Seelowe

Wyragen-TXRG4P has posted a thread, "Seelöwe successful, so what?", which considers the consequences of Operation Sealion, if successful. I thought it might be instructive to consider how that might have come about.
The key requirements for Operation Sealion were the elimination of RAF Fighter Command & elimination of the Royal Navy. The former was do-able, absent some stupid decisions by the German High Command. The latter was not, unless we expand our definition of "elimination" to include temporary diversion by means of a ruse.
On 3 Aug Luftwaffe strength in a/c stood at 1065 single-engine [Bf-109-- 760 combat-ready & avail for offensive ops] & 310 twin-engine [Bf-110-- 230 avail] fighters, 446 [Ju-87-- 343 avail] dive bombers, & 1458 twin-engine [Do-17, Ju-88, & He-111-- 818 avail] medium bombers. As can be seen from the above figures, the LW had many more a/c than fully trained aircrews.
On 7 Aug Brit strength stood @ 960 single-engine [Hurricane & Spitfire-- 714 avail] fighters & 471 medium bombers [which played no direct role in the Battle of Britain].
By the end of Sep 276 German single-engine & 100 twin-engine fighters, 130 fighter-bombers, 343 dive bombers, 26 close support planes, & 700-800 twin-engine bombers faced a Brit force of 665 single-engine fighters. [All strength figures are from Harold Faber, "Luftwaffe-- A History".]
In prep for Adlertag, equip all Bf-109 units w/drop-tanks [amazingly, this was never done!] & rearm Bf-110s [2-20mm & 4-7.92mm fwd, 1-7.92mm aft] w/2-20mm & 4-13mm fwd, 1-double 13mm aft. This isn't for increased range, as hits were rare vs enemy fighters beyond 250 metres anyway; but for added impact in converting damaged targets into destroyed ones. It was well-known in combat aviation circles that a twin-engine fighter couldn't maneuver like a single-engine one. Its only advantages were in range & firepower, so the speed with which it could shoot down an enemy was critical. In addition, Mussolini offered 10 divs & 30 sqdns of a/c. Accept the a/c.
In prep for the invasion itself, accelerate training of the 2d fallschirmjaeger div [in addition to the 7th], plus 2 more airlanding divs [for a total of 2 fallschirm & 3 luftland divs-- the 12th, 22d, & 24th Inf]. Keep the 1st & 6th Gebirgsdivs as part of the OB, but [since ea/has only 2 mtn inf rgts] reinf the 1st w/SS rgt (mot) Liebstandarte AH & the 6th w/IR (mot) Großdeutschland. Build one hell of a lot of DFS-230 gliders & Ju-53 transports.
Do not, as Hitler had planned, sow mines to cut off the Channel at both ends. This would have signaled German intentions & worked against the naval deception. Do, however, move hvy artil into camoflaged firing positions on the Channel opposite Dover. French resistance is certain to report this to the Brits, so do it as early as possible-- like in July, when OKH first began planning for Sealion.
Adlertag was originally scheduled for 10 Aug, but weather on the 10th & 11th prohibited large-scale air ops. The op was rescheduled for the 13th. Instead, put all combat aviation units on 4-hour standby as of 11 Aug.
Mon 12 Aug 1940: Historically 24 Bf-109s & -110s attacked Brit radar stations along the coast as the opening attack of the Battle of Britain. Instead, use an entire geschwader (100+) of Ju-88s & Do-17s w/Bf-109 escort followed by photoreconnaissance, followed by a 2d wave if necessary. [Bekker (see below) writes "...(on 12 Aug 1940)...for the first time, the...target was...the top secret 'radio' aerials sticking up at many points along the English coast. These could be seen...by telescope (from) across the Channel." Faber writes, "...the LW...made no serious attempt to destroy the British coastal radar stations...or even to keep them under continual harassing attack. After 15 Aug there were no more attacks on these stations.(!)]
Follow destruction of the radar stations w/in 1 hour by simultaneous medium bomber attacks vs fighter bases [espec Manston, Middle Wallop, Hawkinge, & Lympne; w/Exeter, Warmwell, Tangmere, & Rochford as alt targets] & Ju-87 attacks vs ships & harbors on the Channel, both w/Bf-109 escort.
Cajus Bekker ["The Luftwaffe War Diaries"] writes, "Although 3 airfields (on 12 Aug)...had taken a pasting, none of them was a fighter base.(!) ...(after) more than a year's...study of all available intelligence...surely (the LW) must...have known where the British fighters and their ground organization could best be hit. ...Instead, the LW had attacked quite irrelevant airfields." [Coastal Command, Bomber Command, & an auxiliary field.]
Continue intensive attacks vs radar & fighter bases thru the 12th. As weather closes down on the 13th & 14th continue small-scale raids in staffel thru gruppe strength (12 to 36 a/c).
Beginning on 15 Aug, conduct daily full-strength bombing raids from bases in Norway. [This was done only once in the entire campaign.]
During the period 15-31 Aug, as it becomes clear that the Bf-110 & Ju-87 are at a disadvantage vs enemy Spitfires [potentially even the rearmed Bf-110s], withdraw them-- using the Bf-110 [as fighter-bombers], Ju-87, & Italian bombers towards the end of the month only in staffel thru gruppe strength raids vs coastal targets [radar stations, ships, & harbor facilities] to disperse RAF defensive efforts, breaking off & withdrawing in the face of fighter opposition. By timing several of these raids at once during major bomber attacks the RAF can be forced either to dissipate its strength or to leave the coastal targets unprotected. Except for these coastal raids [which withdraw in the face of fighter opposition], conduct all bomber attacks in massive strength to reduce the opportunity for enemy flak & fighters to concentrate against smaller numbers of a/c. Conduct bombing attacks in 2 waves-- the 1st one escorted by all avail fighters, & the 2d unescorted & 20 to 30 minutes behind. The RAF can't leave fighters on the ground in reserve because they'd be destroyed on the ground, so they fly up to fight, then after the 1st wave of bombers turns for home they land to rearm & refuel, & while on the ground they're hit by the 2d wave. [The RAF is likely to respond by pulling some fighters back to reserve airfields, in which case the 2d wave of bombers aborts their mission. This has the effect of bringing all avail LW fighters to bear vs half of the RAF fighters, resulting in higher LW a/c survivability.] This 2-wave strategy, after about 1 Sep, creates the possibility of using advanced trainee crews & Italians to pilot bombers in the 2d wave, which are unlikely to encounter Brit fighters. This increases the potential for damage to Brit fighter infrastructure at a small additional risk.
During the period 24 Aug thru 6 Sep RAF Fighter Command was stretched to the limit, having lost by 6 Sep roughly a quarter of its strength (Churchill). [The 11th Fighter Group was given nearly all the pilots in Britain, even the Bomber, Navy, & Coastal commands giving up pilots. Beginning around 1 Sep even the Bf-110 & Ju-87 could survive again in the Brit skies. These are strong indications that RAF Fighter Command was nearing the end of its rope-- Bekker.]
On the night of 24/25 Aug a few German bombers accidentally bombed London, at that time a prohibited area. Churchill ordered an immediate reprisal raid vs Berlin-- the first of 4 w/in 10 days. On 7 Sep Hitler ordered the targeting priorities of the LW changed from attacking Brit fighter bases to attacking their cities-- a critical error that allowed RAF Fighter Command to rebuild its strength. [Bekker-- "This alteration in tactical policy is viewed by the British, from Churchill on down, as a fundamental German mistake that saved the defenses from destruction."] RESIST THIS IMPULSE!!! Instead, continue attacks on fighter bases & broaden the targeting priority as of the last few days of Aug to include a/c production factories. Continue attacks on this basis until between 15 & 30 Sep, by which time tactical air superiority will have been gained over the Channel. Between 15 & 30 Sep, as RAF Fighter Command loses its ability to interfere decisively w/LW ops, maintain pressure vs the fighters while shifting the emphasis to attacks vs ships & harbor facilities in the Channel.
Official LW figures for Aug reflect 231 single-engine fighters lost & 80 badly damaged (311 total), w/160 new a/c produced & 62 repaired [a net loss of 89, leaving a total of 671 (760 - 89]. Official RAF figures for the same period reflect 390 destroyed & 197 badly damaged (587 total), showing an RAF loss ratio of nearly 2:1, w/476 produced & repaired [a net loss of 111, leaving a total of 603 (714 - 111). [Loss & production figures from Faber.] RAF losses during the 1st week of Sep brought their fighter strength down to roughly 536 machines avail, compared to ~650 LW.
On 15 Sep, during the climactic Battle of London, despite Hitler's diversion of the LW to attack cities instead of military targets, RAF Fighter Command committed all of its reserves & barely averted a catastrophe, largely because of dense cloud cover. This is another strong indication that RAF Fighter Command was nearing the end of its rope-- even in the historical timeline. With the proposed changes, RAF Fighter Command should lose its ability to interfere decisively w/LW ops by the end of the 1st week of Oct.
On 20 Sep the LW began using Bf-109s equipped to carry bombs. While this worked well as a surprise tactic, the RAF quickly adapted, resulting in heavy LW fighter casualties. Begin using fighter-bombers earlier (around 1 Sep) & continue using them-- but use Bf-110s, not -109s, as described above-- either in small, unescorted formations to keep the pressure on the RAF, bringing them out to fight; or in large, heavily escorted formations to give the medium bombers a rest. This gives the Bf-110 a role & preserves the air-to-air combat strength of the Bf-109.
1 immediate effect of the above changes is to increase German single-engine fighter strength @ the end of Sep from 276 to 406 (276 + 130), while converting the 100 twin-engine fighters into fighter-bombers. Massed attacks vs Brit radar stations, fighter bases, & a/c factories-- absent the diversion to attack cities-- has increased Brit fighter losses by 50-100%, RAF strength falling to ~536 by the end of the 1st week of Sep [a roughly historical figure, 3½ weeks into the campaign], to ~357 by the end of Sep [compared to 665 historically], & to ~179 by mid-Oct. This smaller RAF Fighter Command is less able to inflict casualties on the LW, with the result that instead of 400, 500-550 single-engine LW fighters have survived, about 150 twin-engine fighter-bombers, 343 dive bombers, 26 close support planes, & 800-900 twin-engine bombers. By mid-Oct RAF Fighter Command has largely lost the ability to intervene decisively w/LW ops.

