Is Paris Burning?
- Thread starter Amerigo Vespucci
- Start date
St.-Cyr was well known in France and abroad as the site of the École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr, a highly regarded military academy founded by Napoleon in 1802. Following the surrender of France in June 1940, the academy laid dormant for four years, its buildings gathering dust and weeds. The school's teachers had moved to Vichy, then on to Free French-held Algeria, where they continued to instruct. Some of the men of the Second Armored Division had been students or teachers at the academy prior to its move south. Eight days previously, German soldiers had occupied the grounds of the school, transforming it into a strongpoint for the defense of Paris, part of the 60-mile-long line that Choltitz had ordered built. On the 20th, the Allies had bombed the town, part of the overall plan to cut road and rail links around Paris in preparation for its encirclement. Several of the 150-year-old buildings were damaged, but few Germans had been killed. As befitting its position on one of the direct roads leading to Paris, St.-Cyr was ably defended by a company of 17 heavy tanks (Panthers and Tigers) eight 88mm guns redeployed from the air defenses of Paris, and several companies of infantry, who had entrenched themselves in the village and in the stone-walled buildings of the school.
Leclerc's French Second Armored Division had its roots in the men who fought under Leclerc in Africa in 1941. In 1943, after the fall of North Africa, the division was reorganized along American lines and reformed as a light armored division. At the time of the opening of the Battle of St.-Cyr, the division boasted nearly 15,000 men, and despite losses incurred in Operation Cobra — the breakout from Normandy — boasted 197 tanks, 474 halftracks, 44 howitzers, and approximately 14,000 men. This was down from its original strength of 54 105mm howitzers, 263 medium tanks, and 501 half-tracks when it had embarked in Southampton in late July. The division's total strength was nearly as great as that of the entire German line defending Paris in the south. Choltitz could only bring to bear fewer than 20,000 men, 234 tanks, 378 artillery pieces (most were 88mm guns redeployed from Paris), and various other pieces of equipment. Countering the theoretical German numerical superiority was the fact that the Germans were forced to defend a 60-mile front. On their side, however, was the fact that Leclerc's division was badly strung out due to its rapid advance. Its men were exhausted after moving for more than 16 consecutive hours, and many of its vehicles had less than half a tank of gasoline remaining. Thus, when contact was made, Leclerc could only bring to bear a single tank battalion with no artillery support at first.
The Germans in St.-Cyr were astonished when the French arrived. Though reliable communications had been restored to the Hotel Meurice — radio signals had been prone to being jammed by the Allies — their intelligence had given them no forewarning about the Allied advance. Thus, the initial attack was a surprise, and the French nearly carried the defensive line in front of the town despite failing to mass their force. Several Shermans roamed through the streets of St.-Cyr, sowing confusion among the German defenders, and slowing the Nazi reaction to the attack. The shock and surprise nearly swept the Germans away. But the soldiers defending the town were veterans, and recovered quickly from their initial surprise in the darkness of the evening. The tanks that had broken through the line were hunted down by a couple of Tigers detached for that purpose, assisted by Panzerfaust-wielding infantry. Meanwhile, at the front, the gunners of the 88mm cannon had recovered from their surprise and fought back against the advancing French. Though the close range at first was to the French advantage, they hadn't had time to adequately deploy infantry cover, and German infantry soon surrounded and knocked out the halftracks and tanks that were threatening the line directly. By 11 p.m., the fight devolved into a long-range gunnery battle in the pitch darkness, neither side gaining an advantage. Leclerc arrived on the scene, and ordered a flanking maneuver around the village on both sides. This was performed quickly, and with skill, as by now, a second battalion had arrived and the division's artillery had begun shelling the town.
