Graehame
Banned
Wyragen-TXRG4P has posted a thread, "Seelöwe successful, so what?", which considers the consequences of Operation Sealion, if successful. I thought it might be instructive to consider how that might have come about.
The key requirements for Operation Sealion were the elimination of RAF Fighter Command & elimination of the Royal Navy. The former was do-able, absent some stupid decisions by the German High Command. The latter was not, unless we expand our definition of "elimination" to include temporary diversion by means of a ruse.
On 3 Aug Luftwaffe strength in a/c stood at 1065 single-engine [Bf-109-- 760 combat-ready & avail for offensive ops] & 310 twin-engine [Bf-110-- 230 avail] fighters, 446 [Ju-87-- 343 avail] dive bombers, & 1458 twin-engine [Do-17, Ju-88, & He-111-- 818 avail] medium bombers. As can be seen from the above figures, the LW had many more a/c than fully trained aircrews.
On 7 Aug Brit strength stood @ 960 single-engine [Hurricane & Spitfire-- 714 avail] fighters & 471 medium bombers [which played no direct role in the Battle of Britain].
By the end of Sep 276 German single-engine & 100 twin-engine fighters, 130 fighter-bombers, 343 dive bombers, 26 close support planes, & 700-800 twin-engine bombers faced a Brit force of 665 single-engine fighters. [All strength figures are from Harold Faber, "Luftwaffe-- A History".]
In prep for Adlertag, equip all Bf-109 units w/drop-tanks [amazingly, this was never done!] & rearm Bf-110s [2-20mm & 4-7.92mm fwd, 1-7.92mm aft] w/2-20mm & 4-13mm fwd, 1-double 13mm aft. This isn't for increased range, as hits were rare vs enemy fighters beyond 250 metres anyway; but for added impact in converting damaged targets into destroyed ones. It was well-known in combat aviation circles that a twin-engine fighter couldn't maneuver like a single-engine one. Its only advantages were in range & firepower, so the speed with which it could shoot down an enemy was critical. In addition, Mussolini offered 10 divs & 30 sqdns of a/c. Accept the a/c.
In prep for the invasion itself, accelerate training of the 2d fallschirmjaeger div [in addition to the 7th], plus 2 more airlanding divs [for a total of 2 fallschirm & 3 luftland divs-- the 12th, 22d, & 24th Inf]. Keep the 1st & 6th Gebirgsdivs as part of the OB, but [since ea/has only 2 mtn inf rgts] reinf the 1st w/SS rgt (mot) Liebstandarte AH & the 6th w/IR (mot) Großdeutschland. Build one hell of a lot of DFS-230 gliders & Ju-53 transports.
Do not, as Hitler had planned, sow mines to cut off the Channel at both ends. This would have signaled German intentions & worked against the naval deception. Do, however, move hvy artil into camoflaged firing positions on the Channel opposite Dover. French resistance is certain to report this to the Brits, so do it as early as possible-- like in July, when OKH first began planning for Sealion.
Adlertag was originally scheduled for 10 Aug, but weather on the 10th & 11th prohibited large-scale air ops. The op was rescheduled for the 13th. Instead, put all combat aviation units on 4-hour standby as of 11 Aug.
Mon 12 Aug 1940: Historically 24 Bf-109s & -110s attacked Brit radar stations along the coast as the opening attack of the Battle of Britain. Instead, use an entire geschwader (100+) of Ju-88s & Do-17s w/Bf-109 escort followed by photoreconnaissance, followed by a 2d wave if necessary. [Bekker (see below) writes "...(on 12 Aug 1940)...for the first time, the...target was...the top secret 'radio' aerials sticking up at many points along the English coast. These could be seen...by telescope (from) across the Channel." Faber writes, "...the LW...made no serious attempt to destroy the British coastal radar stations...or even to keep them under continual harassing attack. After 15 Aug there were no more attacks on these stations.(!)]
Follow destruction of the radar stations w/in 1 hour by simultaneous medium bomber attacks vs fighter bases [espec Manston, Middle Wallop, Hawkinge, & Lympne; w/Exeter, Warmwell, Tangmere, & Rochford as alt targets] & Ju-87 attacks vs ships & harbors on the Channel, both w/Bf-109 escort.
