Is Paris Burning?

Amerigo Vespucci

bm79 said:
It wasn't so much that the Luftwaffe had no stength in France, it was that it was seen as suicidal to go up in the air given total Allied air superiority. Germany never ran out of planes, it ran out of fuel and pilots. And even if an Allied pilot on CAP spotted the Stukas, they would have been flying out of Le Bourget, so there wouldn't really be any time for an intercept
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Bingo. Since they're in the air for such a limited time and because they're not hitting a target that can fight back, this (and an upcoming mission) are perfect for the Luftwaffe's attitude at this time.
 

Amerigo Vespucci

In the afternoon of the 21st, the depressed Choltitz received an ear-blistering call from Field Marshal Model. Model berated Choltitz in the strongest possible terms for failing "to maintain order in the area to which you have been assigned," and for failing to hold the Seine River crossings to allow the passage of his retreating soldiers. Model was, in actuality, merely passing on the frustration he felt when faced with a hopeless situation on the Western front and from being squeezed from behind by Hitler, whose orders, issued hourly, sometimes countermanded each other and added confusion to an already chaotic and unstable situation. The sole bright spot was the situation in front of Paris, which had only reported "light enemy reconnaissance," and it was Model's fear of losing this sole bastion of stability that drove him into a fear-driven harangue. His final order to Choltitz was a stern warning to "restore order in the city at any price." Choltitz managed to prod Model into providing another half-division of reinforcements from the city, this time having them pried from the troops moving east from the Low Countries, and having been given his order, went about his duty with an air of fatalism. Casualties were mounting among the German soldiers (far higher among the FFI, but they had many more men to spare), and almost 100 had been killed by 3:00 p.m., nearly a third of the total killed in the first two days of fighting. SS tankers had resorted to tying captured Frenchmen to the turrets of their tanks in order to prevent attacks by Molotov cocktails. This tactic was effective, despite its barbarity, but no Wehrmacht tanker would dare use it. Choltitz convened a meeting of his staff officers, and they frantically attempted to come up with a plan to successfully bring the uprising to an end in a manner that would not critically weaken the defenses south of the city. In the end, they kept coming back to the plan of General Dessloch and the Luftwaffe. It would provide an immediate benefit, wipe out most of the resistance on the north bank of the Seine, and performed with other actions across the city, would surely clear the streets.

At 4 p.m., Choltitz gave the order for the Luftwaffe to begin planning the strike, with bombing to begin at 9 p.m. that evening. In addition to the bombing, Choltitz ordered that the first stage of the Seine bridges demolition plan be implemented. Most of the bridges across the Seine were to be dynamited, with only a few — under the secure guard of German soldiers — to be saved. Destroying the bridges would cut the city in two and destroy any ability for the FFI to reinforce effectively. Once resistance on the north side of the Seine was eliminated, Choltitz would give the order for all German forces on the north bank to move south and crush resistance there. The defenders could then begin to worry about the Allies without fearing attack from the FFI. In preparation for the air attack, the men of the 158th Reserve Division began to withdraw from the Gare du Nord and Gare de l'est, which they had retaken just 24 hours previously. In that time, however, dozens of barricades had sprung up around the two stations, and the men had a harder fight leaving than they had capturing the two buildings in the first place. Along the way, the disgruntled men followed the orders they had been given, throwing grenades down water mains, breaking pipes, and destroying hydrants. The FFI and citizens were so happy to see the Germans leave that they did not take the destruction as anything more than angry vandalism rather than the precursor to tragedy that it was.
 

Amerigo Vespucci

In the central water distribution plants, the mains were shut at 8 p.m. Again, those in the area did not see this as anything other than a German attempt to harm the Resistance. Most attention in the city was focused on the Seine, where one after another, the bridges across the river were being destroyed. Eight were secured for use by German soldiers. Five of these lay in the central portion of the city, within the pocket considered relatively secure by virtue of the soldiers of the 165th Reserve Division who were holding the perimeter. At the Austerlitz and Tobelac bridges on the east side of the city, the FFI mounted a spirited resistance to German attempts to blow the bridges. Those two bridges were surrounded by over two dozen barricades, and the defenders had been forewarned by the blasts from bridges further west. When German engineers arrived, they were shot dead and their trucks set ablaze with Molotov cocktails. When tanks arrived a half-hour later, the defenders fought back with explosives taken from dead German engineers. At least three French fighters made suicidal charges with improvised satchel charges, disabling three Panthers. The German captain on the scene halted the fighting after the three tanks were disabled and night began to fall.

