Germany's 1914 Eastern Plan?

Deleted member 1487

Did you mean the French 6th Army?
No, the French 9th army on the Marne. The 6th near Paris was something else and did have a lot of reserves not with other armies. I skimmed a bit of Riann's post and saw 9th army and didn't realize he was talking about the German 9th army, not the French though. Though the 9th army was formed from stripping units from other German armies and fortress garrisons, so not much different from the French 9th.


In any event, the army-level formations the French put together in the first two months of the war did pretty well on the defensive, or attacking on home territory near Paris. But yeah, flinging such a new and probably understaffed formation into an attack through difficult terrain in Belgium is very much more challenging than what they were called upon to do OTL.

If the French try this, expect serious C3 errors and potentially catastrophic bungling. This happened OTL even among French regular corps and army formations (around Rossignol, for instance). It might also be relevant to bring up the tremendous administrative chaos that occurred in 1918 when inexperienced American staffs tried to bring troops forward during the Argonne offensive -- a new and understaffed French army trying to attack through the Ardennes would risk similar results for similar reasons.

It might be noted that one of the main reasons Michel proposed to brigade reserve units with regular divisions (which would have created tremendously unwieldy double-size divisions) was because of a serious French shortfall in staff officers -- and indeed, officers of all sorts.
Yeah given how many problems the French regulars had on the offensive in German and Belgian territory IOTL and how well the Germans did on the defensive, especially given their greater MG and artillery parks, they'd pretty much slaughter the French reserve and ad hoc units. Even the German Landwehr and Ersatz divisions on the defensive will do even better than they did on the offensive IOTL, like the French at the Marne in reserve, but better given that they generally were of higher quality than the equivalent French units AND the French did worse on the offensive. Plus the flat firing 75s did not handle trenches well in a mobile situation; they were able to adapt in a static situation later in the war when it was realized the artillery needed to be in a dugout situation to simulate a howitzer trajectory, but that was not the situation for most of 1914, so dug in German troops are pretty much safe from French field artillery but for the unlikely direct hit.

Remember IOTL the Battle of the Frontiers cost the French more dead in 1 week than the US lost in Korea or Vietnam. By the end of September the French had more dead than the US lost in combat in all of WW2. Here it could be even worse.
 

Deleted member 1487

The difficulty facing France was the need to attack to help Russia and at the same time having an army based upon non trench warfare. With Russia reeling and their frontal offensive in AL stopped with massive losses they would have 3 real choices

1. Continue to attack in AL to pin German troops
2. Rebuild their army (they did so at the end of 1917 early 1918 - by actually having enough hi angle firing guns to cause heavy causalities) however the need to refit their fortress guns to field guns would take serious time. Their are many books that i have read (will try to reference) that focus on the early years of of the war and the French ignoring the need for howitzers but instead focusing on the 75 mm (excellent gun) which was ill suited to trench or fortress warfare. Its shell trajectory was not high enough to descend over hills or plunge into trenches or fortresses. So to create a force with such artillary would bring you into early 1917. Its range was also outclassed by the German artillery.
3. Attacks into Belgium would be stopped at the fortresses and keep GB for sure out of the war
And the French left would actively sabotage the war effort if France wasn't attacked; they were not keen on France fighting an offensive war to save Russia when France itself wasn't attacked. As it was the French authorities planned on arresting the leadership of the Socialist and other left movements to prevent this, which would well cause riots.

Beyond that the French are going to be attack the German fortress system in a region where the terrain is pretty rough and defender friendly. Given the type of army the French had it would be very costly to try.
 
Germany and France fighting in Belgium drags Britain into the war, not out of it.

Not if it's France attacking. The potential danger of Germany domination of the continent (and, worse, German ports on the Channel) would probably convince the British to let France go through with it. Oh, they'd do their best to stop them and, probably, try to convince Belgium to let the French through (depening on what France is planning - or, rather, how wide a front they want to open with Germany).

But Britain isn't going to join the war against France, Germany's too much of a threat. Equally, if the French attack (and, therefore, Belgium joins the Central Powers), the British won't enter the war - they won't approve necessarily, but the British won't be joining the CPs. Probably won't even step back from a pro-Entente neutrality ... unless forced to by public opinion.
 
Remember IOTL the Battle of the Frontiers cost the French more dead in 1 week than the US lost in Korea or Vietnam. By the end of September the French had more dead than the US lost in combat in all of WW2. Here it could be even worse.

