If Amherst had not refused command in the ARW...

Hmmm, well even if Amherst had accepted field command, the war would've probably proceeded in a similarly detrimental way to the British as OTL- heck, the Howe brothers were quite pro-American in their sympathies too, which was, due to William Howe's decision to not pursue, a main reason why Washington's army wasn't destroyed in the field early in the yrs 1776-78. With Amherst in charge, that reluctance factor would've been probably multiplied much further, maybe entailing an earlier victory for the colonials without as much bloodshed...
 
Revisiting Jeffery Amherst recently I thought I'd bump this. Online biographies have given me a clearer picture of the man, and I have requested at least one of the two biographies on him for my birthday next month, so, anyway, in the hopes of sparking a bit of a debate:

Amherst was not a tactical wizard, nor in truth a strategic genius (though he wasn't bad at that), his expertese lay instead in the world of logistics. His modus operandi was to build up his supplies, to build up a large and irresistable force, to aim to take strategic points and to keep hold of them once he had done so. He planned thoroughly and he kept on top of events as they unfolded, and he left nothing to chance when it came to supplies and transport. Glacial though his movements may have been he was the man responsible for the conquest of French North America and he had never suffered a major defeat - though some will, uncharitably, say that's because he fought no battles outside seiges. His campaign to take Montreal is a brilliant piece of administrative generalship, what is more is was conducted with, what is termed as, an America Army consisting of British regulars, Colonist troops and Native Americans, showing that he could work with people he had a low opinion for if needed.

Amherst's approach to war was ideal for America at the time. A large untamed continent could not be dealt with by just marching hither and thither with little planning put into logistics. If you marched into the North American interior you had to be sure that you were going to have everything you needed and weren't going to get cut off from friendly forces elsewhere. By relying on overwhelming numbers and firepower, and advancing only on important strategic targets within easy reach of his base of operations, and fortifying the positions once he took them before moving on, he ensured that his advance, no matter how slow, was unstoppable.

Between the fall from favour of Duke of Marlborough and rise of the Duke of Wellington, Amherst was probably the most able administrator at the highest level of command that the British had.

If Amherst had commanded in the American Revolutionary War, and done so with full commitment to the British/Loyalist Cause, then there is little doubt in my mind that he would manage to gain control of a number of Colonies/Statesand be immovable from them, regardless of whether he did this by coming down from Canada into the New England States or by taking control of Middle America from the loyalist territories in that region like New York.

Having said that, he might be defeated in open battle and forced to surrender, since we have no real way of knowing how astute his tactical mind was, but on that subject, the way Amherst allowed the tactically highly capable Wolfe to handle such matters at Louisbourg would suggest that Amherst was able to recognize the abilities of his subordinates and prepared to delegate such responsibilities to them so as to make up for any of his own failings.
 

Flubber

Banned
Revisiting Jeffery Amherst recently I thought I'd bump this. Online biographies have given me a clearer picture of the man, and I have requested at least one of the two biographies on him for my birthday next month, so, anyway, in the hopes of sparking a bit of a debate...


Thank you for that "thumbnail" description of the man. Amherst was a fascinating man.

IIRC, wasn't it his opinion that substantial reinforcements were necessary one of the reasons Amherst wasn't made the overall commander in North America during the ARW?
 
Amherst's approach to war was ideal for America at the time. A large untamed continent could not be dealt with by just marching hither and thither with little planning put into logistics. If you marched into the North American interior you had to be sure that you were going to have everything you needed and weren't going to get cut off from friendly forces elsewhere. By relying on overwhelming numbers and firepower, and advancing only on important strategic targets within easy reach of his base of operations, and fortifying the positions once he took them before moving on, he ensured that his advance, no matter how slow, was unstoppable.

The problem, and this is looking at the thirteen colonies, that sort of approach would also mean something like Howe's campaigns - which is to say, taking "important strategic targets" but not actually landing crippling blows.

In Canada, there are only a few places to take, in the Thirteen Colonies, you eventually wind up with too few forces to continue advancing if you attempt this - for example, how much do you put in Boston? New York? Philadelphia?

And with a continued Continental Army in the field, what's to stop it from recapturing the cities at the thin end of things?

I think having him in the position of overall command would be a good thing , but I don't see much appreciable difference to the gain between him and Howe in the field.
 