Leclerc's French Second Armored Division had its roots in the men who fought under Leclerc in Africa in 1941. In 1943, after the fall of North Africa, the division was reorganized along American lines and reformed as a light armored division. At the time of the opening of the Battle of St.-Cyr, the division boasted nearly 15,000 men, and despite losses incurred in Operation Cobra — the breakout from Normandy — boasted 197 tanks, 474 halftracks, 44 howitzers, and approximately 14,000 men. This was down from its original strength of 54 105mm howitzers, 263 medium tanks, and 501 half-tracks when it had embarked in Southampton in late July. The division's total strength was nearly as great as that of the entire German line defending Paris in the south. Choltitz could only bring to bear fewer than 20,000 men, 234 tanks, 378 artillery pieces (most were 88mm guns redeployed from Paris), and various other pieces of equipment. Countering the theoretical German numerical superiority was the fact that the Germans were forced to defend a 60-mile front. On their side, however, was the fact that Leclerc's division was badly strung out due to its rapid advance. Its men were exhausted after moving for more than 16 consecutive hours, and many of its vehicles had less than half a tank of gasoline remaining. Thus, when contact was made, Leclerc could only bring to bear a single tank battalion with no artillery support at first.
The Germans in St.-Cyr were astonished when the French arrived. Though reliable communications had been restored to the Hotel Meurice — radio signals had been prone to being jammed by the Allies — their intelligence had given them no forewarning about the Allied advance. Thus, the initial attack was a surprise, and the French nearly carried the defensive line in front of the town despite failing to mass their force. Several Shermans roamed through the streets of St.-Cyr, sowing confusion among the German defenders, and slowing the Nazi reaction to the attack. The shock and surprise nearly swept the Germans away. But the soldiers defending the town were veterans, and recovered quickly from their initial surprise in the darkness of the evening. The tanks that had broken through the line were hunted down by a couple of Tigers detached for that purpose, assisted by Panzerfaust-wielding infantry. Meanwhile, at the front, the gunners of the 88mm cannon had recovered from their surprise and fought back against the advancing French. Though the close range at first was to the French advantage, they hadn't had time to adequately deploy infantry cover, and German infantry soon surrounded and knocked out the halftracks and tanks that were threatening the line directly. By 11 p.m., the fight devolved into a long-range gunnery battle in the pitch darkness, neither side gaining an advantage. Leclerc arrived on the scene, and ordered a flanking maneuver around the village on both sides. This was performed quickly, and with skill, as by now, a second battalion had arrived and the division's artillery had begun shelling the town.
whatisinaname
Donor
Another excellent part
I have a nit pick…
It is unlikely that a garrison post would receive Panzer 4 or 5’s, I have done a little research and I have found that the Paris garrison was equipped with old French tanks (dating from 1940 etc)
And an idea !!
The retreating Germans from the pocket retreated though Paris (being one of main transport hubs), in OTL Dietrich von Choltitz did not have access to these troops, but I don’t know what troops did pass through Paris.
Prob parts of 5th Panzer and 7th Army maybe other units as well.
I have a nit pick…
It is unlikely that a garrison post would receive Panzer 4 or 5’s, I have done a little research and I have found that the Paris garrison was equipped with old French tanks (dating from 1940 etc)
And an idea !!
The retreating Germans from the pocket retreated though Paris (being one of main transport hubs), in OTL Dietrich von Choltitz did not have access to these troops, but I don’t know what troops did pass through Paris.
Prob parts of 5th Panzer and 7th Army maybe other units as well.
There were indeed some older French tanks, but there were far more Panzers. The tank that crops up most frequently in accounts of the fighting in Paris is the Panzer V (Panther). The SS contingent in the city had a few Tigers as well, though those were rarer even than the obsolete French tanks.
I am bad, got that wrong about the German tanks, woops
That's okay! I appreciate the comments.
The German commander, within 20 minutes of the first attack, began screaming to Choltitz for help on the recently-laid telephone system that had replaced the now-destroyed civilian system barely 12 hours earlier. Choltitz, roused from slumber, feared that the assault was only the first portion of a larger Allied assault. Though intelligence estimates forwarded to him from Field Marshal Model had indicated the Allies were planning to encircle the city, he did not entirely trust those estimates. After all, the same intelligence officers had failed to detect the Allied invasion of Normandy, instead guessing that it would take place at the Pas de Calais. Because of this disbelief, he only ordered the reserves along the western portion of the defensive line to be put into the fight. Those along the eastern portion of the line would be warned to expect a potential attack in that sector as well. These included soldiers from the 158th Reserve Division, deployed at Orly Airfield. This was the largest single collection of German soldiers along the entire line, and although they lacked heavy armor, their numbers gave them a striking power unmatched among the German forces spread thin along the defensive line. Due to Choltitz's order, however, they remained in place as the defenders of St.-Cyr fought desperately, were outflanked, and surrounded.