At 8:50, a second-hand report of activity at Le Bourget reached Colonel Rol in his headquarters below the streets of south Paris. By this time, it was far too late, even if Rol had believed it to be anything other than German preparations to evacuate the Luftwaffe contingent there. At 9:10 p.m., the first aircraft took off from Le Bourget. They didn't bother to form into groups — this was to be shuttle bombing. Just fly to the target, drop your bombs, land, rearm, fly again, drop and repeat. Because the target was so close, there wasn't even any need to refuel. All told, the 137 aircraft remaining at Le Bourget made 13 runs apiece, with some making 14 or 15 before the stockpiles of aerial weapons at Le Bourget were exhausted. By 4 a.m., all the aircraft had safely returned to Le Bourget and were being refueled prior to leaving France forever. By this time, the streets of northeastern Paris were ablaze. General Dessloch had wanted to create a "little Hamburg" in Paris, but even though the ultimate result fell far short of the destruction wrought in Hamburg, it was still the single largest destructive act on the Western front during the war. There were few incendiary bombs among those dropped on Paris, but the destruction was bad enough. For seven straight hours, at least ten German aircraft were in the air, raining high-explosive destruction on the city.

Not until 8 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd did Colonel Rol receive a report on what had happened, courtesy of a student who had been at one of the barricades on the district when the bombs began to fall. Taking cover in a gutter, 18-year-old Jacob Dévér had shielded his head with his arms as surrounding buildings crumbled. When fires started, he fled south and, exhausted, swam the Seine River to seek the safety of the southern bank. Spotted by a German patrol, he was forced to evade through the unfamiliar alleys and streets until being taken in by a sympathetic store owner. Finally, with the sun well in the sky, he reached Rol's underground headquarters. "We were smiling and confident," he recalled. "The Germans had evacuated the district and we had retaken the train stations. It seemed like they were giving up — a barricade two streets over from ours said they had captured two German soldiers and forced them to work improving the defense. Shortly after nine, we heard a low rumble in the air, coming from the northwest. We all looked up, thinking that it was the Allies, coming to drop supplies. When the bombs began to fall, it took us a moment to realize that we were under attack. By then, the explosions had begun, and everyone scattered. There being no trenches or basements nearby, I was forced to dive into the gutter, the filthy water and urine there staining my shirt and soaking me."
 

whatisinaname

Donor
Hi Amerigo Vespucci

Another great part:)

Also I have been a little bit research on the German miltary post 15 August 1944.....

German Commanders Army Group B

Field Marshal Günther von Kluge from 17 July 1944 to 15 Aug 1944
SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser acting command from 15 Aug 1944 to 17 Aug 1944
Field Marshal Walter Model from 17 Aug 1944 to 17 Apr 1945 as command of army group B was also commander of OB West until 3 Sep 1944 then OB West was under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.


Orders of battle after 15 August 1944

7th Army –
SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from 28 June 1944 to 21 Aug 1944 (WIA)
General der Panzertruppe Hans Freiherr von Funck from 21 Aug 1944 to 22 Aug 1944
General der Panzertruppe Heinrich Eberbach from 22 Aug 1944 to 31 Aug 1944 (POW)
General der Panzertruppe Erich Brandenberger from 31 Aug 1944 to 20 Feb 1945

II. Fallschirm Corps –
General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugen Meindl

3. Fallschirmjäger Division
5. Fallschirmjäger Division
708. Infantry Division
89. Infantry Division
277. Infantry Division
326. Infantry Division

LXXXIV. Corps

363. Infantry Division
Kampfgruppe of the 243 Infantry Division
84. Infantry Division
272. Infantry Division

XXV Corps
265. Infantry Division
343. Infantry Division
2. Fallschirmjäger Division (remnants)
266. Infantry Division (remnants)


5th Panzer Army
General der Panzertruppe Heinrich Eberbach from 5 Aug 1944 to 9 Aug 1944
SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich from 9 Aug 1944 to 10 Sep 1944
General der Panzertruppe Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel from 10 Sep 1944 to 9 Mar 1945

