Hendryk
Banned
De Gaulle's fate in TTL seems to have been foreshadowed by that of another famous Frenchman, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, who had likewise gone missing with his plane three weeks earlier.
Is Paris Burning?
- Thread starter Amerigo Vespucci
- Start date
whatisinaname
Donor
Hi Amerigo Vespucci
Another good part, but I have a couple of nitpicks, the 26 and 27 Panzer Divisions.
26 Panzer Division was formed Sep 1942 in Belgium from parts of 23. Infantry Division. It was transferred to Amiens, France Oct 1942 for training and coastal defense and remained there until July 1943 when it was sent to Italy where it fought the allied landings. It surrendered to the allies in northern Italy at the end of the war.
As you can see from the Bio the 26 Panzer Division was never assigned to Denmark?
+++++
27 Panzer Division was formed Oct 1942 in southern Russia from Kampfgruppe Michalik (formed from elemets of 22. Panzer Division). It fought at Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad until it was disbanded 15 Feb 1943 and absorbed into 7. Panzer Division and 24. Panzer Division.
The 27 Panzer Division ceased to exist after 15 Feb 1943 so it could not have been in Denmark
++++++
On the postive side I have found a Panzer Division that would fit
The only Panzer Division I can find that matches the story is the 25 Panzer Division, the 25. Panzer-Division was formed Feb 1942 in Eberswalde and was sent to Norway where it remained until Aug 1943 when it was transferred to Denmark where it took part in the disarming of the Danish Army. It was sent to the Eastern front Oct 1943 and suffered heavy losses during the withdrawal through the Ukraine. It was once again sent to Denmark, this time for refitting May 1944. It was sent to the front in Poland Sep 1944 and withdrew through Poland and into eastern Germany where it ended the war.
25 Panzer-Division commanders
Generalmajor Oswin Grolig - (1 June 1944 - 18 Aug 1944)
Generalmajor Oskar Audörsch - (18 Aug 1944 - 8 May 1945)
Thanks
Whatisinaname
Another good part, but I have a couple of nitpicks, the 26 and 27 Panzer Divisions.
26 Panzer Division was formed Sep 1942 in Belgium from parts of 23. Infantry Division. It was transferred to Amiens, France Oct 1942 for training and coastal defense and remained there until July 1943 when it was sent to Italy where it fought the allied landings. It surrendered to the allies in northern Italy at the end of the war.
As you can see from the Bio the 26 Panzer Division was never assigned to Denmark?
+++++
27 Panzer Division was formed Oct 1942 in southern Russia from Kampfgruppe Michalik (formed from elemets of 22. Panzer Division). It fought at Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad until it was disbanded 15 Feb 1943 and absorbed into 7. Panzer Division and 24. Panzer Division.
The 27 Panzer Division ceased to exist after 15 Feb 1943 so it could not have been in Denmark
++++++
On the postive side I have found a Panzer Division that would fit
The only Panzer Division I can find that matches the story is the 25 Panzer Division, the 25. Panzer-Division was formed Feb 1942 in Eberswalde and was sent to Norway where it remained until Aug 1943 when it was transferred to Denmark where it took part in the disarming of the Danish Army. It was sent to the Eastern front Oct 1943 and suffered heavy losses during the withdrawal through the Ukraine. It was once again sent to Denmark, this time for refitting May 1944. It was sent to the front in Poland Sep 1944 and withdrew through Poland and into eastern Germany where it ended the war.
25 Panzer-Division commanders
Generalmajor Oswin Grolig - (1 June 1944 - 18 Aug 1944)
Generalmajor Oskar Audörsch - (18 Aug 1944 - 8 May 1945)
Thanks
Whatisinaname
Glad you've picked that out, whatisinaname. The authors of Is Paris Burning? (the book) seemed fairly certain on the identity of those divisions, but I was skeptical as you are, and found pretty much what you have. For lack of anything better, I kept the designations the same.
It begs the question of what units were sent -- two divisions were definitely ordered to Paris, and had I not done investigations of my own, I wouldn't have found that error. I'm inclined to think that the authors of the book merely misidentified the divisions throughout the story rather than inventing them from whole cloth. I don't think 25th Panzer could have been one of these -- in OTL, the two divisions were diverted by Patton's thrust into eastern France and never made it to Paris. Though it's never mentioned what happens to them, I was under the impression that they remained to fight along the Siegfried Line.
After all, it hardly makes sense to withdraw badly-needed forces from one front only to transfer them to another front a thousand miles away. That being said, your idea about 25th Panzer makes as much sense as anything else. I've been unable to find two Panzer or Panzergrenadier divisions that follow the criteria of being stationed in Denmark in August 1944 and which were transferred to France in that same month.
It begs the question of what units were sent -- two divisions were definitely ordered to Paris, and had I not done investigations of my own, I wouldn't have found that error. I'm inclined to think that the authors of the book merely misidentified the divisions throughout the story rather than inventing them from whole cloth. I don't think 25th Panzer could have been one of these -- in OTL, the two divisions were diverted by Patton's thrust into eastern France and never made it to Paris. Though it's never mentioned what happens to them, I was under the impression that they remained to fight along the Siegfried Line.
After all, it hardly makes sense to withdraw badly-needed forces from one front only to transfer them to another front a thousand miles away. That being said, your idea about 25th Panzer makes as much sense as anything else. I've been unable to find two Panzer or Panzergrenadier divisions that follow the criteria of being stationed in Denmark in August 1944 and which were transferred to France in that same month.
And one note on DeGaulle. Removing him is purely for reasons of story, though the flight to France was exceedingly long and dangerous -- in OTL, his plane landed in Normandy with just five minutes of fuel remaining. If he arrives in France, he's certain to demand an advance on Paris no matter what. Nothing's going to stand in his way for that. If Eisenhower refuses him, he will merely order the French Second Armored Division to press on regardless of Eisenhower's orders. This will create a crisis in the Allied leadership that, while interesting, wouldn't prevent the French from liberating Paris quickly, even with Choltitz determined to fight. At this point, the Germans simply don't have the forces in place to defend Paris -- at all, let alone effectively -- if the will is there to liberate the city.
