What If Napoleon had never invaded Russia?

[Tjakari]

So let's say Napoleon occupies the entire old PLC. Defeats Russia decisively in battle, sits there. His position is not in any way weakened by Russia's refusal to admit they lost.

How much of Napoleon's army is tied up in that venture? How much pressure can Napoleon put on the rest of the continent from the head of his army, in-campaign and currently at a diplomatic impasse with Russia. How long until that situation goes bad for some involved party and Russia's insistence on continuing the fight starts to look less like the obstinance of a prideful nation and more like a leading example. Not that anyone could do anything about it, but Russia holding out just makes Napoleon's position seem.....how do I put this? Not weak, but less permanent. A force, that while unchallengeable, is not absolute and unwavering; something that can and is being contested.

Sitting there on top of a nation in defiance erodes Napoleon's theoretical authority and the longer it lasts the more enticing the prospect of ousting Napoleon from his position of strength.

 

[RGB]

The last French troops left Russian soil in December; even if you count the crossing of the Berezina, that was November, which I'm pretty sure is Winter.

Additionally, many of the primary sources mention the weather as a factor. That the logistic situation and set up by Napoleon was a greater cause does not consign the impact of the Russian weather to the status of myth.

Winter didn't defeat Napoleon - logistics, disease and the Russians did. Winter turned his retreat into the disaster it was and was probably more effective at finishing him off than the Russians themselves were.

That said he still had lots of people under arms for the 1813-14 campaign.

 

[Matteo]

Winter didn't defeat Napoleon - logistics, disease and the Russians did. Winter turned his retreat into the disaster it was and was probably more effective at finishing him off than the Russians themselves were.

That said he still had lots of people under arms for the 1813-14 campaign.

That's right. You just forgot the most decisive reason : the strategic fatal mistake of chasing the russian army as far as possible, which was just a deadly nonsense.

But Napoleon prefered blaming winter than his own disastrous strategic change.

 

[RGB]

That's right. You just forgot the most decisive reason : the strategic fatal mistake of chasing the russian army as far as possible, which was just a deadly nonsense.

But Napoleon prefered blaming winter than his own disastrous strategic change.

Well, it worked against Austria and Prussia, so I guess he thought it might work against the Russians too.

Which actually leads to an interesting polemical point that exists in Russophone historiography, as in, how planned was the great retreat by the Russian army itself?

There's a school of thought that beyond the obvious imperative need to keep the army intact if possible, there was no real grand strategy for scorched earth and logistics victory, and in fact the Russian army did give the Grande Armee several big battles that ate up a lot of manpower for both sides, both against the main force and against Napoleon's attempts to catch the Russian armies flanking him.

So potentially not even the Russians themselves were really counting on winter per se. That however casts national legend Kutuzov in an indifferent light and so lots of historians really don't like that interpretation, which is why I said it was polemical.

 

[Westphalian]

I wonder how Napoleon would have gone against the lines of Torres Vedras.
Second Napoleon believed that when he had captured Moscow the Russians would be forced to negotiate. It didn't happen. Napoleon seemed at that point in his career to choose to capture enemy Capitals when he ran out of other ideas, it was increasingly not working for him.

Is it a better strategy to move toward the actual Russian capital of the time, St.Petersburg? That would probably mean going from (East) Prussia through the Baltic Provinces. I assume that harrowing the hinterland of Riga, Reval and StP or simply taking or blocking them will heavily disrupt Russian-British trade. Even if Arkhangelsk and the Black Sea ports are still available.

Tangent: Is there any Swedish faction Napoleon could motivate to enter the fight in order to regain Finland or at least force a more favorable border?

To which degree controlled the Royal Navy the Baltic Sea in 1812?

 

[SlyDessertFox]

How much of Napoleon's army is tied up in that venture? How much pressure can Napoleon put on the rest of the continent from the head of his army, in-campaign and currently at a diplomatic impasse with Russia. How long until that situation goes bad for some involved party and Russia's insistence on continuing the fight starts to look less like the obstinance of a prideful nation and more like a leading example. Not that anyone could do anything about it, but Russia holding out just makes Napoleon's position seem.....how do I put this? Not weak, but less permanent. A force, that while unchallengeable, is not absolute and unwavering; something that can and is being contested.