LXVII. Corps

348. Infantry Division
245. Infantry Division
226. Infantry Division
Sicherungs Regiment 5

LXXXVI. Corps

711. Infantry Division
346. Infantry Division
272. Infantry Division
710. Infantry Division (part)

I. SS-Panzer Corps –
SS Oberstgruppenführer Josef Dietrich from 4 July 1943 to 9 Aug 1944
SS Brigadeführer Fritz Krämer from 9 Aug 1944 to 16 Aug 1944
SS Obergruppenführer Georg Keppler from 16 Aug 1944 to 30 Oct 1944

85. Infantry Division
12. SS Panzer Division “Hitler Jugend”
89. Infantry Division

LXXIV. Corps

271. Infantry Division
277. Infantry Division
276. Infantry Division
21. Panzer Division (part)
326. Infantry Division

II. SS Panzer Corps –
SS Obergruppenführer Willi Bittrich

21. Panzer Division (most)
9. SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen”
3. Fallschirmjäger Division

This maybe helpful?

Thanks

Whatisinaname
 

mattep74

whatisinaname said:
Hi Amerigo Vespucci

Another great part:)

Also I have been a little bit research on the German miltary post 15 August 1944.....

German Commanders Army Group B

Field Marshal Günther von Kluge from 17 July 1944 to 15 Aug 1944
SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser acting command from 15 Aug 1944 to 17 Aug 1944
Field Marshal Walter Model from 17 Aug 1944 to 17 Apr 1945 as command of army group B was also commander of OB West until 3 Sep 1944 then OB West was under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.


Orders of battle after 15 August 1944

7th Army –

5th Panzer Army
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And how many units were more than 50% intact?
 

mattep74

PLEASE: Have allies use every bomber they have to bomb the crap out of Berlin. Leave nothing standing. *channeling a Parisian that was killed*
 

whatisinaname

Donor
mattep74 said:
And how many units were more than 50% intact?
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Hi mattep74

Thats an easy question to answer - none :D

Most were battle groups based around a reinforced regiment, I think that no division had more that 5,000 troops (Brigade strength) at best.

Whatisinaname
 

Amerigo Vespucci

Dévér's story was like many others. Though few fires were started at first, those incendiaries that did fall found plenty of fuel from destroyed buildings. There was not enough wind nor enough incendiaries to create a firestorm, but plenty of fires were created by the few firebombs used and from incidental fires caused by destroyed lamps or stoves. A light southwest wind fortunately kept the fires away from the central portion of Paris — German soldiers had been ordered to create firebreaks if the blazes began to spread toward the central portion of the city — but this only drove the fire toward Montmartre. There, bands of citizen firefighters grouped together to create bucket brigades and create impromptu firebreaks. Their efforts were not enough to save the Basilique du Sacré Cœur from damage, but its scorched sides still stood when the Allies captured the hill in late October. Still, much of the artistic heart of the neighborhood was destroyed and the battle against the fires on the western edge of the bombed zone was the most intense. Throughout the entire bombed zone, the attitude was one of shock. Though the fires had spared much of the eastern portions of the bombed zone due to the wind and the ability of the Canal de l'Ourcq to provide firefighting water, almost no place in the northeastern portion of the city lacked bomb damage. An observer remarked, "It was as if the peak of the London Blitz had visited the city for one night." In the end, nearly 12,000 Parisians were killed by the attack, and almost 100,000 were made homeless. Their flight into the countryside — to the north, where they affected German transportation more than that of the Allies, at first — marked the beginning of the Paris refugee crisis.