How do I change this will? Well, you'll just have to wait for further chapters.
How do I change this will? Well, you'll just have to wait for further chapters.
As the sky brightened above Paris on the morning of the 20th, so too did the sounds of gunfire increase. From scattered shots at the first hint of twilight to the terrible ripping sound of MG-42s at first daylight, the din escalated until, by down, the capper was put on the crescendo. From the north, 27 Ju-87G Stuka dive-bombers flew above the Prefecture of Police prior to beginning their screaming dives upon the structure. They were the complete dive-bombing component of Luftflotte No. 3, the sole remaining component of the Luftwaffe that remained in central France. On August 18, Generaloberst Otto Dessloch had relieved the ineffectual Hugo Sperrle as commander of the Luftflotte with orders to get his aircraft into action over the Western front. Up to the early-morning hours of the 20th, Dessloch had been struggling with the problem of how exactly to do that without being swatted from the sky by overwhelming Allied air superiority. When Choltitz suggested action against the insurrection, Dessloch had embraced the idea. Though his pilots lacked adequate maps of the area, the imposing structure of the Prefecture would be impossible to miss, as would its position on the western end of the Ile de la Cite. Choltitz gave specific orders to Dessloch to avoid hitting the Cathedral of Notre Dame, just 200 yards away, for fear of further antagonizing the populace. Dessloch promised that he would make every effort to avoid the historic structure, but also warned that no guarantees could be made, particularly given the inexperienced nature of many of his replacement pilots.
Thus it was at 6:23 a.m. on the morning of the 20th — approximately 30 minutes after sunrise — that the Stukas struck first in the renewed attack on the Prefecture of Police. Screaming in from above, they delivered their loads almost precisely on target, blasting the top floors of the structure and killing many of the defenders. Owing to Dessloch's instructions to avoid Notre Dame at all costs, only one stick of bombs fell anywhere near the cathedral, and it only scarred the front of the structure, shattering some of the statues on its facade, but surprisingly leaving the stained glass windows on the front intact. Five minutes after the bombs landed on the Prefecture, the massed tanks of the SS contingent and the 5th reserve regiment, coupled with most of the soldiers of the 150th reserve regiment, streamed across the two bridges leading from the north bank of the Seine to the Prefecture. The shocked defenders of the building, having been blasted by the Stukas, could manage only desultory fire before the men of the 150th Reserve entered the building. There, the surviving defenders, having awakened to their peril, responded with ferocity amid the partially-destroyed ruins. As the infantry stormed the building itself, a handful of tanks blasted their way into the courtyard, incidentally cutting off the flood of defenders who, having had enough, were again trying to escape to the Metro station. Unfortunately for them, the German tankers took a dim view of this, and the retreating partisans were stopped by machinegun fire from the tanks. In the corridors, the fighting was ferocious, with Molotovs and grenades flying with abandon. In the confines of the courtyard, a partisan, carrying a Molotov in each hand, ran toward a German tank, setting it ablaze at the cost of his life. Despite such individual acts of gallantry, however, the French defense of the building was doomed. The defenders, after the previous day's action, were virtually out of ammunition, and the attack of the Stukas, combined with that of the tanks and the overwhelming infantry support, brought resistance to an end. Over 600 of the building's estimated 4,500 defenders were killed during the fight, with 73 Germans also losing their lives — almost as many as had been killed in the entire previous day's fighting combined. Over 1,000 partisans did escape before the German soldiers seized the Metro station, but approximately 2,900 FFI men soon found themselves in one of the German prisons scattered across the city.
At 10:45 a.m., Choltitz received the news of the Prefecture's capture with good humor. This was balanced by a report that no more than 50 partisans had taken his offer of pardon in exchange for their surrender. Choltitz was now faced with a dilemma. If he went through with his reprisals, as threatened, it could force the city into an even larger uprising. If, however, he did nothing, he might inspire the partisans to take even bolder action. In the end, he decided to issue orders for the demolition of several industrial plants around the city. Not all the mining was complete at the 200 factories scheduled for demolition, but Choltitz believed that by ordering the destruction of an even dozen of the factories, he could demonstrate his willingness to follow through on his warning while still demonstrating some control. He also ordered that the surrendered partisans be escorted through German lines, as promised. This would further demonstrate his mercy, he thought. Parisian partisans — FFI and communist alike — were not impressed by his action.
After allowing time for the force that had captured the Prefecture to regroup, Choltitz ordered it further south, onto the south bank of the Seine, to capture the Palais du Luxembourg and the fifth and sixth arrondisement city halls. It was now 1:00 p.m., and German soldiers begin running into growing numbers of barricades — hastily-constructed structures that blocked Parisian streets. As in 1871, when the Commune took over the city, the people of Paris began to take to the streets in a spontaneous show of support for the members of the Resistance who had been in it for years. By the end of the day, there were dozens. By the evening of the 21st, there were an estimated 500 in the city, constructed of everything from overturned cars to paving stones to — in the case of several Parisian theaters — the contents of the theaters' prop departments. In his attempt to frighten the populace into submission via reprisals and the use of the Luftwaffe, Choltitz had in fact angered the normal populace of Paris: the teachers, bakers, store owners and secretaries who, while not collaborating with the Germans, hadn't gone out of their way to resist, either. But with liberation apparently at hand, they took to the streets and, clutching weapons dating from the 18th century to some abandoned in 1940, began to fight back. The peak of the average citizens' involvement didn't come until the next day, however, and Choltitz, despite the rising tide of partisan action, felt confident enough to order portions of the 158th Reserve Division at Le Bourget to recapture the train stations and switching yards in the northwestern portion of the city. These had been seized by the FFI, and Choltitz needed them to funnel whatever reinforcements Model deemed fit to give him, as well as to provide for the shipment of prisoners to Germany. He knew that every mouth removed from the city would be one less that would draw on the city's limited stockpiles when the Allies finally encircled it. Choltitz had slightly more than 36,000 men to subdue a city of more than 3 million people. Adding to the problem was the fact that 16,000 of that total was deployed to the south, along the 60-mile long line he had decreed built to defend the city from the advancing Allies. Reinforcements would be desperately needed if any attempt was to be made to hold the city.