1. German first generation drop tanks on the ME-109 where a failure. Several reasons

A. The ME-109 was allready prone to take off and landing accidents due to poor visability and crappy landing grear... adding weight, drag, and volital aviation fuel under its belly only made these problems worse

B. The 66 liter moulded plywood tank could only be dropped in strait level flight at low speeds (otherwise it would pitch up and hit the tail plane damaging the aircraft)

C. The feeding systems where prone to air leaks causing the engine to cut out and force the pilot to revert to the main tank

D. The disengage mechanism was very unreliable and would frequently fail to work, forcing the pilot to keep his tank (with its severe effects on manueverability) and to land with the thing which would frequently fall off and hit the ground on touch down

Putting those crappy tanks on the ME-109s in the BOB just increases their losses in all honesty

2. They can't just attack fighter command airfields and sector stations

A. The Luftwaffe intel on these was terrible and they didn't know about them or where they where until too late in the campaign

B. Even if successful the RAF would just pull back slightly so that their bases aren't bombing range with fighter escort

C. The Germans had a damn difficult time conducting photo recon because the Brits used the recon plans as "practice" for radar guided intercepts

3. Bombers from Norway can't operate with fighter cover...theres no reason to employ them except at night on the ports, and night bombing was generally useless in 1940

4. The ME-110 was a turkey against all single engine aircraft... its only possible use would be as a schnellbomber against airfields and radar stations at dawn and dusk (outside of German doctrine, and Goering considered the ME-110 pilots elite and not to be used for secondary missions)... otherwise they where only good in their later roles as nightfighters or scouting

