"...domino effect despite occurring a full two years before the outbreak of war. To whatever extent one debates that the Central European War was a war
about Hungary, it cannot be denied that events in Hungary were a major part of what eventually caused the war, as uncertainty over its place within the Habsburg Empire and relationship to Vienna scrambled strategic calculations across Europe and even threatened to bring in powers such as the Ottomans and Russians in time.
The November Crisis had in its genesis, as so much in Hungary did, the complicated and fluid relationship between various factions of Hungarian nationalism and their intersection with Hungarian aristocratic opinion and the intellectual elite. The "48ers" had controlled the Hungarian Diet since 1904, but the death of Kossuth had left them with a great leadership vacuum at their center, and the relationship between the Prime Minister of Hungary, Albert Apponyi, and younger firebrands such as Gyula Justh or Mihaili Karolyi were rapidly fraying. In practice, this meant that the coalition colloquailly referred to as the Greens often came to rely on external support despite its majority in the Diet, either from the left (Reds) in the form of Oskar Jaszi's Civic Radical Party or the socialist MSZDP, which by late 1916 had gone fully revisionist Marxist and was toying with the abolition of monarchy and outright syndicalism, or from the right (Whites), the collection of Imperial-faction "67ers" gathered around Istvan Tisza and dominated largely by the magnates who were vehemently opposed to an end to their rights and also strongly supportive of the continued arrangement with Vienna.
Apponyi was a nationalist, conservative intellectual who had spearheaded the Magyarization of Hungarian schools, but hailed from a wealthy background and was skeptical of the more radical economic programs proposed by the Justh faction, by 1916 known as the Green Left. Nonetheless, he had supported Kossuth's compromise with the Whites to gradually move along expanded suffrage - a key plank that stitched together the heterogenous parties of the 48er coalition - and slowly grow it so that at the time of the November Crisis, 17% of Hungarians, but only men, were allowed the vote. This had allowed the Greens a broader and broader voting base without threatening universal suffrage that conservatives were confident would bring Jaszi or the MSZDP to power and end the monarchy or bring about a syndicalist revolution, while also letting the Whites preserve their power and prevent a reactionary response from the Hungarian nobility.
This vote was still done publicly, however, and powerful landlords and factory owners often punished or socially ostracized voters who crossed them; the Catholic Church often joined in, with excommunication or sanction threatened to those in towns and villages who chose the Civic Radicals or MSZDP. Proposals to further gradually increase suffrage by 1920 went nowhere; liberal and radical deputies of the Diet wanted a secret ballot, as was common almost everywhere else in Europe by that point, and a massive protest in Budapest on November 1st demanding the vote on Jaszi's secret ballot bill made clear that this was increasingly a line in the sand for the reds.
In a decision that would have enormous impact on European history, Apponyi - who, again, viewed much of his own coalition as upjumped rabble - elected to whip specifically against the secret ballot, declaring it "unmanly and undignified" but mostly concerned about his working relationship with the Whites and, more importantly, the tacit support given the Greens by the Catholic hierarchy that was otherwise robustly pro-Vienna. While elitist scorn for universal suffrage was indeed part of Apponyi's miscalculation, there was also the factor that the renewal of the Ausgleich - the 1867 Austrian-Hungarian Compromise - was due by the spring, and Apponyi wanted to cement his authority ahead of those negotiations and make clear that he was every bit Kossuth's equal and successor, especially over the restive and radical Green Leftists who were pushing for more control of his increasingly shaky coalition. As such, the Law of the Secret Ballot was defeated on November 10, 1916 - to a loud chorus of boos.
Apponyi had severely underestimated the importance of the secret ballot to the Reds, and not only the deputies of the MSZDP and Civic Radicals walked out, but so did Karolyi, with Justh having missed the vote due to poor health, and the breach between the Prime Minister and Karolyi was from then on permanent, with the latter fully rather than partially identified with the Red faction. Apponyi had also
overestimated the support the Whites would give him as he had aligned with them to kill the act; Tisza said little supportive in public and openly questioned the viability of the Apponyi government. Massive protests broke out in Budapest and Kassa, and even White-friendly minority-heavy cities like Temesvar and Podzony saw unrest. The collapse of the Apponyi cabinet, and indeed the entire 48er movement, seemed imminent.
This did not go unnoticed in Vienna, where the days of protests following the vote began to raise concerns of another 1848. Franz Josef immediately called Apponyi to him, and they walked and talked outside in the Schonnbrunn Gardens; neither man fully trusted the other, with Franz Josef considering Apponyi a dangerous Kossuthite and Apponyi frustrated by Vienna's continued support for the Whites ahead of the negotiations to come, but the conversation was courteous and Franz Josef persuaded Apponyi not to tender his resignation, at least not immediately. Apponyi, relieved, returned on a train to Budapest on the evening of the 15th, only to hear upon his return to the Hungarian capital that
Der Alte Herr had fallen ill after their walk in the cold and was suffering from severe pneumonia..."
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The Central European War
(Hat tip to
@Rion_marcus for his advice to me on internal Hungarian political dynamics)