Thus it was at 6:23 a.m. on the morning of the 20th — approximately 30 minutes after sunrise — that the Stukas struck first in the renewed attack on the Prefecture of Police. Screaming in from above, they delivered their loads almost precisely on target, blasting the top floors of the structure and killing many of the defenders. Owing to Dessloch's instructions to avoid Notre Dame at all costs, only one stick of bombs fell anywhere near the cathedral, and it only scarred the front of the structure, shattering some of the statues on its facade, but surprisingly leaving the stained glass windows on the front intact. Five minutes after the bombs landed on the Prefecture, the massed tanks of the SS contingent and the 5th reserve regiment, coupled with most of the soldiers of the 150th reserve regiment, streamed across the two bridges leading from the north bank of the Seine to the Prefecture. The shocked defenders of the building, having been blasted by the Stukas, could manage only desultory fire before the men of the 150th Reserve entered the building. There, the surviving defenders, having awakened to their peril, responded with ferocity amid the partially-destroyed ruins. As the infantry stormed the building itself, a handful of tanks blasted their way into the courtyard, incidentally cutting off the flood of defenders who, having had enough, were again trying to escape to the Metro station. Unfortunately for them, the German tankers took a dim view of this, and the retreating partisans were stopped by machinegun fire from the tanks. In the corridors, the fighting was ferocious, with Molotovs and grenades flying with abandon. In the confines of the courtyard, a partisan, carrying a Molotov in each hand, ran toward a German tank, setting it ablaze at the cost of his life. Despite such individual acts of gallantry, however, the French defense of the building was doomed. The defenders, after the previous day's action, were virtually out of ammunition, and the attack of the Stukas, combined with that of the tanks and the overwhelming infantry support, brought resistance to an end. Over 600 of the building's estimated 4,500 defenders were killed during the fight, with 73 Germans also losing their lives — almost as many as had been killed in the entire previous day's fighting combined. Over 1,000 partisans did escape before the German soldiers seized the Metro station, but approximately 2,900 FFI men soon found themselves in one of the German prisons scattered across the city.
At 10:45 a.m., Choltitz received the news of the Prefecture's capture with good humor. This was balanced by a report that no more than 50 partisans had taken his offer of pardon in exchange for their surrender. Choltitz was now faced with a dilemma. If he went through with his reprisals, as threatened, it could force the city into an even larger uprising. If, however, he did nothing, he might inspire the partisans to take even bolder action. In the end, he decided to issue orders for the demolition of several industrial plants around the city. Not all the mining was complete at the 200 factories scheduled for demolition, but Choltitz believed that by ordering the destruction of an even dozen of the factories, he could demonstrate his willingness to follow through on his warning while still demonstrating some control. He also ordered that the surrendered partisans be escorted through German lines, as promised. This would further demonstrate his mercy, he thought. Parisian partisans — FFI and communist alike — were not impressed by his action.
After allowing time for the force that had captured the Prefecture to regroup, Choltitz ordered it further south, onto the south bank of the Seine, to capture the Palais du Luxembourg and the fifth and sixth arrondisement city halls. It was now 1:00 p.m., and German soldiers begin running into growing numbers of barricades — hastily-constructed structures that blocked Parisian streets. As in 1871, when the Commune took over the city, the people of Paris began to take to the streets in a spontaneous show of support for the members of the Resistance who had been in it for years. By the end of the day, there were dozens. By the evening of the 21st, there were an estimated 500 in the city, constructed of everything from overturned cars to paving stones to — in the case of several Parisian theaters — the contents of the theaters' prop departments. In his attempt to frighten the populace into submission via reprisals and the use of the Luftwaffe, Choltitz had in fact angered the normal populace of Paris: the teachers, bakers, store owners and secretaries who, while not collaborating with the Germans, hadn't gone out of their way to resist, either. But with liberation apparently at hand, they took to the streets and, clutching weapons dating from the 18th century to some abandoned in 1940, began to fight back. The peak of the average citizens' involvement didn't come until the next day, however, and Choltitz, despite the rising tide of partisan action, felt confident enough to order portions of the 158th Reserve Division at Le Bourget to recapture the train stations and switching yards in the northwestern portion of the city. These had been seized by the FFI, and Choltitz needed them to funnel whatever reinforcements Model deemed fit to give him, as well as to provide for the shipment of prisoners to Germany. He knew that every mouth removed from the city would be one less that would draw on the city's limited stockpiles when the Allies finally encircled it. Choltitz had slightly more than 36,000 men to subdue a city of more than 3 million people. Adding to the problem was the fact that 16,000 of that total was deployed to the south, along the 60-mile long line he had decreed built to defend the city from the advancing Allies. Reinforcements would be desperately needed if any attempt was to be made to hold the city.
whatisinaname
Donor
Hi Amerigo Vespucci
Another good part and two in one day that is cool
I have been hunting for a better Panzer Division, I have found one, 233 Reserve Panzer Division, this division was based in Denmark from Aug 1943 - Apr 1945 and I think it would be a good division to replace the 26 & 26 Panzer Divisions?
233 Reserve Panzer Division, this division was based in Denmark from Aug 1943 - Apr 1945 and I think it would be a good division to replace the 26 & 26 Panzer Divisions?
