I'll be sure to think up a storm of name ideas, don't you worry!
Looking forward to it
Russian said:
OK, I'll see what I can do...
I'll start my reply by saying that all your criticism is greatly appreciated
You hit a wide variety and large number of decisions that I made, which is exactly what I was hoping to hear. Of course, I will try to justify my choices as well as possible.
Regarding the number of generals, it is no different than IOTL. Pertinax, Maximianus, Clodius, and Pescennius were all
legati legionis under the auspices of the emperor so it's ambiguous who would lead. When I find a lack of information one way or the other, I try to leave the matter open-ended: if you're correct that one general had to have supreme command on the battlefield, then such arrangements would, logically, have been made, but if it is not unusual for the campaign to be directed by a war council of the fielded generals, then that would have occurred. In either case, all four men - alongside Tarutenius who had made a name for himself with victories as a prefect - would have been named in announcing the victory before the Senate.
I wouldn't go so far as to call Sulla's position secure.
This is a key point for me to address.
Even though the
trivmphvs was in their names, the generals received secondary credit to that given to Marcus Aurelius and the public would automatically associate the victory with the
Imperator as much as with the actual generals (while some aristocrats and the very pious would see it as Sulla's victory for happening under his auspices). Meanwhile, the generals themselves are rewarded for their service to Rome and receive the highest praises that any non-emperor has received in centuries - rewards that would not be easily forgotten. Quite frankly, I don't see any incentive for any of the generals to take power from Sulla at that point. Even putting aside the reciprocation of getting the (unlawful) triumph, the way that the triumph was basically a promise of further benefits for loyalty, the sense of duty any aristocrat felt to avoid treasonous acts, the fact that the generals knew Sulla personally as a young boy, and any post-humous loyalty to Marcus Aurelius, there were still five generals (at least two of equal rank) and none were in a better position (in terms of reputation and the number of men under their command before the triumph) than the others to take power. Before the triumph, trying to take power would have just involved all of the other victorious generals fighting you (even if one man had the supreme command, it's a toss up for a legionary to obey that commander or his immediate commander). After the triumph, the generals are either away on new commands, where other generals have armies that would contend rebellion (cf. IOTL Avidius Cassius' swift end), and the others have rejoined the ranks of the Senate, where the emperor commands the Praetorian Guard (more on them in future posts!).
All of that said, I do think that personal ties to Marcus Aurelius and the young Sulla made the series of events as I described (where ultimately the generals become part of an inner circle for the emperor) a likely outcome. If the reasons I have presented still seem insufficient, then I will gladly address specific counterpoints.
A "homebird" emperor receiving the praise of a victorious general, despite being personally uninvolved, is not an unprecedented case for Rome - Nero after the First Parthian War being a good example. In fact, the idea that the generals who actually won the war would receive the honors was the strange part - refusing the honors himself might have only looked better on Sulla's part in the eyes of the people, generously giving away what was rightfully his (I didn't go this far in the actual text but it's arguably more plausible).
Trajan made his Eastern campaign at an old age, having great experience of Dacian conquest which he commanded personally.
And he actually failed.
For Sulla to be well-informed about Parthia during his invasion at the age of 30 is quite plausible, given the centuries of contact between Rome and Parthia and the numerous prior invasions. I don't think a Macedonian invading a distant Egypt, Persia, and India is comparable to a Roman invading his neighbor (Avidius Cassius had invaded Parthia shortly before and could have provided ample tactical information for this purpose). I have in mind that Pescennius Niger accompanied Sulla in the war - injecting his experience into Sulla's own command - but my concept of Sulla (as part of the PoD) has him treating his second-in-command's advice with respect without seeming to be led by the hand by a wiser commander. In this sense, no one would have seen Pescennius as "really in command" of the war and his own perception would not be one of underappreciation.
Where are the revolts (rebellions)? That's quite abnormal for the Romans to have new territories conquered without a good old long bloody revolt.
A great point and, I admit, I should devote more space to the aftermath of the conquests rather than leaving things implied. As you accurately say, revolts are occurring in the recently conquered parts of Parthi - hence the need to keep Pescennius in Mesopotamia as legate. I did not mean for it to seem as though all was fine and dandy for his time as governor - he would have been heavily involved in the task of curbing the unrest of the conquered peoples. The same can be said for Caledonia. The next few decades will be fraught with fighting in the new territories as they settle into Roman rule.
Another consideration, however, segues well into my next point which is that not much land has actually been conquered by Sulla - except in Dacia and Scotland. Once I post a map this week, it will be more clear how little land Rome took from Parthia (I wasn't thinking when I said Adiabene yesterday - I'll cross that out while leaving it visible as a testament to my forgetfulness). To give a basic idea, Rome annexes its vassal of Osrhoene (a smooth transition of power) and takes land between the Euphrates and Tigris up to about the Median Wall. Using line integrals and some old maps, only about 30-40 thousands sq km would have been conquered. This leaves Parthia with a fair bit of its territory - Chaldaea, Media, and everything beyond the Zagros. Even if Rome had taken all of Mesopotamia, it would be an exaggeration to say that Parthia lost the source of most of its income. It would have retained the mines and pastures on the Zagros in addition to the tremendous revenues that came from tolls on the Silk Road (an oft-cited source of much of Parthia's wealth). Mesopotamia is important, rich land but it's not the end-all-and-be-all of Parthian finances.
(in OTL Parthia never paid tribute to Roma: if they were strong - they fought, if they were weak - they did not have money; quite simple pattern of behavior).
Do you know why Parthia never paid tribute to Rome IOTL? That part will be changed if there is a good reason why it didn't happen.
As for the Parthian incentive to retake Mesopotamia, that is a possible direction. However, Parthia is known for taking a defensive stance toward Rome and at this point would be greatly lacking in confidence after two successive (harsh) defeats within the lifetime of many of its rulers. If this possibility were to seem more convincing, then it might arise in the coming posts
It would certainly be interesting!