Deleted member 1487
No, the French 9th army on the Marne. The 6th near Paris was something else and did have a lot of reserves not with other armies. I skimmed a bit of Riann's post and saw 9th army and didn't realize he was talking about the German 9th army, not the French though. Though the 9th army was formed from stripping units from other German armies and fortress garrisons, so not much different from the French 9th.Did you mean the French 6th Army?
Yeah given how many problems the French regulars had on the offensive in German and Belgian territory IOTL and how well the Germans did on the defensive, especially given their greater MG and artillery parks, they'd pretty much slaughter the French reserve and ad hoc units. Even the German Landwehr and Ersatz divisions on the defensive will do even better than they did on the offensive IOTL, like the French at the Marne in reserve, but better given that they generally were of higher quality than the equivalent French units AND the French did worse on the offensive. Plus the flat firing 75s did not handle trenches well in a mobile situation; they were able to adapt in a static situation later in the war when it was realized the artillery needed to be in a dugout situation to simulate a howitzer trajectory, but that was not the situation for most of 1914, so dug in German troops are pretty much safe from French field artillery but for the unlikely direct hit.In any event, the army-level formations the French put together in the first two months of the war did pretty well on the defensive, or attacking on home territory near Paris. But yeah, flinging such a new and probably understaffed formation into an attack through difficult terrain in Belgium is very much more challenging than what they were called upon to do OTL.
If the French try this, expect serious C3 errors and potentially catastrophic bungling. This happened OTL even among French regular corps and army formations (around Rossignol, for instance). It might also be relevant to bring up the tremendous administrative chaos that occurred in 1918 when inexperienced American staffs tried to bring troops forward during the Argonne offensive -- a new and understaffed French army trying to attack through the Ardennes would risk similar results for similar reasons.
It might be noted that one of the main reasons Michel proposed to brigade reserve units with regular divisions (which would have created tremendously unwieldy double-size divisions) was because of a serious French shortfall in staff officers -- and indeed, officers of all sorts.
Remember IOTL the Battle of the Frontiers cost the French more dead in 1 week than the US lost in Korea or Vietnam. By the end of September the French had more dead than the US lost in combat in all of WW2. Here it could be even worse.