Sitting there on top of a nation in defiance erodes Napoleon's theoretical authority and the longer it lasts the more enticing the prospect of ousting Napoleon from his position of strength.

Yes, but at the end of the day you still have to defeat him. At the end of the day's Napoleon is still (more or less depending on how you look at Spain in 1811) undefeated and more or less the master of continental Europe. In any case, there's going to be a lot of internal pressure on Alexander I to come to some kind of settlement. Napoleon could have got the Ottomans to close the Bosphorous to Russian shipping and might pull Denmark back in to seal off the Baltic.

Is it a better strategy to move toward the actual Russian capital of the time, St.Petersburg? That would probably mean going from (East) Prussia through the Baltic Provinces. I assume that harrowing the hinterland of Riga, Reval and StP or simply taking or blocking them will heavily disrupt Russian-British trade. Even if Arkhangelsk and the Black Sea ports are still available.

Tangent: Is there any Swedish faction Napoleon could motivate to enter the fight in order to regain Finland or at least force a more favorable border?

To which degree controlled the Royal Navy the Baltic Sea in 1812?

Offer Sweden the return of Swedish pommerania maybe?

 

[RGB]

Is it a better strategy to move toward the actual Russian capital of the time, St.Petersburg? That would probably mean going from (East) Prussia through the Baltic Provinces. I assume that harrowing the hinterland of Riga, Reval and StP or simply taking or blocking them will heavily disrupt Russian-British trade. Even if Arkhangelsk and the Black Sea ports are still available.

Tangent: Is there any Swedish faction Napoleon could motivate to enter the fight in order to regain Finland or at least force a more favorable border?

To which degree controlled the Royal Navy the Baltic Sea in 1812?

There is a little problem with that, and that little problem is called the Russian Baltic Navy, which is (at least on paper) a good deal more formidable than the French navy at that exact moment, and so dominant in the Baltic at the time only the Royal Navy can challenge it, and that won't happen because they're on the same side this time around.

Basically, during most of the coalition wars the Russians were participating in blockades of French ports, and not the other way around.

 

[Matteo]

Well, it worked against Austria and Prussia, so I guess he thought it might work against the Russians too.

Which actually leads to an interesting polemical point that exists in Russophone historiography, as in, how planned was the great retreat by the Russian army itself?

There's a school of thought that beyond the obvious imperative need to keep the army intact if possible, there was no real grand strategy for scorched earth and logistics victory, and in fact the Russian army did give the Grande Armee several big battles that ate up a lot of manpower for both sides, both against the main force and against Napoleon's attempts to catch the Russian armies flanking him.

So potentially not even the Russians themselves were really counting on winter per se. That however casts national legend Kutuzov in an indifferent light and so lots of historians really don't like that interpretation, which is why I said it was polemical.

No, this is precisely the fatal strategic mistake : believing that Russia is the same as Prussia or Austria.

Russian was different because it had a gigantic strategic depth that no other european power had. So one could defeat Russia only by setting precise and limited strategic goals.

Initially, that's what Napoleon had planned : a 2 years campaign aimed at snatching former greater Poland away from Russia. He gave up that plan in august 1812.

 

[Circonflexe]

November, which I'm pretty sure is Winter.

Not at all. The month of November is fully included in Autumn (in the Northern hemisphere), which starts at the equinox (~ 21 September, or 1 Vendémiaire French Republican-style , and ends at the solstice (~21 December, or 1 Nivôse).

 

[Tanc49]

Maybe he invades Russia but doesn't go all the way to Moscow, taking the baltic states and Ukraine as "punishment" and staying there. It's an option explored in War and Peace.

Actually, why didn't he try to go for St Petersburg? It seems that's where the actual power was. Although, if you're trying to cut a maritime trade, seizing the port seems like a good option?

