More powerful RN in post-war era: One way to bring it

Something you could have is the RN adopting a development of the swept wing Hawker P1052 and P.1081.
 

Riain

Banned
That would be nice, but the problem of ships themselves still remains, how do you get big, long-lived carriers into the RN while they were still buying such ships?
 
5. Planning the future Fleet Air Arm of 1950's - 1947-1950

The structure of air wing for the Malta-class strike carriers was widely discussed during late 1940's. Decision not to order interim propellor planes for FAA before transition to jet fighters was widely criticized within FAA messes. While RAF was introducing new, fast and powerful Meteors and Vampires the FAA would soldier on with wartime Fireflies and piston-engined Sea Furies. Only a few jet planes were being bought for trial purposes. The scarce procurement funds were being directed towards shipbuilding in order to have carriers for the expected generation of powerful new jets.

The lead ship of her class, HMS Malta, was expected to be completed around 1952. The air wing was to be composed of day fighter Hawker Sea Hawk, all weather fighter De Havilland Sea Venom and the crucial strike plane English Electric Canberra. In 1948, as reports of new Soviet advances in aerospace field came to view, it was decided that Sea Hawk would be based upon swept-wing P.1052 instead of more conventional P.1040. Support would be provided by Fairey Gannet ASW planes and initially by Skyraider AEW planes. All these new designs were expected to be in operational use circa 1952.

Smaller carriers would be able to use all the planes bar the EE Canberra of the new generation (An EE Canberra with aid of RATO could take off from smaller carriers but could not land on it) but problems were already at sight as it was expected that new futuristic planes of the mid-to-late 1950's would be heavier and faster than those of the "early 1950's generation". In rooms of the admiralty it was being questioned whether Audacious-class carriers, construction of which was already began during wartime, which were scheduled to be completed after Malta-class, would be really useful?

Similar problems were seen across the pond where USAF and USN were battling over B-36 versus new giant USS United States. The Admiralty took note on "Revolt of the Admirals" and quietly prepared itself for a showdown with the RAF, which was busily designing not one but four bombers with an obvious atomic bombing mission. Unlike the USN, the new EE Canberra was still touted as a long range maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft. The RN also was tutoring friendship with the Army by using it's Fireflies, with pilots highly skilled in night flying, for close reconnaissance, supply drops and close air support in Malaya.

Note: Thanks for feedback, will proceed with 1950-1952 soon after getting some necessary sourcebooks. The Korean build-up will be the period which is the most crucial for direction of RN in some respects for the rest of the century.
 
Note: Decided to continue this after all after some new ideas...

6. Battle of London - 1950

The Battle of London in July 1950 was among the most well prepared naval operations of the post-war era. The Korean War had just started and British defence expenditure was about to climb to astronomical height (from 1 £ billion to 1.5 £ billion) and the Royal Navy was about to take it's share.

The Battle was organized around a ceremonial occasion. HMS Warspite, the impressive battleship of First and Second World Wars, was about to be delivered to Greenwich as a museum ship. Around this event the Royal Navy organized a number of other headline grabbing events. First, a flight of three new EE Canberra bombers, launched from HMS Victorious operating in Canadian waters made an overflight of HMS Warspite as it was docked in Greenwich. EE Canberra was really at protype stage and ten years later it surfaced that the propaganda flight was carried at great personal risks for the pilots. However, it succeeded in displaying that RN had a modern jet bomber apparently in operational service while RAF had not.

On board HMS Warspite in addition to museal values the visitors were treated with colour films about new Royal Navy equipment and concepts for the future. Although "breach of secrecy" was damned in more traditional circles it was widely thought that only by displaying itself as the high technology force could RN beat the RAF.

The films displayed modern threats and how the RN planned to deal with them. In one of the most impressive scenes a wartime RNAS base was treated a mock "atomic attack" with conventional explosives deployed in a gigantic scale. The airplanes were swept away by pressure wave and looked clearly damaged like the airplane hangars. Naturally cheerful FAA ground crew came to repair the damage. As a clear comparison an "atomic attack" on a Royal Navy carrier task force was demonstrated. The impressive sequence, still actively viewed on YouTube, was made by deploying four actual ships very close to a barge housing a very large quantity of surplus explosives.