Seelowe-- Pt. #2

By Aug the Army devised an invasion plan utilizing 21 inf , 4 pz, & 2 mot divs, 2 mot rgts, 1 ind rgt, & 2 flak rgts. This was far in excess of what the Kriegsmarine could support, so by early Oct the Army downsized its plan to a total of 6 inf, 2 pz, 1 mot divs, 1 ind rgt, & 2 flak rgts. Increase this by 1 inf div, reinf the 1st & 6th Gebirgs as shown (in Pt. #1), & designate an Armee command under FM R v Leeb.
Work commenced on 22 Jul 1940 to assemble & emplace every Army & Navy hvy artil piece avail along the French coast, primarily at Pas-de-Calais. By early Aug 4/28 cm (11 in) traversing turrets were fully operational as were all 7 of the Army’s railway guns. The railway guns, 6/28 cm K5 guns, & a single 21 cm (8.3 in) K12 gun with a range of 115 km (71 mi), could only be used against land targets. The remainder, 13/28 cm guns & 5/24 cm (9.4 in) guns, plus additional motorized batteries comprising 12/24 cm & 10/21 cm guns, could be fired at shipping but were of limited effectiveness due to their slow traverse speed, long loading time, & ammunition types.
Better suited for use against naval targets were the 4 hvy naval batteries installed by mid-Sep: Friedrich August with 3/30.5 cm (12.0 in) guns; Prinz Heinrich with 2/28 cm guns; Oldenburg with 2/24 cm guns & Siegfried with 2/38 cm (15 in) guns. Fire control for these guns was provided by both spotter a/c & by DeTeGerät radar sets installed at Blanc Nez & Cap d’Alprech. These units were capable of detecting targets out to a range of 40 km (25 mi), including small Brit patrol craft inshore of the English coast. 2 additional radar sites were added by mid-Sep: a DeTeGerät at Cap de la Hague & a FernDeTeGerät long-range radar at Cap d’Antifer near Le Havre.
16th Army’s Artillerie Kommand 106 was slated to land w/the 2d Wave to provide fire protection for the transport fleet as early as possible. This unit consisted of 24/15 cm (5.9 in) guns & 72/10 cm (3.9 in) guns. About a third of them were to be deployed on English soil by the end of Sealion’s first week. [This was under the original, 30-div plan. Under the revised 10-div plan the hvy artil could arrive in Dover beginning late on Day #2.]
The presence of these batteries was expected to greatly reduce the threat posed by Brit destroyers & smaller craft along the eastern approaches as the guns would be sited to cover the main transport routes from Dover to Calais & Hastings to Boulogne. They could not entirely protect the western approaches but a large area of those invasion zones would still be w/in effective range.
In Jun 1940 the Brit Army had 22 inf divs & 1 armd div in England. The inf divs were, on average, at half strength, had only a sixth of their normal artil, & were almost totally lacking in transport. [Since artillery normally makes up half to two thirds of a div's firepower, this put these divs at roughly a fifth to a quarter-strength-- the equivalent of about 5 inf divs.] There was a critical shortage of ammunition such that none could be spared for practice. [After the Dunkirk evacuation & up until 27 Aug 1941 the 1st Armd Div was stationed in the UK on anti-invasion duties. It then embarked for Egypt, replaced by the 6th Armd Div-- a ghost div w/only a signals rgt as of 12 Sep, so the effective total Brit defensive strength was about 5 inf divs with no transport & v limited ammo.]
On 1 Jul 1 cruiser & 23 destroyers were committed to escort duties in the Western Approaches, plus 1 cruiser & 12 destroyers on the Tyne, & the a/c carrier Argus. More immediately avail were 10 destroyers at the south coast ports of Dover & Portsmouth, 1 cruiser & 3 destroyers at Sheerness on the River Thames, 3 cruisers & 7 destroyers at the Humber, 9 destroyers at Harwich, & 2 cruisers at Rosyth. The rest of the Home Fleet-- 5 battleships, 3 cruisers, & 9 destroyers-- was based far to the north at Scapa Flow. By the end of Jul a dozen additional destroyers were transferred from escort duties to the defence of the homeland, & more would join the Home Fleet shortly afterward. At the end of Aug the battleship Rodney was sent south to Rosyth for anti-invasion duties. She was joined on 13 Sep by her sister ship Nelson, the battlecruiser Hood, 3 anti-aircraft cruisers, & a destroyer flotilla.
These ships will have to be destroyed or driven off during the period 12 Aug thru 19 Oct. As evidence that this can be done, during Aug & Sep of 1941, while supporting Army Group North in the Russian Campaign, Luftkorps 1-- w/roughly a fifth of the bombers allocated for Adlertag-- sank the Russian battleship Marat & the cruiser Petropavlovsk, & heavily damaged the battleship Oktober Revolution & the cruisers Kirov & Maxim Gorkiy, to the point of rendering them unsuitable as gun platforms. The ships on escort duty in the Western Approaches, at Rosyth in Scotland, & on the Tyne & the Humber, in the far N of England, aren't immediately relevant, as it will take any of them at least a full day to reach the invasion beaches. This accounts for 2 battleships, 1 battlecruiser, 1 small carrier, 7 cruisers, & roughly 50 destroyers, leaving just 1 cruiser & 22 destroyers in the vicinity of the invasion beaches. However, the battleships, battlecruiser, carrier, & cruisers are dangerous enough that they, at least, must be eliminated for the invasion to proceed. By 19 Oct the thin-skinned Hood & the Argus have most likely been sunk, w/the Rodney & Nelson both heavily damaged & either neutralized [firepower or mobility kill], removed to safer anchorages, or both. Of the 8 cruisers, 2 or 3 are probably sunk, w/the others all damaged, the S coast of England has been swept clean of destroyers, & those cruisers & destroyers which can be removed have been.
At the end of Sep the Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were avail @ Brest [the Prinz Eugen having suffered bomb damage], the Lutzow was avail in the Baltic, & the Scheer was about to depart on her N Atlantic cruise [the Hipper being in drydock for a refit]. These 4 hvy warships were totally inadequate to face the RN on anything like an even footing, but they could have simulated a mass breakout into the N Atlantic of the kind that the Brits had nightmares about. This could have drawn off the Home Fleet for the critical 2 days that the German Army needed to land troops in England, w/air superiority & an escort of destroyers & light cruisers.
During the 1st week of Oct stand ready to conduct the mock naval breakout, timing this to coincide w/an extended period of calm weather. Beginning the night of 27 Sep strong northerly winds prevail, making passage hazardous thru 10 Oct, but calm conditions return on 11-12 Oct. On 11 Oct move U-boats into position & begin the aerial & naval deployment of mines to close both the N & S approaches to the invasion beaches. Sortie the fleet on 11 Oct, but break off on the night of the 12th as the weather worsens, withdraw into the Arctic, & withdraw naval minelayers, but leave U-boats in position w/orders not to engage. Calm weather returns during 16-20 Oct, so move the fleet back S & conduct the ruse on 16-17 Oct, proceeding as far as the Denmark Straits but breaking off when in sight of Brit heavies. As photoreconnaissance confirms the Home Fleet is away from Scapa Flow & moving NW at dawn on the 18th, resume minelaying on the 18th & begin the invasion on 18 Oct. After 20 Oct light easterly winds prevail which actually assist the invasion craft traveling towards the invasion beaches, but by the end of Oct very strong southwest winds (force 8) prohibit any non-seagoing craft from risking a Channel crossing.