Order of battle as of late June 1944
233. Military Police Detachment (mot)
5. Reserve Panzer Regiment
Panzer Battalion
4 x Company
Panzergrenadier Battalion
2 x Company (half-track)
Artillery Battery (self-propelled)
Panzerjäger Battery
3. Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
Signals Platoon (mot)
Armored Car Company
Platoon (half-track)
Gun Platoon)
Motorcycle Company
Infantry Company (mot)
83. Reserve Panzergrenadier Regiment
Staff Company
Gun Platoon
Signals Platoon
Motorcycle Platoon
Mortar Platoon
Platoon (half-track)
2 x Battalion (half-track)
Staff Company
Signals Platoon (mot)
3 x Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Panzerjäger Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Pioneer Company (mot)
3. Reserve Panzergrenadier Regiment
Staff Company
Signals Platoon
Panzerjäger Platoon
Motorcycle Platoon
Reserve Platoon (mot)
2 x Battalion
Staff Company
Signals Platoon (mot)
3 x Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Panzerjäger Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Pioneer Company (mot)
59. Reserve Artillery Battalion
Staff Battery
Signals Platoon
Calibration Platoon
Reserve Platoon
2 x Battery (mot)
3. Reserve Panzerjäger Battalion
Signals Platoon
Panzerjäger Company (mot)
Panzerjäger Company (self-propelled)
Sturmgeschütz Company
Reserve Company
208. Reserve Panzer Pioneer Battalion
Signals Platoon (mot)
3 x Company (mot)
K Bridging Column (mot)
B Bridging Column (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
1233. Panzer Signals Troop
Supply & Support Units
Hope that this helps ?
Thanks
Whatisinaname
Another good part and two in one day that is cool
I have been hunting for a better Panzer Division, I have found one, 233 Reserve Panzer Division, this division was based in Denmark from Aug 1943 - Apr 1945 and I think it would be a good division to replace the 26 & 26 Panzer Divisions?
233 Reserve Panzer Division, this division was based in Denmark from Aug 1943 - Apr 1945 and I think it would be a good division to replace the 26 & 26 Panzer Divisions?
Order of battle as of late June 1944
233. Military Police Detachment (mot)
5. Reserve Panzer Regiment
Panzer Battalion
4 x Company
Panzergrenadier Battalion
2 x Company (half-track)
Artillery Battery (self-propelled)
Panzerjäger Battery
3. Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
Signals Platoon (mot)
Armored Car Company
Platoon (half-track)
Gun Platoon)
Motorcycle Company
Infantry Company (mot)
83. Reserve Panzergrenadier Regiment
Staff Company
Gun Platoon
Signals Platoon
Motorcycle Platoon
Mortar Platoon
Platoon (half-track)
2 x Battalion (half-track)
Staff Company
Signals Platoon (mot)
3 x Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Panzerjäger Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Pioneer Company (mot)
3. Reserve Panzergrenadier Regiment
Staff Company
Signals Platoon
Panzerjäger Platoon
Motorcycle Platoon
Reserve Platoon (mot)
2 x Battalion
Staff Company
Signals Platoon (mot)
3 x Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Panzerjäger Company (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
Reserve Pioneer Company (mot)
59. Reserve Artillery Battalion
Staff Battery
Signals Platoon
Calibration Platoon
Reserve Platoon
2 x Battery (mot)
3. Reserve Panzerjäger Battalion
Signals Platoon
Panzerjäger Company (mot)
Panzerjäger Company (self-propelled)
Sturmgeschütz Company
Reserve Company
208. Reserve Panzer Pioneer Battalion
Signals Platoon (mot)
3 x Company (mot)
K Bridging Column (mot)
B Bridging Column (mot)
Reserve Company (mot)
1233. Panzer Signals Troop
Supply & Support Units
Hope that this helps ?
Thanks
Whatisinaname
Sixty miles to the north, Field Marshal Model arrived at his new headquarters, utterly exhausted after a tour of the front — if the situation was even worthy of that name. All along the line, German soldiers were falling back, helpless in the face of the advancing Allied ground and air assault. Air attack destroyed German transport, and soldiers on foot were soon overrun by the mechanized and motorized Americans and British. Unlike the Wehrmacht, which still relied on horses for most of its transport, this Allied army was entirely motorized. The collapse and the situation he was facing was unlike anything he had faced on the Eastern front. It was ironic, he thought, that he should be sitting in the same bunker where Hitler planned Operation Sealion, his never-launched invasion of England, while now, four years later, Model should be facing an Allied attack that would bring the British to the German border. Still, he thought, there was hope. His first orders upon returning to his new headquarters (freshly moved from St.-Germain-en-Laye, directly west of Paris), were to order the evacuation of all German forces south of the Seine. These would be routed through Paris, and help with the defenses there, he decided. Paris would have to be the linchpin of any plan to delay the Allies. Hitler had decreed the city be held at all costs, and all things considered, the plan wasn't the worst possible idea. Holding Paris would force the Allies to invest the city, slowing their advance and allowing time for his mauled armies to regroup and launch counter-attacks, just as Hitler had ordered.
With a plan taking shape in his mind, he contacted Choltitz via telephone. It took nearly 45 minutes for a connection to be established, but this allowed Model to further refine his plan with his staff officers before communicating with Choltitz. He instructed Choltitz that Paris should be held at all costs and that he was planning to evacuate the four infantry divisions remaining south of the Seine through Paris. Furthermore, the rest of the remnants of the Seventh Army (which had been facing the Allies in Brittany and southern Normandy) would also be evacuated through the city. Portions would remain behind to bolster the city's defenses, aided by the arrival of the 26th and 27th Panzer divisions, which, he informed Choltitz, were being redeployed from Denmark on the Fuhrer's orders. The city, he instructed, should be held at all costs in order to slow the Allied advance and force them to devote forces against it. Choltitz informed him of the growing problems with partisans in the city, and said that wide stretches of Paris had been "abandoned by German forces in an effort to protect critical installations." Model ordered that Choltitz continue with his reprisal campaign and suggested that driving some of the populace out of the city and into Allied lines might force the Allies to slow their advance in order to care for the refugees. Because no record of the telephone conversation exists today, historians have been unable to fully recreate the exact phrasing of this, or whether it was indeed an order, as most have suggested. Regardless of whether it was a suggestion or an order, Choltitz took it as an order, a fact that would have drastic consequences during the siege of the city during the fall. Choltitz and Model disconnected the conversation after approximately two hours, each feeling that the other was doing their utmost to help the other, and both came away satisfied. Unfortunately for Choltitz, however, little of Model's actions did any good. Such was the rapid pace of the Allied advance that the whole of the Seventh Army was trapped south of the Loire and forced to surrender. Of the four infantry divisions remaining on the south side of the Seine (the 158th and 165th had also been part of this force, but had been withdrawn ahead of the others), their fate was scarcely different. Barely 7,000 scattered, panicked men arrived in Paris from a total strength of over 35,000. The rest had been either captured or killed.