Two "old" warships were used to demonstrate the vulnerability of old designs to new challenges. These ships were HMS Furious, the 1916 aircraft carrier, and HMS Jervis, a 1939 J-class destroyer. After the initial blast both ships were displayed suffering fires on board and debris everywhere. For display effects the Furious had had some surplus aircraft on board. These effects were compared to two "new" ships, HMS Illustrious complete with new mock-up tower structure and her aircraft complement naturally residing inside her, and HMS Penn, modified as a mock up for planned frigate conversions with new sleek and low superstructure. The damages were very minor and the automatic decontamination gear was also displayed.

Other modern marvels demonstrated were use of helicopters to bring in Royal Marine commandos, landing craft and helicopters used for floods rescue during 1947 Thames floods and perhaps most intriguingly the use of "electric brains" in combat. The "electric brains" referred to electronic equipment in test use. Two pieces of equipment were particularly impressive. The first was TARDIS, size of a police telephone booth. TARDIS, being naturally an acronym, meant Tactical Aid for Reconnaissance, Direction, Investigation and Strikes. In practice this was a system which enabled transfer of various tactical plot pictures via television. The other was old system dating from Second World War, the acoustic torpedo seeking the new evasive submarine targets. What was portrayed as new "Biter" ASW torpedo in film was actually wartime German "Zaunkönig" torpedo as the "Biter" was yet at design stage, but the display was impressive, especially when the two devices were used in tandem. Displays of heroic British scientists experimenting with laboratory devices followed. The anonymous scientist, "Dr Who", was displayed to be an equally important man to the new Royal Navy as the heroic Commandos, witty sailors and calm officers. The message was clear: Royal Navy was a futuristic, high technology force ready to answer to any challenge.

Overall, RN had taken initiative in public relations battle and this was to be seen when the decisions about how to rearm Britain were made.
 
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Note: as during this period the crucial decisions having decades of importance are made, this part 7 will continue in additional posts...

7. Labour rearms - the British Korean War build-up
of 1950

The Korean conflict shook the Western world and started a gargantuous military build-up. For Britain, the rearming was particularly painful due to her vulnerable economic status. Furthermore, the policymakers of the era were strongly influenced by coming of the Second World War. It seemed that a world war would be merely some years away. The year of maximum danger, which previously had been thought to be in 1957, would already arrive in 1954.

7.1. The NATO dimension

Britain was not alone in this new era. The new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with USA as it's back bone, was the framework under which largest part of British defence efforts were being made. The strategic concept of NATO was to destroy by strategic offensive the will and capabilities of USSR and her satellities to wage war.

Royal Navy's primary task in this conflict would be to secure the sea lines of communications against Soviet efforts to cut them. As the leadership of Royal Navy saw it, the most effective way to secure sea lines would be vigorous attacks on the source of the offensive, ie. ports. The threat of fast submarines simply could not be contained otherwise, as the new type of escorts required could not be purchased in large enough numbers.

One way devised both to diminish the escort shortage and to create room for new construction was the active British Military Assistance Program. Under it's auspices the transfer of older British warships to allied navies was accelerated. An intended consequence was that the allied navies were now introduced to British tactics, techniques and equipment which would hopefully show up in future purchases.

Additionally, Royal Navy stressed the importance of carriers as offensive bases. The air attacks on United Kingdom would be of vast more massive scale than during the Second World War. With the offensive power based on carriers, the RAF and allied air forces operating in United Kingdom could concentrate upon air defense of United Kingdom. Lack of offensive forces in UK would also reduce the amount of air attacks to be expected against UK. Particularly during the initial part of the operations the carrier task forces could direct their efforts to a theater mostly in need.

(the OTL document is available in: )

http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500328d.pdf


7.2. The atomic dimension

The primary military program of the United Kingdom was the development of British nuclear weapons by AWRE. The staff plans of the era stated requirement of a very large number (800) of fairly small yield atomic bombs (Blue Danube, of 10-12kT yield) as the so called "Super", or hydrogen bomb, was not yet in sight. The Air Ministry had placed an operational requirement to which prototypes of no less than four bombers (Sperrin, Valiant, Victor and Vulcan) were already placed. The bomber prototypes were scheduled to fly in 1951-1952 for operational introduction in 1955-1957. However, the bomb itself was scheduled to be tested in 1952 and introduced in 1953 and the year of maximum danger was to be in 1954.