Cajus Bekker ["The Luftwaffe War Diaries"] writes, "Although 3 airfields (on 12 Aug)...had taken a pasting, none of them was a fighter base.(!) ...(after) more than a year's...study of all available intelligence...surely (the LW) must...have known where the British fighters and their ground organization could best be hit. ...Instead, the LW had attacked quite irrelevant airfields." [Coastal Command, Bomber Command, & an auxiliary field.]
Continue intensive attacks vs radar & fighter bases thru the 12th. As weather closes down on the 13th & 14th continue small-scale raids in staffel thru gruppe strength (12 to 36 a/c).
Beginning on 15 Aug, conduct daily full-strength bombing raids from bases in Norway. [This was done only once in the entire campaign.]
During the period 15-31 Aug, as it becomes clear that the Bf-110 & Ju-87 are at a disadvantage vs enemy Spitfires [potentially even the rearmed Bf-110s], withdraw them-- using the Bf-110 [as fighter-bombers], Ju-87, & Italian bombers towards the end of the month only in staffel thru gruppe strength raids vs coastal targets [radar stations, ships, & harbor facilities] to disperse RAF defensive efforts, breaking off & withdrawing in the face of fighter opposition. By timing several of these raids at once during major bomber attacks the RAF can be forced either to dissipate its strength or to leave the coastal targets unprotected. Except for these coastal raids [which withdraw in the face of fighter opposition], conduct all bomber attacks in massive strength to reduce the opportunity for enemy flak & fighters to concentrate against smaller numbers of a/c. Conduct bombing attacks in 2 waves-- the 1st one escorted by all avail fighters, & the 2d unescorted & 20 to 30 minutes behind. The RAF can't leave fighters on the ground in reserve because they'd be destroyed on the ground, so they fly up to fight, then after the 1st wave of bombers turns for home they land to rearm & refuel, & while on the ground they're hit by the 2d wave. [The RAF is likely to respond by pulling some fighters back to reserve airfields, in which case the 2d wave of bombers aborts their mission. This has the effect of bringing all avail LW fighters to bear vs half of the RAF fighters, resulting in higher LW a/c survivability.] This 2-wave strategy, after about 1 Sep, creates the possibility of using advanced trainee crews & Italians to pilot bombers in the 2d wave, which are unlikely to encounter Brit fighters. This increases the potential for damage to Brit fighter infrastructure at a small additional risk.
During the period 24 Aug thru 6 Sep RAF Fighter Command was stretched to the limit, having lost by 6 Sep roughly a quarter of its strength (Churchill). [The 11th Fighter Group was given nearly all the pilots in Britain, even the Bomber, Navy, & Coastal commands giving up pilots. Beginning around 1 Sep even the Bf-110 & Ju-87 could survive again in the Brit skies. These are strong indications that RAF Fighter Command was nearing the end of its rope-- Bekker.]
On the night of 24/25 Aug a few German bombers accidentally bombed London, at that time a prohibited area. Churchill ordered an immediate reprisal raid vs Berlin-- the first of 4 w/in 10 days. On 7 Sep Hitler ordered the targeting priorities of the LW changed from attacking Brit fighter bases to attacking their cities-- a critical error that allowed RAF Fighter Command to rebuild its strength. [Bekker-- "This alteration in tactical policy is viewed by the British, from Churchill on down, as a fundamental German mistake that saved the defenses from destruction."] RESIST THIS IMPULSE!!! Instead, continue attacks on fighter bases & broaden the targeting priority as of the last few days of Aug to include a/c production factories. Continue attacks on this basis until between 15 & 30 Sep, by which time tactical air superiority will have been gained over the Channel. Between 15 & 30 Sep, as RAF Fighter Command loses its ability to interfere decisively w/LW ops, maintain pressure vs the fighters while shifting the emphasis to attacks vs ships & harbor facilities in the Channel.