Leclerc knew that time was rapidly running out and that despite his effort to involve the division in combat, representatives from V Corps were likely on their way to arrest him and relieve him of command. Any delays, even minor ones, could be fatal to his plan of liberating Paris before the Germans could destroy it further or the Allies fully bypass it. He ordered that the reconnaissance battalion speed onward past St.-Cyr on the road through Versailles to the loop in the Seine west of Fort d'Issy. That would take the division into the southern suburbs of Paris, and hopefully bring enough success to prod the army into giving him reinforcements enough to liberate the city entirely, resistance or not. Leclerc might have rested easier had he known that even then, at midnight on the morning of the 24th, the Allied command was still unsure about what to do as a response to his action. Leclerc's ignoring of orders had provoked a crisis of confidence among the Allied leadership. Bradley and Eisenhower both favored taking a hard line on the rogue commander, but Patton and Montgomery — united in one rare instance — favored giving Leclerc the support he needed to liberate the city. Eisenhower desperately wanted to consult with Churchill and Roosevelt, as this was as much of a political issue as a strategic one, but time was not on his side. With the arguments of both sides resonating in his mind, he ordered a compromise. If Leclerc could enter Paris proper, he would be given all the reinforcements needed to liberate the city immediately. If not, he would be arrested for disobeying orders, the Second Armored withdrawn from the city, and the original Allied plan continued. There would be no throwing good money after bad, Eisenhower assured the frustrated Bradley. If Leclerc were successful in taking Paris alone, he would have merely accelerated the plans of the Allied advance, not taken anything away. And if not, yes, the plight of the Parisians was terrific, but there was simply no getting around the cost it would take to liberate the city without a defense-weakening siege first. It was not a plan he enjoyed contemplating — particularly not with the consequences it entailed for the city's civilians — but it was simply the best of a bad set of options right then.
In Paris, Choltitz, too, was debating the best choice from among a series of bad options. By midnight, it had been more than two hours since the initial contact was made at St.-Cyr. Now, contact had been lost with that bastion — it was either cut off or fallen — and firing could be heard in Versailles, just outside the Paris city limits. The limited sector reinforcements were moving into blocking positions along the Versailles roads, and the tanks in the area already had good fields of fire, but would it be enough? He didn't think so. Glancing at the map, he again examined the forces along the eastern portion of the defensive line. There had been no contact, no firing at all along any portion of the line other than around St.-Cyr. Could he risk it? He would have to. He had already spread himself thin in the face of a numerically superior enemy — he now regretted ordering the defense of such a long line — and now he feared he was making the situation worse by preparing to devote his largest unengaged force to the one attack that had so far shown itself. If there was another, as yet undeveloped attack waiting to fall on the eastern portion of his line, moving his reserve out of position would be fatal. But he had no choice. There was no indication of such an attack developing, and he gave the order for the soldiers of the 158th Reserve Division to begin moving west from Orly. Few trucks were available, and local vehicles would have to be commandeered. That brought another question. If moving the 158th was the right move, would they even arrive in time? It was now 12:30 a.m. on the morning of the 24th.
whatisinaname
Donor
Things are hotting up, "Karl" should arrive soon, that should livern things up a bit
The two panzer divisions should also start arriving after "Karl"?
The two panzer divisions should also start arriving after "Karl"?
I have to warn you that I don't go into much more than the barest outline in the afterword, and I'm sure that'll draw the most flak and opinions. But it's still two weeks off, so until then, enjoy!
***
In the dark streets of Versailles, not far from the centuries-old palace that gave the suburb its name, Colonel Von Aulock and the men of the 11th Paratrooper Regiment waited. Aulock, the overall commander of the defensive line, had rushed to the area upon hearing about the attack. Now, in Versailles, a position he had thought safely in the rear was about to come under direct attack. He hurriedly ordered the few 88mm guns available to be emplaced in the best positions available to cover the road from the southwest. Unfortunately, most of the city's 88mm guns had been spread along the entire 60-mile length of the defensive line, just as the soldiers had been. Only four 88s were in Versailles, and they were only present because the trucks transporting them to the line had broken down. At 12:30 a.m., Aulock's force engaged the reconnaissance battalion of the French Second Armored. Several French light tanks and half-tracks were destroyed, left burning in the street as the unit scattered. A running gun battle resulted as the French tried to simply filter through the winding streets of Versailles and drive past the Germans to reach Paris. Several companies did successfully escape the streets and reach the wooded parks east of town, but they were scattered and disorganized in the process. Furthermore, nearly 40 percent of the battalion didn't manage to escape the town, and as at St.-Cyr, became separated and defeated in detail by German infantry and tanks. This did have one favorable outcome for the French force — when the first of the division's main body of tanks reached Versailles at 2 a.m., the German defenders were themselves distracted by the reconnaissance unit's actions east of town.