Barely had Choltitz finished his conversation with Model when the switchboard in the Hotel Meurice notified him that he had an incoming call from Rastenburg. Generaloberst Jodl, Hitler's right-hand military man, demanded to know why only twelve of the city's factories had thus far been demolished. The Fuehrer, he warned, was growing impatient. Had the experts from Berlin finished their work? he asked. Yes, Choltitz admitted, they had. In fact, the demolition plans for all 200 factories were located in a suite in an upstairs bedroom of the Meurice. The four demolitions experts, having been trapped in the city due to the uprising, were busy at work assisting with emplacing demolition charges on the Seine bridges. With that answer, Jodl demanded to know why the demolitions had not progressed further. It was, Choltitz answered again, due to the uprising. All available troops were needed to retake the city and quell the uprising. Furthermore, he answered, he was afraid that demolitions might further antagonize the populace. "The Fuhrer," Jodl responded, "does not care for the citizens of Paris. Antagonize them if you must, but whatever happens, the Fuhrer expects you to carry out the widest demolition possible in the area assigned to your command."
In Normandy, where late evening was beginning to fall along with the rain, General Eisenhower had just been informed that General De Gaulle's plane was overdue and that no contact with it had been made since it left Gibraltar. Worried, Eisenhower ordered that a search be begun for the General. It was possible, he replied, that De Gaulle had been forced to divert to another location for any number of reasons. With the order given, Eisenhower put the subject out of his mind — there was too much already to worry about. His armies were crossing the Seine, and preparing to thrust east and north. Montgomery was poised to strike toward the Pas de Calais and Antwerp, while Bradley was crossing the upper Seine and getting ready to race to the Rhine. There was much to be done, and as long as they stayed clear of Paris, Eisenhower figured, everything would fall into place.
As night fell on Paris and the second day of the insurrection came to an end, Colonel Rol's communist fighters exacted a bit of revenge for the Prefecture of Police. Attacking a convoy of German trucks with Molotovs, they managed to set four ablaze and brutally machine-gunned those who managed to escape the flames by jumping out of the truck beds. The 83 Germans killed were almost as many as had been killed during the entire day's fighting up to that point. Adding to the previous day's total, an estimated 337 Germans had been killed by nightfall. French casualties, while unknown, are estimated to have been in the thousands. Shortly after being informed of the convoy ambush, Choltitz was informed by an excited member of the SD that German soldiers had captured three important FFI officers with all their papers as they tried to drive through a German checkpoint. They hadn't even bothered to burn the papers, he exclaimed, thrilled with the success. He asked Choltitz what they should do with the men, given that they had been captured with weapons and were thus in violation of Choltitz's edict that any Frenchman captured with a firearm should be punished — with death. The other option was to hand the three men over to the SD, a fate, as Choltitz recorded in his diary, "not worthy of a dog." Instead, "shoot them" was his order. With that order, Alexandre Parodi, the highest-ranking member of the Gaullist resistance in the city, became one of its first casualties.
With a plan taking shape in his mind, he contacted Choltitz via telephone. It took nearly 45 minutes for a connection to be established, but this allowed Model to further refine his plan with his staff officers before communicating with Choltitz. He instructed Choltitz that Paris should be held at all costs and that he was planning to evacuate the four infantry divisions remaining south of the Seine through Paris. Furthermore, the rest of the remnants of the Seventh Army (which had been facing the Allies in Brittany and southern Normandy) would also be evacuated through the city. Portions would remain behind to bolster the city's defenses, aided by the arrival of the 26th and 27th Panzer divisions, which, he informed Choltitz, were being redeployed from Denmark on the Fuhrer's orders. The city, he instructed, should be held at all costs in order to slow the Allied advance and force them to devote forces against it. Choltitz informed him of the growing problems with partisans in the city, and said that wide stretches of Paris had been "abandoned by German forces in an effort to protect critical installations." Model ordered that Choltitz continue with his reprisal campaign and suggested that driving some of the populace out of the city and into Allied lines might force the Allies to slow their advance in order to care for the refugees. Because no record of the telephone conversation exists today, historians have been unable to fully recreate the exact phrasing of this, or whether it was indeed an order, as most have suggested. Regardless of whether it was a suggestion or an order, Choltitz took it as an order, a fact that would have drastic consequences during the siege of the city during the fall. Choltitz and Model disconnected the conversation after approximately two hours, each feeling that the other was doing their utmost to help the other, and both came away satisfied. Unfortunately for Choltitz, however, little of Model's actions did any good. Such was the rapid pace of the Allied advance that the whole of the Seventh Army was trapped south of the Loire and forced to surrender. Of the four infantry divisions remaining on the south side of the Seine (the 158th and 165th had also been part of this force, but had been withdrawn ahead of the others), their fate was scarcely different. Barely 7,000 scattered, panicked men arrived in Paris from a total strength of over 35,000. The rest had been either captured or killed.
Barely had Choltitz finished his conversation with Model when the switchboard in the Hotel Meurice notified him that he had an incoming call from Rastenburg. Generaloberst Jodl, Hitler's right-hand military man, demanded to know why only twelve of the city's factories had thus far been demolished. The Fuehrer, he warned, was growing impatient. Had the experts from Berlin finished their work? he asked. Yes, Choltitz admitted, they had. In fact, the demolition plans for all 200 factories were located in a suite in an upstairs bedroom of the Meurice. The four demolitions experts, having been trapped in the city due to the uprising, were busy at work assisting with emplacing demolition charges on the Seine bridges. With that answer, Jodl demanded to know why the demolitions had not progressed further. It was, Choltitz answered again, due to the uprising. All available troops were needed to retake the city and quell the uprising. Furthermore, he answered, he was afraid that demolitions might further antagonize the populace. "The Fuhrer," Jodl responded, "does not care for the citizens of Paris. Antagonize them if you must, but whatever happens, the Fuhrer expects you to carry out the widest demolition possible in the area assigned to your command."