In August-Sept 1914 the French took the tactical offensive even while on the defensive, causing heavy casualties. In this A-H they will be on the tactical offensive, meaning operational considerations do not increase the number of casualties. OTOH, the number of German artillery pieces and MG's is fewer, perhaps 1/2 or 1/3 of historical. Therefore, French casualties will be 1/2 or 1/3 of historical.
 
Not if it's France attacking.

Who first invades Belgium makes no difference to the fact that the expansion of the war draws Britain in, as opposed to pushing her further into neutrality. (The conclusion that Britain's policy towards Belgium changes depending on whether France or Germany acts first suggests that Britain actually had no real interests in Belgium and it was all just pretext).

The potential danger of Germany domination of the continent (and, worse, German ports on the Channel) would probably convince the British to let France go through with it. Oh, they'd do their best to stop them and, probably, try to convince Belgium to let the French through (depening on what France is planning - or, rather, how wide a front they want to open with Germany).
Once the French are in the Germans are in. It's not a question of 'convincing' the Belgians to do anything. It's the fact that the French have given the Germans a gold plated invitation to occupy Belgium.

But Britain isn't going to join the war against France, Germany's too much of a threat.
Right, so by process of elimination the French invasion of Belgium forces Britain to go to war against Germany. So all this talk of British neutrality is a soap bubble that pops as soon as Joffre cuts the order to advance into the Ardennes. Starting to see why some posters see no advantage to Germany in an eastern offensive?

Equally, if the French attack (and, therefore, Belgium joins the Central Powers), the British won't enter the war
The British went from being willing to go to war to prevent Germany occupying Belgium to being fine with Germany annexing Belgium after defeating France just because it was the French that first opened the front?

- they won't approve necessarily, but the British won't be joining the CPs. Probably won't even step back from a pro-Entente neutrality ... unless forced to by public opinion.
I understand the intellectual "short circuit" you're trying to work around - you think it's "unfair" that France invades Belgium and Britain is forced to go to war with Germany in response. Well, sometimes life isn't fair.
 
Trajen777,

Right, those seem to be the choices -- and all are bad.

1) continue attacks in AL: horrific casualties for no real gain, helps convince the British voting public that they want no part of this war. Also, the French voting public lose confidence in their leaders and grow frustrated with an unprecedentedly bloody war that cannot be successfully prosecuted and was forced upon them not by Germany, but by their own leaders.

2) pause to refashion the army: gives Germany breathing space in which to focus maximum effort on Russia. This damages Franco-Russian relations, requires sacking of leading figures (those associated with the previous strategy, army composition, etc), and affects French civilian morale -- as the WW2 Sitzkrieg did.

3) invade Belgium: probably bogs down, gives Germany another ally (and France another opponent), grants Germany a justification for extending the front, and angers Britain (who may not fear French conquest of Belgium, but certainly will not welcome neutral Belgium being made a combat zone and thereby giving Germany a golden opportunity to occupy or dominate it themselves).

Choice number 2 is, at least for France, perhaps the least bad decision. But in the longer term, it makes Russian defeat -- and therefore loss of the war -- even more certain. It also means that even if Tsarist Russia somehow survives defeat, it will not ally herself with Perfidious France again.




As for Britain staying out of the war, I admit it is possible that Britain might enter the war against Germany. But with satisfactory Germany answers regarding her respecting Belgian neutrality and not sending the HSF into the Channel, it will be much harder to get that initial consensus for war. It was by no means certain even OTL, with a lot of dissent in the Cabinet and Commons. Without the real but much-exaggerated German atrocities in Poor Little Belgium to rally public support, you have to fall back on the argument that non-intervention means Germany forming a European hegemony hostile to Britain -- a conviction that was far from universal even amongst statesmen (which is why Grey had to tiptoe around making commitments of any sort to France, and even being compelled to public deny that he was doing so). Also, this sort of abstract and conjectural argument won't necessarily be compelling to most common people.

And there is very little if any chance of Britain going to war when neither a strong Cabinet consensus for war, nor strong public support for war, exist.

Then, once France looks impotent, Russia suffers tremendous disasters, and the full scope of the slaughter is made clear, good luck trying to convince Britons to send their sons to die in vast numbers is what already seems a disastrous (and needless, but for France's idiocy) war.