There were also other problems with the atomic bomb scenarios. The Korean War had displayed that there was yet a problem of strategic surprises and the nuclear weapons of the era required an elaborate assembly scheme, they were not yet "push-button weapons" ready from the first moment. Thus the bomber bases would have to be well protected. In view of possible Soviet rocket development based on V-2's and alarming reports of new jet bombers it might well be that British nuclear bombers could be crippled at their bases.

The Royal Navy had some answers to these problems. It had developed a carrier based bomber, EE Canberra, which could be introduced in 1951-1952 to give a robust operational capability in 1953 when the Blue Danube weapons would arrive. Canberras taking off with RATO and assisted by aerial refuelling could reach strategic targets deep inside Soviet Union. Their mobile bases would be far less threatened than fixed bases of RAF. Furthermore, the nuclear elements could be either stored on board the carriers or could be flown in very quickly by special transportation scheme in similar way to what USN planned to do at the time.

While Royal Navy lobbying did not mean the end of RAF's V-bomber force it meant a shift of priorities. Instead of atomic bombs being under sole RAF control the Royal Navy would be trusted with a significant portion of British atomic firepower.
 
7.3. Tools of destruction - Attack carriers

The chief beneficiaries of RN's well-executed lobbying operations were it's new Malta-class carriers which were to be constructed primarily as means of delivering atomic strikes upon Soviet Union. The four large carriers (HMS Malta, HMS New Zealand, HMS Gibraltar, HMS Africa), which had been consructed in rather leisure fashion after the war, were being given over-the-top priority in new construction plans to give Britain an operational nuclear deterrent by 1 April 1954. The ships were to incorporate new instruments of steam catapults and angled flight deck, special storage for nuclear weapons and reinforced decks for operating the new EE Canberra atomic bomber.

7.4. Measures of coercion - General purpose carriers

For general purpose carriers the four Audacious-class units were to be completed within five years, coming into service between 1953-1955. HMS Audacious, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Eagle and HMS Furious were larger than any aircraft carriers in service but significantly smaller than Malta-class ships.

The surge of new commissionings was to be around "year of maximum danger" and would permit rapid decommissioning of the remaining wartime fleet carriers (HMS Indefatigable, HMS Implacable, HMS Victorious) and some of the light carriers if the international situation would easen up.

As for the light carriers, the two remaining Majestic-class carrier hulks (HMS Leviathan, HMS Hercules) were to remain in reserve to be completed in mobilization. Of the Colossus-class carriers the all remaining ships (HMS Glory, HMS Ocean, HMS Perseus, HMS Pioneer, HMS Triumph) would remain in service as active carriers, training carriers or trial ships to be fully operational in case of mobilization in the year of maximum danger. The four Centaur-class hulks were to remain in reserve for possible construction.

7.5. Fast, hard hitting spearheads - Surface warfare forces


All seven Crown Colony -class cruisers would remain in service until year of maximum danger with modernization planned for possible new guided weapons. New cruiser type would be studied but not begun with until completion of strike and general purpose carriers.

The eight Darings would be commissioned in 1952-1953. The eight Battle-class destroyers would be all commissioned compared to situation in which 4 of them were in reserves.
 
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Riain

Banned
I read an academic article a couple of times where the view was that the RN chose defence as opposed to deterrence against the Soviet sub threat in about 1948-9 and so built up ASW escort forces instead of carrier and amphibious forces for attacks on the sub bases. By the time the Cold War settled down and the RN decided that carriers and 'phibs were the most useful ships for the RNs roles Suez had been lost and Britian pulled her head in.

Sigh!!
 
7.6. Means of protection - Escort forces

The largest quantity of ships in RN build-up plans were the new escorts. The proposed forces would need a very large amount of escorts for protection and despite the American industrial help and the plans to strike against the U-boat, no Soviet submarine, threat at source the demands for escort forces would be considerable.