The KM had collected approximately 2400 barges from throughout Europe to transport their troops across the Channel [860 from Germany, 1200 from the Netherlands & Belgium & 350 from France]. Of these, only about 800 were powered (some insufficiently). Use the unpowered barges [towed by tugboats] mainly to land supplies & the powered barges to land troops in multiple trips.
Before dawn on 19 Oct begin bombing & shelling the invasion targets of Rochester, Brighton, & Dover. Begin airdrops [2d & 7th fallschirm in the morning, 1 div/ea @ Rochester & Brighton, & the Brandenburger rgt @ Tonbridge[while amphib landing in the morning the elite 1st & 6th Gebirgs divs [1 N of Dover vic Deal & 1 S of Dover vic Folkestone]. Airland in the afternoon 12th Inf Div @ Rochester, 22d Inf Div @ Brighton, & 24th Inf Div @ Dover. The Dover op has priority for hvy artil & the Dover & Brighton ops have priority for naval gunfire. All have equal priority for close air.
This puts 2 divs/ea vs Rochester (GL W Sussmann) & Brighton (GL K Student) & 3 vs Dover (G der Inf E v Manstein). Assault all 3 objectives as airlanding troops become avail, continuing into the night as necessary. Before dawn begin unloading @ Dover (GO H Hoth) the 4th & 8th Pz Divs, the 29th Inf Div (motor), & additional supplies. Once the pzkorps is avail, lead a drive on Guildford while seizing local transport to motorise & follow w/an additional inf div [2 as soon as possible-- the 12th & 22d Inf]. Seize Brit airbases to lengthen the range of German fighters & provide abort strips for damaged a/c. Eliminate Brit radar stations. Expand the beachhead w/2 inf divs [2d Fallschirm & 12th Inf-- Sussmann] advancing on London from the SE, 2 more advancing on Portsmouth [7th Fallschirm & 22d Inf-- Student], & the balance of the invasion force [1st & 6th Gebirgs-- v Manstein] attacking London from the S, with the 24th Inf on garrison duty & 4th & 8th Pz & 29th Mot (Hoth) crossing the Wey at Guildford, the Thames between New Windsor & Shepperton, & enveloping London from the W. Continue air attacks vs Brit fighter bases. With air & artil superiority established over the E end of the Channel, begin ferrying hvy artil & garrison troops into Dover & Brighton.
Brighton & Rochester fall on the evening of 19 Oct & Dover by dawn on the 20th [Brighton & Rochester are defended mainly by ill-equipped Home Guards, but Dover is defended by the equiv of 2 Brit divs fresh from the Dunkirk evac, low on morale & ammo, & entirely outclassed by 3 German divs with temp air, naval, & artil superiority]. 1½ Brit divs are destroyed &/or captured, about ½ of an inf div withdrawing towards London. On the 20th, before the RN can intervene, the combat echelons of 2 pz divs have been unloaded, w/the 29th (mot) & support echelons of the pz divs unloaded that night. Sufficient civilian transport has been seized to motorize 1 inf div by the 21st, w/another to follow on the 23d.
By the night of 20-21 Oct the Brits fully man the GHQ Line, running from near Highbridge in Somerset, along the River Brue & the Kennet & Avon Canal to Reading, Aldershot, & S of Guildford, around the S of London, & N to Great Chesterford in Essex. ½ of their 3½ surviving effective inf divs is deployed W of Guildford, ½ is defending from Guildford to London, 2 S of London, & ½ in reserve from London to Great Chesterford. By the night of 20-21 Oct their destroyers are engaged E & W of the Channel w/U-boats, mines, the LW, & land-based artil. The minelaying op, only 4 days old, is not complete, but naval minelayers have to be withdrawn. Aerial minelaying continues. By 21 Oct 2 or 3 RN cruisers join the battle, & by the evening of 22 Oct the Home Fleet is in position to engage hvy land-based artil &/or disrupt naval supply ops. Shift the LW & hvy artil vs the heavies of the Home Fleet, heavily damaging or sinking 1 or 2 battleships.
Attack the GHQ line @ Guildford on the night of 21-22 Oct w/2 pz & 1 motor divs, breaching it on the 22d. [Brit ammo is very short, many artil pieces having only 10 rounds apiece.] At this point attack London w/inf from the S while enveloping to the W w/the pzkorps. The Brits evac their gov't to Manchester & begin prep to evac to Canada. London falls by 25 Oct.
It takes luck-- it especially requires the Home Fleet to take the bait-- but this puts 7 inf divs, 2 pz div, 1 motor div, & 1 indep rgt on Brit soil under conditions of German air superiority. This is about the smallest force that could have achieved decisive results, & about largest force that in late 1940 the LW could have supplied by air.
On 15 Nov King Edward VIII returns triumphantly to Windsor Castle [traveling in an oceangoing yacht belonging to Swedish magnate Axel Lennart Wenner-Gren], Oswald Moseley is elected Prime Minister, & he concludes a peace treaty w/Germany that establishes a rump state N of London similar to Vichy France, headquartered at York, w/southern England under German occupation. In Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 1 Dec Winston Churchill receives a vote of no confidence in Parliament, Lord Halifax is elected Prime Minister, & on 2 Jan 1941-- after turning the remnants of the RN over to the Canadians-- he signs an armistice w/Germany. The European gov'ts in exile relocate from Halifax NS to the US.
While the fall of England strikes like a bombshell in Washington, & while the European gov'ts in exile lobby for war, there is even less enthusiasm for war with Germany than in the historical timeline. The conquest of England satisfies a key condition for both Spain & Turkey to join the Axis coalition. Isolationist forces in the US are strengthened & Roosevelt's warhawks are fatally weakened. The Brit Halifax gov't in exile is unwilling to send any forces to the Far East. In India, agitation for immediate independence grows much stronger, & when granted by the York gov't leads to civil war against the colonial forces of the Halifax gov't. Lord Halifax reluctantly withdraws from India. S Africa, Australia, & NZ are reluctant to contribute any forces to Britain, with the result that N Africa rapidly falls to the Axis. Absent British encouragement Yugoslavia doesn't rebel, & with his hands full in N Africa Mussolini doesn't invade Albania or Greece, with the result that the Balkan Campaign is avoided. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, & Iran remain friendly to Germany, with no Brit intervention. Barbarossa is ready to begin in mid-May 1941 instead of late June-- 5 weeks earlier-- this time with Turkish, Iraqi, & Iranian participation.
On 4 Sep 1940 the Chief of Naval Staff issued a memo stating that if the Germans "...could get possession of the Dover defile & capture its gun defences...then holding these points on both sides of the Straits they would be in a position largely to deny those waters to our naval forces." Should the Dover defile be lost, he concluded, the RN could do little to interrupt the flow of German supplies & reinforcements across the Channel, at least by day, & he further warned that "...there might really be a chance that they might be able to bring a serious weight of attack to bear on this country". The very next day the Chiefs of Staff, after discussing the importance of the defile, decided to reinforce the Dover coast w/more ground troops. This forward deployment was crucial in allowing the German invasion force, w/temporary air, naval, & artil superiority, to annihilate the equivalent of 2 Brit divs at Dover.
General Brooke frequently confided his concerns to his private diary. He wrote, "...I considered the invasion a very real & probable threat & one for which the land forces at my disposal fell far short of what I felt was required to provide any degree of real confidence in our power to defend these shores."