Edit: If France invades Belgium contrary to Britain's wishes, and strong support and consensus for sacrificing hundreds of thousands of British boys in a disastrous and obviously ill-considered war cannot be reached, then I suspect Britain might well now occupy the Belgian ports to safeguard them. The ports are her greatest concern anyway, and occupying them need not involve her in the Entente-CP war unless Germany is stupid enough to attack the ports -- which Germany has no need to do, nor anything to be gained, ITTL.
 
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Deleted member 1487

In August-Sept 1914 the French took the tactical offensive even while on the defensive, causing heavy casualties. In this A-H they will be on the tactical offensive, meaning operational considerations do not increase the number of casualties. OTOH, the number of German artillery pieces and MG's is fewer, perhaps 1/2 or 1/3 of historical. Therefore, French casualties will be 1/2 or 1/3 of historical.
Relative to the casualties they took they were bested repeatedly. Yeah tactically they will suffer even worse as they repeatedly throw themselves against Germans in prepared defensive positions, not on the operational offensive and exposed. A major problem IOTL was the mobile French field guns being able to hit Germans moving on the operational and tactical offensive in the open and either limber up and run before they were threatened by infantry or German artillery, or stayed and fought while French infantry attacked; ITTL they have to try and get direct hits on German in dugout positions against German artillery on ground they picked and sighted, while the ground itself is a defender's dream. It may well end up being a wash due to the fewer Germans present, but the terrain and defensive advantages on the German side will enhance their performance rather than hinder it.

I don't think you're factoring in the German border forts either with their guns, the French will run into a lot of firepower that they historically didn't have to deal with, while the Germans have a force multiplier that reduces their losses, especially as they are not assaulting the French border forts as they did in the Alsace-Lorraine offensive after the French were repelled from A-L in August.

Look at the border area that the French have to attack in:
wwi_1914.jpg


There were even more forts than the map represents in Colmar and Mulhouse, while the terrain is really broken and forested, not to mention the front restricted; moving through the Ardennes is tough, it brings the Belgians in as a belligerent against France, keeps Britain out, and Belgian forts block the major highways and rail lines.

Plus the Lorraine campaign map if you want and idea of the terrain:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Lorraine/maps/USA-E-Lorraine-II.jpg
 
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Wiking,
The map makes certain facts pretty clear.

If the French attack just through the Ardennes, they aren't expanding the front that much, or that far from the German armies. Troops drawn from Fourth through Seventh Armies, plus strategic reserves and Landwehr units, will hold them. It's questionable at this point whether the French First through Fourth Armies will even be able to launch attacks sufficiently effective to pin German reserves, as those armies' regular divisions are already bled out from the initial attacks and are at this point busily incorporating reservists in mass numbers.

If the French attack north of the Meuse, they get held up for an extended period by Namur and Liege; plenty of time for Germany to amass and deploy blocking forces.

If the French bypass Namur and Liege, they have to leave troops to screen those fortresses, and to screen against the Belgian field army which is likely now digging in around Antwerp, while advancing with whatever is left, and with both flanks in the air. This is a recipe for disaster.

Edit: the above assumes a later French attack through Belgium. I think it unlikely that the French will attack Belgium immediately upon realizing that the Germans aren't. If they do, however, the southern German armies are probably unable to send help, having their attentions fully occupied by the first rush of French offensives.
On the other hand, the French won't have as many mobilized reserve units to beef up the offensive in Belgium. Further, the German eastern armies will be either still in transit, or at least still very close to their eastern railheads. It won't be easy to turn them around, but very strong forces can be made ready around Aachen by the time the French arrive. In this case, the French forces are overextended, not so numerous as would be the case in a later offensive, and have unreduced fortresses constricting the rear and blocking supporting French forces from moving up to cover the flanks. This is a perfect scenario for German counterpunching, something they often rehearsed from about 1890 through at least 1910. And the French spearheads being so far forward and so exposed makes decisive defeat -- or even encirclement -- quite possible.

And if the French pause to reduce Namur and Liege, that merely gives the Germans more time.
 
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With regards to a French offensive through Belgium, one final point occurs to me.

The reason the Germans were able to advance so swiftly through Belgium was (in addition to their unique ability to reduce Belgian fortresses quickly) the fact that they had devoted a tremendous amount of planning to such an offensive, during the prewar years.

The French, by comparison, have merely toyed with the notion prewar. Should they invade Belgium, they will not be able to duplicate the swift and relatively orderly German advance of OTL.
 