In Normandy, where late evening was beginning to fall along with the rain, General Eisenhower had just been informed that General De Gaulle's plane was overdue and that no contact with it had been made since it left Gibraltar. Worried, Eisenhower ordered that a search be begun for the General. It was possible, he replied, that De Gaulle had been forced to divert to another location for any number of reasons. With the order given, Eisenhower put the subject out of his mind — there was too much already to worry about. His armies were crossing the Seine, and preparing to thrust east and north. Montgomery was poised to strike toward the Pas de Calais and Antwerp, while Bradley was crossing the upper Seine and getting ready to race to the Rhine. There was much to be done, and as long as they stayed clear of Paris, Eisenhower figured, everything would fall into place.
As night fell on Paris and the second day of the insurrection came to an end, Colonel Rol's communist fighters exacted a bit of revenge for the Prefecture of Police. Attacking a convoy of German trucks with Molotovs, they managed to set four ablaze and brutally machine-gunned those who managed to escape the flames by jumping out of the truck beds. The 83 Germans killed were almost as many as had been killed during the entire day's fighting up to that point. Adding to the previous day's total, an estimated 337 Germans had been killed by nightfall. French casualties, while unknown, are estimated to have been in the thousands. Shortly after being informed of the convoy ambush, Choltitz was informed by an excited member of the SD that German soldiers had captured three important FFI officers with all their papers as they tried to drive through a German checkpoint. They hadn't even bothered to burn the papers, he exclaimed, thrilled with the success. He asked Choltitz what they should do with the men, given that they had been captured with weapons and were thus in violation of Choltitz's edict that any Frenchman captured with a firearm should be punished — with death. The other option was to hand the three men over to the SD, a fate, as Choltitz recorded in his diary, "not worthy of a dog." Instead, "shoot them" was his order. With that order, Alexandre Parodi, the highest-ranking member of the Gaullist resistance in the city, became one of its first casualties.
whatisinaname
Donor
Hi Amerigo Vespucci
Another excellent part, well done
I like the idea that Model will use Paris as part of his defence plan, that should be interesting?
Another excellent part, well done
I like the idea that Model will use Paris as part of his defence plan, that should be interesting?
Well, what he wants to do and what he's able to do are two different things. We can't handwave away the rapid collapse of the German defenses along the Western Front, forex.
whatisinaname
Donor
Agreed, but will they collapse as in out TL, or will Paris buy somw time for Model, he was always very good at dealing with problems like this on the eastern front.
My thought is that the new front line ends up further west then in our TL as this would be possible if Paris slows the allies advance to allow the German army to regroup?
But I could be wrong
Agreed, but will they collapse as in out TL, or will Paris buy somw time for Model, he was always very good at dealing with problems like this on the eastern front.
My thought is that the new front line ends up further west then in our TL as this would be possible if Paris slows the allies advance to allow the German army to regroup?
But I could be wrong
Well, that's the fun of the matter. You'll just have to wait a few days as the story is unveiled.
Shortly after midnight in the very early morning hours of August 21st, General Jacques Philippe Leclerc, commander of the French Second Armored Division, digested the news that Charles De Gaulle was missing. The word had been passed through the army's grapevine almost at the speed of light, and as a general commanding a division, he got the news even quicker than most. It was something that had kept him awake, even into this, the darkest morning he had ever known. De Gaulle and Leclerc had fought together from Cameroon in central Africa to now, almost the very doorstep of Paris. It was a "tragedy beyond tragedy" to lose him at the very moment of Paris' liberation, Leclerc thought. Still, he vowed, he had a duty perform, and though De Gaulle might be gone — he knew in his heart that De Gaulle was dead, even though officially, he was merely "overdue" — he would fulfill the promise he made in the sands of the Sahara to one day liberate Paris, even if it meant disobeying the orders of his corps commander, his army commander, that of General Bradley, General Eisenhower — even God himself. For the last four weeks, his fuel trucks had been secretly taking double rations. He had been slow in reporting destroyed vehicles. All this was to allow him to build up a supply of fuel "off the books," thus enabling the division to have the capability to sprint into Paris, if and when the opportunity arose. He vowed that he would seize that opportunity, and damn the consequences. For De Gaulle, for himself, and for Paris.
Also in the early-morning hours of the 21st, Colonel Rol took advantage of the relative safety the night provided by moving into a new underground headquarters. The capture and execution of Parodi — Rol had learned of the man's death shortly after midnight — put new impetus on the move. And so, Rol and his lieutenants crept through the sewers of Paris, through darkness even more total than that of the blacked-out city above. His destination was a station of the pumping authority, located 90 feet below the streets of the Monparnasse district. Though the Germans had retaken much of the historic central district, Rol was enormously satisfied with all that had been accomplished up to the morning of the 21st. The hospitals had been seized, most of the city halls still remained in FFI hands, the newspapers were rapidly turning out masses of propaganda and instructions on how to build barricades, make Molotov cocktails, and all the vital information needed to resist the Germans. Most of the city's train stations were in the hands of the partisans, and best of all, new barricades were being erected almost hourly. Rol calculated that these would do the best work in slowing the German tanks. But, he allowed, slowing them wasn't his goal — he wanted to retake the city, wresting it from German control. Barricades were not enough for that. He needed weapons: Bazookas, Gammon grenades, mortars, and explosives of all kinds. To do that, he needed to request assistance from the Allies. The trick was to do that without pushing them into invading the city themselves, something that would surely wreck the communists' plans to install a leftist government. Rol had sent a messenger through the German lines, but there was no guarantee that the man would arrive safely. He needed to send messages through the FFI radios, something that would have to be done quickly, before the Gaullists in charge of those radios recovered from the death of Parodi's command. He resolved that he would have trustworthy men and women in control of the radios by noon.