On the morning of the 22nd, the Luftwaffe's bombing, though brutal, seemed to have accomplished its effect. The streets were mostly quiet for the first time since the beginning of the uprising. Most of the city, though not informed of what had happened overnight, had at least some inkling. The explosions of the bombs, coupled with the drone of aircraft engines, left few in doubt that Paris had taken a great blow from the air. Surprisingly, few believed that it had been the Allies, bombing rail connections in the city. As one man later said, "We believed that the Allies would never damage the City." The fear that the Germans had performed an enormous reprisal were confirmed when Parisians fleeing the affected arrondisements began to reach the southern portions of the city in late morning. Choltitz did his utmost to encourage that flight — if possible, to push the refugees outside the city and into the Allies. Loudspeaker-laden trucks roamed the streets, announcing that any Parisian who wished to leave the city to "avoid the further bombardment of resisting districts by the Luftwaffe." Ironically, Resistance newspapers did much to fan the flames of fear by describing in detail the horrific bombardment of the night before. When two regiments of the 165th Reserve Division moved from their position in the "Central Bastion," as the position along the Seine River was becoming known, to reoccupy the rail yards in the northeast of the city, no shots were fired at them. Instead, sullen Frenchmen and women merely lined the streets and watched them drive by. It took some hours before the lines had been cleared, but by evening, the first train loaded with French prisoners taken during the insurrection was heading east, to Germany.

Though Choltitz's barbarity had won the Germans a short reprieve, Colonel Rol was prepared to continue the fight, harder than ever. All that would be required was a resupply of weapons and munitions from London, and the Resistance would be back and a bigger threat to the Germans than ever. He had, through radio transmissions, received word that the Allies were secretly planning a drop of weapons into the city. Unbeknownst to Rol, General Pierre Koenig, head of the FFI, had ordered the drop be delayed for 24 hours. With De Gaulle missing and presumed dead, Koenig was under enormous stress. As one of the most senior Free French leaders remaining, he had none of the prestige of De Gaulle, and believed that the Free French desperately needed to make a statement if they intended to take the reins of the postwar government. Koenig had none of De Gaulle's drive to build a government entirely separate from the plan intended by the Allies, but he knew that the interests of France and her allies would not always dovetail so clearly as they did during the war. Creating a government free of Allied — and even more importantly, Communist — influence was of critical importance. He knew that any weapon drop would almost certainly benefit the communists more than his own Gaullist FFI members, particularly with De Gaulle's and Parodi's deaths. Secretly, he had radioed Leclerc in France, pleading with him to order the Second Armored Division to advance on the city as soon as possible. A swift liberation would allow he and others to install a Gaullist government of their own choosing, and not one of Allied or communist creation. But he could not hold off on the weapons drop forever. If Leclerc did not reach Paris before nightfall on the 23rd, he would be forced to order the drop, and damn the consequences.
 

whatisinaname

Donor
Hi Amerigo Vespucci

Very interesting, will the German reinforcements arrive before that Allies arrive, now that the Germans control the Rail Station?

Its a race!

Thanks

Whatisinaname
 

Hendryk

Banned
Amerigo Vespucci said:
Secretly, he had radioed Leclerc in France, pleading with him to order the Second Armored Division to advance on the city as soon as possible.
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I've always had a fondness for Leclerc, and wonder, now that de Gaulle is no more, if he'll play a more prominent role.
 

Amerigo Vespucci

In an apple orchard sixty miles of Paris, Leclerc received the covert plea with no small degree of torment. De Gaulle was almost certainly dead, no trace of him having been seen in over two days. At the cusp of what he believed would be his ultimate triumph, the fulfillment of his pledge to liberate Paris, it was being snatched away. Bradley had returned from the military conference with Eisenhower with orders for Leclerc's division to being advancing to the east — to the German border and away from Paris. Bradley had answered his question about the insurrection and the German bombing with a curt remark that the partisans "bore the responsibility for their failure to obey the order not to begin an uprising." Now Koenig wanted him to disobey orders and liberate the city on his own. In the end, it took him barely thirty minutes to make up his mind. The object of his dreams — Paris — would not be denied. The division would begin its advance at 5:30 a.m. the morning of the 23rd. But first, he had to distract his Allied liaison officers.

