How could Germany defeat the USSR in WWII?

[b12ox]

Could the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe be really to start Operation Barbarossa on June 1st, 1941 or June 7th, 1941... thus giving them at least three to two weeks of good combat weather to attack or was the Russian Rasputitsa still in effect during late May and early June???

May and April were very rainy. The terrain was too swampy for tanks to roll over. The Bugs tributaries were overflowing land just next to the river. They needed to wait for summer.

 

[mekilldyou]

Two words: Hunger Plan. And it is not even Hitler's idea.

Then they should give food to the soldiers fighting for them. It might encourage more russians to fight for Germany actually. Or not.

I do not see this happening. Not even if Xerxes himself resurrected.

Well with Iran on the Axis side the soviets have no way to prevent the Germans to take Baku once they reach the caucasus. Also lend-lease equipment will take a much longer time to arrive on the front. I don't know how an invasion of Iran could have been prevented though.

Errr, hate to brake it to you, they did exactly that...

I'm sure they could have used more, out of these 6 million...

Nope. Not in the amount that mattered.

I disagree, especially if the Germans are "winning" and less harsh towards the locals.

I do not see this with Hitler. If Germans win D-Day (impossible in its own right) and Hitler is assassinated, resultant chaos brings Soviets in Berlin by 1945.

I didn't meant Hitler is assassinated, he's just not able to impose his views on the military, and hopefully they will not do the same mistakes. Besides this I'm sure there are reasonably plausible TLs of failed D-Days.

 

[LegionoftheUnitedStates]

The Germans can't win, they can have better, more realistic plans, but they can't WIN.

But the Soviets can lose. All that has to be done is for Stalin to lose control of himself. If he goes off the deep end, kills any general he thinks is failing and imitates Hitler's actions (no retreat, no surrender) when the war went bad for him, then the Soviets can throw away their advantages and let the Germans win. But even then it might be close...

 

[Snake Featherston]

What if they had used chemical and biological weapons on the Eastern front, especially in some of the city sieges? It would have opened that can of worms, but the Germans were much better equipped for that kind of warfare. At the start of the war the Soviets did not even have enough rifles to equip the forces they were rushing to the front, so they would be unlikely to even have enough gas masks, nonetheless full chemical warfare equipment.

That would be the WWI Russian Army you're thinking of. WWII Soviet armies never had problems of rifles, rather they had them with ammunition, especially in 1941.

 

[RGB]

Then they should give food to the soldiers fighting for them. It might encourage more russians to fight for Germany actually. Or not.

Where would they GET the food to start with? It's not like Germany was swimming in extra supplies.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Could the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe be really to start Operation Barbarossa on June 1st, 1941 or June 7th, 1941... thus giving them at least three to two weeks of good combat weather to attack or was the Russian Rasputitsa still in effect during late May and early June???

Or would the German air and ground units among with the supplies & fuel that was earmark for the Afrika Corps be instead be diverted to create another Panzer Corp and be used either by Army Group North Or South instead for the drive for either Leningrad or Rostov...?

If they strike earlier it would have been on 15 May right into the teeth of a ready and waiting Soviet defense that would have seen them chewed up further, faster, and not getting anywhere near their OTL depth and scale of deep striking. While at the same time the USSR is even stronger than it was IOTL. The German factor was never one of time, rather it was one of insufficient strength for the task at hand, relative to the USSR.

 

[Julian]

The idea of a halt in German operations in the Center after Smolensk, with Typhoon being cancelled in favor of rest and recovery is a simple POD which could feasibly be worked out provided Hitler believes that an advance on Moscow in the fall would prove ill advised. I don't think it's a stretch to say that he could have come to that conclusion. So let's look at the pros and cons of such a halt:

Pros:

1. Manpower losses are certainly less than those sufferd during Typhoon.

2. German strategic defensive position is better, with fewer salients and awkward twists and turns.

3. Infantry divisions can be better distributed along the front.

4. Logistics can to some degree be improved.

5. Divisions have time to entrench and rest.

Cons:

1. A halt essentially hands the Red Army the strategic initiative without a fight. Even with German tactical superiority this is a bad thing.

2. The Red Army will likely launch counteroffensives. Not very succesful ones, but they will be very costly and irritating for both sides.

3. The Red Army wins several valuable months to regroup. Rather than losing multiple fronts during Typhoon it can recuuperate essentially unchecked.

4. Several hundred thousand men lost during Typhoon, along with equipment, remain availiable for use.

5. The Heer cannot halt operations along the entire front. In the center yes, but not in the north and south. Thus counteroffensives will still strike overextended forces in those areas, ever moreso than IOTL.