Despite the continued fighting at St.-Cyr, which had now been encircled by the division, Leclerc's force managed to liberate the palace of Versailles at 2:45 a.m. despite losing several tanks and halftracks to Aulock. The losses didn't prevent the French from driving Aulock's force from the town of Versailles, either. Despite a 2.5:1 kill ratio for his tanks, he was forced to retreat to the north of the town shortly after 3:00 a.m. This retreat left Leclerc free to advance to the Boulogne loop of the Seine, which lies to the west of Paris proper. The reconnaissance battalion reached the suburb of Sevres and the banks of the Seine at 3:30 a.m. There, however, they were stymied by the fact that the Germans had blown the bridges across the river. Thus, the leading elements of the division were unable to advance into Boulogne-Billancourt, just to the east. Leclerc was buoyed by the fact that the Loire had been reached. At 4 a.m., he received further good news when word was received that the last German holdouts in St.-Cyr had surrendered. Outnumbered, running low on ammunition, and under fire from all sides, they had nevertheless extracted a surprisingly heavy toll on the French, and it wasn't until Leclerc's massed divisional artillery began to blast them from the stone-walled buildings of the military academy that they lost hope and surrendered. Several valuable hours had been lost to digging them out, but Leclerc hoped that they would not be in vain. He ordered the reconnaissance battalion to halt at Sevres until the strung-out division could be re-armed, re-fueled, rested a bit, and massed for the entry into Paris proper, something he hoped would take place that afternoon.
By 6 a.m. — sunrise — the reconnaissance battalion began to come under increasing fire from the west, where Choltitz had ordered elements of the 165th Division and portions of the city garrison to move south to confront the French before they could advance further. The Germans, dispirited after days of fighting hidden partisans, and believing the fall of the city to be had hand, made a few ineffectual attacks before halting their brief counterattack. Many of the ordinary German soldiers in the city, their commander's desire to fight on notwithstanding, had been demoralized by the rapid German retreat across France, the massive partisan uprising, and the increasing ration shortages caused by Allied bombardment. The approach of the French division was thus seen as the last straw, a chance to surrender and end the war quickly. When Choltitz received word of the desultory action at Sevres, he departed the Hotel Meurice for the neighborhood itself, where he vowed to take direct control of the action and thus boost morale directly. Arriving before 7 a.m., he used his seemingly inexhaustible store of energy rushing all along the hasty line, dodging occasional shots from the French reconnaissance soldiers who were at times just a few blocks away. With the German left anchored on the Seine, Choltitz organized a defensive position that the French could not budge until more soldiers arrived. He vowed that they would not get the chance.
whatisinaname
Donor
Another excellent part
The only other units that I have found that you could use is the Panzer brigades, but these brigades are noy able to be deployed to the fronmt unit after 11 Sept!
The only other units that I have found that you could use is the Panzer brigades, but these brigades are noy able to be deployed to the fronmt unit after 11 Sept!
Not a problem. As I said, it's already been written. I'm simply releasing one section a day. There's just under two weeks' worth left now.
Just after 9 a.m., 12 hours after the attack had begun and fully nine hours after Choltitz had given orders for its movement, the elements of the 158th division arrived in position opposite the vulnerable French left flank. From Velizy, south of Versailles, they attacked directly into the unsuspecting French. As Leclerc gave orders for his soldiers to redeploy and face the unexpected threat, which threatened to cut his lines of communication to Sevres, Von Aulock's force, having rallied after being driven from Versailles, counterattacked from Bougival, to the north of Versailles. Though Aulock was acting under no orders other than his own — having lost communication with Choltitz in the retreat from Versailles, his timely action forced Leclerc to address an attack that threatened to cut his overextended division in two. In many ways, Leclerc's success in breaking through the German line was his downfall. Denied reinforcements by a reluctant Allied command, and forced into an attack along a single line, Leclerc was thus vulnerable to counterattack, particularly given that his tired soldiers had been moving for over 30 consecutive hours and fighting for nearly half that time. His tanks and halftracks had not been given time to adequately refuel or rearm, and many were running low on both fuel and ammunition.
