immense territories were taken from Germany OTL, not the later '47-'48 period, when things really started to heat up vs. the Soviets. Besides, a lot of the additional annexations are on the eastern side of Germany, the side where the Soviets are calling the shots as opposed to the Wallies and the side where most of the really big annexations happened OTL and where it wouldn't be too implausible for the Soviets, who have the most reason of any major Ally to hate the Germans, to rip off a few more big chunks to add to their satellites. And a lot of the proposed annexations on the western side of Germany are small stuff, an island here, an island there, a small border strip over there, stuff that wouldn't weaken Germany too much but would have quite a good symbolic value for the angry Allies tearing off these small morsels. Besides, the Saar was detached from Germany even OTL, becoming a French Protectorate until its return to Germany in 1956, and it wouldn't be too much of a stretch to have it not just detached from Germany and added to the French sphere of influence, but annexed directly to France.
 
Probably the most plausible further loss of German territory: Czechoslovakia gets Lusatian Sorbia as compensation for the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia to the USSR (this is more realistic than Germany losing all of Saxony, as the original post proposed; it can be defended on national self-determination grounds).

In OTL, the Czechs did show some interest in the idea, but Stalin was opposed to it. According to Karel Kaplan, *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945-1948* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1987), pp. 24-25:


"The Czechoslovak government expressed interest in annexing territory
inhabited by the Lusatian Sorbs in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany.
Prague did not demand annexation officially, but spoke out as a defender
of the smallest Slavic people and supported the Sorbian national movement,
which strove for annexation with Czechoslovakia. In particular it was the
Lusatian Sorb National Council in Bautzen which turned to the Prague
government, Benes and Stalin with the demand for annexation. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs cooperated with the Lusatian National Council and
forwarded its memorandum to Zorin in Moscow. Kopecky [the Minister of
Information] and Nejedly [the Minister of Education and Culture] urged on
June 8, 1945, that the Czechoslovak government insist on the annexation of
the Lusatian Sorbs. The government decided to request the occupation of
Lusatia by its army. The Society of Friends of Lusatia renewed its
activities in Czechoslovakia and together with the Slavic Council
organized demonstrations calling for annexation. All these actions evoked
no significant response in the international arena. The Great Powers did
not reply to memoranda and the occupation of the territory by Czechoslovak
troops did not take place. An attempt by representatives of the National
Council to bring up the Lusatian Sorb problem at the Potsdam Conference
met with similar results. They had hoped that Stalin would present their
plan, but he was silent on the matter. Even after the conference, organs
of the Lusatian Sorb national movement tried to achieve a separation from
Germany, but without success.

"The attitude of the National Council and the Prague government toward
Lusatia's secession from Germany was not in conformity with Soviet
interests. In June 1945, in response to an inquiry from Stalin on the
Lusatian matter, [Prime Minister] Fierlinger termed the affair
'delicate.' In reality, Moscow had no intention of ceding this German
territory, where its own army was in place. Moreover, within the
framework of its conception of a central administration of Germany, Moscow
was opposed to splitting up its own occupation zones. In Lusatia, the
Soviets oriented themselves around the Domowina, after the National
Council the number-two local and traditional organization, which Moscow
recognized as the sole representative of the Lusatian Sorbs. Control of
the Domowina was gradually taken over by Communists, who proceeded to
claim that the rights of the Sorbs would be best ensured in a democratic
Germany. German Communists, whose stand reflected Soviet intentions,
characterized the separatist tendencies as reactionary. In the autumn of
1945, the Soviet occupation authorities halted the activities of the
Lusatian Sorb National Council. For the first time, the Prague government
realized that its intentions were inconsistent with Soviet plans for a
central administration of Germany, which were based on the Soviets' anti-
German attitude, and ceased its attempts to ensure a permanently weak
Germany. As soon as Prague woke up to the fact that it was out of step
with Moscow, around the end of 1945, it lost interest in the fate of
Lusatian Sorbs."

Still, one wonders: Granted that in 1945 it made sense for the Soviets to prefer to keep Sorbia as part of their occupation zone, rather than give it to Czechoslovakia, where they were about to withdraw their troops, and where the government was not yet fully controlled by Communists. Still, after February 1948, might not Stalin change his mind? After all, Czechoslovakia by then had come under Communist control, and Stalin might in this way (a) compensate it for its loss of Ruthenia, and (b) assure that if ever he did have to accept a unified non-Communist Germany, at least that one area would not be part of it? (The fact that by the 1940's even the most heavily Sorbian areas of Germany had a substantial German population could be "solved" by ethnic cleansing; indeed, as part of Czechoslovakia, Sorbia would presumably be subject to the Czechoslovak policy on expulsion of Germans, which after all had been originated not by the Communists but by Benes. A few trusted German "anti-fascists" might be allowed to remain. And of course a lot of Germans in the area might suddenly re-discover their Slavonic roots...)
 
"Keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out" was the point...

...which a further truncated Germany than OTL would fulfil rather better than it did OTL.

"Keep the Germans down" - well, a West Germany shorn of Saxony, its Catholic South, Schleswig-Holstein including Hamburg, the Palatinate, and assorted bits elsewhere would be rather more "kept down" than OTL's FRG, no?

"The Americans in" - TTL's rump FRG would be rather more dependent on the Americans than OTL's West Germany, what with its much lesser ability to defend itself and all. Such a rump West Germany would be essentially an American client state, removing the danger of the Germans trying to go their own way, independent of the US. Such a weakened West Germany would firmly cement the US' position in Central Europe.