BLAIRWITCH
"German first generation drop tanks on the ME-109 were a failure."
You are correct in all of your criticisms of 1st gen German drop-tanks. However, I presume that the engineers who designed the Me-262 jet fighter, the V-2 rocket, & the HS-293 radio-controlled glide bomb could have solved these relatively minor problems.
"They can't just attack fighter command airfields and sector stations. The Luftwaffe intel on these was terrible and they didn't know about them or where they were until too late in the campaign."
That is a common misconception. The Germans in fact had developed a superb radio-intercept service. Bekker writes, "By systematic listening-in on the enemy's radio channels it had become known to the Germans that British fighters were remotely controlled...by ground stations. It was further known that these stations obtained their information...by means of a new radio location system... Target data, British aerial photo-maps, & an airfield atlas of Great Britain had been circulated...down to gruppen-level. The astonishingly frequent radio orders issued to (British) aircraft in the air had been written down word-for-word and radio fixes taken. Cover names, such as 'Charlie Three' for Manston, had long since been decoded." The Luftwaffe certainly possessed precise intelligence on Brit fighter dispositions, but made extraordinarily poor use of it.
"Even if successful the RAF would just pull back slightly so that their bases aren't bombing range with fighter escort."
That is precisely what Kesselring kept expecting them to do, & what the Brits had never done-- even down thru the 1st week of Sep, when it appeared they were losing the air war. Even had they done so, the systematic suppression of the radar installations would have denied them the early warning they would have needed to scramble from rear area bases in time to meet the attacking German a/c, & the use of drop tanks on the fighters would have extended escort range.
"The Germans had a damn difficult time conducting photo recon because the Brits used the recon plans as 'practice' for radar guided intercepts."
A problem that's eliminated by suppressing the radar installations.
"Bombers from Norway can't operate with fighter cover..."
1st, they can if fighters meet them over the target, which with the Knickebein system was eminently feasible. And 2d, fighters aren't necessary if the bombers are part of the 2d wave described in my base document.
"...night bombing was generally useless in 1940."
The Knickebein system was designed especially for night bombing, it was in use from 14 Nov 1940, & it wasn't successfully jammed until mid-'41.
"The ME-110 was a turkey..."
That is a vast over-simplification. The Bf-110 (Me-110 is a misnomer, since the Bf-110 went into production before Willi Messerschmitt took over the company) was mis-utilized because of Goering's fantasies.
"...its only possible use would be as a schnellbomber against airfields and radar stations at dawn and dusk (outside of German doctrine)..."
That is essentially how I've proposed that it be used, except that I'm equally confident that the Bf-110 could have functioned well in large formations escorted by Bf-109s. (And on an alt-history site, we're to be bound by tactical doctrine? I'm proposing a sensible & professional approach the Operation Sealion instead of the haphazard way the Germans actually went about it. Tough to do if I'm to be bound by all of Goering's lunatic decisions.)

I'd suggest reading some of the threads on this subject.

I'd also suggest a manual on punctuation and layout of text....

I would comment if I could read it.

A suggestion: if you don't want to be bound by Goering's idiocy, kill him off. Let's say he had a heart attack. Who takes over for him? Pick some Luftwaffe general you think would do a good job and have Hitler put him in charge.

Graehame said:

BLAIRWITCH
"German first generation drop tanks on the ME-109 were a failure."
You are correct in all of your criticisms of 1st gen German drop-tanks. However, I presume that the engineers who designed the Me-262 jet fighter, the V-2 rocket, & the HS-293 radio-controlled glide bomb could have solved these relatively minor problems.
"They can't just attack fighter command airfields and sector stations. The Luftwaffe intel on these was terrible and they didn't know about them or where they were until too late in the campaign."
That is a common misconception. The Germans in fact had developed a superb radio-intercept service. Bekker writes, "By systematic listening-in on the enemy's radio channels it had become known to the Germans that British fighters were remotely controlled...by ground stations. It was further known that these stations obtained their information...by means of a new radio location system... Target data, British aerial photo-maps, & an airfield atlas of Great Britain had been circulated...down to gruppen-level. The astonishingly frequent radio orders issued to (British) aircraft in the air had been written down word-for-word and radio fixes taken. Cover names, such as 'Charlie Three' for Manston, had long since been decoded." The Luftwaffe certainly possessed precise intelligence on Brit fighter dispositions, but made extraordinarily poor use of it.
"Even if successful the RAF would just pull back slightly so that their bases aren't bombing range with fighter escort."
That is precisely what Kesselring kept expecting them to do, & what the Brits had never done-- even down thru the 1st week of Sep, when it appeared they were losing the air war. Even had they done so, the systematic suppression of the radar installations would have denied them the early warning they would have needed to scramble from rear area bases in time to meet the attacking German a/c, & the use of drop tanks on the fighters would have extended escort range.
"The Germans had a damn difficult time conducting photo recon because the Brits used the recon plans as 'practice' for radar guided intercepts."
A problem that's eliminated by suppressing the radar installations.
"Bombers from Norway can't operate with fighter cover..."
1st, they can if fighters meet them over the target, which with the Knickebein system was eminently feasible. And 2d, fighters aren't necessary if the bombers are part of the 2d wave described in my base document.
"...night bombing was generally useless in 1940."
The Knickebein system was designed especially for night bombing, it was in use from 14 Nov 1940, & it wasn't successfully jammed until mid-'41.
"The ME-110 was a turkey..."
That is a vast over-simplification. The Bf-110 (Me-110 is a misnomer, since the Bf-110 went into production before Willi Messerschmitt took over the company) was mis-utilized because of Goering's fantasies.
"...its only possible use would be as a schnellbomber against airfields and radar stations at dawn and dusk (outside of German doctrine)..."
That is essentially how I've proposed that it be used, except that I'm equally confident that the Bf-110 could have functioned well in large formations escorted by Bf-109s. (And on an alt-history site, we're to be bound by tactical doctrine? I'm proposing a sensible & professional approach the Operation Sealion instead of the haphazard way the Germans actually went about it. Tough to do if I'm to be bound by all of Goering's lunatic decisions.)