In August-Sept 1914 the French took the tactical offensive even while on the defensive, causing heavy casualties. In this A-H they will be on the tactical offensive, meaning operational considerations do not increase the number of casualties. OTOH, the number of German artillery pieces and MG's is fewer, perhaps 1/2 or 1/3 of historical. Therefore, French casualties will be 1/2 or 1/3 of historical.

I don't agree.

The French Army suspended the offensive, i.e., the Battle of the Frontiers, on 24 August, and never resumed it.

In this timeline, there's no German flank attack barreling through Artois and Picardy, so despite the losses incurred in the initial attacks, French doctrine is going to win the day, and offensive operations inot Alsace-Lorraine will resume for at least several more weeks. Joffre - who in OTL blamed the failure of the first offensive assault on the lack of offensive qualities by French infantry - is not going to simply sit still and have his men dig in after a mere two weeks of offensive operations to execute his beloved Plan XVII no matter how much French blood is spilled.

So the French casualties avoided on the Marne and beyond will be offset by continued offensive attacks into Lorraine into September. Hard to quantify casualties on that, but it's not going to be THAT much less than what was incurred in OTL.
 
With regards to a French offensive through Belgium, one final point occurs to me.

The reason the Germans were able to advance so swiftly through Belgium was (in addition to their unique ability to reduce Belgian fortresses quickly) the fact that they had devoted a tremendous amount of planning to such an offensive, during the prewar years.

The French, by comparison, have merely toyed with the notion prewar. Should they invade Belgium, they will not be able to duplicate the swift and relatively orderly German advance of OTL.

Excellent points.

The French did no real planning for a Belgian campaign. It will cost them.
 

trajen777

Banned
Good text Wiking

Just a further point -- i have hiked some of the border regions -- so imagine a french attacking force coming over hills and valleys supported by flat trajectory 75 mm guns. Germans dug in in trenches and forts. German howitzers on the reverse side of the hills, firing on prepared points or with observers directing fire. French 75's caught in the open or french infantry attacking with bayonets (policy). The french attack over 500 - 3000 yards of Howitzer fire from Germans. The remains of the french infantry come into mg and rifle fire.

This was actually the case in the french attacks in AL.

As stated by someone above if the Germans do not attack through Belgium then Joffee continues the attacks with more and more troops. Same result. As the months pass the only difference is more and more mg and artillery for the Germans.

If they don't attack then we have a Russia who has been hammered. We have AH with more troops, Bulgaria, Romania, OE, enter war. Russia really fighting the world. Who knows about Japan and Italy.
 

Deleted member 1487

Good text Wiking

Just a further point -- i have hiked some of the border regions -- so imagine a french attacking force coming over hills and valleys supported by flat trajectory 75 mm guns. Germans dug in in trenches and forts. German howitzers on the reverse side of the hills, firing on prepared points or with observers directing fire. French 75's caught in the open or french infantry attacking with bayonets (policy). The french attack over 500 - 3000 yards of Howitzer fire from Germans. The remains of the french infantry come into mg and rifle fire.

This was actually the case in the french attacks in AL.

As stated by someone above if the Germans do not attack through Belgium then Joffee continues the attacks with more and more troops. Same result. As the months pass the only difference is more and more mg and artillery for the Germans.

If they don't attack then we have a Russia who has been hammered. We have AH with more troops, Bulgaria, Romania, OE, enter war. Russia really fighting the world. Who knows about Japan and Italy.
Thanks. Yeah I've read first hand accounts of French regiments wiped out by rifle fire alone without seeing a single German during the A-L offensive. Even Landwehr on the defensive, dug in and hard to spot due to the terrain, can mangle regular French troops bayonet charging without MG or artillery help due to doctrine (immediately charge when engaged, don't wait for fire support to get brought up). IOTL the French benefited from being on the operational defensive in 1914 because they were able to disguise the issues with their offensive doctrine and use their artillery and MGs to defensive effect, even when going on the tactical defensive, because they could initiate and ambush or defensive engagement as desired and when the Germans were disrupted by the firepower they could charge them down with FAR less problems due to German MG and artillery lagging behind the marching infantry on the operational offensive. On the operation defensive the Germans play that game instead, maximizing their artillery and MG assets in the terrain, their terrain that they have good maps for and landline telephone communications, which the French would lack. Just like how Tannenberg turned into a major German success due to the advantage of having good defensive terrain, good landline communications, and operational mobility due to rail lines, while the Russians had none of that, the Germans would have all that advantage on the Western Front on the defensive.