Naturally, the Conservative opposition raised hell on decision to dismantle with vast majority of wartime escort forces right after the war, but against new threats of jet aircraft and fast submarines the wartime escorts would had been grossly inadequate.

The 36 Black Swan -class sloops would be kept as mobilization reserve (with exception of 12 serving already in colonial duties). These would form the backbone of local escort forces and would be given limited modernization in case of mobilization.

The sixty C, W and Z -class destroyers available would be modified in three batches to ensure sufficient number of combatants to remain available. The conversion, so-called Type 15 frigate, would ensure that on the year of maximum danger the carrier forces would have sufficient escorts. Test conversion of some of the ships had already been begun.

Twenty remaining O, P and R class destroyers in reserve status would be given less ambitious Type 16 frigate conversion starting from 1953. The new construction escorts would include several types of rather specified roles. The construction plan included eight Type 41 Salisbury fighter direction frigates, eight Type 61 Leopard anti-aircraft frigates, twelve Type 12 Whitby fast ASW frigates and finally grand total of 96 Type 14 Blackwood class 2nd rate ASW frigates. The priority was to be with higher quality Type 41 / 61 / 12 frigates with Type 14's being prepared mainly to be started in 1953-1954. Type 14's would be prepared for greatest possible use of mass production techniques pioneered during Second World War.

All this would suffice to meet British commitment to NATO's Medium Term Plan, which would demand a total of 32 destroyer escorts (Type 16's and Type 12's), 144 lesser escorts (32 Black Swan, 16 Type 41/61, 96 Type 14).

7.7. The submarines

The Royal Navy - like the USN - had a rather large number of well-constructed Second World War submarines which were at hand for modernization. Eight T-class submarines were already scheduled to be given "Super-T" conversion, essentially a British GUPPY conversion. After completion the other T's were to be similarly treated. The sixteen A's were to be given similar extensive conversion but the S-class would be treated just with introduction of snorts and installation of modern fire-control equipment in mobilization phase. The new submarines - planned new P class - would have to wait until 1954.

As a note: all the numbers mentioned are planning numbers which will face some quite tough choices after certain Mr. W is back
 
In Fantastique's epic where France retreats to North Africa the RN found itself under less pressure and with more time/resources to plan ahead.

As a result the first two post-WWII fleet carriers, comparable to the USN Coral Sea, were entering service in 1945. If the British already have a proven carrier-class in service when WWII ends they'll surely keep it...and the destroyers and cruisers to serve as escorts.
 
In Fantastique's epic where France retreats to North Africa the RN found itself under less pressure and with more time/resources to plan ahead.

As a result the first two post-WWII fleet carriers, comparable to the USN Coral Sea, were entering service in 1945. If the British already have a proven carrier-class in service when WWII ends they'll surely keep it...and the destroyers and cruisers to serve as escorts.

And if Canada and/or Australia can be convinced to buy a carrier each...
 
Original scenario and a good one too, if the UK government had allowed this to proceed after the war. Sadly the anti millitary sentiments were strong in the post war politics and lots of efforts were therefore doomed from the beginning.

My idea of a reformed Royal Navy post WW2 is a bit smaller than the scenario suggests, mainly bound to economical and technical restrictions, such as yard capacity and so on.

My idea of a postwar Royal Navy would see something like the following:
Carriers:
- Malta class CVB continued, but only 2 ships ordered.
- Audacious class continued, but again only 2 vessels ordered.
- Illustrious class decommissioned, save HMS Victorious for experimental purposes.
- Indifatigable class decommissioned
- HMS Furious and HMS Argus decommissioned
- New CVL's completed as historical, but offered to friendly nations for hard cash. Some maintained in subsidiary roles (such as commando and helicopter roles.)
- CVE's decommissioned and sold to either friendly nations, or to commercial firms.