Faced with attacks on three sides, Leclerc gave the order for his division to pull back to St.-Cyr to regroup. They could refuel, rest, and rearm there, he knew, then punch through the remaining German resistance with no problem. The Germans were outgunned, he knew, and only the fact that he had been forced to rush into combat gave them the advantage. Despite his hopes, Leclerc would never get the chance. At 3 p.m., as he set up his headquarters in St.-Cyr, he was arrested by officers from V Corps. The second-in-command of the division took over, and was given orders to pull the division further away from the city, expressly written by General Eisenhower. He did so, and Leclerc's foray came to an end. Had he been in position to continue the fight, there seems little doubt that Choltitz's forces would have been able to put up little resistance. Most of their heavy tanks had been destroyed, and once the Second Armored Division was resupplied and rested, it would have made easy meat of the demoralized Germans. This supposes, of course, that Leclerc would have been operating under orders and thus able to request reinforcements from Bradley and Eisenhower. Of course, this was not the case, and the withdrawal of the Second Armored on the afternoon of the 24th gave the German defenders of the city an enormous morale boost. They had seen themselves, outgunned and potentially outnumbered, turn back a foe superior to themselves. To a group of men who had been retreating since Normandy, it was an enormous relief. Choltitz's efforts notwithstanding, until the French withdrawal, many German soldiers had been contemplating surrender en masse as so many of their brethren did outside of Paris.
In the wake of the abortive attack on Paris, the French Second Armored Division was sent north to assist in Montgomery's drive on the Channel ports while Patton and Bradley continued to liberate France. Leclerc himself was never punished for disobeying orders — political considerations in the wake of the death of DeGaulle mandated that the situation be dealt with kid gloves. Leclerc was reassigned to southern France, where he supervised the French drive into northern Italy, and after the war, settled into a quiet retirement in the same region.
Faced with attacks on three sides, Leclerc gave the order for his division to pull back to St.-Cyr to regroup. They could refuel, rest, and rearm there, he knew, then punch through the remaining German resistance with no problem. The Germans were outgunned, he knew, and only the fact that he had been forced to rush into combat gave them the advantage. Despite his hopes, Leclerc would never get the chance. At 3 p.m., as he set up his headquarters in St.-Cyr, he was arrested by officers from V Corps. The second-in-command of the division took over, and was given orders to pull the division further away from the city, expressly written by General Eisenhower. He did so, and Leclerc's foray came to an end. Had he been in position to continue the fight, there seems little doubt that Choltitz's forces would have been able to put up little resistance. Most of their heavy tanks had been destroyed, and once the Second Armored Division was resupplied and rested, it would have made easy meat of the demoralized Germans. This supposes, of course, that Leclerc would have been operating under orders and thus able to request reinforcements from Bradley and Eisenhower. Of course, this was not the case, and the withdrawal of the Second Armored on the afternoon of the 24th gave the German defenders of the city an enormous morale boost. They had seen themselves, outgunned and potentially outnumbered, turn back a foe superior to themselves. To a group of men who had been retreating since Normandy, it was an enormous relief. Choltitz's efforts notwithstanding, until the French withdrawal, many German soldiers had been contemplating surrender en masse as so many of their brethren did outside of Paris.
In the wake of the abortive attack on Paris, the French Second Armored Division was sent north to assist in Montgomery's drive on the Channel ports while Patton and Bradley continued to liberate France. Leclerc himself was never punished for disobeying orders — political considerations in the wake of the death of DeGaulle mandated that the situation be dealt with kid gloves. Leclerc was reassigned to southern France, where he supervised the French drive into northern Italy, and after the war, settled into a quiet retirement in the same region.
Hendryk
Banned
Depending on the sort of political developments you have in mind for post-war France, Leclerc may play a further role yet. I'm fairly sure he would have in OTL, had he not died in that plane crash in 1947.
