Greenbacks were fiat money - they were only credible on the word of the government and were not guaranteed a redemption for gold and silver. Due to the absence of a central bank to borrow cash and the limited specie within the top banks in Boston, Philadelphia and New York (if the banks kept lending to the Federal government, there would not be not enough money which could have caused a financial crisis in the midst of a civil war), the authorities in Washington reluctantly accepted that they needed a national fiat money and thus the greenbacks were born. Naturally, government creditors hated the thing and some bankers could never trust Congress with the power to expand and inflate the money supply.
It should be remembered that sustained inflation is a modern phenomenon. Inflation pre-1950s were more like episodes - usually war-related - and offset by episodes of deflation. Inflation was viewed as good for Western men because they were largely farmers, who were net-debtors. Technically speaking, inflation is good for debtors as the real value of the interest payments decline (supposing fixed rates), thus there is a transfer of wealth from creditor to debtor. During deflation, wealth is transferred from the debtor to the creditor as the interest payments become more onerous - the value of money being paid is higher than it was when the agreement was said.
During the Panic of 1873, monetary policy came to attention. The "Crime of 1873" had already happened and farms and factories were calling for an injection in money supply (greenbacks) in order to stimulate the economy. Grant vetoed the "Inflation Bill" to the surprise of many, but in a compromise, greenbacks were permitted to remain in circulation rather than be retired. However, silver came into fore again. In 1876, George M. Weston, writing for the Republican Boston Globe, popularized the idea that silver, not greenbacks, could provide a well-needed inflationary boost to the economy. Silver was “hard money" and the skyrocketing production meant that its increased supply promised inflation without the disgrace of being fiat money, which was why it was pushed hard up until the 1890s.
Nah, Grant and his contemporary generals strongly resented France for its involvement in Mexico. When Sheridan left to observe the war on the Prussian side, both he and Grant were hoping that the French would get their teeth kicked in.
That said, a better outcome for France is not out of question. The Germans would have had difficulty in penetrating into the French interior had the Army of Châlons or Army of the Rhine survived (preferably both). Although the French were inferior with respect to officer material, artillery equipment and infantry tactics, Châlons was the perfect place from which to execute a fighting retreat into the Paris fortifications, or across to the left bank of the Loire, where a relief army for Paris could be constituted as a dagger in Moltke’s flank. Indeed, the Prussians gave the French a window of opportunity to flee. Karl von Steinmetz, commander of the First Army and 74 years old, was hungry for glory, scornful of Moltke and well past his prime, some of his peers even thought him senile. Steinmetz also consistently blundered into very costly frontal attacks, both against the Austrians and the French, until he was finally relieved.
In the opening offensive, Steinmetz maneuvered his army, which was only meant to play a supporting role, in front of the Second Army, which was meant to be Motlke’s fist. Although the Prussians managed to drive the French back, there was plenty of time for the French to escape the closing maws. Hell, even at Mars-la-Tour, Moltke overestimated the French retreat speed and thus only one corps was actually present on the French line of retreat, facing the entire Army of the Rhine. Unfortunately, French army officers seemed to be sort of McClellan-caricatures and kinda sat there and let Moltke have his win.