Official LW figures for Aug reflect 231 single-engine fighters lost & 80 badly damaged (311 total), w/160 new a/c produced & 62 repaired [a net loss of 89, leaving a total of 671 (760 - 89]. Official RAF figures for the same period reflect 390 destroyed & 197 badly damaged (587 total), showing an RAF loss ratio of nearly 2:1, w/476 produced & repaired [a net loss of 111, leaving a total of 603 (714 - 111). [Loss & production figures from Faber.] RAF losses during the 1st week of Sep brought their fighter strength down to roughly 536 machines avail, compared to ~650 LW.
On 15 Sep, during the climactic Battle of London, despite Hitler's diversion of the LW to attack cities instead of military targets, RAF Fighter Command committed all of its reserves & barely averted a catastrophe, largely because of dense cloud cover. This is another strong indication that RAF Fighter Command was nearing the end of its rope-- even in the historical timeline. With the proposed changes, RAF Fighter Command should lose its ability to interfere decisively w/LW ops by the end of the 1st week of Oct.
On 20 Sep the LW began using Bf-109s equipped to carry bombs. While this worked well as a surprise tactic, the RAF quickly adapted, resulting in heavy LW fighter casualties. Begin using fighter-bombers earlier (around 1 Sep) & continue using them-- but use Bf-110s, not -109s, as described above-- either in small, unescorted formations to keep the pressure on the RAF, bringing them out to fight; or in large, heavily escorted formations to give the medium bombers a rest. This gives the Bf-110 a role & preserves the air-to-air combat strength of the Bf-109.
1 immediate effect of the above changes is to increase German single-engine fighter strength @ the end of Sep from 276 to 406 (276 + 130), while converting the 100 twin-engine fighters into fighter-bombers. Massed attacks vs Brit radar stations, fighter bases, & a/c factories-- absent the diversion to attack cities-- has increased Brit fighter losses by 50-100%, RAF strength falling to ~536 by the end of the 1st week of Sep [a roughly historical figure, 3½ weeks into the campaign], to ~357 by the end of Sep [compared to 665 historically], & to ~179 by mid-Oct. This smaller RAF Fighter Command is less able to inflict casualties on the LW, with the result that instead of 400, 500-550 single-engine LW fighters have survived, about 150 twin-engine fighter-bombers, 343 dive bombers, 26 close support planes, & 800-900 twin-engine bombers. By mid-Oct RAF Fighter Command has largely lost the ability to intervene decisively w/LW ops.
The key requirements for Operation Sealion were the elimination of RAF Fighter Command & elimination of the Royal Navy. The former was do-able, absent some stupid decisions by the German High Command. The latter was not, unless we expand our definition of "elimination" to include temporary diversion by means of a ruse.
On 3 Aug Luftwaffe strength in a/c stood at 1065 single-engine [Bf-109-- 760 combat-ready & avail for offensive ops] & 310 twin-engine [Bf-110-- 230 avail] fighters, 446 [Ju-87-- 343 avail] dive bombers, & 1458 twin-engine [Do-17, Ju-88, & He-111-- 818 avail] medium bombers. As can be seen from the above figures, the LW had many more a/c than fully trained aircrews.
On 7 Aug Brit strength stood @ 960 single-engine [Hurricane & Spitfire-- 714 avail] fighters & 471 medium bombers [which played no direct role in the Battle of Britain].
By the end of Sep 276 German single-engine & 100 twin-engine fighters, 130 fighter-bombers, 343 dive bombers, 26 close support planes, & 700-800 twin-engine bombers faced a Brit force of 665 single-engine fighters. [All strength figures are from Harold Faber, "Luftwaffe-- A History".]
In prep for Adlertag, equip all Bf-109 units w/drop-tanks [amazingly, this was never done!] & rearm Bf-110s [2-20mm & 4-7.92mm fwd, 1-7.92mm aft] w/2-20mm & 4-13mm fwd, 1-double 13mm aft. This isn't for increased range, as hits were rare vs enemy fighters beyond 250 metres anyway; but for added impact in converting damaged targets into destroyed ones. It was well-known in combat aviation circles that a twin-engine fighter couldn't maneuver like a single-engine one. Its only advantages were in range & firepower, so the speed with which it could shoot down an enemy was critical. In addition, Mussolini offered 10 divs & 30 sqdns of a/c. Accept the a/c.