 

[Matteo]

Maybe he invades Russia but doesn't go all the way to Moscow, taking the baltic states and Ukraine as "punishment" and staying there. It's an option explored in War and Peace.

Actually, why didn't he try to go for St Petersburg? It seems that's where the actual power was. Although, if you're trying to cut a maritime trade, seizing the port seems like a good option?

Because the topography did not allow to move a big army alone the coast and because It would have been a losing strategy too.

The good strategy is the one where you set limited goals, reach them, and force the opponent either to accept the new situation or to risk a major battle in order to take away from you the advantages you have seized.

That was Napoleon's initial war plan. Snatching Poland and Lituania away from Russian would have been a terrible blow because it was a densely populated area and because the russian war-monter elite held à huge chunk of its properties there.

 

[unprincipled peter]

Matteo,
your idea is fairly sound. there are some problems with it, but no war plan is completely idiot proof. Nap, though, didn't agree and went hell bent for leather into Russia, and doomed himself. Personally, I think he was doomed no matter what - he simply didn't set up a long term sustainable situation - but his actions in Russia moved up the timescale of his demise. He could have easily rode out the storm until his death in 1821. After that, France is still fooked. All in all, the overall situation could have been worse with a different chain of events, so maybe Nap did everyone a favor, and additional wars didn't erupt from the peace process.

 

[Matteo]

Well, if you read really trustable sources, that is sources written before the end of 1812, you realize that almost everybody in Europe, and first of all in Russia, believed that Napoleon was going to won his russian campaign. That's why the russian army made retreat : not because It was a genious trap but because It had no other solution.

 

[Penny for The Guy]

I Just Gotta!

 

[SlyDessertFox]

Matteo,
your idea is fairly sound. there are some problems with it, but no war plan is completely idiot proof. Nap, though, didn't agree and went hell bent for leather into Russia, and doomed himself. Personally, I think he was doomed no matter what - he simply didn't set up a long term sustainable situation - but his actions in Russia moved up the timescale of his demise. He could have easily rode out the storm until his death in 1821. After that, France is still fooked. All in all, the overall situation could have been worse with a different chain of events, so maybe Nap did everyone a favor, and additional wars didn't erupt from the peace process.

Napoleon's death might actually be the only way for the French to sustain their gains. Assuming Napoleon dies in 1821 as per OTL (and hangs on until then), then some sort of diplomatic solution can be reached after his death.

 

[unprincipled peter]

calling the retreat a 'genius trap' is a bit overstatement. Calling it no other choice is understating it. Russia was planning on going to war with France. That means battles. They weren't forced into war, but entered it knowingly. you make it sound like they were running scared and lucked into a victory. Scorched earth had been practiced in Portugal and was extremely successful. Portugal had the line of something or other (having a mind fart on the name) to hide behind. Russia had distance. It was a willful action to not give battle, but to retreat and to practice scorched earth, expecting Nap to give chase and overextend. While it worked out beautifully, it wasn't all planned, but it wasn't some stroke of luck, either, although, I will allow that Nap completely blew the situation beyond anyone's wildest dreams.

 

[Matteo]

The russian retreat was what is called a forced move. They had no other choice than retreating because confronting Napoleon's army in the first months of the russian campaign would have led to defeat.

The point is that this forced move was not by itself a winning strategy.
Retreat and guerilla warfare can become a winning strategy only if the opponent accepts to play this game.
And it became a winning strategy when Napoleon decided, contrary to his initial war plan (a 2 years campaign for the limited goal of snatching greater Poland away from Russia and forcing it to admit defeat), finally decided to chase the russian army as far as it would retreat.

This change was a strategic nonsense and suicide. That's the proof that, as great a commander as Napoleon was, he was not infallible and he made terrible strategic mistakes. And in 1812, he was spinning a bad way on strategic and military matters. You can call it erosion of power, especially since it was an autocratic power. Napoleon had reached the point where he should have entrusted the conduct of the russian campaign to someone else, Davout being the obvious alter ego of Napoleon that could fill the part and avoid the mistakes due to confusion of the roles of head of State and army commander.