As night fell in Paris, General Choltitz emerged from the funk of the previous day. Despite all odds, his Luftwaffe gambit appeared to have worked. Just 20 German soldiers had been killed in the city, his troops had retaken the critical rail links, and all was well. The highlight of his evening came when four unfamiliar SS officers arrived at the Meurice. Choltitz believed them to be bringing reinforcements, but instead they had visited the city on orders from Heinrich Himmler, who had ordered them to recover the Bayeux Tapestry from the Louvre and take it to Germany before Paris was surrounded. Upon arriving at the museum, they had been fired upon by a section of FFI fighters. Choltitz was forced to pull together a group of infantry and an armored car to clear the enormous structure. When the German soldiers finally began searching the building in earnest, they were shocked to discover that most of the museum's art treasures had already been removed by the FFI. Hidden away in places of perceived safety, many would never be recovered. Fortunately for the SS men, the Bayeux Tapestry was one of the few items still remaining — no doubt due to its large size. They loaded it into their automobile and transported it to a salt mine in Germany, where it was recovered with thousands of other objets d'art at the end of the war. In Paris, meanwhile, art from the Louvre continues to be discovered behind walls and in odd places today. The most famous example, of course, was the rediscovery of the Mona Lisa in 1966, found behind a wall in a Parisian apartment when the owner was renovating the building. Despite successes like these, fewer than 3/5 of the pre-war art collection of the Louvre has been recovered. Many pieces are believed to have been destroyed in the liberation of the city, but some are believed to still hide in the nooks and crannies of Paris.

As the fighting in the Louvre was taking place, the enormous "Karl" mortar reached Soissons, 80 miles distant from Paris. This was its final stopping point before arriving in Paris on the early-morning hours of the 24th. In Metz, 188 miles from Paris, the tanks of the 26th and 27th Panzer divisions continued their nighttime movement toward the city. Their arrival was less than 48 hours away — if Leclerc didn't arrive first.

Oh, and Hendryk: Over the next six days of updates, Leclerc features heavily. There are perhaps 15 more days of updates before the story wraps up. That's slightly more than the 30 days I promised at the start, but I've broken up some of the longer "chapters" where I felt appropriate.
 

Archangel

Amerigo Vespucci said:
As night fell in Paris, General Choltitz emerged from the funk of the previous day. Despite all odds, his Luftwaffe gambit appeared to have worked. Just 20 German soldiers had been killed in the city, his troops had retaken the critical rail links, and all was well. The highlight of his evening came when four unfamiliar SS officers arrived at the Meurice. Choltitz believed them to be bringing reinforcements, but instead they had visited the city on orders from Heinrich Himmler, who had ordered them to recover the Bayeux Tapestry from the Louvre and take it to Germany before Paris was surrounded. Upon arriving at the museum, they had been fired upon by a section of FFI fighters. Choltitz was forced to pull together a group of infantry and an armored car to clear the enormous structure. When the German soldiers finally began searching the building in earnest, they were shocked to discover that most of the museum's art treasures had already been removed by the FFI. Hidden away in places of perceived safety, many would never be recovered. Fortunately for the SS men, the Bayeux Tapestry was one of the few items still remaining — no doubt due to its large size. They loaded it into their automobile and transported it to a salt mine in Germany, where it was recovered with thousands of other objets d'art at the end of the war. In Paris, meanwhile, art from the Louvre continues to be discovered behind walls and in odd places today. The most famous example, of course, was the rediscovery of the Mona Lisa in 1966, found behind a wall in a Parisian apartment when the owner was renovating the building. Despite successes like these, fewer than 3/5 of the pre-war art collection of the Louvre has been recovered. Many pieces are believed to have been destroyed in the liberation of the city, but some are believed to still hide in the nooks and crannies of Paris.
Click to expand...
Paris will be a sort of treasure lottery. It will be good for future movies about the war and the post-war.
 

mattep74

Amerigo Vespucci said:
Fortunately for the SS men, the Bayeux Tapestry was one of the few items still remaining — no doubt due to its large size. They loaded it into their automobile and transported it to a salt mine in Germany, where it was recovered with thousands of other objets d'art at the end of the war. In Paris, meanwhile, art from the Louvre continues to be discovered behind walls and in odd places today. The most famous example, of course, was the rediscovery of the Mona Lisa in 1966, found behind a wall in a Parisian apartment when the owner was renovating the building. Despite successes like these, fewer than 3/5 of the pre-war art collection of the Louvre has been recovered. Many pieces are believed to have been destroyed in the liberation of the city, but some are believed to still hide in the nooks and crannies of Paris.
Click to expand...


FYI: The Bayeux tapestry was in Bayeux the entire war and was safe in the town because The 51st highland division took the town on june 7
 

Amerigo Vespucci

mattep74 said:
FYI: The Bayeux tapestry was in Bayeux the entire war and was safe in the town because The 51st highland division took the town on june 7
Click to expand...