As it had the previous day, the sun brought increased fighting. The day did not begin as bloodily as the 20th, however — the fall of the Prefecture of Police removed the biggest single block of resistance against the German forces. But as Napoleon once said, "he who is strong everywhere is strong nowhere," and that statement was proved on the morning of the 21st. As Choltitz's massed soldiers and tanks had begun to recapture various public buildings across the city on the 19th and 20th, they began to lose the strength of numbers. Firepower is exponential — two men firing rifles is more than twice as effective as one man firing a rifle. And because the widespread nature of the insurrection forced Choltitz to detach units to protect buildings his "fire brigades" had seized, the effectiveness of those fire brigades dropped with every platoon forced to defend the shattered remains of a building. Choltitz's original plan to maintain a perimeter around the area of the city that had been cleared of FFI began to show cracks. In the morning, small numbers of FFI fighters managed to slip past the German perimeter around the historic core of Paris to snipe at officers and men along the Champs Elysses. In the north, the 158th Reserve Division, which had been battered by the Allies, ordered to retreat to Paris, then had its remaining strength spilt to cover the two Paris airfields, found its northern section stretched to the limit in order to recapture the train stations south of Le Bourget. It was not so much the resistance posed by the FFI — every time the Germans massed for an attack, or if they used tanks, they were successful. It was the fact that the FFI had numbers far beyond what the Germans could bring to bear. The barricades and their ability to draw everyday Parisians into the city made the situation even worse for the defending Germans.
Also in the early-morning hours of the 21st, Colonel Rol took advantage of the relative safety the night provided by moving into a new underground headquarters. The capture and execution of Parodi — Rol had learned of the man's death shortly after midnight — put new impetus on the move. And so, Rol and his lieutenants crept through the sewers of Paris, through darkness even more total than that of the blacked-out city above. His destination was a station of the pumping authority, located 90 feet below the streets of the Monparnasse district. Though the Germans had retaken much of the historic central district, Rol was enormously satisfied with all that had been accomplished up to the morning of the 21st. The hospitals had been seized, most of the city halls still remained in FFI hands, the newspapers were rapidly turning out masses of propaganda and instructions on how to build barricades, make Molotov cocktails, and all the vital information needed to resist the Germans. Most of the city's train stations were in the hands of the partisans, and best of all, new barricades were being erected almost hourly. Rol calculated that these would do the best work in slowing the German tanks. But, he allowed, slowing them wasn't his goal — he wanted to retake the city, wresting it from German control. Barricades were not enough for that. He needed weapons: Bazookas, Gammon grenades, mortars, and explosives of all kinds. To do that, he needed to request assistance from the Allies. The trick was to do that without pushing them into invading the city themselves, something that would surely wreck the communists' plans to install a leftist government. Rol had sent a messenger through the German lines, but there was no guarantee that the man would arrive safely. He needed to send messages through the FFI radios, something that would have to be done quickly, before the Gaullists in charge of those radios recovered from the death of Parodi's command. He resolved that he would have trustworthy men and women in control of the radios by noon.
As it had the previous day, the sun brought increased fighting. The day did not begin as bloodily as the 20th, however — the fall of the Prefecture of Police removed the biggest single block of resistance against the German forces. But as Napoleon once said, "he who is strong everywhere is strong nowhere," and that statement was proved on the morning of the 21st. As Choltitz's massed soldiers and tanks had begun to recapture various public buildings across the city on the 19th and 20th, they began to lose the strength of numbers. Firepower is exponential — two men firing rifles is more than twice as effective as one man firing a rifle. And because the widespread nature of the insurrection forced Choltitz to detach units to protect buildings his "fire brigades" had seized, the effectiveness of those fire brigades dropped with every platoon forced to defend the shattered remains of a building. Choltitz's original plan to maintain a perimeter around the area of the city that had been cleared of FFI began to show cracks. In the morning, small numbers of FFI fighters managed to slip past the German perimeter around the historic core of Paris to snipe at officers and men along the Champs Elysses. In the north, the 158th Reserve Division, which had been battered by the Allies, ordered to retreat to Paris, then had its remaining strength spilt to cover the two Paris airfields, found its northern section stretched to the limit in order to recapture the train stations south of Le Bourget. It was not so much the resistance posed by the FFI — every time the Germans massed for an attack, or if they used tanks, they were successful. It was the fact that the FFI had numbers far beyond what the Germans could bring to bear. The barricades and their ability to draw everyday Parisians into the city made the situation even worse for the defending Germans.
Had the Germans developed the Panzerfaust by this point? Anyway, was wondering if the FFI and Communist partisans wouldn't at some point "liberate" a couple of German ammo dumps and turn those weapons upon the occupiers?...
The problem for the partisans in a prolonged engagement is that while they've got numbers on their side, they don't have the ability to mass those numbers. In OTL, the biggest individual actions were those around the barricades, in the city halls, and of course, at the Prefecture of Police. They didn't have the ability to coordinate, and with the destruction of the civilian telephone switching network, what little ability they had would be knocked out almost entirely.
Furthermore, there really weren't ammunition dumps as we think of them in the city. For Germany, Paris was a garrison town used for rear-area recreation. Because it was well away from the front, there wasn't a logistical infrastructure built up in the city the way the Allies would in eastern France in late 1944. In TTL, the Germans fighting the partisans is like someone using a hammer to empty a puddle. The Germans are far fewer in number, but are coordinated and have a firepower advantage. The French are far more numerous, but are separated and have few reliable weapons. There are always some captured weapons (German grenades were a popular choice), but never enough to meet demand. Panzerfausts weren't present in the city in any great numbers, mainly due to the fact that they weren't needed. You don't send anti-tank weapons to a place where there aren't any tanks facing you.