6. The Red Army as time to plan a counteroffensive. IOTL the Moscow counterattack was designed first and foremost to drive the Germans from the outskirts. Only a month later was it expanded into an attempt to destroy Center as a whole. So instead of planning as it advances, STAVKA can conceive an operational design without having to rush into an offensive.

So while a winter halt does help the Heer, it greatly speeds up the Red Army's recovery. Both sides benefit equally from an operatonal lull. Further I'm rather critical of the idea that the heer can critically improve it's supply situation in time to properly equip all units and supply them. Better than OTL, but not to the degree that it has a decisive impact.

In conclusion the Red Army will likely drive the Germans from the region east of Lenungrad and the Rostov region as per OTL. Further counterattacks will see the Germans lose key portions of the western Donbass. The Leningrad blockade may also be loosened earlier than OTL, but the region's geography prevents the Red Army from achieving any effective victory until much later. Center will come under the heaviest pressure, especially 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Army, along with 6th Army further south. The Red army will take the line of Kharkov-Oboian-Kursk-Orel-Briansk but will stall before further gains can be made, except in more local salients. Other parts of Center and south will also buckle, but there will be no Toropets-Kholm breakthroughs. Losses will be very heavy on both sides; not as bad as OTL but still crippling for the Heer in the long run. By Spring the Red Army will have achieved noticeable advances, but just as IOT the Heer will be ready to resume it's advance. Oddly it's target will likely be Moscow, the most realistic target due to the defeats in the south.

 

[Shaby]

But Germans kept getting sucked further and further into fight by almost continuous strings of Soviet defeats. It always seemed that just one more nudge will do it. The thing that might cause Germans to pause is some sort of a reverse that shows them the falsehood of that assumption. However any reverse in fortunes that could cause this would probably be of a magnitude that would cripple German war effort in the East.

 

[Snake Featherston]

The Germans could not copmpletly destroy the Red Army. it was what Hitler was aiming at
"i want to eliminate the oponents combat mobility once and for all with one giant blow"
This led to time consuming operations withing Barbarossa. In theory it was a good plan. Germans guessed correctly that the weakest link in russian defence was unreadiness to fight modern war. They destroyed 20000 tanks within a couple of months. Russians were churning out thousnads upon thousnads of outdated tanks and artilery units and failed to relaise that on its own, without constant supply of fuel, spare parts they are useless. They destroyed most of russian tanks but that armor and without backup was not really what they should be worrying about that much. All they did was to show Russians where was the problem with their own war preperations.

The best they could do was to concentrate all forces on two prong attack without delays on Moscow and Leningrad, in the south resorting to fake war. Bring the remaing divitions stationed in the west and attach them to army center, close off Leningrad and hit Moscow with all. Moscow would have had no time to get ready to surround the city with five rings, the troops from the far east would have had not arrived yet, Wermacht tanks would have had less technical problems in front of Moscow because they wouldn't have been used in Ukraine, winter still far away. These are just few easy to see benefits. If Moscow was gone, Leningrad would fell apart soon after as it held on food supply from Moscow. The rail Murmansk-Moscow with lend-lease would have been abandoned. I am not saying that would be enough, but Moscow and Leningrad were not far away. The targets were finite and clear, unlike endless landscape that make you walk in circles fighting the same battles again and again.

Actually the Soviets were prepared *in theory and in terms of total equipment pools and variety* for modern war. They, however, were prepared for a defensive war and like the Germans made no effort whatsoever to focus on defensive war (Germany just dusted off 1918's concepts without remotely bothering to see if they still held true). Relative to the Nazis, and actually to everyone else in WWII, the Soviets were the only ones to make the conceptual and organizational leaps into modern *warfare* by a WWII timeframe. It was a relative advantage that was very well-timed, as it's what kept the Nazis from simply slaughtering their way through Central Europe.

 

[kclcmdr]

If they strike earlier it would have been on 15 May right into the teeth of a ready and waiting Soviet defense that would have seen them chewed up further, faster, and not getting anywhere near their OTL depth and scale of deep striking. While at the same time the USSR is even stronger than it was IOTL. The German factor was never one of time, rather it was one of insufficient strength for the task at hand, relative to the USSR.

In May 15, 1939, Soviet Defenses based inside the Soviet Borders before they invaded Poland was ; indeed; quite strong..

However, after Nov 1939, I believe that the Soviets decided to move most of those Troops emplaced on those fortified positions inside Soviet Territory forward into Soviet Occupied Polish territory..

According to some Barbarossa books, the movement of these Soviet units forward towards positions inside occupied Poland also made the Soviets stripped the fortified positions near the Former Polish / Soviet border and posted them in the newly occupied territories..

The Soviets were also in the process of re-organizing their forces during the late 1940 / early 1941 time due to what their combat experience told them what did work and didn't work during their war against Finland and then the German Blitzkrieg in the Lowlands and France that overwhelmed them and shock the Soviets even more to continue re-organize their military formations...