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Its more than the release mechanism and the tank feeding system being poorly designed... its that the ME-109 wasn't really suitable to carry drop tanks. Von Braun Kurt Tank and every other engineer in Germany can't change the inherrant problem that the ME-109's landing gear layout was crap.

If you want drop tanks... it would require earlier POD's and the ME-109 to be cancelled... maybe Hitler gets angry at all the landing accidents and decides that Kurt Tank can have the DB inline engines which allows the FW-190 to come immediately into production...with its much wider and studier landing gear, and its sturdier airframe it could function both as an escort fighter with drop tanks AND as a schnell bomber since she could carry 1500 pounds of bombs without any special difficulty... The FW-190 with the DB inline engine could outperform any British fighter in 1940 handily

The data on British sector stations took months to accumulate, and by then the window was closed.

If you look at the Luftwaffe intel guys like Martini, they where geniunely idiots in how they presented and absorbed information. They where operating under the premise that the home chain radar stations where just midair communication devices for too long. Also night bombing wasn't going to achieve any serious victory. German bomber pilots where paranoid as shit to fly on their radio beams... they felt that British nightfighters would home in the beams and intercept them... this lead to bombers flying off center and generally missing their targets (both Helbig and Havighorst who flew 10's of missions in BOB confirm these fears)
They also curtailed missions against the stations because they where difficult to destroy from the air... some kind of early adaptation of the "Beethovan" bomber which mirrored the American Aphrodite program of Joe Kennedy fame would have been excellent against them. The Germans could take a worn out Do-17 hook it to an ME-109 and then let the pilot smash the bomber by wire control into the radar station (although such missions would have to be done at dawn and dusk which was outside German tactical doctrine even if the hybrid bomber was available... early prototypes appeared in '43 but there was no technical reason they couldn't exist earlier)

German bombers from Norway are attacking well north of the acceptable range of an ME-109... if you combine it with a change over to the 190, then you can have them link up if it can be properly arranged... not really a game changer though Luftflotten V only had 100 bombers and Norway wasn't exactly a high servicability theater

If you want the ME-110's to contribute in a different way than OTL then you have to move your points of departure back considerably. The 110 pilots where fighter pilots, with only a few having any meaningful bombing experience or previous sorties. They where engrained for years to be though of as "elite" pilots "Goerings Ironsides"... if they are going to conduction missions, successful missions in this manner not only would Goering need to have died a considerable bit before BOB but you would have to have the entire OHL realize the design was a failure as a fighter beforehand (and up to that point the design hadn't been proven non functional as a day fighter)... this sort of change alone probably requires going back to at least 1937

Astrodragon said:

I'd also suggest a manual on punctuation and layout of text....

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Gosing said:

I would comment if I could read it.

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Shhhh... not so loud... that's part of the plan.

If no one can be bothered to wade through several mono-block posts of poorly punctuated and eccentrically spelled blue text with variable grammar, then no one will refute, rebut, or take exception to the claims being made.

In this manner you can use a deliberately torturous style to actively prevent any real debate on substance and thus "win".

For reasons others have explained in other threads, even if planning was started in January of 1940, Germany simply would not be ready to properly prepare itself for Seelowe. Even with the existent factors, the two major vehicles that could ensure its success would be the Landwasserschlepper and the Marinefährprahm, the former to bring in supplies and heavy equipment, and the later to actually deploy the troops. Even a small number (about a hundred) of Landwasserschleppers would be able to land large amounts of supplies that could last for weeks, and without the need of a port.

However, while arguably there could be enough time to prepare the Landwasserschleppers, the Marinefährprahm would not be ready in a quantity that was decent, or may not be ready at all for operations in 1940.

Regardless of that factor, you would need to push the Royal Air Force North so as to prevent them from constantly bombing the supply depots formed upon the beaches. And even then, you have the threat of the British deploying Mustard Gas against the landing beaches, which would make the invasion fail even if the landing forces were equipped with gas masks. The only way to counter that would be full suits designed to protect the wearer, which would only inhibit his actions on the field, and generate larger casualties on the whole.

So even if you are able to put men on the beaches, you basically have them become incapacitated upon the beaches, with the British Army coming in and disarming them.

The last period a invasion could take place in which the tides were favourable and the weather might hold was around the 21st September, after that time no one in their right mind would consider launching an invasion.

Don Lardo said:

Shhhh... not so loud... that's part of the plan.

If no one can be bothered to wade through several mono-block posts of poorly punctuated and eccentrically spelled blue text with variable grammar, then no one will refute, rebut, or take exception to the claims being made.

In this manner you can use a deliberately torturous style to actively prevent any real debate on substance and thus "win".

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Then why don't we just ignore the whole thing?

KyleB said:

Then why don't we just ignore the whole thing?

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What thing?

