If memory serves that's partially why the British economy became so screwed up. Rather than use things like Marshall Aid or the billions borrowed shortly after the end of the war to rebuild infrastructure and modernise industry the politicians spent it on things like excessive military spending, trying to maintain the Sterling Area and being a central player in the Commonwealth plus using it as a general subsidy for whatever they wanted to spend it on. One of these days I might actually get around to doing a timeline based on the ASBs smacking some of the central players of the time around the head and getting them to realise they have to drastically draw down on Britain's commitments.
More powerful RN in post-war era: One way to bring it
- Thread starter Jukra
- Start date
Very true. Out of all of post war Europe Britain used her share of the Marshall Aid most ineffectually. Much of it was used to help build the new welfare state/nationalisation (throwing money at it and not really thinking) and poorly manage the peacetime armed forces. Short of going ASB, what would be ideal would be a series of ruthless administrators/businessmen/practical minded politicians to come to power. Radical reform of the armed forces (as Jukra as posted), perhaps a cheaper form of national service (I remember reading in history a plan that involved only a part time "territorial" service where troops would do a basic military training plut 30 days a year and would be mobilised in needed. Thus millions are not being spent on troops when not needed while at the same time thousands more young men can go and work in industry and help rebuild the country). Finally a more constrained or better thought out nationalisation in Britain. Less money thrown at the national health service and less nationalisation of industry keeping it free and competitive for longer. Theoretically, within the next twenty years Britain could be in a much better position.
However, that all said, it's mostly irrelevant in the scope of this thread. Looking forward to Suez, Jukra!
Note: Thanks for all the comments! Getting a flu is beneficial for allowing time to participate on alternatehistory.com ... 
8. The 1951 General Elections
In October 1951 the Conservatives achieved a victory over the Labour in an election where the Conservative party had actually less votes than the Labour destined for opposition. In issues of defence (as in OTL) the both parties were committed to large rearmament effort and actually tackled some of the issues in quite similar ways. The Conservative Manifesto on defence read as follows:
For all these purposes we support the Rearmament programme on which the Socialist Government have embarked. We believe however that far better value could be got for the immense manpower and sums of money which are involved. Special sacrifices are required from us all for the sake of our survival as free democratic communities and the prevention of war.
Our theme is that in normal times there should be the freest competition and that good wages and profits fairly earned under the law are a public gain both to the Nation and to all in industry-management and wage-earner alike. But the vast Rearmament policy of spending five thousand millions in three years on Defence inevitably distorts the ordinary working of supply and demand, therefore justice requires special arrangements for the emergency. We shall set our face against the fortuitous rise in company profits because of the abnormal process of Rearmament. We shall accordingly impose a form of Excess Profits Tax to operate only during this exceptional period.
(quote from OTL document, available via:
http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1951/1951-conservative-manifesto.shtml )
Like so often happens, in practice the Churchill cabinet had to do some hard choices on rearmament which proved to be financially unsustainable and technologically in many areas a failure, both due to bottlenecks in industry and the inability of British R&D machinery to create a broad range of modern equipment.
9. British naval participation in the Korean War
The British naval participation in the Korean War was in many ways not only a participation in an alliance but also a joint effort with other Commonwealth navies which shared a similar organizational background (right up to the name of particular organizations) and in many cases similar equipment to the Royal Navy.
Royal Marines 40 Commando took part in the fighting around Pusan bridgehead and was then attached to the US 1st Marine Division for Inchon operations which gave Royal Marines fresh experience in taking part in a corps sized landing. In no less important but less visible tasks the ships of the Commonwealth Task Force provided both naval gunfire and aerial support for the operation.
After Inchon operation the 40 Commando as a part of 1st Marine Division and alongside other units of US X Corps was deployed to Wonsan operation and in November 1950 again found itself in a battle against Chinese forces. After evacuation of Wonsan the 40 Commando was relieved and replaced by new 43 Commando which was not retained in the US 1st Marine Division but as a maritime raiding force operating in North Korean littorals. This role continued for 43 Commando and other units relieving it until the end of the Korean War. Both 40, 43 and subsequent Commandos deployed to Korea cultivated the joint operations with various Royal Navy units and especially with the FAA. The role of RM Commandos and amphibious operations would be recognised in the 1953 British defence reorganization.