That re-organization left many units in the transformation from a 1939 military combat formation to a new 1941 military combat formation but they were in the process of exchanging old equipment with new equipment and re-training their troops and the Germans attack the Soviets during their re-organization where they were yet to be prepare for full-combat...

No matter how much time Wehrmacht have, the Moscow is outside their envelope. They will be uterly exhausted and unable to capture the city defended by whatever Soviets scrap from the cupboard. And Soviets will defend it to the last bullet. Besides, German logistics cannot support drive to Moscow.

That is why I inquire if the units and supplies & fuel not sent to the Afrika Corps be sent either to AGN or AGS , not AGC ...

If Hitler follows OTL decision making... the extra Armoured Corp will give either AG North or AG South an extra mobile Panzer unit to flank and break the Soviet Line towards Leningrad or towards Rostov...

I suspect that the extra German Panzer Corp might not be enough to help in the reduction/surrounding of Smolensk at a faster pace ... probably...

but the extra German Pz Corp might ... just might ... help either AGN or AGS... maybe...

 

[Snake Featherston]

In May 15, 1939, Soviet Defenses based inside the Soviet Borders before they invaded Poland was ; indeed; quite strong..

However, after Nov 1939, I believe that the Soviets decided to move most of those Troops emplaced on those fortified positions inside Soviet Territory forward into Soviet Occupied Polish territory..

According to some Barbarossa books, the movement of these Soviet units forward towards positions inside occupied Poland also made the Soviets stripped the fortified positions near the Former Polish / Soviet border and posted them in the newly occupied territories..

The Soviets were also in the process of re-organizing their forces during the late 1940 / early 1941 time due to what their combat experience told them what did work and didn't work during their war against Finland and then the German Blitzkrieg in the Lowlands and France that overwhelmed them and shock the Soviets even more to continue re-organize their military formations...

That re-organization left many units in the transformation from a 1939 military combat formation to a new 1941 military combat formation but they were in the process of exchanging old equipment with new equipment and re-training their troops and the Germans attack the Soviets during their re-organization where they were yet to be prepare for full-combat...

It's not just that, the MP-40 plan was based on a very erroneous assumption that the USSR would have 14 days to contain a Nazi strike, which was further amplified by inexperience issues and a poor distribution of forces. 1941 was as perfect a chance as Germany had to attack, they did all it was in their power to do. And four years later Zhukov's Front was raising the Hammer and Sickle over the Reichstag all the same.

 

[Fredrick II Barbarossa]

If Hitler (or whoever has his job instead in the TL...) had been just sane enough to make a genuine anti-Soviet alliance with Poland in 1939, and sent their forces east with Poland's consent & support, then Britain and France would probably have stayed out of the war altogether. Not having a 'Western Front' to worry about could possibly then have let the Germans (and Poles) hit the Russians that much earlier, while Stalin's purge of the Red Army was actually in progress, and....

Umm... didn't this happen in turtledoves series on WWII called East and West where Hitler declares war 11 months early....

 

[b12ox]

Actually the Soviets were prepared *in theory and in terms of total equipment pools and variety* for modern war. They, however, were prepared for a defensive war and like the Germans made no effort whatsoever to focus on defensive war (Germany just dusted off 1918's concepts without remotely bothering to see if they still held true). Relative to the Nazis, and actually to everyone else in WWII, the Soviets were the only ones to make the conceptual and organizational leaps into modern *warfare* by a WWII timeframe. It was a relative advantage that was very well-timed, as it's what kept the Nazis from simply slaughtering their way through Central Europe.

What good make the numbers and veriety of combat armor if you have no ways to keep it going because of the lack of fuel, spare parts, trucks to transport shells, food, people. Even if Germans had not destroyed majority of it, the Soviets would have been struggling badly with logistics. I won"t even add that the tanks were obsolete. The problems that arouse with the defence didn't differ much with the offensive issues Germans were having. It was the struggle with the movement of troops and armour through a large territory and of keepig it supplied. Russians were only able to engage sucesfully Germans close to the limits of biggest cities. The same happened with Blue. They could walk weherver they wanted. They could walk round the globe without Soviets doing much to stop them. They had no defensive strategy at all to fight this war in the field, perhaps some good theoretical stuff that was quickly scrapped as not applicable to reality.
Germans put all modern walfare to work to achive shock victories. Not very complecated in itself, but required to be budled with supply demand, communication, reconnaisance. It was the best tactics of the time. At the start of the war the Russians only could allow to dispatch small tank groups to attack the opponent which was not working. They could not afford large scale combat. Whatever brilliant concepts they had, it was not applicable.