In prep for the invasion itself, accelerate training of the 2d fallschirmjaeger div [in addition to the 7th], plus 2 more airlanding divs [for a total of 2 fallschirm & 3 luftland divs-- the 12th, 22d, & 24th Inf]. Keep the 1st & 6th Gebirgsdivs as part of the OB, but [since ea/has only 2 mtn inf rgts] reinf the 1st w/SS rgt (mot) Liebstandarte AH & the 6th w/IR (mot) Großdeutschland. Build one hell of a lot of DFS-230 gliders & Ju-53 transports.
Do not, as Hitler had planned, sow mines to cut off the Channel at both ends. This would have signaled German intentions & worked against the naval deception. Do, however, move hvy artil into camoflaged firing positions on the Channel opposite Dover. French resistance is certain to report this to the Brits, so do it as early as possible-- like in July, when OKH first began planning for Sealion.
Adlertag was originally scheduled for 10 Aug, but weather on the 10th & 11th prohibited large-scale air ops. The op was rescheduled for the 13th. Instead, put all combat aviation units on 4-hour standby as of 11 Aug.
Mon 12 Aug 1940: Historically 24 Bf-109s & -110s attacked Brit radar stations along the coast as the opening attack of the Battle of Britain. Instead, use an entire geschwader (100+) of Ju-88s & Do-17s w/Bf-109 escort followed by photoreconnaissance, followed by a 2d wave if necessary. [Bekker (see below) writes "...(on 12 Aug 1940)...for the first time, the...target was...the top secret 'radio' aerials sticking up at many points along the English coast. These could be seen...by telescope (from) across the Channel." Faber writes, "...the LW...made no serious attempt to destroy the British coastal radar stations...or even to keep them under continual harassing attack. After 15 Aug there were no more attacks on these stations.(!)]
Follow destruction of the radar stations w/in 1 hour by simultaneous medium bomber attacks vs fighter bases [espec Manston, Middle Wallop, Hawkinge, & Lympne; w/Exeter, Warmwell, Tangmere, & Rochford as alt targets] & Ju-87 attacks vs ships & harbors on the Channel, both w/Bf-109 escort.
Cajus Bekker ["The Luftwaffe War Diaries"] writes, "Although 3 airfields (on 12 Aug)...had taken a pasting, none of them was a fighter base.(!) ...(after) more than a year's...study of all available intelligence...surely (the LW) must...have known where the British fighters and their ground organization could best be hit. ...Instead, the LW had attacked quite irrelevant airfields." [Coastal Command, Bomber Command, & an auxiliary field.]
Continue intensive attacks vs radar & fighter bases thru the 12th. As weather closes down on the 13th & 14th continue small-scale raids in staffel thru gruppe strength (12 to 36 a/c).
Beginning on 15 Aug, conduct daily full-strength bombing raids from bases in Norway. [This was done only once in the entire campaign.]
During the period 15-31 Aug, as it becomes clear that the Bf-110 & Ju-87 are at a disadvantage vs enemy Spitfires [potentially even the rearmed Bf-110s], withdraw them-- using the Bf-110 [as fighter-bombers], Ju-87, & Italian bombers towards the end of the month only in staffel thru gruppe strength raids vs coastal targets [radar stations, ships, & harbor facilities] to disperse RAF defensive efforts, breaking off & withdrawing in the face of fighter opposition. By timing several of these raids at once during major bomber attacks the RAF can be forced either to dissipate its strength or to leave the coastal targets unprotected. Except for these coastal raids [which withdraw in the face of fighter opposition], conduct all bomber attacks in massive strength to reduce the opportunity for enemy flak & fighters to concentrate against smaller numbers of a/c. Conduct bombing attacks in 2 waves-- the 1st one escorted by all avail fighters, & the 2d unescorted & 20 to 30 minutes behind. The RAF can't leave fighters on the ground in reserve because they'd be destroyed on the ground, so they fly up to fight, then after the 1st wave of bombers turns for home they land to rearm & refuel, & while on the ground they're hit by the 2d wave. [The RAF is likely to respond by pulling some fighters back to reserve airfields, in which case the 2d wave of bombers aborts their mission. This has the effect of bringing all avail LW fighters to bear vs half of the RAF fighters, resulting in higher LW a/c survivability.] This 2-wave strategy, after about 1 Sep, creates the possibility of using advanced trainee crews & Italians to pilot bombers in the 2d wave, which are unlikely to encounter Brit fighters. This increases the potential for damage to Brit fighter infrastructure at a small additional risk.
