Why are Sealion threads so hated on this site?

[Burton K Wheeler]

I've got to defend Mussolini here.

He was absolutely fucking great on the issue of saving who he could from the Holocaust, and thats good enough for me.

Terrible war leader, but a good enough man for me.

Hahahaha, what? One would presume that a better way to save people from the Holocaust would be, you know, NOT ALLYING WITH HITLER.

 

[twistedirregular]

He ordered the use of mustard gas in Ethiopia. That classifies him as a bastard no matter what else he did.

Not just very liberal use of gas but the atrocities committed by Italian occupational forces.

 

[Garrison]

I'd probably add submarines to that, but it's more to do with British industry being more efficient, rather than the British economy being more mobilised for war.

In 1940, for example, the Germans had about 1 million people in the aircraft industry, produced 10,247 planes and 15,510 aero engines. The British aircraft industry, by contrast, had 973,000 employees, and produced 15,049 planes and 24,047 aero engines.

In 1941 the figures had increased to 1,850,000 employees in Germany producing 11,776 aircraft, incorporating 68 million pounds of airframe weight and 22,400 engines, while in the UK 1,259,400 workers produced 20,094 aircraft, 87 million pounds of airframe weight and 36,551 engines. (figures from Overy, The Air War).

I would say its also the result of the endless shortages of critical resources that afflicted German industry, compounded by the constantly changing priorities for the allocation of those materials.

 

[eltf177]

I would say its also the result of the endless shortages of critical resources that afflicted German industry, compounded by the constantly changing priorities for the allocation of those materials.

Exactly, the US and the UK never had the bottlenecks in raw materials that Germany suffered. Priorities in Germany were constantly changing as designers and builders used their influence to get their projects priority...

 

[Crowbar Six]

That mobilization figure is fairly meaningless. Germany had no choice but to achieve much higher levels of mobilization than the UK since it only had its own industrial base to draw up until after the conquest of Western Europe, and the industrial output of the occupied countries for the German war effort was disappointing to say the least. The UK had the Empire and the USA to draw on and by 1945 they were indirectly benefiting from the war production of the USSR as well, which was absorbing the bulk of what fighting power the Wehrmacht could deploy.

A better comparison is the output of German war industries in 1940 versus those of 1942-43. Looking at those it is clear that in 1940 Germany was certainly not 'a fully industrialized total war machine'. In 1940 It’s Panzer divisions depended on training vehicles and captured Czech tanks, its supply system depended on the horse and cart, and the infantry either walked or travelled on a train network that was crumbling from overwork and lack of investment, so yes the ‘total war machine’ is a myth.

But the Germans didn't really achieve "full" industrial mobilisation until 1943, they still had a large sector producing goods for the civilian sector. Also, German war planning was pretty poor, they stopped bomb production after the fall of France then had to start up again de-mothballing production when they realised it wasn't all over.

 

[hipper]

I would say its also the result of the endless shortages of critical resources that afflicted German industry, compounded by the constantly changing priorities for the allocation of those materials.

And nothing to do with the fact that Messerschmitt were selling aluminium ladders till 1943? (They had secured more aluminium than they could turn into aircraft)

 

[sloreck]

The Germans also made very poor use of women in war industries - Kinder, Kirche, Kuche was the watchword (children, church, kitchen). In the US and Britain (as well as other places in the British Empire) women, married, and single and even some with children worked in the factories and not just as secretaries but as Rosie the Riveter as well.

 

[TDM]

And nothing to do with the fact that Messerschmitt were selling aluminium ladders till 1943? (They had secured more aluminium than they could turn into aircraft)

heh quite, but I don't think Garrison was saying it was only shortages, and that bad economic planning and mobilisation couldn't also be a factor.

 

[Erwin the German]

I've got to defend Mussolini here.

He was absolutely fucking great on the issue of saving who he could from the Holocaust, and thats good enough for me.

Terrible war leader, but a good enough man for me.