Plus French morale is weakened due to being the aggressor; its easy to fight in defense of your homeland, not when it is a war of choice to defend Russia and you have to bayonet charge an enemy dug in with firepower you lack on his turf.

Also I think the Russians would have a much better time on the defensive for all of the reasons I said the Germans would do well in the west and due to the fort situation in the East. Really the Germans get too much credit and the Russians too little in 1914 due to the advantages of the defender being the bigger factor than any German skill (though they had probably the best army in the world in 1914). For an example of that see how well the Germans did on the Vistula in October (hint: not well) or again post Battle of Lodz when they were stopped cold once the Russians went on the defensive on their own turf. Again on the Dvina in 1915 once the Russians were able to pick defensible terrain and get their shell situation figured out they stopped the Germans cold until the Russian Revolution broke their morale. Inversely the Germans were able to check them in 1916 at Lake Naroch due to the defender advantage.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Vistula_River
 
With regards to a French offensive through Belgium, one final point occurs to me.

The reason the Germans were able to advance so swiftly through Belgium was (in addition to their unique ability to reduce Belgian fortresses quickly) the fact that they had devoted a tremendous amount of planning to such an offensive, during the prewar years.

The French, by comparison, have merely toyed with the notion prewar. Should they invade Belgium, they will not be able to duplicate the swift and relatively orderly German advance of OTL.

Maybe, maybe not. Your specific projection is for a race between German armies entrained for the east being turned around and sent back west versus the French advance through the Ardennes. Two observations from this. First, if the mere act of going into the Ardennes causes two (?) entire German armies to abort their deployment to attack Russia, then France has a very easy way of relieving the burden on Russia right at the start. Why not take it? Second, your assumption seems to be that the Germans are alerted of the violation as it occurs and can get trains back west faster than the French can march. But when the Germans advanced via the Ardennes in 1914, 1940 and 1944, it was always came with a certain degree of surprise. What exactly is Moltke's margin for error? It looks incredibly slight.
 
Maybe, maybe not. Your specific projection is for a race between German armies entrained for the east being turned around and sent back west versus the French advance through the Ardennes.

Nope. I also mentioned troops from the southern German armies, Landwehr, and any strategic reserves the Germans may have in hand.


Two observations from this. First, if the mere act of going into the Ardennes causes two (?) entire German armies to abort their deployment to attack Russia, then France has a very easy way of relieving the burden on Russia right at the start. Why not take it? Second, your assumption seems to be that the Germans are alerted of the violation as it occurs and can get trains back west faster than the French can march. But when the Germans advanced via the Ardennes in 1914, 1940 and 1944, it was always came with a certain degree of surprise. What exactly is Moltke's margin for error? It looks incredibly slight.

I don't know that two entire armies will be sent back to counter the French. Depends on how many men the French scrape up and how effectively they're using them, plus how many troops the Germans can put in from strategic reserves, the western armies, and the Landwehr.

Still, this will lessen the pressure on Russia to a greater or lesser extent.

Of course, it will also put Belgium into the German camp, disturb Britain (and I don't think that irritation from any and every source results in Britain automatically and instantly bellowing for German blood), result in further heavy casualties (for it to be a successful ploy, real heavy attacks must be launched), and gives Germany free rein to use Belgian territory from then on -- for instance, after they finish with Russia. I'm also not sure how well received a French invasion of neutral Belgium will be by the French public, and especially the Socialists.

With every advantage, there are trade-offs. The French might do it, but it won't be a freebie move.

The Germans will be fully aware of the potential effects of a French invasion through Belgium, especially as they previously intended to do it themselves; they will without doubt have reserves earmarked for deployment in such a scenario, and probably have some reserve and Landwehr units already standing on the German side. This would be an obvious precaution.

It is highly unlikely that more than a day or so will pass before they are aware of French invasion -- the Ardennes are rough, but not that broad, and the Belgians will know almost immediately and won't hide it. Since the French have not given as much study and planning to such an operation as the Germans did, they will almost certainly move more slowly than the Germans OTL.

There is simply no way that the French can completely clear the difficult Ardennes terrain before German troops arrive in reasonable numbers.

The Germans need not even get very many troops into the Ardennes on short notice, as even a relatively small number can delay effectively in such terrain. And as I've mentioned, there will also almost certainly be reserves and Landwehr available not too far away, so the Germans won't be completely reliant on troops rapidly returned from the East.