I often think Clive is the more interesting AH opportunity as he turned down the command as well shortly before his suicide.

If Amherst accepted the command I suspect he would have had to make a decision to commit to war. Unlike the Howe brothers he appeared a man of clear principles. He refused to fight because of principle. If he agreed to fight he would, I think, commit to the principle.

So unlike General Howe I suspect he would fight without reserve. Also, he planned/approved multiple attacks during the French & Indian War. I believe he would co-ordinate with his other commanders better - Amherst in Howe's shoes wouldn't have left Burgoyne in the lurch...
 
The problem, and this is looking at the thirteen colonies, that sort of approach would also mean something like Howe's campaigns - which is to say, taking "important strategic targets" but not actually landing crippling blows.

In Canada, there are only a few places to take, in the Thirteen Colonies, you eventually wind up with too few forces to continue advancing if you attempt this - for example, how much do you put in Boston? New York? Philadelphia?

And with a continued Continental Army in the field, what's to stop it from recapturing the cities at the thin end of things?

I think having him in the position of overall command would be a good thing , but I don't see much appreciable difference to the gain between him and Howe in the field.

Perhaps its a matter of recognizing the restrictions. Amherst did believe that there would need to be 75,000 British troops to properly quell the rebellion and he was refused that on the ground the it was more than British could spare, which is one of the reasons he refused command.

If he had taken command anyway I would imagine such a cautious general would rather have taken control of a state or two and just secure his hold on it than go out seeking to find the Colonist's armies and destroy them. He would probably spend time building up fortification around that area he controlled, and comandeering local production facilities for food and supplies to suplement the supplies coming in from abroad, while fending off attacks from the continental army or whatnot, while also sending raiding parties out into the the rebelling territories to cause mischief. He would also require a close working relationship with the Royal Navy and need them to at least cripple supplies coming in from France.

It would, I think, be a matter of who could outlast the other and the outcome would still be far from clear, but Amherst would certainly bring a greater level of cohesion at the highest level to the British/Loyalist efforts, which could only be beneficial to them.
 
Perhaps its a matter of recognizing the restrictions. Amherst did believe that there would need to be 75,000 British troops to properly quell the rebellion and he was refused that on the ground the it was more than British could spare, which is one of the reasons he refused command.

Makes sense. And that figure sounds appropriate for the scale of the task.

If he had taken command anyway I would imagine such a cautious general would rather have taken control of a state or two and just secure his hold on it than go out seeking to find the Colonist's armies and destroy them. He would probably spend time building up fortification around that area he controlled, and comandeering local production facilities for food and supplies to suplement the supplies coming in from abroad, while fending off attacks from the continental army or whatnot, while also sending raiding parties out into the the rebelling territories to cause mischief. He would also require a close working relationship with the Royal Navy and need them to at least cripple supplies coming in from France.

It would, I think, be a matter of who could outlast the other and the outcome would still be far from clear, but Amherst would certainly bring a greater level of cohesion at the highest level to the British/Loyalist efforts, which could only be beneficial to them.
This is true. But I am not sure that simply holding say, Massachusetts (as where the British Army was entangled early on) would have been enough to significantly harm the rebellion.

But yeah, someone like him coordinating things would have been a very good thing - and he seems like someone who could get good work out of his subordinates, which is also to the good.

No one says the Overall North American Theater Commander (whatever the term used is) has to be able to ensure routed armies never reform, but if he can direct operations, that severely hinders the ability of the rebels to take advantage of any openings.

Howe and Burgoyne operating as they did should still have hindered Washington and Schuyler/Gates, but it seems to have failed there for reasons Amherest might have been able to address (subject to the limits of 18th century communications, obviously).
 
This is true. But I am not sure that simply holding say, Massachusetts (as where the British Army was entangled early on) would have been enough to significantly harm the rebellion.

But yeah, someone like him coordinating things would have been a very good thing - and he seems like someone who could get good work out of his subordinates, which is also to the good.

No one says the Overall North American Theater Commander (whatever the term used is) has to be able to ensure routed armies never reform, but if he can direct operations, that severely hinders the ability of the rebels to take advantage of any openings.

Howe and Burgoyne operating as they did should still have hindered Washington and Schuyler/Gates, but it seems to have failed there for reasons Amherest might have been able to address (subject to the limits of 18th century communications, obviously).