You're probably right, but I don't know enough about the man to make any sort of educated guess, which is why I left him here. In postwar France, he could be made out to be the one true "hero" for trying to liberate France despite orders ... even though he was unsuccessful, at least he tried.
Paris isn't likely to come out of this timeline without serious damage. Leclerc being the man who failed to liberate the city before much of it was flattened isn't going to endear him much to the French public, IMO.
Ah, but at least he tried. And going against orders to do so gives him a bit more rue cred than he'd otherwise have.
In Paris, Leclerc's failure to liberate the city meant the fighting in the streets continued. Colonel Rol's partisans and the men and women manning Paris barricades benefited immensely from the break in fighting afforded by Choltitz's need to face Leclerc. Rol managed to restore effective communications with his men across the city via specialty telephone lines, such as those maintained by the department of public works, and ensured the distribution of Molotov cocktails and medical supplies to barricades across the city. Furthermore, the distraction of most of the German troops in Paris allowed partisans to retake several public buildings that had been recaptured by the Germans. As the firing drew closer on the morning of the 24th, many Parisians thought their hour of liberation was at hand and were overjoyed. Many prepared liberation meals, readied a stored-away bottle of wine, or generally prepared for what they assumed would be the largest party of their lives. It didn't arrive. Most Parisians in the city had little idea of what was actually going on in Sevres, and when the firing died off as Leclerc pulled back, many assumed that it was because the Germans had surrendered. The truth was revealed when the Germans returned to their positions guarding Choltitz's "central bastion." Those German soldiers who had remained to guard the perimeter were glad to see their comrades return, not least because they were afraid the partisans, buoyed by the spirit of liberation, would overwhelm them and begin a slaughter of the men who had begun to demolish the city.
In reality, Colonel Rol could not have assaulted the central bastion even with most of the Germans gone. The previous days' fighting had virtually exhausted his ammunition and weapon supply. In many places, Parisians were reduced to wielding gardening implements as they "guarded" their neighborhood barricade. Rol's continued pleas for air supply yielded no fruit as long as Leclerc still had a chance to liberate the city and Pierre Koenig in London still had a chance to avoid giving communists weapons they might later use against the Gaullists. By 6 p.m. on the evening of the 24th, however, Koenig received word of Leclerc's withdrawal and arrest. The last hope for early Allied liberation gone, he had no choice but to order the postponed weapons drop to go forward. At an airfield near the English town of Harrington, the engines of dozens of B-24 bombers of the "Carpetbagger" squadron warmed up. Since January 1943, they had been the men responsible for air dropping weapons and badly-needed supplies to resistance organizations from Norway to the Pyrenees. Now, they prepared for a maximum-effort operation, codenamed Operation Beggar, that had been first ordered by Koenig, then delayed when it had appeared that Leclerc would break into the city. As the sun began to set, the bombers roared into the air, their bomb bays loaded with 300 tons of specially packaged weapons, ammunition, radios, and medical supplies.
Due to the secrecy of the operation and in an attempt to keep the Germans from being informed about the drop, word was not radioed to Paris until 10 p.m., when the bombers were already in the air. A harried Colonel Rol was forced to quickly mobilize parties to prepare to recover the weapons, which would be dropped at points across the city. Racetracks, open plazas, and the Bois de Boulogne were all selected as the landing zones. Shortly before midnight, the citizens of Paris were jolted from their beds by the drone of aircraft engines and the sounding of air raid sirens. Fortunately for the American and British pilots of the B-24, the German 88s had long since all been deployed in their anti-tank role, and almost no flak greeted the low-flying aircraft. In the streets of Paris, many uninformed citizens sought shelter from what they feared would be another German air attack on the partisans. Since the firebombing of northeastern Paris, the average Parisian had been far less fervent in his resistance to the Germans. White parachutes blossomed in the black sky, and partisans rushed to recover the precious packages that thudded to the ground with a heavy solidity. Not all were successful in recovering the packages, of course. At the place de la Republique, SS soldiers at the nearby Prince Eugenie Barracks drove off the partisan group that had gathered in the plaza to recover that area's drop. The scene was repeated at other points where German soldiers happened to be present. At a few, the partisans managed to drive off the Germans, but this was uncommon. Of the 300 tons of supplies dropped on Paris that night, approximately 190 tons were successfully recovered by the partisans. The rest were destroyed by the Germans, or recovered by non-partisan Frenchmen. The weapons — in particular the precious bazookas — were distributed across the city to points of need. Not all the weapons went to the areas where Colonel Rol dictated, but most did, and the 25th promised to be a hot day for the German occupiers of the city.