He was not a good man. He oversaw the construction of a racist, fascist government in his country which interfered in the lives of millions of its citizens. He capriciously attacked several countries (mostly ineptly, thank god) in the grandiose desire to create an empire. He allied with Hitler. He did send people to die in the Holocaust, because it served his political ends.

I want to condemn this post in much ruder terms but I'll leave it at that.

 

[Garrison]

heh quite, but I don't think Garrison was saying it was only shortages, and that bad economic planning and mobilisation couldn't also be a factor.

Pretty much this, with a measure of empire building and infighting thrown in. Also of course there were two other considerations. Firstly a certain amount of civilian production was necessary just to maintain some minimum standard of living. The Nazi's were falling to meet even this in 1940 and by 1943 they gave up all pretence of trying in the name of arms production. Secondly as bizarre as it sounds Germany needed to maintain some level of export production just to keep their few trading partners onside. The reality is Nazi Germany poured an unsustainable share of what resources it had into military production, with the civilian population increasingly left with the scraps.

 

[sloreck]

In the US and the UK you had, from relatively early on, organizations that looked at raw materials, transport, and manpower and enforced priorities about which industry or products got what. This, on the manpower side, included not drafting or in some cases even accepting enlistments of folks with critical or in critical sectors so as to maintain production. The Germans did not do this until very late in the game, and even then you had different little fiefdoms (the SS, the Army, the Luftwaffe) grabbing stuff/people for their pet, frequently competing, and often useless projects. Throw in the ideological unwillingness to adequate exploit the female half of the labor force and the fact that they managed to produce as much as they did was a minor miracle.

 

[Astrodragon]

Actually Germany had a higher percentage of women working than the UK did, just that they were working in agriculture (small family farms).
Lack of exploitation of women by Germany is a myth.

 

[marathag]

Actually Germany had a higher percentage of women working than the UK did, just that they were working in agriculture (small family farms).
Lack of exploitation of women by Germany is a myth.

HausFraus from Berlin were not working the Farms in the rural parts of Brandenburg, though.

Exploitation, as you put it, was done with Polish 'Guest Workers' as slave labor in those factories in urban areas.

Why pay German Women when you can work Slaves to death for Free?

 

[steamboy]

 

[lighthorse]

Actually Germany had a higher percentage of women working than the UK did, just that they were working in agriculture (small family farms).
Lack of exploitation of women by Germany is a myth.

I fully agree.

Every German Youth did 6 months in labour service, woman usually on farms. With most fighting age males away (and no reserve occupation system), farms were run by wives and family. (Old men and boys). Farm wives weren’t on a payroll and included in labour figures.

Britain had only 1 tractor per 6 farms in ‘39, only reaching 4/6 post war. Most old Fordsons before lead-lease Fords. Not far ahead of Germany. Most farm labour was by muscle, human and horse.

Women at Work in Nazi Germany
Citation: C N Trueman "Women At Work In Nazi Germany"
historylearningsite.co.uk. The History Learning Site, 9 Mar 2015. 29 Jul 2018.

“However, what Nazi propaganda wanted to portray in Nazi Germany and what actually went on were at odds with each other. The German economy had a healthy number of women working in it in the lead up to World War Twoand during the war itself when many men were away in the military. In fact, without the input of women the German economy may well have faltered and Goebbels desire for ‘Total War’ may well have been impossible. The statistics clearly show that a great number of women were engaged in work at any one time. Albert Speer may have wanted to use more women and ‘Inside the Third Reich’ gives the impression that the Armaments Minister was in despair that he had to use more and more slave labour when he wanted to use German women who he believed would be more loyal to the cause. But in industry the number of women at work in Nazi Germany during the war never fell below 3.5 million. Likewise, agriculture needed a large female input and the figure for women workers here never fell below 5.5 million. During World War Two itself, the total figure for women at work in Nazi Germany never fell below 14 million – despite the impression the regime wanted to portray. “

 

[Glenn239]

Throwing away massive parts of your economic infrastructure and 100,000 men will ensure that happens anyway, only your in a weaker position.

