WI: Pearl Harbor Had Been a Sea Battle

The most principle thing is that a hunting force with no aircover of its own, nor any real means to defend itself against even a small aircomponent of an opposing force, is facing serious difficulties. The batlte in the Samar Sea is one such example of a much larger force of surface ships hunting down a much weaker (and even slower) force with little or no real surface warships. The smaller force will fight a delaying fights, using smoke and agressive attacks to force the larger force to counter manouvre, loosing the innitiative quickly, while having to dodge enemy aircrat at the same time as well.

In the original propposal, the USN is going to get a serious bloody nose, so stupid to engage the faster, better equipped IJN taskforce in a surface fight, simply as the USN force cannot outrun the IJN force, while at the same time sinding in seperate groups of Cruisers only is suicidal at best. (DD's will be left behind, lacking the speed to manouvre with the cruisers in the seaconditions likely encountered. (It was winter, so seastate was not favourable for the relative small USN DD's.)

Also note the OTL Shokaku and Zuikaku still had retained their full complement of B5N's with a strong force of A6M-2's as these had en holded back as reserve by the cautious Nagumo, in case just such a thing as the scenario unfolded. A battleline of 8 slow (less than 18 knots at best in the OTL seastate) battleships, lacking seriously a good AA outfit and no upgrades on most ships yet, such as bulges and addapted underwater protection, is a nightmare, as even a single torpedo can cause enough damage to permanently destroy such as ship in the open sea leaving it lost forever, compared to being sunk in shallow inshore waters. As at S Sea, the airforce of the hunted force will force the hunting surface group to call off sooner or later, just due to lacking the air component.

As for surface ships alone, the IJN taskgroup would likely use its DD's only to hunt down and fight the hunters, leaving the larger ships to dash away at flank speed. The DesRon was there for that purpose and could in the se case be sacrificed. Likely they would outfight the USN DD's of that time and even be superior to the ill equipped USN cruisers of that period, possibly leading to the sort of dissasters shown at Guadalcanal.

My calculations would sea possibly three or four out of one light cruiser and nine DD's for the start, for the IJN DD's getting lost for the bulk of the USN Pacific Fleet, succumbed under constant air and torpedo attacks, just as the IJN had been training for years before and the USN had not. Likely all eight USN BB's will get hit by airattack, possibly loosing all, due to lack of upgrades and poor management ohat period. (USA was in peacetime condition still). Most of the attacking cruisers and DD's too will get hits, mostly form the delaying fight of the IJN DesRon and loose several ships as a consequense. All 6 IJN carriers, the Battleships and heavy cruisers will get away, though loosing most of the aircraft, as these will have to ditch lacking enough fuel to get home again.
 

jahenders

Banned
I think if the engagement occurs near to the morning of 7 Dec, then there's more loss to the Japanese, but results are almost as bad (and possibly worse) for USN.

If, instead, the US gets enough warning to get a couple carriers back and then the Japanese detect it, that could make a difference. Imagine if the entire US fleet (including carriers) is steaming 20-30 miles off the coast of Hawaii. Seeing that, what does the IJN do?
- They could attack, but it would be against a fairly strong USN force with additional land-based air cover. They'd likely win, but would be badly wounded, couldn't linger and probably couldn't hit a lot of land targets.
- They could try to keep the island between them and the main US fleet and hit what targets they could, but they'd miss their objective
- They could leave and wait for another opportunity, but then the trip's a waste
 

Deleted member 9338

While this is all well and good what about the American carriers. Both were between the Japanese carries and their bases. I am sure some air support could be provided if given 24 hour notice.
 
While this is all well and good what about the American carriers. Both were between the Japanese carries and their bases. I am sure some air support could be provided if given 24 hour notice.

With what excactly? USS Enterprise at the time had around 18 F4F-3's only and USS Lexington still had her slow and obsolete F2-Buffaloo fighters. Sending all F4F's was suicidal, leaving USS Enterprise a sitting unprotected target herself, which Halsey never would allow. Loosing battleships was not a problem for him, as he already believed fast aircraft carriers were the true capital ships for the Pacific War, not the slow gunboats of the past.
 
If the USN knew the IJN was coming really the smart thing would be to sortee the fleet to the South East. AWAY from the IJN. Sure the IJN is light on surface escorts for this but you're going to be on the reciving end of 6 carriers worth of aircraft piloted by probably the best carrier pilots in the world at the time.

Going away from the threat preserves the fleet and lets the IJN vent itself on ground targets whilst being opposed by fighters etc.

I followed that COA in a computer game...
 
What if instead of the IJN striking Pearl Harbor in a surprise attack, the United States had a day or two of notice and sortied to meet them?
With a day's advance notice, the IJN strike is in shambles.
Pearl is on full alert. A CAP is up. Every patrol plane operational is out looking. AAA mounts are manned and ready. As much of the Fleet as possible has stood out to sea. Unless the advance notice includes directions as to where the IJN force is located, I'd expect the ships to assemble toward the mainland US where they can still benefit from Pearl's aircover.

If the IJN becomes aware of what is going on, they have two options. Attack the nearly empty base into the teeth of alerted defenses...or try to find the ships of the fleet. If they start searching, they will probably have to deal with aerial counter-attacks from Pearl and their own decreasing fuel supply.

In many ways, if Pearl is alerted, the best option is to retreat to fight another day.
Given the accent on aggressive attack in the Japanese military of the time, that probably wasn't really an option. The strike force would have stayed and tried to sink what it could until it ran out of fuel/munitions/planes and had to leave.