Well, I dont think the only thing he would do would be to hold and fortify, that would just be the main focus of his operations, for a few years anyway. There would be nothing stopping him sending out say 3-10,000 men early in the war or 10-25,000 men later on to campaign somewhere against the rebels and disrupt their operations, assuming doing so wouldn't weaken his base of operations.

Interestingly wikipedia claims that one of the major problems the British suffered was logistical. It says:

...the British had logistical problems whenever they operated away from the coast; they were vulnerable to guerilla attacks on their supply chains whenever they went far inland...The army suffered from mediocre organisation in terms of logistics, food supplies were often bad and the sparse land of America offered little in the way of finding reliable substitutes...

That passage is one of the reasons why I think Amherst well suited for overall commander because, as I explained earlier, his expertese was logistics and I doubt there's any way any army under his control is going to go marching into the North American countryside with "mediocre organization" of logistics.
 
Well, I dont think the only thing he would do would be to hold and fortify, that would just be the main focus of his operations, for a few years anyway. There would be nothing stopping him sending out say 3-10,000 men early in the war or 10-25,000 men later on to campaign somewhere against the rebels and disrupt their operations, assuming doing so wouldn't weaken his base of operations.

Well, let's say he has Howe's force of '76 - around thirty thousand men.

If he stations say, 10,000 men in NYC after taking it (no reason to suspect he'd be less able to take it than Howe was), that leaves ~20,000 minus casualties for the next step.

And so on from there. Depending on what he's taken and how he defines secure, he might not have a significant army to put into the field.

Interestingly website claims that one of the major problems the British suffered was logistical. It says:

...the British had logistical problems whenever they operated away from the coast; they were vulnerable to guerilla attacks on their supply chains whenever they went far inland...The army suffered from mediocre organisation in terms of logistics, food supplies were often bad and the sparse land of America offered little in the way of finding reliable substitutes...

That passage is one of the reasons why I think Amherst well suited for overall commander because, as I explained earlier, his expertese was logistics and I doubt there's any way any army under his control is going to go marching into the North American countryside with "mediocre organization" of logistics.
It would be interesting to see whose armies OTL did have the most trouble -Cornwallis in the South and Burgoyne come to mind.

The reason I say that is that I'm not sure if it would significantly alter say, the campaigning in New Jersey. Not to slight Amherest - just that there were places that "the sparse land of America" sounds more accurate than others.
 
Well, let's say he has Howe's force of '76 - around thirty thousand men.

If he stations say, 10,000 men in NYC after taking it (no reason to suspect he'd be less able to take it than Howe was), that leaves ~20,000 minus casualties for the next step.

And so on from there. Depending on what he's taken and how he defines secure, he might not have a significant army to put into the field.

One assumes that Amherst, having been a favorite of the King, might have more sway in getting reinforcements, but, not being well read about that period of time, I'm not sure what the British could spare. Maybe that would instead compell Amherst into recruiting and training more Loyalist troops to make up the numbers.

Regardless, Amherst was the kind of man who would regard the capture of one strategic point as worthy outcome of a detailed campaign, even if all the campaign involved was advancing on, and taking, the place in question. So he would be more than happy to have taken New York City and halted again for weeks or months to secure it before moving to the next step - hence my comments earlier about his movements being "glacial".

It would be interesting to see whose armies OTL did have the most trouble -Cornwallis in the South and Burgoyne come to mind.

The reason I say that is that I'm not sure if it would significantly alter say, the campaigning in New Jersey. Not to slight Amherest - just that there were places that "the sparse land of America" sounds more accurate than others.
I took that quote from Wikipedia if you want to look it up. I had a typo that I hadn't sorted before you replied.

Beyond that I cant think of anything more to say to this section.
 

Flubber

Banned
That passage is one of the reasons why I think Amherst well suited for overall commander because, as I explained earlier, his expertese was logistics and I doubt there's any way any army under his control is going to go marching into the North American countryside with "mediocre organization" of logistics.


While I believe Amherst would be a better overall commander, I don't believe the logistics situation is too comparable between the FIW and ARW.

In the FIW, Amherst moved through "empty" lands. The population of New France`was something around 60,000 IIRC and, even counting those Amerinds "loyal" to France, the guerrilla environment was negligible. As part of his campaigns, Amherst carefully built supply depots and made sure he had enough transportation. However, defending those depots and guarding transport columns which moved between them wasn't too difficult.