 

[Snake Featherston]

What good make the numbers and veriety of combat armor if you have no ways to keep it going because of the lack of fuel, spare parts, trucks to transport shells, food, people. Even if Germans had not destroyed majority of it, the Soviets would have been struggling badly with logistics. I won"t even add that the tanks were obsolete. The problems that arouse with the defence didn't differ much with the offensive issues Germans were having. It was the struggle with the movement of troops and armour through a large territory and of keepig it supplied. Russians were only able to engage sucesfully Germans close to the limits of biggest cities. The same happened with Blue. They could walk weherver they wanted. They could walk round the globe without Soviets doing much to stop them. They had no defensive strategy at all to fight this war in the field, perhaps some good theoretical stuff that was quickly scrapped as not applicable to reality.
Germans put all modern walfare to work to achive shock victories. Not very complecated in itself, but required to be budled with supply demand, communication, reconnaisance. It was the best tactics of the time. At the start of the war the Russians only could allow to dispatch small tank groups to attack the opponent which was not working. They could not afford large scale combat. Whatever brilliant concepts they had, it was not applicable.

The Germans didn't have any preparation for modern warfare, they invented a concept based on their string of luck earlier in the war. German generals as late as the aftermath of the battle of France were seriously advocating doing away with their armor to replace it with horses (I can only imagine how this would have worked in Greece, let alone Russia), and the concept that they were infalliable wonder-workers is purely a product of their memoirs and Cold War politics.

The Soviets had the concepts, they had the structure. What they did not have was a defensive doctrine suited to the conditions of modern warfare. Fortunately for them they faced an army with only a tiny modern spearhead superimposed on a primarily pre-modern structure. The Nazi army was totally unsuited for a modern war. However its enemies were at the start still more unsuited.

The reason the Soviets did as well as they did is that unlike the Nazis they were prepared to sustain a war, the Nazis wanted a fourteen-day battle and it was all downhill from there when it failed.

 

[b12ox]

14 days battle is exageration. What they wanted was to destroy Soviets everywhere at the same time before Christmas. They could not haVe gotten evrywhere within that timespan. The token they based their wishes on was speed and russian alcoholic stupor or something like that. They could have never done it even if all Russians were drunk. Doing the best possible thing and reducing their ambitions to Moskow and Leningrad, would cause Russians to relocate and reorganize in the south and in the Urals, still sitting on oil.They could have taken that option cause it was the only oprions managable, not necessery doable, but Moscow was not that far away while the whole land is endless.

 

[Hawkeye]

They would never be able to cross the Urals, and the Soviets would keep fighting on from beyond.

Not really. If, by some miracle, the Germans actually managed to get that far then they would have nearly everything that's worth having in the USSR. Meanwhile the Urals wont give the Russians much protection since they basically amount to a glorified speed-bump.

 

[Blue Max]

Even in the worst of all possible cases where the Soviets lose Moscow, Leningrad and most of their army in 1941, the Soviet people can't fold.


Hitler winning is at best slavery, and more likely its death via famine, via death camp, massacre, medical experiments or many other calculated cruelties. The Soviets would fight on at least as desperately as the Chinese fought on against Imperial Japan--and Japan had no intention of wiping out the Chinese people.


Germany will start eating kiloton weapons before they kill off the Soviet people. And if the terms of Soviet 'victory' are their survival and akward aid by ideological rivals, they'll drink it with the sweet vodka of killing the fascist invaders.


If you want to beat the Soviets, make Germany's leadership hypercompetent and able to win the global battle for the moral high ground and world opinion.

 

[Hawkeye]

If you want to beat the Soviets, make Germany's leadership hypercompetent and able to win the global battle for the moral high ground and world opinion.

If they were competent then they would of avoided war in the first place.

 

[Snake Featherston]

14 days battle is exageration. What they wanted was to destroy Soviets everywhere at the same time before Christmas. They could not haVe gotten evrywhere within that timespan. The token they based their wishes on was speed and russian alcoholic stupor or something like that. They could have never done it even if all Russians were drunk. Doing the best possible thing and reducing their ambitions to Moskow and Leningrad, would cause Russians to relocate and reorganize in the south and in the Urals, still sitting on oil.They could have taken that option cause it was the only oprions managable, not necessery doable, but Moscow was not that far away while the whole land is endless.

Actually it's the truth. The exaggeration would be that they just thought they'd run over the Russians on their panzers, at least the ones that didn't run away.

 

[b12ox]

Germans are not stupid. I believe it was the fear of what may have happened, had they failed to achieve complete victory. In other words they were scared of what would happen if they pissed off Russians but came short of finishing them off. Thats why they never negotiated a war with Soviets that could be led in stages, one step at a time. They underestimated them yet not quite. Perhaps the image of bolshevick beasts they invented held them in check and prevented to make more resonable decisions