Of the British naval operations during the static war the role of HMS Glory was perhaps the most important. HMS Glory, deploying to the Korean waters on November 1952, carried the first FAA jets into action. The Hawker P.1052 Sea Hawks she carried were rushed into action and suffered some very heavy losses, many due to operational causes, which caused a great deal of criticism. However, the important thing was that Royal Navy could display it had advanced jet fighters serving alongside Americans, something the RAF had not. The fact that the Sea Hawk had to be rushed into service and the new all-weather Sea Venom was not yet operational at all (although the PR machinery said the Sea Venom was not deployed to secure it's gizmo gadgets from falling into enemy hands) was a symbol of problems with British industrial machinery tackling with requirements of rearmament aiming more to quality rather than quantity.
By 1953 it was clear that the rearmament program was far too ambitious. This lead to a clear change of policy which was largely justified by three world political events: introduction of hydrogen bombs first to US and then to Soviet arsenals (as it seemed, in reality the large scale introduction was some years away), death of Stalin and end of the Korean conflict. As the planned rearmament was unattainable something else had to be done.
8. The 1951 General Elections
In October 1951 the Conservatives achieved a victory over the Labour in an election where the Conservative party had actually less votes than the Labour destined for opposition. In issues of defence (as in OTL) the both parties were committed to large rearmament effort and actually tackled some of the issues in quite similar ways. The Conservative Manifesto on defence read as follows:
For all these purposes we support the Rearmament programme on which the Socialist Government have embarked. We believe however that far better value could be got for the immense manpower and sums of money which are involved. Special sacrifices are required from us all for the sake of our survival as free democratic communities and the prevention of war.
Our theme is that in normal times there should be the freest competition and that good wages and profits fairly earned under the law are a public gain both to the Nation and to all in industry-management and wage-earner alike. But the vast Rearmament policy of spending five thousand millions in three years on Defence inevitably distorts the ordinary working of supply and demand, therefore justice requires special arrangements for the emergency. We shall set our face against the fortuitous rise in company profits because of the abnormal process of Rearmament. We shall accordingly impose a form of Excess Profits Tax to operate only during this exceptional period.
(quote from OTL document, available via:
http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1951/1951-conservative-manifesto.shtml )
Like so often happens, in practice the Churchill cabinet had to do some hard choices on rearmament which proved to be financially unsustainable and technologically in many areas a failure, both due to bottlenecks in industry and the inability of British R&D machinery to create a broad range of modern equipment.
9. British naval participation in the Korean War
The British naval participation in the Korean War was in many ways not only a participation in an alliance but also a joint effort with other Commonwealth navies which shared a similar organizational background (right up to the name of particular organizations) and in many cases similar equipment to the Royal Navy.
Royal Marines 40 Commando took part in the fighting around Pusan bridgehead and was then attached to the US 1st Marine Division for Inchon operations which gave Royal Marines fresh experience in taking part in a corps sized landing. In no less important but less visible tasks the ships of the Commonwealth Task Force provided both naval gunfire and aerial support for the operation.
After Inchon operation the 40 Commando as a part of 1st Marine Division and alongside other units of US X Corps was deployed to Wonsan operation and in November 1950 again found itself in a battle against Chinese forces. After evacuation of Wonsan the 40 Commando was relieved and replaced by new 43 Commando which was not retained in the US 1st Marine Division but as a maritime raiding force operating in North Korean littorals. This role continued for 43 Commando and other units relieving it until the end of the Korean War. Both 40, 43 and subsequent Commandos deployed to Korea cultivated the joint operations with various Royal Navy units and especially with the FAA. The role of RM Commandos and amphibious operations would be recognised in the 1953 British defence reorganization.