Surfaceships:
- All Battleships decommissioned and most either scrapped, or preserved as monuments. (HMS Warspite and HMS King George V most likely)
- HMS Vanguard canceled, while building.
- All guncruisers of prewar period decommissioned. Some sold to Dominions, some preserved as monuments.
- All wartime construction cruisers reduced to limmited support roles, such as landattack and experimental purposes. Some may be sold to Dominions and friendly nations.
- All prewar period DD's and DE's decommissioned, some preserved as monuments, some sold to friendly nations.
- All Wartime period construction'of Emergency Programm, reconstructed as fast ASW ships and Fast escorts. (stopgab for new construction.)
- All Wartime built DE's simmilarly reconstructed as fast escorts.
- All Battle and Daring Class DD's continued and modernized, if necessary.
- Most of the larger specialized ASW escorts of wartime construction maintained and addapted for modern warfare. Corvettes decommissioned. Some of both can be sold to friendly nations and allie, as well as commercial firms. (Whaling industry and Offshore companies.)
- All small craft to be reduced in numbers and focus on minesweeping mainly.
- Most submarines decommissioned and only A and T classes modernized, whenever possible, awaiting newer construction. Some will be sold to friendly nations. Some preserved as monuments.

Conclusion is that the most personel intenseve units will be disposed off (mainly the bigger gun carriers, such as cruisers and battleships.) The Fleet will center around the four newly constructed large carriers, with a few smaller ones serving in subsidiary roles. Cruisers maintained in the fleet will be used as trainingships mainly, as well as supportships during amphibious operations, like in Korea. Escorts will be as modern as possible, considering the potential threath of the USSR's vast submarine ambitions.
 
This really is quite interesting. However, with Britain economic state in 1945 i don't see the Malta Class carriers being completed, not by a long shot. A third or maybe even a forth Audacious class, well thats another story. Combined with a quick post war scrapage of battleships and the likes (i.e. solid post war planning) I can see the Royal Navy being a somewhat more potent force. In 20 or so years time the Royal Navy could easily replace its 5/6 fleet carriers with perhaps 2/3 CVA-01 class carriers in the 60's and 70's.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CVA-01
 
This really is quite interesting. However, with Britain economic state in 1945 i don't see the Malta Class carriers being completed, not by a long shot. A third or maybe even a forth Audacious class, well thats another story.

One should note, at least for part 7, that these are planning figures and the reality will be something else. However, there's large economic measures inflicted, many with advantage of hindsightinium, I agree.

- Scrapping of reserve ships soaking money and manpower
- Nuclear (or, at this stage, atomic) role of RN -> much of the money which in OTL was given to RAF goes to RN
- No Centaur-class carriers, four of which were completed in OTL
- No ambition of Illustrious-class refits
- No post-war Minotaur construction (at least yet)
- Much smaller cruiser force than OTL (7 versus OTL 1950 figure of ca. 20)
- No commitment to interim propellor type FAA aircraft

In OTL the RN had about 20 carriers in early 1950's, quite a fewer number were in commission. In OTL, the 1950's in carrier construction resources were spent in merry go round of reconstructing old ships...
 
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Perhpas a good start to this TL would be one where the Concervatives win the 1945. They would undoubtably be a lot more sympathetic to the armed forces, although with them I can see HMS Vanguard and the remaining George V's staying in commision as a prestige thing. The hard part however it getting the Torys elected.

Russell
 
Perhpas a good start to this TL would be one where the Concervatives win the 1945. They would undoubtably be a lot more sympathetic to the armed forces, although with them I can see HMS Vanguard and the remaining George V's staying in commision as a prestige thing. The hard part however it getting the Torys elected.

I'm not planning to meddle with British internal politics, but considering that during the Labor government of 1945-1951 military spending at it lowest was, as per cent of GDP was 7.6% (an astronomical amount compared to any other peacetime expenditures, barring 1938-1939 procurement surge and not ever exceeded after 1957) I'm not at all sure that a Conservative goverment would, or even more importantly, could act very differently.
 
I'm not planning to meddle with British internal politics, but considering that during the Labor government of 1945-1951 military spending at it lowest was, as per cent of GDP was 7.6% (an astronomical amount compared to any other peacetime expenditures, barring 1938-1939 procurement surge and not ever exceeded after 1957) I'm not at all sure that a Conservative goverment would, or even more importantly, could act very differently.

Fair enough. Still good work!
 
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