I'm back. Game on.

If Sealion failed at high cost the British would have been no closer to winning the war. If Sealion were not attempted, then barring the success of some peace offensive, the Allied strategic air campaign would be a certainty.

 

[Glenn239]

German and Italian High Command continued to debate about the importance of having control over the Suez Canal and the Middle East Oil Fields. The only reason they dropped it was due to Hitler's focus on the Lion Cache that was the Soviet Union. A more apt analogy to this would've been Lee invading up the Mississippi river in order to cut off the Union's access to the West and its resources.
I mean, it was a relatively important target for both the Allies and Axis as there were over a million forces deployed in the theater. I understand that it doesn't appear important but the Suez Canal and the Middle East Oil Fields were basically an option to peace the British out the war, but Germany went for the wood chipper rather than the blender.

How does the taking of the oil fields of the Middle East, or the capture of Suez, prevent US factories from pumping out 16 million tons of shipping in 1943 and 100,000 aircraft in 1944?

 

[Glenn239]

There was pre-existing infrastructure to bring the oil back in amounts necessary to sustain the shortfall that the Germans were suffering throughout the war. Its not a great infrastructure but it was able to maintain the movement of massive amounts of arms to Syrian Vichy France in a short period of time. There's also the matter that German/Italian ships could move limited distances between Syria and Greece to deliver the oil as was done in April 1941 with some of the controlled Oil Fields.
However, I am curious to the Mosul sabotage seeing how the order was given before the Anglo-Iraqi war in a attempt to undermine the newer Pro-Nazi regime in 1941 and not in 1940 as the League Document states the drop being in.

The Germans needed the oil to fight the United States and the USSR. With the USSR, war could have been avoided through diplomatic means. With the USA, war was either to be avoided altogether or else the chances of defeat were significant, (Soviets friendly to Germany), or certain, (Soviets hostile to Germany). In any case, no amount of oil in Germany's possession, or removed from the British, could offset the massive industrial advantages of the USA.

 

[jsb]

If Sealion failed at high cost the British would have been no closer to winning the war.

With the total destruction of the KM and airborne troops, GB can move far more south and clear the Med earlier... This combined with losing the BoA faster and the hit to German industry starts to add up.

 

[Glenn239]

Couple that with some of the worst weather in the world. And then add in an ad-hoc invasion fleet. You will make a lot of money selling tickets to the upcoming disaster...

By January 1942, if every German soldier in Russia had somehow been given a vote whether they would stay in Russia to fight, or load up for Sealion once and, if they survive, never return to Russia - wanna bet on how overwhelmingly the Sealion vote would win over the stay and freeze in Russia vote? 90% maybe?

Only since undertaking sealion ends in failure you still get the same results only you weaken yourself, and strengthen your enemy first. And this is the problem with your point here, it only works if you think Sealion can work, and since sealion can't work, neither does you point. It doesn't work either in isolation about the risk/reward analysis of sealion, and it doesn't work in comparison to the same analysis for Barbarossa.

I've always assumed that Sealion had a small chance of success, a large chance of failure. The question in terms of strategy is whether a large strategic payoff is worth the cost of a lousy operation that will likely fail. In this case, the answer was yes, because, unlike the Allies, Germany did not have luxury of time and Sealion was the only operation on the agenda that might deliver a short war. A failed Sealion would not have strengthened the British position, whereas Barbarossa massively increased the strength of the British position by giving Churchill a continental ally stronger than Germany could defeat.

No the advantage is: not doing Barbarossa, which is not the same thing as doing sealion

Strategically, the only reason not to do Sealion was Barbarossa. If Barbarossa was off the table, there was no reason other than lousy operational characteristics not to try Sealion, (arguments to the effect that the British strategic position would somehow be improved are not correct). That's why Sealion vs. Barbarossa was an either/or.

What's the quote, "dangerous at both ends and tricky in the middle"

I think Gimli said it best,

Certainty of death. Small chance of success. What are we waiting for?