Of the British naval operations during the static war the role of HMS Glory was perhaps the most important. HMS Glory, deploying to the Korean waters on November 1952, carried the first FAA jets into action. The Hawker P.1052 Sea Hawks she carried were rushed into action and suffered some very heavy losses, many due to operational causes, which caused a great deal of criticism. However, the important thing was that Royal Navy could display it had advanced jet fighters serving alongside Americans, something the RAF had not. The fact that the Sea Hawk had to be rushed into service and the new all-weather Sea Venom was not yet operational at all (although the PR machinery said the Sea Venom was not deployed to secure it's gizmo gadgets from falling into enemy hands) was a symbol of problems with British industrial machinery tackling with requirements of rearmament aiming more to quality rather than quantity.
By 1953 it was clear that the rearmament program was far too ambitious. This lead to a clear change of policy which was largely justified by three world political events: introduction of hydrogen bombs first to US and then to Soviet arsenals (as it seemed, in reality the large scale introduction was some years away), death of Stalin and end of the Korean conflict. As the planned rearmament was unattainable something else had to be done.
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Note:I decided to use end-use codenames when applicable in order not to confuse readers.
10. R & D in motion - technical plans for the future fleet of late 1950's in 1950-1953
The Korean war build-up accelerated a number of research projects, some of which had been already underway, and in practise in view of later budget cuts decided what kind of equipment would enter in service for RN use until early 1960's. Many of the programs were cancelled, what is seen here are those weapons which would either come into service or would be cancelled at late stage.
10.1. Guided weapons
In the area of air defence a need for three missile types was recognized. First one was one of fleet air defence, helping the air defence fighters tackle with the fast bombers and the cruise missiles they would be undoubtely carrying. This specification required a huge ramjet powered missile which was to be developed in co-operation with RAF. The missile was contracted to Bristol which would produce it under name Bloodhound. The initial plan was to fit the missile on cruiser-sized ships, perhaps at first to converted Colony-class cruisers.
Second requirement was for air defence of convoys. The planned range was to be around 15 nautical miles. This missile was contracted to Armstrong Whitworth under name Sea Slug and was scheduled to come into service as soon as possible.
Third requirement was the replacement of heavy and ineffective Bofors guns. After numerous cancellations this project was to surface later on as Seacat missile produced by Short Brothers during late 1950's.
Missiles were not to be the only guided weapons. Both ASW and anti-ship homing torpedoes (Bidder and Fancy (not Biter)) were in fast track of development.
By early 1950's it was also clear that future fighters would employ missiles as their main armament. Here the FAA effort was pooled with RAF and the resulting Fireflash and Firestreak missiles were to come into service during late 1950's.
10.2. FAA's futuristic requirements
As the first generation of FAA's jets were scheduled to come into operational service between 1952-1954 the service was already viewing at the future requirements. The aviation was in very fast period of development. Speeds were seemingly multiplying, electronics getting more effective and the costs rising. While the replacements were scheduled to enter service in late 1950's, circa 1957, in practice the problems with British military-industrial complex meant that their development was significantly delayed.
In strike aircraft there was requirement for two different types. First would be the follow-on for Canberra strategic bomber. The initial plans were very ambitious for a Mach 2 capable heavy attack aircraft with 4000 kilometers range. These initial plans would not be materialized for a long time as it was (perhaps wrongly in hindsight) that Canberra would be adequate for a quite long time.
Second type would be general purpose strike aircraft for strikes against new Soviet heavy surface units - Sverdlov class cruisers - and various land targets. This specification NA-39, was contracted to Blackburn for it's BANA aircraft later on to be known as the Buccaneer.
For fleet air defence there was a need for all-weather aircraft with missile armament capable of performing also strike role. With technology of the era this required a two seat heavy fighter. The specifications would not be finished before start of 1954. While the delay in this phase was not significant it meant that due to rapid progress in aviation Mach 2 performance was now required and the resultant aircraft would not see service before 1960's, leaving upgraded Sea Venoms and Sea Hawks to serve in the carrier force of 1950's.