GRIDLEY
"...if you don't want to be bound by Goering's idiocy, kill him off."
I actually considered something like that. There was a period between 21 Jun (the armistice) & 19 Jul (Goering's promotion to Reichsmarschall) when he was politically vulnerable. Prior to the armistice Hitler wouldn't have wanted to mess with his high command during a major campaign, & afterward he felt committed to Goering because of the promotion. But by the French campaign Heydrich had accumulated a detailed file on Goering's questionable financial dealings, sexual escapades, & drug use which-- given sufficient motivation-- could have been used to cripple Goering with Hitler. So in early Jul Heydrich leaks the existence of the file to Hitler, who demands to see it, & he then calls Goering on the carpet. Goering simpers & begs & blames it all on the drugs that he's taken ever since getting injured in the Munich putsch, so Hitler orders him to take a couple of months off & divides his responsibilities between Milch, in charge of the Air Ministry, & Kesselring, who gets appointed deputy OB Luftwaffe. Goering is therefore gone from 16 Jul thru 16 Oct.
BLAIRWITCH
"...the ME-109's landing gear layout was crap."
A problem that I'm confident can be fixed-- if not by redesigning the landing gear, then by repositioning the drop-tanks.
"...Hitler...decides that Kurt Tank can have the DB inline engines which allows the FW-190 to come immediately into production...it could function both as an escort fighter with drop tanks AND as a schnell bomber..."
Exactly the kind of compromise that I'm trying to avoid. You simply can't hang 1000 or 1500 lbs. of bombs on a high-performance fighter without turning it into a pig.
"The data on British sector stations took months to accumulate, and by then the window was closed."
It wasn't necessary to be able to tell a sector station from a fighter base. The Luftwaffe had more than adequate intel to distinguish a fighter base from a Coastal Command base-- & that is the point. But in point of fact, as laid out in my previous post, by Adlertag the Luftwaffe had decoded enough Brit radio traffic to know precisely where the sector stations were.
"If you look at the Luftwaffe intel guys like Martini, they were operating under the premise that the home chain radar stations were just midair communication devices for too long."
Bekker writes that shortly after the fall of France, Martini's specialists established that the Brits had a radio-control system for their fighters that relied on info from a Brit radar net. On 3 Aug Jeschonnek's Hq issued an order, "Known English DeTe (radar) stations are to be attacked by special forces of the first wave..."; so before Adlertag the Luftwaffe certainly knew that the English radio antennae visible from France constituted a radar net. They attacked it, for crying out loud, on 12 Aug!
"Also night bombing wasn't going to achieve any serious victory."
Night bombing, by either side, was a terror tactic-- nothing more.
"If you want the ME-110's to contribute in a different way than OTL then you have to move your points of departure back considerably. The 110 pilots were fighter pilots..."
That didn't stop OKL from hanging bomb racks on the 109 & calling it a fighter-bomber. My point is that doing that to the 109 seriously impaired its fighting ability, whereas the 110 had little fighting ability to begin with.
"...you would have to have the entire OKL realize the design was a failure as a fighter..."
As pointed out in my base post (which I would have assumed you would actually read before commenting), during the period 15-30 Aug it became abundantly clear that the 110 was unsuitable to function as a fighter in Brit skies.
"...this sort of change alone probably requires going back to at least 1937."
No, 15-30 Aug 1940 is far enough.
ARIOSTO
"...even if planning was started in January of 1940, Germany simply would not be ready to properly prepare itself for Seelowe. ...the two major vehicles that could ensure its success would be the Landwasserschlepper and the Marinefährprahm..."
I'm not trying to ensure its success, merely to show how-- within the existing operational constraints-- it might have possibly succeeded. And with calm waters & 2400 modified river barges, there was indeed a slim possibility of success.
"...you would need to push the Royal Air Force North so as to prevent them from constantly bombing the supply depots formed upon the beaches."
I addressed this point at length in my base post.
"...you have the threat of the British deploying Mustard Gas against the landing beaches..."
Although I didn't expressly say so, this is why I based my plan on assaults close to major urban centers-- Dover, Brighton, & Rochester. The Brits did say they intended to use mustard gas, but it's hard to believe they'd do it against their own civilian population.
REDCOAT
"The last period a invasion could take place in which the tides were favourable and the weather might hold was around the 21st September..."
Untrue, as discussed in my base post. The weather was ideal in the latter part of October.
TO ALL-- I by no means propose this version of Operation Sealion as a serious undertaking. Based on Wyragen's thread, I merely consider it an interesting thought experiment. The elimination of RAF Fighter Command I regard as eminently feasible. The diversion of the Home Fleet by a ruse is questionable, the ability of the Luftwaffe to eliminate even half of the RN ships (aside from the Home Fleet) deployed in coastal waters even more so, & for the Army to have relied on river barges in the unpredictable weather of the Channel would have been irresponsible. The weather of late October, as a matter of fact, is known in hindsight-- but it could not have been predicted more than a couple of days in advance. Nor did the Army have reliable intel on the state of Brit ground forces, hence their early planning for a 30 or 40-division invasion force.
However, all that said, I am convinced that had the Germans gotten ashore with even a 10-division invasion force of the type described, under conditions that precluded the Brit use of mustard gas (such as proximity to civilian population centers), then I am convinced that the invasion would have succeeded vs the equivalent of 5 Brit infantry divisions that were extremely low on ammo & had almost no transport. The risks inherent in getting that force ashore were simply too extreme, & the outcome couldn't be predicted with an arbitrarily high degree of certainty.

KyleB said:

Then why don't we just ignore the whole thing?

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Isn't it our duty to show the heathen why the Unmentionable Sea Lion cannot work?

The wargame of Operation Sealion conducted at Sandhurst War College in 1974 has been proposed as a rebuttal of my suggested plan to invade Britain in 1940. As it happens I have a copy of the summary of that wargame, which I used as part of the source material for my plan. I thought that it might be instructive to include here my appreciation of the relevance of that exercise.

To begin with, the umpiring staff was structured with 6 umpires-- a Brit 4-star, a German 3-star, 2 Brit 2-stars, & 2 German 2-stars. In any disagreement over rules the Brit 4-star would have the final word, favoring the desired Brit outcome. In any dispute among the Germans the 3-star would have the final word, & of the 3 Germans this 3-star was the least qualified to judge. VAdm. Friedrich Ruge was a mine warfare officer who'd served 20 years on mine warfare ships before being posted to a staff job in Paris during Sealion. He played no active role in planning the operation. Adolf Galland, while a famous fighter ace who fought in the Battle of Britain-- & indeed, helped pave the way for Sealion-- also played no role in planning the operation. Only Heinz Trettner, the Chief of Operations of 7th Fliegerdiv during the planning of Sealion, had any relevant staff experience.

Assumptions: "a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather & tides (for a high water attack) & c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping."
a) In my scenario the Luftwaffe has won air supremacy, & I've described in detail how they did it.
b) My invasion dates are equally constrained by the weather & tides, but by waiting until late Oct that isn't such a problem.
c) By waiting until late Oct more shipping has been assembled.