The population of the colonies, on the other hand, was around 3 million. While the land wasn't densely settled in an European sense, it was settled far more than New France was and the guerrilla environment was far more dangerous. Amherst will take care of his supply lines but the measure he'll need to take to guard those lines is not going to be anything like the measures he took in the FIW.
 
While I believe Amherst would be a better overall commander, I don't believe the logistics situation is too comparable between the FIW and ARW.

In the FIW, Amherst moved through "empty" lands. The population of New France`was something around 60,000 IIRC and, even counting those Amerinds "loyal" to France, the guerrilla environment was negligible. As part of his campaigns, Amherst carefully built supply depots and made sure he had enough transportation. However, defending those depots and guarding transport columns which moved between them wasn't too difficult.

The population of the colonies, on the other hand, was around 3 million. While the land wasn't densely settled in an European sense, it was settled far more than New France was and the guerrilla environment was far more dangerous. Amherst will take care of his supply lines but the measure he'll need to take to guard those lines is not going to be anything like the measures he took in the FIW.

Which brings up the question, do you think Amherst able to adapt to this different challenge of logistics?
 

Flubber

Banned
Which brings up the question, do you think Amherst able to adapt to this different challenge of logistics?


Yes, but I think his estimate of 75,000 regulars is going to do the job. Look at Boston for example.

Not only do you need to garrison the city itself, you need to occupy Bunker and Breeds hills plus Dorchester Heights in order not to be besieged like Gage found himself. How many troop just for Boston?

Look at New York next. You'll need outlying positions on Staten and Long Island plus a ring of posts inland. How many troops there? Then there's Philadelphia, Newport. Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and so many others.

Take a look at this population density map I found. Most of South Carolina was populated at 2 to 15 people per square mile but other than Charleston and a few fortified outposts, Britain controlled little and British columns moved through the countryside under constant threat of ambush. What will the situation be like in more densely populated regions? I do know that the British hunkered down in New York and Newport while making no attempts to continually sweep the surrounding countryside.

Seventy five thousand men to hold down 3 million seems - or "only" one million if we use the usual 1/3rd Patriot/Loyalist/Neutral formula - seems like a pittance. Communications is at the speed of horses and ships, by the time you hear that one of your outposts is under attack the attack is already over. Smuggling is going to be all but impossible to stop too.

Was he planning on raising Loyalist units?
 
One assumes that Amherst, having been a favorite of the King, might have more sway in getting reinforcements, but, not being well read about that period of time, I'm not sure what the British could spare. Maybe that would instead compell Amherst into recruiting and training more Loyalist troops to make up the numbers.

It's possible, but Howe got a formidable force by British expeditionary standards in 1776.

And the loyalist question . . . I don't really get the sense, and I could be wrong, that there was much enthusiasm for volunteering to fight on the part of the loyalists. Relying on them turning out in numbers never worked for anyone else, and I'm not sure if Amherest's abilities would address that.

Regardless, Amherst was the kind of man who would regard the capture of one strategic point as worthy outcome of a detailed campaign, even if all the campaign involved was advancing on, and taking, the place in question. So he would be more than happy to have taken New York City and halted again for weeks or months to secure it before moving to the next step - hence my comments earlier about his movements being "glacial".

Yeah. That sounds like it would duplicate Howe's successes and failures, although with hopefully better coordination.
 
Yes, but I think his estimate of 75,000 regulars is going to do the job. Look at Boston for example.

Not only do you need to garrison the city itself, you need to occupy Bunker and Breeds hills plus Dorchester Heights in order not to be besieged like Gage found himself. How many troop just for Boston?

Look at New York next. You'll need outlying positions on Staten and Long Island plus a ring of posts inland. How many troops there? Then there's Philadelphia, Newport. Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and so many others.

Take a look at this population density map I found. Most of South Carolina was populated at 2 to 15 people per square mile but other than Charleston and a few fortified outposts, Britain controlled little and British columns moved through the countryside under constant threat of ambush. What will the situation be like in more densely populated regions? I do know that the British hunkered down in New York and Newport while making no attempts to continually sweep the surrounding countryside.

Seventy five thousand men to hold down 3 million seems - or "only" one million if we use the usual 1/3rd Patriot/Loyalist/Neutral formula - seems like a pittance. Communications is at the speed of horses and ships, by the time you hear that one of your outposts is under attack the attack is already over. Smuggling is going to be all but impossible to stop too.