 

[unprincipled peter]

matteo,
I mostly agree with that.

I think the 'forced retreat' is you saying potayto, me saying patahto. The russians went with an unorthodox move because, as you say, they knew simply going toe to toe with France's armies was not a good strategy.

As you also say, it takes two to do the dance, and Nap stupidly played his part to russian perfection. I seem to recall Davout advocating a different plan of action, but Nap shot him down. I also recall that the Russian commander planning the retreat was under immense criticism, and that it was only Nap's willingness to play his part and lose his army that gave the Russians hope. If Nap had declined to play his role, the Russians would have been forced to come forth and go toe to toe, which they likely would have lost.

Nap was a great general, but he was saved in some of his battles by subordinates. In the end, he lost his luster and proved himself mortal. I don't know that this was the result of taking on too much as head of state and supreme military leader, a belief that he knew better than davout, whether physical ailments were clouding his judgement, whether he just wasn't as great as he thought, or a combination of all that.

I think we both agree that his actions in Russia were the wrong actions. Don't know that different actions would have been successful, but we do know that what he did do was wrong (hence his demise).

I do wonder if he could have held on til his OTL death. I don't think he could ever win, because his style of winning depended on total domination, and total domination on such a global scale is impossible, IMO. but, he could have stayed on top longer than he did.

Victory in an alternate war would depend on finances. Was France in 1812 fiscally sound? could they ride out the storm with their army in Poland? Could Russia pay for their army for a couple of years without a real battle victory? Did Britain have enough left in the coffers to prop up Russia? It would be interesting that one of Nap's biggest blunders (taking on Britain economically) may have been his one hope for victory blown because he decided to settle Russia militarily. Everybody at that time was fiscally and materially hurting. France was bled by Spain, but everyone was drained. An alternative to massive military victory in Russia would depend on a war of attrition both materially and financially. Could France last til 1821 financially? Could Britain?

 

[Booster Gold]

The British will keep throwing money at anyone and everyone willing to fight him until the day he dies. Could have been Napoleon or the Second Coming of Christ it wouldn't have mattered, the British would not have allowed a united Europe under anyone. The whole point of the Continental System was to weaken Britain economically until she backed off. And if Napoleon can't maintain the system, then he's killed by a million papercuts eventually.

Bottom Line: Napoleon was checkmated long before the Russian campaign.

 

[Napoleonrules]

November, no matter what the calendar says, IS WINTER, as anyone from South Dakota, Minnesota, Michigan, Upstate NY, or RUSSIA will tell you. So please don't nitpick and say November is Autumn. THAT'S a myth.

Napoleon doesn't invade Russia. Deals with minor rebellions and unruly rulers who think they can get away with what Russia did in ignoring the Continental System. As others have mentioned. Is the failure in Spain a failure because Napoleon is not there? French armies tend to do better in a campaign that involves Napoleon than when he is not there, for what reason that's debatable, his charisma, higher morale, better strategy, better resources brought to bear because he's actually there. But I'd like to think Spain (but not Portugal) is brought under control. Sweden might be enticed with Finland, but they just lost it in 1809, will they really want a new war so soon? Sweden was under de facto rulership of Charles XIV, a former Marshal of France under Napoleon. Whether he had any loyalty or not, I'm not sure but I doubt it. Unless we take the view that like with Stalin and Hitler, even if Russia is not invaded, it is only delaying the inevitable war between the two. Napoleon can hold Europe until Russia invades. Once that happens he's done. Napoleon, being of the same type of cloth as Alexander or Caesar, is going to have another adventure up his sleeve, just like with Egypt. Maybe he pulls a Charles the XII of Sweden and randomly campaigns around Europe. Maybe he goes after the Ottoman Empire to finish what he started in Egypt. Napoleon at the gates of Istanbul would be interesting and the Russian and British response.