matteo,
I mostly agree with that.
I think the 'forced retreat' is you saying potayto, me saying patahto. The russians went with an unorthodox move because, as you say, they knew simply going toe to toe with France's armies was not a good strategy.
The Russians tried long-distance retreats followed by a big battle before. The first time Emperor Alex intervened and it resulted in Austerlitz, the second time Benningsen had Napoleon successfully frustrated and doing a lot of useless activity in Prussia, right up until when Benningsen himself fell for a trap the French set for him resulting in Friedland.
So they had good reasons to suppose that if they did it perfectly this time on their own territory, it might work. It didn't quite (because none of the big battles they gave were victories even if they did chew up a lot of the Grande Armee), but then Napoleon obliged them by occupying Moscow and deciding to retreat late in the year after chasing them very deep into the country.
All they had to do was nudge him back into the road where the armies already came though earlier because it was stipped of everything, and they did. The end is known.
So it was simultaneously something they planned on, but it wasn't new, it wasn't any kind of genius move, and yes, it had to be done because Russia had less troops and less quality than you know, all of Europe under arms. Being a forced move doesn't mean they didn't plan for it, but it wasn't some unexpected masterstroke.
Both the French and Russian armies have played this exact game at least twice before on a large scale. This was just the laterest and greaterest iteration of the same.