Was he planning on raising Loyalist units?

75,000 troops, all at once, is actually a pretty huge number of troops for the time and population density. The colonial forces would never be able to match those numbers, and without a Saratoga-like victory, they'd never be able to win the war. I think with those numbers, and a decent commander like Amherst, British victory would be assured.

Of course, the main question is where the hell would the British be able to get so many troops and still have enough to protect Britain itself and their other territories?

The British strategy was to raise large numbers of loyalist forces OTL, and that never worked out, so I really doubt it would here either.
 

Flubber

Banned
75,000 troops, all at once, is actually a pretty huge number of troops for the time and population density. The colonial forces would never be able to match those numbers, and without a Saratoga-like victory, they'd never be able to win the war. I think with those numbers, and a decent commander like Amherst, British victory would be assured.


You don't understand. Those 75,000 won't be concentrated in one force or just a handful of forces. Amherst is going to be occupying/garrisoning cities up and down the Eastern seaboard and each of those occupied/garrisoned cities are going to require multiple outposts.

Once he's occupied Boston and New York and Philadelphia and Charleston and Savannah, how much is going to be left for the field forces he needs to regularly sweep the countryside?

Look at the southern campaign. The British easily held Charleston and, less easily, a string of fortified outposts in the interior but the colony itself remained in rebellion. Pacification of an area only lasted along as British troops remained in that area.

For the UK, winning the American Revolution requires a political solution. Will Amherst and 75,000 troops create the time and/or options necessary for a political solution to be found?

Honestly, I don't know. :eek:
 
You don't understand. Those 75,000 won't be concentrated in one force or just a handful of forces. Amherst is going to be occupying/garrisoning cities up and down the Eastern seaboard and each of those occupied/garrisoned cities are going to require multiple outposts.

Once he's occupied Boston and New York and Philadelphia and Charleston and Savannah, how much is going to be left for the field forces he needs to regularly sweep the countryside?

Look at the southern campaign. The British easily held Charleston and, less easily, a string of fortified outposts in the interior but the colony itself remained in rebellion. Pacification of an area only lasted along as British troops remained in that area.

For the UK, winning the American Revolution requires a political solution. Will Amherst and 75,000 troops create the time and/or options necessary for a political solution to be found?

Honestly, I don't know. :eek:

I can't remember the exact numbers, but the British had something like 70,000 troops in NA throughout the entire war. Amherst wanted 75,000 troops, all at once, under his own command.

I disagree. The war was a fairly close thing, the British having tens of thousands more troops at any point in the war, especially in 1776, would likely have given them a victory. There would not be a political situation, the British would not have offered anything substantial prior to French entry into the war, doing so would be a massive about-face for them, and American negotiators would not accept anything less than independence after French entry into the war.
 
I disagree. The war was a fairly close thing, the British having tens of thousands more troops at any point in the war, especially in 1776, would likely have given them a victory. There would not be a political situation, the British would not have offered anything substantial prior to French entry into the war, doing so would be a massive about-face for them, and American negotiators would not accept anything less than independence after French entry into the war.

Tens of thousands of troops actually put to use more than OTL, I would say.

Howe had plenty of troops of which to crush Washington with his thirty-thousand odd man force in '76, he just failed to rise to the occasion to deal the kind of blows it would take.
 
You don't understand. Those 75,000 won't be concentrated in one force or just a handful of forces. Amherst is going to be occupying/garrisoning cities up and down the Eastern seaboard and each of those occupied/garrisoned cities are going to require multiple outposts.

Once he's occupied Boston and New York and Philadelphia and Charleston and Savannah, how much is going to be left for the field forces he needs to regularly sweep the countryside?

Look at the southern campaign. The British easily held Charleston and, less easily, a string of fortified outposts in the interior but the colony itself remained in rebellion. Pacification of an area only lasted along as British troops remained in that area.

For the UK, winning the American Revolution requires a political solution. Will Amherst and 75,000 troops create the time and/or options necessary for a political solution to be found?

Honestly, I don't know. :eek:

Probably not - to hold down 1 million rebels or rebel-sympathetic, even Amherst would have probably needed something in the region of 300,000 to 400,000 troops to successfully quash the revolt.
 
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