And "the Russians out" - that would be dealt with quite sufficiently by the increased US presence in West Germany as compared to OTL, no?


Probably the most plausible further loss of German territory: Czechoslovakia gets Lusatian Sorbia as compensation for the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia to the USSR (this is more realistic than Germany losing all of Saxony, as the original post proposed; it can be defended on national self-determination grounds).

Germany's possession of Pomerania, Lower Silesia, and northern East Prussia could have been defended on national self-determination grounds, too, had the entire German population of those areas not been expelled wholesale immediately after the end of the war. No-one whose opinions the Allies actually listen to is going to object to Saxony being ethnically cleansed of Germans in similar fashion to Lower Silesia or East Pomerania, especially not when the Czechs were one of the very first nations wronged by Hitler's racist, expansionist, genocidal Germanism. Being made to give up Saxony to Czechoslovakia is going to be considered to still be a lenient punishment for trying to wipe the entire Czech people off the face of the Earth. The only people who might think differently would be the Germans previously inhabiting said regions, whose opinions the Allies would, for obvious reasons, not even take into consideration.

In OTL, the Czechs did show some interest in the idea, but Stalin was opposed to it. According to Karel Kaplan, *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945-1948* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1987), pp. 24-25:

[...]

Still, one wonders: Granted that in 1945 it made sense for the Soviets to prefer to keep Sorbia as part of their occupation zone, rather than give it to Czechoslovakia, where they were about to withdraw their troops, and where the government was not yet fully controlled by Communists. Still, after February 1948, might not Stalin change his mind? After all, Czechoslovakia by then had come under Communist control, and Stalin might in this way (a) compensate it for its loss of Ruthenia, and (b) assure that if ever he did have to accept a unified non-Communist Germany, at least that one area would not be part of it? (The fact that by the 1940's even the most heavily Sorbian areas of Germany had a substantial German population could be "solved" by ethnic cleansing; indeed, as part of Czechoslovakia, Sorbia would presumably be subject to the Czechoslovak policy on expulsion of Germans, which after all had been originated not by the Communists but by Benes. A few trusted German "anti-fascists" might be allowed to remain. And of course a lot of Germans in the area might suddenly re-discover their Slavonic roots...)

Besides, it would be completely possible for Stalin to weaken the non-Communist Czechoslovak government more and faster than OTL - arrange some "tragic accidents" for the most vocal anti-Communists during the period of time while the Soviet Army is still occupying Czechoslovakia, have Benes assassinated by a "crazed Sudeten\Saxon\insert-random-nearby-previously-German-populated-area-here German - as an additional plus, that would not only weaken the anti-Communist faction in the Czechoslovak government, but also serve to further inflame anti-German sentiment in Czechoslovakia, and provide an excuse for the Soviets to delay withdrawing their army from Czechoslovakia - "with the recent surge in unrest caused by the actions of diehard German fascists, the Soviet Army will be remaining in Czechoslovakia for the time being to assist the Czechoslovak Army in restoring order and removing the German terrorists plagueing the innocent Czech people." Voila - a Communist Czechoslovakia in 1946 or 1947, firmly in the Soviet sphere, and with Saxony and Lusatia to boot!
 

Driftless

Donor
Would it have been feasible for somewhat more territory to have been taken from Germany in the immediate aftermath of WWII, along the following lines:


  • Bavaria independent (perhaps with minor border adjustments in favour of Czechoslovakia, plus southwestern Lindau panhandle to Baden-Württemburg [see below]), under Allied occupation and committed to permanent neutrality (as with Austria);
  • Saxony to Czechoslovakia, perhaps with Görlitz and other areas east of the Spree to Poland instead;
  • Saar annexed directly to France, rather than OTL's Protectorate (plus perhaps a border strip in the southern Palatinate, or maybe even the entire Palatinate, all the way up to Worms);
  • Rest of Pomerania east of the Ücker to Poland (instead of just Stettin-Swinemünde as OTL), along with rest of Usedom and all of Rügen;
  • Thuringia to West Germany and Schleswig-Holstein (including Hamburg) to East Germany, with permanent Soviet naval bases at Kiel and Lübeck and the Kiel Canal itself an international waterway with ships of all nationalities having the right of innocent passage into and out of the Baltic (perhaps with a permanent joint Allied occupation authority to ensure this, a la Berlin);
  • Rhineland and Ruhr re-occupied;
  • Rhineland west of the Saar (river) to Luxembourg;
  • Heligoland back to Britain, plus Trischen, Scharhörn, and Neuwerk;
  • East Frisian Islands (Borkum to Wangerooge) to Netherlands (plus perhaps Lower Saxony west of the Ems);
  • Sylt and Fehmarn to Denmark;
  • Berlin an independent city-state but under permanent joint Allied occupation;
  • Baden-Württemburg either French protectorate (as OTL Saar) or independent but French (+American?)-occupied and committed to permanent neutrality (as OTL Austria and TTL Bavaria)?
In the event of these additional border changes occurring, what would have been their knock-on effects?

I would think something on this order more likely to have occured post WW1 - an even more Draconian Versailles Treaty
 
No. The FRG was a reaction to the Soviet presence in Central Europe.

"Keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out" was the point...

That was the point up until Stalin set off a nuke and then the point changed quite a bit and plans to keep Germany down forever economically and militarily changed.
 
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