During the period 24 Aug thru 6 Sep RAF Fighter Command was stretched to the limit, having lost by 6 Sep roughly a quarter of its strength (Churchill). [The 11th Fighter Group was given nearly all the pilots in Britain, even the Bomber, Navy, & Coastal commands giving up pilots. Beginning around 1 Sep even the Bf-110 & Ju-87 could survive again in the Brit skies. These are strong indications that RAF Fighter Command was nearing the end of its rope-- Bekker.]
On the night of 24/25 Aug a few German bombers accidentally bombed London, at that time a prohibited area. Churchill ordered an immediate reprisal raid vs Berlin-- the first of 4 w/in 10 days. On 7 Sep Hitler ordered the targeting priorities of the LW changed from attacking Brit fighter bases to attacking their cities-- a critical error that allowed RAF Fighter Command to rebuild its strength. [Bekker-- "This alteration in tactical policy is viewed by the British, from Churchill on down, as a fundamental German mistake that saved the defenses from destruction."] RESIST THIS IMPULSE!!! Instead, continue attacks on fighter bases & broaden the targeting priority as of the last few days of Aug to include a/c production factories. Continue attacks on this basis until between 15 & 30 Sep, by which time tactical air superiority will have been gained over the Channel. Between 15 & 30 Sep, as RAF Fighter Command loses its ability to interfere decisively w/LW ops, maintain pressure vs the fighters while shifting the emphasis to attacks vs ships & harbor facilities in the Channel.
Official LW figures for Aug reflect 231 single-engine fighters lost & 80 badly damaged (311 total), w/160 new a/c produced & 62 repaired [a net loss of 89, leaving a total of 671 (760 - 89]. Official RAF figures for the same period reflect 390 destroyed & 197 badly damaged (587 total), showing an RAF loss ratio of nearly 2:1, w/476 produced & repaired [a net loss of 111, leaving a total of 603 (714 - 111). [Loss & production figures from Faber.] RAF losses during the 1st week of Sep brought their fighter strength down to roughly 536 machines avail, compared to ~650 LW.
On 15 Sep, during the climactic Battle of London, despite Hitler's diversion of the LW to attack cities instead of military targets, RAF Fighter Command committed all of its reserves & barely averted a catastrophe, largely because of dense cloud cover. This is another strong indication that RAF Fighter Command was nearing the end of its rope-- even in the historical timeline. With the proposed changes, RAF Fighter Command should lose its ability to interfere decisively w/LW ops by the end of the 1st week of Oct.
On 20 Sep the LW began using Bf-109s equipped to carry bombs. While this worked well as a surprise tactic, the RAF quickly adapted, resulting in heavy LW fighter casualties. Begin using fighter-bombers earlier (around 1 Sep) & continue using them-- but use Bf-110s, not -109s, as described above-- either in small, unescorted formations to keep the pressure on the RAF, bringing them out to fight; or in large, heavily escorted formations to give the medium bombers a rest. This gives the Bf-110 a role & preserves the air-to-air combat strength of the Bf-109.
1 immediate effect of the above changes is to increase German single-engine fighter strength @ the end of Sep from 276 to 406 (276 + 130), while converting the 100 twin-engine fighters into fighter-bombers. Massed attacks vs Brit radar stations, fighter bases, & a/c factories-- absent the diversion to attack cities-- has increased Brit fighter losses by 50-100%, RAF strength falling to ~536 by the end of the 1st week of Sep [a roughly historical figure, 3½ weeks into the campaign], to ~357 by the end of Sep [compared to 665 historically], & to ~179 by mid-Oct. This smaller RAF Fighter Command is less able to inflict casualties on the LW, with the result that instead of 400, 500-550 single-engine LW fighters have survived, about 150 twin-engine fighter-bombers, 343 dive bombers, 26 close support planes, & 800-900 twin-engine bombers. By mid-Oct RAF Fighter Command has largely lost the ability to intervene decisively w/LW ops.