By noon, Choltitz had even been informed of a series of desertions and surrenders, where disheartened Germans surrendered to FFI cells that promised to hide them and keep them safe until the Allies arrived in the city. These posed as great a threat to his ability to defend Paris as any of the FFI's actions. It was in this atmosphere that General Otto Dessloch, commander of Luftflotte 3, arrived at the Hotel Meurice. Dessloch was in high spirits — higher, at least than those of Choltitz — after his Stukas had helped smash the Prefecture of Police. It was then that he laid out his plan. The 150 aircraft of the Luftflotte in Paris would soon have to depart for safer airfields to the north and east. But before they left, Dessloch proposed an assault — not on the strongpoints of the FFI — but on the neighborhoods of northeast Paris. Dessloch traced a finger on a map he had brought for the purpose. From Montmartre east to Pantin, and from Buttes-Chaumont north to the empty stockyards of the porte de la Villette, the Luftflotte could engage in shuttle bombing from Le Bourget, barely five miles distant. The raid would create "a little Hamburg," snuffing out all resistance — and life — in the area, which housed approximately 700,000 Parisians. All that would be required of Choltitz and his men would be to evacuate the area, smash the water mains, and set flares for bomb aiming. This would, hopefully, quell the populace's willingness to resist as well as drawing down the stocks of weaponry at Le Bourget, all of which would need to be destroyed in any event. Choltitz was initially shocked by the man's savagery, but did not reject the plan out of hand. He had been enormously depressed about the chance of the Wehrmacht keeping the city from falling into French hands, but this was something else. He dismissed Dessloch without even a promise to keep the plan in mind. He was too taken aback.
On the other side of the Seine River, a half-dozen FFI radio operators were ordered to take a break. Their positions were replaced by other, fresher operators, who just happened to be communists. Most of the original operators were more than happy to take a temporary — or so they thought — break from the constant readiness the FFI radiomen maintained. The one man who did not feel a need to take a break was ordered to do so. Over the next few hours, each was suddenly awakened from a deep sleep and ordered into "emergency" action against the Germans. Though none were killed, they didn't manage to return to their radio sets for several days. In that time, the radios were manned by a steady stream of communist FFI agents. The tone of the messages sent to London during that time shifted. Instead of requesting an immediate advance to the city by Allied forces, the signals requested urgent air drops of weapons and ammunition. This request was bolstered by the arrival of Colonel Rol's messenger into the Allied lines, now just 30 miles distant from Paris at the town of Rambouillet. Ushered into the tent of General Bradley, he informed Bradley of the situation in the city, and, downplaying the seriousness of the partisans' position, said that all the FFI needed were steady drops of weapons and ammunition and they would be able to deliver a liberated Paris into Allied hands without the need of a single Allied soldier. Though of two minds about this (dreading the need to supply the liberated city, but relieved that no street fighting would be needed), Bradley agreed to pass the message on to Eisenhower in a strategy meeting scheduled for that evening.
On the other side of the Seine River, a half-dozen FFI radio operators were ordered to take a break. Their positions were replaced by other, fresher operators, who just happened to be communists. Most of the original operators were more than happy to take a temporary — or so they thought — break from the constant readiness the FFI radiomen maintained. The one man who did not feel a need to take a break was ordered to do so. Over the next few hours, each was suddenly awakened from a deep sleep and ordered into "emergency" action against the Germans. Though none were killed, they didn't manage to return to their radio sets for several days. In that time, the radios were manned by a steady stream of communist FFI agents. The tone of the messages sent to London during that time shifted. Instead of requesting an immediate advance to the city by Allied forces, the signals requested urgent air drops of weapons and ammunition. This request was bolstered by the arrival of Colonel Rol's messenger into the Allied lines, now just 30 miles distant from Paris at the town of Rambouillet. Ushered into the tent of General Bradley, he informed Bradley of the situation in the city, and, downplaying the seriousness of the partisans' position, said that all the FFI needed were steady drops of weapons and ammunition and they would be able to deliver a liberated Paris into Allied hands without the need of a single Allied soldier. Though of two minds about this (dreading the need to supply the liberated city, but relieved that no street fighting would be needed), Bradley agreed to pass the message on to Eisenhower in a strategy meeting scheduled for that evening.
whatisinaname
Donor
Another great part, this story is developing well.
Even though the authors of "Is Paris Burning?" Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre have made a bit of a mess of the German divisions and units.
I do have a suggestion on alternate units that could be used -
Suggestions for division replacements –
26 and 27 Panzer Divisions replaced by the 25 Panzer Division and/or the 233 Reserve Panzer Division(s)
The 158th and 165th Reserve Divisions –
158 Reserve Division was formed Oct 1942 from Division Nr. 158. It was stationed in Strasbourg and took part in the occupation of Vichy France and was later stationed on the coast of the Bay of Biscay. It was used to reform 16 Infantry Division in Aug 1944, (this order does not go though in this TL?)
165 Reserve Division was formed Oct 1942 from Division Nr. 165. It was disbanded May 1944 and was used to form 70 Infantry Division (based in Denmark so that is ok, all need to do is to renumber).
Luftwaffe
Ju-87G needs to be changed to the Ju-87D, as the G model was only used on the eastern front.
Hope you don't mind these ideas ?
Whatisinaname
Even though the authors of "Is Paris Burning?" Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre have made a bit of a mess of the German divisions and units.
I do have a suggestion on alternate units that could be used -
Suggestions for division replacements –
26 and 27 Panzer Divisions replaced by the 25 Panzer Division and/or the 233 Reserve Panzer Division(s)
The 158th and 165th Reserve Divisions –
158 Reserve Division was formed Oct 1942 from Division Nr. 158. It was stationed in Strasbourg and took part in the occupation of Vichy France and was later stationed on the coast of the Bay of Biscay. It was used to reform 16 Infantry Division in Aug 1944, (this order does not go though in this TL?)
165 Reserve Division was formed Oct 1942 from Division Nr. 165. It was disbanded May 1944 and was used to form 70 Infantry Division (based in Denmark so that is ok, all need to do is to renumber).
Luftwaffe
Ju-87G needs to be changed to the Ju-87D, as the G model was only used on the eastern front.
Hope you don't mind these ideas ?
Whatisinaname
It wasn't so much that the Luftwaffe had no stength in France, it was that it was seen as suicidal to go up in the air given total Allied air superiority. Germany never ran out of planes, it ran out of fuel and pilots. And even if an Allied pilot on CAP spotted the Stukas, they would have been flying out of Le Bourget, so there wouldn't really be any time for an intercept
Not at all. That's why I've been posting this here -- so I can get constructive feedback, then modify it.