22 Sep-- "The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield."
330,000 men reflects the size of the original 25-30 division invasion force, which was completely untransportable, unsupportable by the KM, unsupplyable, crazy, & part of a German plan that by 22 Sep had been completely superseded.
Brighton also reflects the original (Heer) plan of the invasion-- not the multiservice Dover plan developed a month later. Brighton is 'way too far from Calais, & even too far from Boulougne. My scenario is based on the Dover plan.

"The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing..."
This amounts to an admission by the Brits themselves that the Germans could get ashore-- even with converted river barges-- with the lead elements of 9 freaking divisions!

"...but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged..."
Heavy losses.

"...the landings...overwhelmed the beach defenders..."
"Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent."
My other sources say 22 divs, but I'll bow to the Brits. And I seriously doubt that only 4 months after Dunkirk the Brits had been able to "fully equip" 17 divs. My other sources say not.

22 - 23 Sep-- "The Germans had still not captured a major port..."
That's because they were going for Brighton with amphibiously delivered ground forces. With my plan, Brighton would be taken by surprise by a paratroop div & a glider-borne airlanding div. Dover would be taken by a glider-borne airlanding div with an elite gebirgsdiv landing just north & another just south of town. These options were denied to the Germans playing at Sandhurst because they were constrained by the plan as it existed in Aug-- not as it might have developed into Oct had serious multiservice planning begun in Jul, which is the essence of my scenario.

"Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids..."
...which would have been avoided had the Luftwaffe 1st achieved air superiority, as I've specified & described in detail.

"...then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows & had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats, & 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk & one damaged."
More heavy RN casualties with little or nothing to show for them in return.

"However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed..."
My diversionary sortie happened at the beginning of the invasion, in the Denmark Straits, & it wouldn't have been destroyed because as soon as the Home Fleet heard about the invasion they'd break off & run for home.

23 Sep-- "The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters & 70 bombers), & the RN had suffered losses such that it was keeping its BBs & CVs back..."
Harold Faber, the author of "Luftwaffe: A History", writes that official RAF strength figures for the end of Sep reflect 665 fighters, not over a thousand. But anyway, more heavy Brit losses.

"Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg & forces were diverted to the South West."
A German buildup in Cherbourg is more craziness, unless done as a diversion. The Cherbourg forces were originally earmarked to land in Lyme Bay, 90+ miles away. (Dover is 21 miles from Calais.) The plan for landings in Lyme Bay was part of OKW Direktiv 16, issued on 16 Jul-- but abandoned by mid-August, with the publication of the 13-div "Dover Plan"! So at the time when the wargame was conducted-- 22 thru 28 Sep 1940-- the Brits were forcing the German players to use an operational plan that had been published on 16 Jul, but superceded by a heavily revised plan in mid-Aug!!!

"German...preparations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div (which) airlanded successfully at Lympne... 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty..."
Wait a minute!!! 7th Panzer Div??? It's only Day #2 of the invasion!!! I thought the Germans hadn't captured a port yet, it'd take 3 days to offload a panzer div even in a port, there's no way they could land heavy equipment over the beaches, they were just light infantry with no artillery or tank support... All that kind of stuff. Are the Brits themselves actually admitting that a whole German panzer div could get ashore under these conditions? In 2 Days? But what does that do to all the learned criticisms of this alt-history board?

23d - 24th-- "The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, & the navy protested that the weather was unsuitable..."
Of course it was unsuitable. The Brit umpires insisted that the invasion be launched in the unsuitable weather of Sep instead of waiting 'til Oct. I know that's what Hitler insisted upon-- but alt-history is all about what-if. What if Hitler had been talked into waiting a month for better weather? If it's good we go for it, if not then we call it off?

"The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440."
Fewer than that if my plan had been followed.

"The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming."
Even constrained by Goering's idiotic decisions, the Luftwaffe has still managed to virtually annihilate RAF Fighter Command.

"On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover..."
Not as good as they would have if they'd done it my way.

The wargame ended on 28 Dec in a decisive German defeat, based mainly on the absence of supply. But that's because the rules prevented the Germans from establishing air superiority, prevented them from choosing a later invasion date, prevented them from downsizing their invasion force to a more manageable level, prevented them from adding more paratroop & airlanding units, prevented them from diverting the Home Fleet by a ruse, prevented them from using the short invasion route from Calais to Dover, forcing them to use the longer route to Brighton instead... In fact prevented them from exercizing good common sense, forcing them to use the rules devised by the Brit umpires of the Sandhurst War College instead.

Note also (1) that the Brits in this wargame very sensibly kept their heavy fleet units far away from the Luftwaffe (whose pilots the contributors to this board insist were inept at attacking ships), & (2) made no use of mustard gas, or indeed chemical weapons of any kind.

I hope that this essay has illustrated why I feel that the Sandhurst wargames of 1974 can in no way be considered a decisive commentary on the plan for Operation Sealion that I have proposed on this board.

Graehame said:

I hope that this essay has illustrated why I feel that the Sandhurst wargames of 1974 can in no way be considered a decisive commentary on the plan for Operation Sealion that I have proposed on this board.

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Apart from the technical reasons, I'd say that there are the psychological ones.
The Maritime Mammalin idea strikes a very deep chord in the british soul even today, and professional how it could be the army, it is not immune to that.
Thus, one must be very careful when considering analysis on the matter coming from a british source.
This does not disqualify the analysis result in toto, but certainly adds a margin of possible error which must be take into account

Sorry, but it's already firmly established that the unmentionable Sea Mammal is Alien Space Bats.

yourworstnightmare said:

Sorry, but it's already firmly established that the unmentionable Sea Mammal is Alien Space Bats.

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The Sandhurst wargames proved that even under rigorously enforced adverse conditions the Germans could (1) devastate the RAF, (2) drive all of the RN heavies & most of its light fleet units out of the Channel, (3) get ashore with initially 9, & ultimately about 12 divisions, & (4) hold the RN heavies at bay out of range of the Luftwaffe, & 'way too far off to influence the landings. Your ASB commentary ignores all of these facts.

Sigh,

http://web.archive.org/web/20070504051527/gateway.alternatehistory.com/essays/Sealion.html

http://web.archive.org/web/20070504034219/www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm

Also this:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=142907