Edit: incidentally, the French were not at all surprised by the German OTL 1914 attack through the Ardennes. They thoroughly expected it, but reckoned it would come earlier and faster. When their cavalry failed to detect Germans as far west as expected, they concluded that the Germans were moving northwest and the French could strike their flank.

Not that it mattered, since the French were already advancing in the Ardennes, as they had previously determined to do even if the Germans were coming west as expected. The allegations that the French were surprised and neglected security, are based on the results of miserable French cavalry reconnaissance and on the false claim that the French were advancing headlong in the spirit of offensive a outrance. Actually, the French demonstrably advanced per the previous Bonnal doctrine, which emphasized security, with strong advance guards and lots of patrols -- the French just did it poorly. Grandmaison's ideas had been adopted too recently before the war to become fully instituted.
 
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trajen777

Banned
Hello Glen

Per your points - i am not sure that the Germans would race in. I think the French forces would have great trouble withe the forts and the forces. If the Germans come in it will be delayed while they scrap together forces to move in . However i can see a strong French advance and GB pissed or "we cant support them now" attitude. I could see Belgium asking the Germans in also.

It would make a great TL

Wiking - i agree the Russians would have done better on defense. It really comes down to when the Germans strike East. I was thinking that they would fight along the same timelines as real world. Victory at ML and Tannenberg and then armies north into Lith. and the majority of forces into Poland with AH from the South in force (with AH following your TL for Conrad).


However more likely was an attack into Poland (i believe this was a plan with AH - operation Sedlitz ?). I think the preponderance of German artillery, radio intercepts et al would still have left massive Russian losses.
 

Deleted member 1487

However more likely was an attack into Poland (i believe this was a plan with AH - operation Sedlitz ?). I think the preponderance of German artillery, radio intercepts et al would still have left massive Russian losses.
Without a doubt, but probably no worse than IOTL and probably less; it would end up being a 1914 version of 1915, but with more Russian shells on hand making Germany losses much worse than IOTL 1914 or 1915.
 
Also I think the Russians would have a much better time on the defensive for all of the reasons I said the Germans would do well in the west and due to the fort situation in the East. Really the Germans get too much credit and the Russians too little in 1914 due to the advantages of the defender being the bigger factor than any German skill (though they had probably the best army in the world in 1914). For an example of that see how well the Germans did on the Vistula in October (hint: not well) or again post Battle of Lodz when they were stopped cold once the Russians went on the defensive on their own turf.

This is a worthwhile point, no question.

But to compensate to some degree here, the Germans are sending the cream of their army East in this scenario. They'll be bringing more force to bear in these offensives.

Of course, the Russians also have plenty of space to trade away, which helps complicate German logistics...
 
Re: Belgium

A couple points:

1) It seems highly unlikely that the French will make any immediate move into Belgium. They have no plans for it; and in the first weeks, they are still hoping for a British entry into the war. While a French invasion of Belgium won't result in a British declaration of war on France, it will not help the cause of bringing them in as a French ally for Asquith, politically. Especially if it is done in a very naked fashion, with Belgian resistance.

The far more likely scenario is well after the war is underway, probably in 1915, as it has become clear that an offensive into Alsace-Lorraine is simply impossible/prohibitively expensive, and the French (either through a Joffre desperate to retain command, or his successor) are becoming desperate for some new strategy - and they have had some time to do some planning for it. If this is the case, we are not talking about a sudden German turnaround of forces deploying for the Eastern Front in the opening phase of the war.

2) A French attack is going to have to be more than just an expansion through the Ardennes, but a wide flank attack through the open terrain north of the Meuse Valley, through Liege, to pose a threat to the Ruhr. But that has its own problems - the Belgians are prepared for such an eventuality, with lots of fortifications and and deployments. And the French don't have the kind of siege artillery that the Germans had to deal with these fortresses. It will be a slow and bloody slog for them. Truly, it will be a desperate French Army that attempts a Belgian solution, and they'll likely only try it after more obvious policies have failed (i.e., attempting to get Britain and Italy into the war on the Entente side).

3) I think Tallil2long is in the right of it in spelling out the German disposition: "The Germans will be fully aware of the potential effects of a French invasion through Belgium, especially as they previously intended to do it themselves; they will without doubt have reserves earmarked for deployment in such a scenario, and probably have some reserve and Landwehr units already standing on the German side. This would be an obvious precaution."
 
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