Actually, it was seized by the Ahnenerbe after the fall of France and spent most of the war in the basement of the Louvre. See Setton, Kenneth M., "900 Years Ago: the Norman Conquest", National Geographic Magazine (August 1966): 206–251.
 

Amerigo Vespucci

Leclerc's tanks began moving shortly before dawn. To a modern observer, it seems difficult to imagine that a division consisting of hundreds of vehicles and thousands of men could move in secret, but this was an era before computer networks, before tanks featured aircraft-like friend-or-foe systems, and before constant communications kept commanders in touch at all hours of the day. By 7:30 a.m., virtually all the men of the division had been informed of their commander's plan and its illicit nature. Not a single one broke formation. All were veterans, part of a division whose fighters had seen combat since Free French soldiers marched across the Sahara to do battle against Vichy forces in French West Africa. Many were not from France at all — instead hailing from the colonies or even foreign countries like Mexico or Paraguay and most of those had never been to France before, let alone Paris. All were volunteers. And all shared a common devotion to the idea that France should be liberated and free. The key to all of this was Paris, and their drive toward the city could hardly be stopped by any orders from American commanders who knew nothing of their devotion. Due to Leclerc's foresight, the division didn't need to stop at any of the Allied fuel depots located behind the lines. They fueled instead from their own organic fuel trucks, which drove just behind the tanks and halftracks. Shortly after 9 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd, the BBC made the official announcement that General Charles De Gaulle, commander of the Free French, was missing and had been so since the 19th. News of this spread along the advancing division. By the time the unit reached Chartres, every man in the group knew it. To some, it lent a cold fury. To others, it disheartened them. Leclerc, near the head of the column, was disappointed at the spread of the news. Regardless of the effect it had, he knew it would serve as a distraction to his men, all of whom needed to have their minds clear for the battle ahead.

In Paris, the gunfire that had not appeared on the morning of the 22nd reappeared with a vengeance on the morning of the 23rd. By know, the FFI was running short of ammunition on a city-wide basis, but the bombing of the northeastern portion of the city had inspired a fearful resistance to the Germans. In places where German forces massed to drive out the FFI — as at the Grand Palais, where tanks set the building ablaze — the fear caused FFI fighters to become brittle in their fighting, fleeing at the first sign that the Germans were breaking through. On the south side of the city, soldiers succeeded in securing a highway corridor to the defensive line from the central bastion for the first time. This allowed for the stringing of landlines to replace the ineffective telephone system, allowing for better communication. To both General Choltitz and on the opposite side, Colonel Rol, it appeared that the Germans were slowly retaking the city despite the FFI's continued resistance. Rol continued his desperate pleas for an air drop of ammunition and weapons. These were his only hope. If Leclerc arrived with his division, it would mean an end to the communist resistance, De Gaulle or no De Gaulle.

At 8 a.m., Choltitz had received orders from Rastenburg via Field Marshal Model that instructed him to leave the city a "field of ruins" for the advancing Allies and make his stand among those ruins. Choltitz had already begun to implement those instructions, which were merely a reiteration of orders he had received over the previous days. As propaganda trucks announcing his "amnesty" for refugees filtered through the streets on the 22nd, their broadcasts stood as counterpoint to the loud bangs of factories being destroyed and the enormous plume of smoke that still hovered over the city from the Luftwaffe bombardment. Now, on the morning of the 23rd, the plume of smoke and the trucks had mostly vanished, but the explosions continued. Demolition teams, freed from being tied to the now-destroyed Seine bridges, implemented the destruction plans created by the four experts from Berlin. In addition, explosives continued to be laid at each of Paris' major landmarks. Each was given a flimsy military excuse for demolition — collapsing the Arc de Triomphe would clear fields of fire, while the destruction of the Eiffel tower would block the approaches to several destroyed Seine bridges — but even Choltitz was reluctant to push the plunger on historic landmarks. Still, to him, a line had been crossed and he was far more willing to execute the demolition plan than he had been just 24 hours prior.
 

