If Amherst had not refused command in the ARW...

Probably not - to hold down 1 million rebels or rebel-sympathetic, even Amherst would have probably needed something in the region of 300,000 to 400,000 troops to successfully quash the revolt.


That sounds far too high.


After all, less than a million (in the field armies) Union soldiers dealt with something under 5.5 southern whites in the 1860s, across an area no smaller than the thirteen colonies.
 
That sounds far too high.


After all, less than a million (in the field armies) Union soldiers dealt with something under 5.5 southern whites in the 1860s, across an area no smaller than the thirteen colonies.

That's because the vast majority weren't acting as guerrillas and causing massive disruption to supply lines, unlike in the AWI.
 
That's because the vast majority weren't acting as guerrillas and causing massive disruption to supply lines, unlike in the AWI.

The vast majority weren't acting as guerillas and causing massive disruption in the supply lines in the AWI either. 2-3 million Americans should subtract the percentage of the population who were slaves, or children, or women before we look at those able - nevermind interested.
 
The vast majority weren't acting as guerillas and causing massive disruption in the supply lines in the AWI either. 2-3 million Americans should subtract the percentage of the population who were slaves, or children, or women before we look at those able - nevermind interested.

That's why I was only counting the 1 million who were actually rebels or actively supporting them, and not the 2 million who were either Loyalist or Neutral. Also keep in mind that a big part of those 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers are probably going to be Loyalists.
 
That's why I was only counting the 1 million who were actually rebels or actively supporting them, and not the 2 million who were either Loyalist or Neutral. Also keep in mind that a big part of those 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers are probably going to be Loyalists.

One million as "one third rebel, one third neutral, one third Tory" still ignores women, children, and slaves when trying to determine how many men are available to actually do anything.

And it still leaves most of those on the rebel side not acting as guerrillas.

And if you think you can get tens of thousands of Loyalist soldiers, I would really love to know how.
 

Flubber

Banned
The vast majority weren't acting as guerillas and causing massive disruption in the supply lines in the AWI either. 2-3 million Americans should subtract the percentage of the population who were slaves, or children, or women before we look at those able - nevermind interested.


Again, look at South Carolina. During the late colonial period, slaves actually outnumbered whites by roughly 4 to 3 and yet the UK controlled little beyond Charleston and a few interior outposts. Then, when Cornwallis moved his field force north, most of the interior outposts quickly fell because the Charleston garrison could not support or supply them.

The white population of South Carolina was only about 60,000 in 1775, a number which includes women, children, loyalists, and neutrals, there was a bestial fighting going on between Patriot and Loyalist factions, and yet in the end the UK couldn't control any part of the colony beyond the reach of the RN's guns.

I'm not tooting my fife and waving the flag here. I am suggesting that winning the Revolution requires a political solution and not a military one. Whether Amherst and his 75,000 additional troops can buy the time militarily for a political solution to found, I just don't know.
 
Again, look at South Carolina. During the late colonial period, slaves actually outnumbered whites by roughly 4 to 3 and yet the UK controlled little beyond Charleston and a few interior outposts. Then, when Cornwallis moved his field force north, most of the interior outposts quickly fell because the Charleston garrison could not support or supply them.

Cornwallis had a field army in the range of five thousand men, maybe less, if my memory of my reading is correct. This is hardly a substantial force by any standard, especially allowing for that not being 100% fit, healthy, and so on at any given time. And what that leaves for the interior outposts is hardly going to be more than token.

The white population of South Carolina was only about 60,000 in 1775, a number which includes women, children, loyalists, and neutrals, there was a bestial fighting going on between Patriot and Loyalist factions, and yet in the end the UK couldn't control any part of the colony beyond the reach of the RN's guns.
But the UK had the distinct problem of facing more than just the men from South Carolina in South Carolina, with, as stated, a pitiful field army. Take Greene's men out of the picture and there's a lot less in the way of holding anything beyond the reach of the RN's guns.

Just because you can't realistically expect to hold the back country of SC with less than a thousand men doesn't mean that you need 300-400,000 for the American theater.

I'm not tooting my fife and waving the flag here. I am suggesting that winning the Revolution requires a political solution and not a military one. Whether Amherst and his 75,000 additional troops can buy the time militarily for a political solution to found, I just don't know.
Neither do I, and what it would take to find one is beyond my ability to guess at what the British might be able and willing to do once things have started fighting.
 

Flubber

Banned
Just because you can't realistically expect to hold the back country of SC with less than a thousand men doesn't mean that you need 300-400,000 for the American theater.


Please understand me, I am not arguing that 300-400,000 men would be needed.
 
Please understand me, I am not arguing that 300-400,000 men would be needed.

How many men do you think would be needed on the military side of things?

Since presumably, something has to happen to convince the Americans that further fighting will end poorly for them.
 

Flubber

Banned
How many men do you think would be needed on the military side of things? Since presumably, something has to happen to convince the Americans that further fighting will end poorly for them.


Amherst not only has to beat the Continental Army soundly, and beat it soundly a number of times, Amherst also needs to somewhat pacify and keep somewhat pacified the territories he's already liberated as he moves on to the next target.

The UK's OTL strategy was an attempt to do something like this. The idea was that the southern colonies and particularly South Carolina would be easier to pacify thanks to the (presumed) number of loyalists, a smaller overall population, fears of a slave uprising, and other factors. As you note, that strategy failed due to a lack of troops among other reasons.

The British couldn't control the countryside, couldn't buttress the Loyalists enough so they could control the countryside, couldn't stop the partisan fighting, couldn't garrison/occupy everything they needed to, and couldn't decisively defeat the Continental/militia forces they faced. Some of those are purely military goals, but most are political ones that military force can only help achieve.

Amherst was a painstaking sort of fellow so I can see him employing a methodical approach and more of a combined political-military one than in the OTL one.
 
No, if the British had decisively won victory after victory after victory in battles, they would have won the war. That's how 18th century warfare worked, it didn't matter how hostile the population was. So long as they could hold the major cities and crush the Continental army, they would rule the country. The effectiveness of guerrilla tactics during the ARW are pretty overrated. This was the 18th century, wars were won and lost almost purely due to naval and land forces. Weapons technology was too basic to drive an enemy out through hit-and-run tactics.

Another thing to keep in mind was that throughout the war, but especially during the early phases of it, was that the biggest challenge facing the American side were shortages of weapons and ammunition. No matter how many angry people in the countryside there are, they're not going to be able to do anything useful if they have no gunpowder and no cannons.
 
No, if the British had decisively won victory after victory after victory in battles, they would have won the war. That's how 18th century warfare worked, it didn't matter how hostile the population was. So long as they could hold the major cities and crush the Continental army, they would rule the country. The effectiveness of guerrilla tactics during the ARW are pretty overrated. This was the 18th century, wars were won and lost almost purely due to naval and land forces. Weapons technology was too basic to drive an enemy out through hit-and-run tactics.

And unfortunately for the British, they seem to have lacked the manpower to consistently hold the major cities and the generalship to crush the Continental Army.

That's the problem, speaking as a military historian. Yes, the British won a lot of battles. But I can think of two where you can say a crushing blow was dealt to an American force of significant size:

Fort Washington (1776)
Charleston (1780)

One thing that I think is also telling . . .

The British refused to campaign in the winter. Now that makes a certain amount of sense, even ignoring military orthodoxy. But . . .

Example: Henry Knox going to Ticonderoga and bringing back a nice train of artillery. In winter.

The British needed the kind of men who could perform such operations to win this kind of war.
 
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