Tim
 
That would have occured when the scout plane arrived a hour or so before the main strike.
Scout plane? Hmm. My research clearly wasn't detailed enough.

Would there not be a land based CAP for the USN fleet?

The British Carrier Ops in the Med often found that even a handful (litereal a handful) of fighters (in this case often Fulmars and Sea Hurricanes) was usually enough to seriously disrupt any attacking formation even when grossly outnumbered - so even if the CAP was a single Squadron of P40s this would seriously degrade any attack by the Japanese.
The aircraft at Pearl had first been defending their own airfields. Some aircraft did rush to defend the fleet once the Japanese strike was detected but they were badly outnumbered by the escorting Zeros.

Nagumo approaches to launch the first wave under cover of darkness. If the fleets meet at that time, detection is indeed going to be within engagement range.
If the fleets meet at that time, yes. Which doesn't seem terribly unlikely to me unless the USN knew where to find the IJN. Unless they have advance notice of where Nagumo will be launching from or fortune favours them as if they were fools, drunks and a ship called Enterprise, that doesn't seem likely.
 

Deleted member 9338

With what excactly? USS Enterprise at the time had around 18 F4F-3's only and USS Lexington still had her slow and obsolete F2-Buffaloo fighters. Sending all F4F's was suicidal, leaving USS Enterprise a sitting unprotected target herself, which Halsey never would allow. Loosing battleships was not a problem for him, as he already believed fast aircraft carriers were the true capital ships for the Pacific War, not the slow gunboats of the past.

I was unaware that there were no bombers on either carries. If they only have fighters than it makes sense they stay clear. It than brings up the question were are the torpedo and bomber squadrons?
 
I was unaware that there were no bombers on either carries. If they only have fighters than it makes sense they stay clear. It than brings up the question were are the torpedo and bomber squadrons?

USS Enterprise at 12-07-1941 had a complement of 17x F4F-3, 33x SBD-2/3 and 17x TBD-2. 6 F4F's were lost over Pearl Harbor itself, leaving just 11 for combat. that is not much, just for a modest CAP over the own carrier. (Three at any time in the air, three ready on deck and the other five fueling and arming, for both CAP and escort missions.)

USS Lexington at the same date carried 18 F2 Buffalo fighters, 18 SB2U Vindicator and 17 SBD-2 Dauntles divebombers and 15 TBD's.

Both ships could carry more, but rarely did so in the early years of war.
 
USS Enterprise at 12-07-1941 had a complement of 17x F4F-3, 33x SBD-2/3 and 17x TBD-2. 6 F4F's were lost over Pearl Harbor itself, leaving just 11 for combat. that is not much, just for a modest CAP over the own carrier. (Three at any time in the air, three ready on deck and the other five fueling and arming, for both CAP and escort missions.)

USS Lexington at the same date carried 18 F2 Buffalo fighters, 18 SB2U Vindicator and 17 SBD-2 Dauntles divebombers and 15 TBD's.

Both ships could carry more, but rarely did so in the early years of war.

Standard CV based VF squadron strength was around 18 planes at that point. It got seriously plussed up after the war started.
 

Deleted member 9338

So we are looking at a possible attacking force of two squadrons of bombers and two of torpedo planes. Granted have are obsolete but they are an attacking force.
 
So we are looking at a possible attacking force of two squadrons of bombers and two of torpedo planes. Granted have are obsolete but they are an attacking force.

The Japanese do not have radar & there was a fair amount of overcast and haze. So, the attackers have some chance of lining up a attack, maybe one in three (?), without serious interception.

On the down side the USN lacked some refinements in coordinating air strikes, so whatever group does get through will be small. Probable best case for the USN is Nagumo is stuck with nursing a torpedo cripple home. Worst case is the USN learns some nasty lessons.
 
Standard CV based VF squadron strength was around 18 planes at that point. It got seriously plussed up after the war started.


It only got increased numbers after roughly halfway 1942, during the fight in the Solomons. At both Coral Sea and Midway, USN airgroups retained their somewhere around 18 numbers, due to shortages in skilled aviators and available aircraft. The big increase in fighters themselef, was only much later, reducing the number of strike aircraft drasticly as a consequence. Shortage of fighters remained a strong weakness in 1942 in general on all aircraft carriers of all nations in use at that time.
 
It only got increased numbers after roughly halfway 1942, during the fight in the Solomons. At both Coral Sea and Midway, USN airgroups retained their somewhere around 18 numbers, due to shortages in skilled aviators and available aircraft. The big increase in fighters themselef, was only much later, reducing the number of strike aircraft drasticly as a consequence. Shortage of fighters remained a strong weakness in 1942 in general on all aircraft carriers of all nations in use at that time.

I'm too lazy to look up Coral Sea at the moment but at Midway the VF squadrons were up 25 to 27 per carrier. The folding wings on the Dash-4 Wildcat allowed them to carry more fighters.
 
Okay, at least according to the wiki page YORKTOWN's VF squadron had 17 and LEXINGTON's had 21 at Coral Sea. They still had Dash-3s at Coral Sea.
 
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Deleted member 9338

I am not sure the number of aircraft will make much of a difference. It is the fact that a couple of carrier based squadrons attacks the Japanese fleet from a direction that they were unaware of.

While damaging a carrier is a bonus, just an attack may force Admiral Nagumo to rethink the enterprise. OK maybe a bad choice of words.
 
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