Amerigo Vespucci

At the Austerlitz and Tobelac bridges, fighting renewed after the brief calm of the 22nd. By 10 a.m., German tanks had blasted through the barricades guarding the two remaining Seine bridges not in German hands. Choltitz had forbade most major action in the city after the Luftwaffe bombardment in hopes that his restraint would allow time for the FFI to realize the hopelessness of the situation, rather than forcing them into a corner from which they would be forced to fight. When this failed to achieve the desired effect, he issued orders for the capture or destruction of FFI strongpoints across the city. At the two bridges, two more tanks were destroyed by Molotov cocktails, but both bridges fell to German explosives before noon. Similar scenes took place at city halls and public Paris buildings all across the city. Tanks were massed to blast the FFI from the buildings, and FFI fighters, their ammunition almost gone and lacking heavy weapons beyond Molotovs, were unable to resist for long. Some managed to escape into the warrens of the city. Others were captured and sent to German prisons, which were now bulging with captured Frenchmen, crammed into the most inhumane conditions imaginable, particularly for the wounded. Many were executed outright. To those in the prisons, who would later endure enormous hardships during the siege of the city or who were shipped to German concentration camps, those executed almost seemed to have gotten the better result.

In the city, few knew about Leclerc's approaching tanks. Only the few Gaullist FFI leaders remaining alive and able to communicate via radio had gotten the message. One of these men, Yvon Morandat, executed his orders to capture the Hotel de Matignon, home of France's prime ministers. Upon his arrival, the 400 Vichy policemen who had served as Pierre Laval's bodyguard surrendered to him despite the fact that he had come alone. Together, the four hundred secured the Matignon in the face of a German attack. This arrived in the evening, and German tanks set the palace ablaze. Morandat and the men defending the building refused to surrender, and died fighting while the building burned down around them.

By 6 p.m., Leclerc's division had reached Rambouillet, barely 30 miles from Paris. And all along the line, Allied commanders were searching for the French second armored division. Astonishingly, Leclerc's move had gone unnoticed until 11 a.m. by his liaison officers, who had enjoyed a good time put on by one of his officers. When Leclerc failed to arrive at a staff meeting at 1 p.m. and failed to answer a radio message, a frantic search began. Several times, elements of his division had been found by neighboring Allied forces, but by the time their messages were passed to corps command, the French had moved on. At Rambouillet, Leclerc desperately wanted to stop, regroup, and rest his division, which had been moving for over 12 hours now and had become badly strung out. But he knew that if he stopped, even for an instant longer than the refueling trucks demanded, the Allies would find a way to hand him an order in person. Then, he would be forced to ignore it and be promptly arrested. That could not be allowed, not until his division was engaged in combat with the Germans. Once combat was joined, he would have a ready-made excuse for avoiding further contact. He would have to gamble that the Allies would not force his troops back if he was about to break through to Paris. And so his division moved on through the growing darkness, not even slowing for the crowds of cheering, liberated French men and women who lined the streets of Rambouillet. Had he more time, Leclerc would have preferred to move the thrust of his attack further east. The direct line from Rambouillet to Paris ran through Versailles, and the latest intelligence before he began his move indicated the Germans had recently reinforced the area with more than 50 tanks. It would be like running a gauntlet, but he lacked the time to shift east.

Eisenhower and Bradley, in an emergency conference, debated what to do about the rogue general. Clearly, the first thing to do was to cut off all resupply to Leclerc's division in order to bring him to heel. This had already been effectively done due to his rapid advance. The second thing to do was to regain control of the division. To do that, they had to figure out what he was trying to do. "Isn't it obvious?" Patton, who had joined the meeting while it was in progress, said. "The crazy bastard is trying to liberate Paris all by himself." Messengers were sent via jeep to all likely routes Leclerc's division would have to take to reach the city. Shortly before Leclerc's tanks encountered the first Germans outside of St.-Cyr, a messenger from the V Corps caught up with him. This was Leclerc's moment to cross the Rubicon. To that point, all his actions had been covered by a thin veil of legitimacy. He could always deny receiving radio communications, or come up with other excuses for not halting. But now, reading the paper orders in his hand, he had to take the step from which there was no returning. He ordered the man detained until the attack had begun.

At 9:40 p.m., in the darkness of the evening of the 23rd, Leclerc's division began to engage the Germans outside of St.-Cyr. Paris' best chance for an early liberation had arrived.
 
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