10. R & D in motion - technical plans for the future fleet of late 1950's in 1950-1953
The Korean war build-up accelerated a number of research projects, some of which had been already underway, and in practise in view of later budget cuts decided what kind of equipment would enter in service for RN use until early 1960's. Many of the programs were cancelled, what is seen here are those weapons which would either come into service or would be cancelled at late stage.
10.1. Guided weapons
In the area of air defence a need for three missile types was recognized. First one was one of fleet air defence, helping the air defence fighters tackle with the fast bombers and the cruise missiles they would be undoubtely carrying. This specification required a huge ramjet powered missile which was to be developed in co-operation with RAF. The missile was contracted to Bristol which would produce it under name Bloodhound. The initial plan was to fit the missile on cruiser-sized ships, perhaps at first to converted Colony-class cruisers.
Second requirement was for air defence of convoys. The planned range was to be around 15 nautical miles. This missile was contracted to Armstrong Whitworth under name Sea Slug and was scheduled to come into service as soon as possible.
Third requirement was the replacement of heavy and ineffective Bofors guns. After numerous cancellations this project was to surface later on as Seacat missile produced by Short Brothers during late 1950's.
Missiles were not to be the only guided weapons. Both ASW and anti-ship homing torpedoes (Bidder and Fancy (not Biter)) were in fast track of development.
By early 1950's it was also clear that future fighters would employ missiles as their main armament. Here the FAA effort was pooled with RAF and the resulting Fireflash and Firestreak missiles were to come into service during late 1950's.
10.2. FAA's futuristic requirements
As the first generation of FAA's jets were scheduled to come into operational service between 1952-1954 the service was already viewing at the future requirements. The aviation was in very fast period of development. Speeds were seemingly multiplying, electronics getting more effective and the costs rising. While the replacements were scheduled to enter service in late 1950's, circa 1957, in practice the problems with British military-industrial complex meant that their development was significantly delayed.
In strike aircraft there was requirement for two different types. First would be the follow-on for Canberra strategic bomber. The initial plans were very ambitious for a Mach 2 capable heavy attack aircraft with 4000 kilometers range. These initial plans would not be materialized for a long time as it was (perhaps wrongly in hindsight) that Canberra would be adequate for a quite long time.
Second type would be general purpose strike aircraft for strikes against new Soviet heavy surface units - Sverdlov class cruisers - and various land targets. This specification NA-39, was contracted to Blackburn for it's BANA aircraft later on to be known as the Buccaneer.
For fleet air defence there was a need for all-weather aircraft with missile armament capable of performing also strike role. With technology of the era this required a two seat heavy fighter. The specifications would not be finished before start of 1954. While the delay in this phase was not significant it meant that due to rapid progress in aviation Mach 2 performance was now required and the resultant aircraft would not see service before 1960's, leaving upgraded Sea Venoms and Sea Hawks to serve in the carrier force of 1950's.
Nice. While I know this is ASB it still draws me back ever time.
Just wondering, now that it is becoming somewhat evident that Britain is buidling up it's military policy around the Navy TTL, what are the royal marines like? You have mentioned them but they seem little changed. Would they not be enlarged TTL and made into a more effective "police force"?
Again good stuff!
Russell
Just wondering, now that it is becoming somewhat evident that Britain is buidling up it's military policy around the Navy TTL, what are the royal marines like? You have mentioned them but they seem little changed. Would they not be enlarged TTL and made into a more effective "police force"?
Again good stuff!
Russell
Russell
While I agree with a lot of what you say I think the problem with the enbolden section is that it assumes that British industry was free and competitive. Things could have been done a lot better but it definitely needed serious reforms for Britain to start competing. Its not for nothing that the two world wars were the times when British industry performed at its best, in large parts because government did intervene.
Steve
I agree with you a great deal here. What I was really thinking is that without any large scale nationalisation in the UK, the Trade Unions may not/wont gain so much power in the country and British industry won't see the cripling conflict between rhe Unions and the government that it had OTL (obviously the economy had other porblems at the time as well.) Government interference can be a good thing, especially when it comes to co-ordinating resources and such. However, like all things, interfere too much and all you end up creating is even more problems.
Russell