In Rastenburg, Hitler's late night/early morning strategy session began with a focus on Paris. Upon being informed of the French division's approach to the city, Hitler asked, "Is Paris burning?" General Warlimont replied, "Yes, my fuehrer," for lack of any concrete information. Hitler again asked about the location of the Karl mortar and the 26th and 27th Panzer divisions. The mortar had not been able to move due to Allied air attack, but the two divisions continued to approach the city, and were expected to arrive early in the morning of the 26th, about the same time the mortar would reach the city. Each was slightly more than 24 hours away from Paris.
In reality, Colonel Rol could not have assaulted the central bastion even with most of the Germans gone. The previous days' fighting had virtually exhausted his ammunition and weapon supply. In many places, Parisians were reduced to wielding gardening implements as they "guarded" their neighborhood barricade. Rol's continued pleas for air supply yielded no fruit as long as Leclerc still had a chance to liberate the city and Pierre Koenig in London still had a chance to avoid giving communists weapons they might later use against the Gaullists. By 6 p.m. on the evening of the 24th, however, Koenig received word of Leclerc's withdrawal and arrest. The last hope for early Allied liberation gone, he had no choice but to order the postponed weapons drop to go forward. At an airfield near the English town of Harrington, the engines of dozens of B-24 bombers of the "Carpetbagger" squadron warmed up. Since January 1943, they had been the men responsible for air dropping weapons and badly-needed supplies to resistance organizations from Norway to the Pyrenees. Now, they prepared for a maximum-effort operation, codenamed Operation Beggar, that had been first ordered by Koenig, then delayed when it had appeared that Leclerc would break into the city. As the sun began to set, the bombers roared into the air, their bomb bays loaded with 300 tons of specially packaged weapons, ammunition, radios, and medical supplies.
Due to the secrecy of the operation and in an attempt to keep the Germans from being informed about the drop, word was not radioed to Paris until 10 p.m., when the bombers were already in the air. A harried Colonel Rol was forced to quickly mobilize parties to prepare to recover the weapons, which would be dropped at points across the city. Racetracks, open plazas, and the Bois de Boulogne were all selected as the landing zones. Shortly before midnight, the citizens of Paris were jolted from their beds by the drone of aircraft engines and the sounding of air raid sirens. Fortunately for the American and British pilots of the B-24, the German 88s had long since all been deployed in their anti-tank role, and almost no flak greeted the low-flying aircraft. In the streets of Paris, many uninformed citizens sought shelter from what they feared would be another German air attack on the partisans. Since the firebombing of northeastern Paris, the average Parisian had been far less fervent in his resistance to the Germans. White parachutes blossomed in the black sky, and partisans rushed to recover the precious packages that thudded to the ground with a heavy solidity. Not all were successful in recovering the packages, of course. At the place de la Republique, SS soldiers at the nearby Prince Eugenie Barracks drove off the partisan group that had gathered in the plaza to recover that area's drop. The scene was repeated at other points where German soldiers happened to be present. At a few, the partisans managed to drive off the Germans, but this was uncommon. Of the 300 tons of supplies dropped on Paris that night, approximately 190 tons were successfully recovered by the partisans. The rest were destroyed by the Germans, or recovered by non-partisan Frenchmen. The weapons — in particular the precious bazookas — were distributed across the city to points of need. Not all the weapons went to the areas where Colonel Rol dictated, but most did, and the 25th promised to be a hot day for the German occupiers of the city.
In Rastenburg, Hitler's late night/early morning strategy session began with a focus on Paris. Upon being informed of the French division's approach to the city, Hitler asked, "Is Paris burning?" General Warlimont replied, "Yes, my fuehrer," for lack of any concrete information. Hitler again asked about the location of the Karl mortar and the 26th and 27th Panzer divisions. The mortar had not been able to move due to Allied air attack, but the two divisions continued to approach the city, and were expected to arrive early in the morning of the 26th, about the same time the mortar would reach the city. Each was slightly more than 24 hours away from Paris.