Seelowe

I don't recall suggesting that the RN intended sending ships past the Skaggerak in my earlier post, so don't see the relevance.

As to the iron ore, in 1939 Germany had an intake of 8 million tons, of which 6 million came from Northern Sweden. I agree that in summer some of this could be shipped through the Baltic via Lulea, but this route was icebound in winter, when the ore was transported by rail to Narvik, as the sea route via the Leads was kept open all year round by the Gulf Stream.

One of the main arguments for Weserubung used by Raeder to convince Hitler was the need to safeguard the ore supplies being transported through Norwegian waters. Presumably Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew which way the ore was shipped to Germany.

Unless, of course, you know something Raeder (and, come to that, Adams, author of 'The Campaign in Norway, 1940' which makes the same point) didn't?

Should have mentioned this earlier, but wanted to confirm it from my files;
In 1939, 60% of German iron ore imports from Sweden came via Narvik through the Leads, and 40% through the Baltic.
 
BS at both ends?

Should have mentioned this earlier, but wanted to confirm it from my files;
In 1939, 60% of German iron ore imports from Sweden came via Narvik through the Leads, and 40% through the Baltic.

Please find below 2 memos which passed between Dudley Pound and Winston Churchill, and a further, post war, statement by the commander of the German invasion forces These shed further light on the importance of the ore traffic through Norwegian waters, which a previous contributor seems to think unimportant.

Further comment on my part would be superfluous.

[FONT=&quot]Winston Churchill[/FONT][FONT=&quot], memo to the First Sea Lord (29th September 1939)[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]At the end of November the Gulf of Bothnia normally freezes, so that Swedish iron ore can be sent to Germany only through Oxelosund in the Baltic, or from Narvik at the north of Norway. Oxelosund can export only about one-fifth of the weight of ore Germany requires from Sweden. In winter normally the main trade is from Narvik, whence ships can pass down the west coast of Norway, and make the whole voyage to Germany without leaving territorial waters until inside the Skagerrak.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]It must be understood that an adequate supply of Swedish iron ore is vital to Germany, and the interception or prevention of these Narvik supplies during the winter months, i.e., from October to the end of April, will greatly reduce her power of resistance. For the first three weeks of the war no iron-ore ships
left Narvik owing to the reluctance of crews to sail and other causes outside our control. Should this satisfactory state of affairs continue, no special action would be demanded from the Admiralty. Furthermore, negotiations are proceeding with the Swedish Government which in themselves may effectively reduce the supplies of Scandinavian ore to Germany. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Should however the supplies from Narvik to Germany start moving again, more drastic action will be needed. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Our relations with Sweden require careful consideration. Germany acts upon Sweden by threats. Our sea power gives us also powerful weapons, which, if need be, we must use to ration Sweden. Nevertheless, it should be proposed, as part of the policy outlined in paragraph 2, to assist the Swedes so far as possible to dispose of their ore in exchange for our coal; and, should this not suffice, to indemnify them, partly at least, by other means. This is the next step.[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]Memo from the First Sea Lord to [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Winston Churchill[/FONT][FONT=&quot] (16th December 1939)[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]The effectual stoppage of the Norwegian ore supplies to Germany ranks as a major offensive operation of war. No other measure is open to us for many months to come which gives so good a chance of abridging the waste and destruction of the conflict, or of perhaps preventing the vast slaughters which will attend the grapple of the main armies.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]If the advantage is held to outweigh the obvious and serious objections, the whole process of stoppage must be enforced. The ore from Lulea (in the Baltic) is already stopped by the winter ice, which must not be (allowed to be) broken by the Soviet ice-breaker, should the attempt be made. The ore from Narvik must be stopped by laying successively a series of small minefields in Norwegian territorial waters at the two or three suitable points on the coast, which will force the ships carrying ore to Germany to quit territorial waters and come on to the high seas, where, if German, they will be taken as prize, or, if neutral, subjected to our contraband control. The ore from Oxelosund, the main ice-free port in the Baltic, must also be prevented from leaving by methods which will be neither diplomatic nor military. All these three ports must be dealt with in various appropriate ways as soon as possible.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]To every blow struck in war there is a counter. If you fire at the enemy he will fire back. It is most necessary therefore to face squarely the counter-measures which may be taken by Germany, or constrained by her from Norway or Sweden. As to Norway, there are three pairs of events which are linked together. First, the Germans, conducting war in a cruel and lawless manner, have violated the territorial waters of Norway, sinking without warning or succour a number of British and neutral vessels. To that our response is to lay the minefields mentioned above. It is suggested that Norway, by way of protest, may cancel the valuable agreement we have made with her for chartering her tankers and other shipping. But then she would lose the extremely profitable bargain she has made with us, and this shipping would become valueless to her in view of our contraband control. Her ships would be idle, and her owners impoverished. It would not be in Norwegian interests for her Government to take this step; and interest is a powerful factor. Thirdly,
Norway could retaliate by refusing to export to us the aluminium and other war materials which are important to the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply. But here again her interests would suffer. [/FONT]

[FONT=&quot](6) After the war General [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Nikolaus von Falkenhorst[/FONT][FONT=&quot] described a conversation he had with [/FONT][FONT=&quot]Adolf Hitler[/FONT][FONT=&quot] on 20th February 1940.[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Hitler reminded me of my experience in Finland, and said to me "Sit down and tell me what you did". After a moment, the Fuehrer interrupted me. He led me to a table covered with maps. "I have a similar thing in mind," he said: "the occupation of Norway; because I am informed that the English intend to land there, and I want to be there before them."[/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Then marching up and down he expounded to me his reasons. "The occupation of Norway by the British would be a strategic turning movement which would lead them into the Baltic, where we have neither troops nor coastal fortifications. The success which we have gained in the east and which we are going to win in the west would be annihilated because the enemy would find himself in a position to advance on Berlin and to break the backbone of our two fronts. In the second and third place the conquest of Norway will ensure the liberty of movement of our Fleet in the Bay ofWilhelmshaven, and will protect our imports of Swedish ore". Finally he said to me, "I appoint you to the command of the expedition".[/FONT]
 
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