It depends.
Here's the Ameriwank version:
If... somehow... the US gets pretty good knowledge of the IJN plan in detail (bearing in mind that Nagumo did not approach on the expected least-distance bearing from the Mandates) on about Nov 27th after Kido Butai has sortied, then the ideal US plan will be to get the battlewagons into range of the Carrier Striking Force just as dawn breaks on the morning of the 7th, based on the outcome of S&G vs Glorious and the FAA attacks on the KM in Norway.
0607 Hawaiian twilight
0610 Kido Butai commences first wave launch
0630 Horizon visible at Kido Butai position, assuming I understand how these sunrise calculator apps work
0725 Sunrise at Kido Butai position.
If Kimmel gets it absolutely perfect, he should be approaching Nagumo from the south-west at dawn after the first wave has gone, get radar detection of the Japanese force and close, and then at about 0645ish will find the IJN silhouetted against the lightening eastern horizon at about 16000 yards, and give the order to open fire.
The gunnery duel is grossly unbalanced in favour of the USN; Nagumo will swiftly order the carriers to turn away and flee at best speed under a destroyer smoke screen, while Hiei, Kirishima, Tone and Chikuma fight on until sunk to buy time for the rest of the destroyer screen to launch a torpedo attack.
The probable outcome is that the battleships and cruisers are sunk outright, Abukuma and the 8 destroyers lose about half their number, and a carrier or two is sunk - fuelling and arming the second wave means that they are terribly vulnerable to any penetrating hit. On the US' side, it won't be as bad as Tassafaronga, but the Long Lances will be fired from outside the expected torpedo range and Anderson and Kidd will probably not take evasive action in time, resulting in perhaps three hits, spread out among the battleships, all of which are significant but not fatal, slowing the targets through flooding.
The carriers may have the speed to outrun Anderson's Battle Force, but Leary's CruDivs 6 & 9 will be able to hold them in range, and with the USN's 3:1 superiority in destroyer hulls available, Kimmel will be able to both keep some to screen the battleships and send others to help run down Nagumo.
Simply, no carrier will survive to launch the second wave, though sinking the IJN destroyer screen on the way will probably cost a few US losses as well.
Meanwhile, back in Hawaii, the first wave finds Opana Point and the other radar stations manned and operating vaguely properly, and Lt. Tyler is not expecting 6 B-17s but instead the 1st Air Fleet of the IJN. Accordingly, the Hawaiian Air Force is scrambled with priority going to intercepting the raids on the airfields - the level bombers going down the west coast of the island are slow and targetted with a P-36 force.
Fundamentally, it's down to how well the defenders manage their ground control - they aren't set up to defend Hawaii from an air campaign like Dowding and Park in 1940 Britain, and so their controllers will not be experienced in raid interception control. Fundamentally, though, the USAAF has 89 P-40 and 38 P-36 - Fuchida has half as many A6Ms as he faces P-40s, with 140 strike planes - he is going to be taking significant losses on the way in, though the number of attackers means that several dozen should attack unmolested even while their compatriots are being intercepted.
USN losses will probably be Pennsylvania, in dry dock, along with Cassin and Downes alongside, and probably Utah, and possibly the auxiliaries Oglala, Vestal, and Curtiss, just because there are so few targets for the Japanese with the majority of the fleet at sea. While the level bombers have the right weapons to attack the fuel tanks, they are unlikely to do so unless they are undisturbed by the USAAF pursuit planes and the first runs clearly destroy Pennsylvania and Utah.
With no carriers to return to, all of the IJN aircraft which survive will ditch.