Germany's 1914 Eastern Plan?

[BooNZ]

I propose, for no reason in particular, that the German eastern plan is updated for 1914 and published on 1 April. The Russian plan update went live a couple of months later and would have been in draft at the same time as the German plan so couldn't really take it into account. No real subterfuge, just bad luck based on bad timing.

Would it just as likely be like a high stakes game of rock-paper-scissors, with Russia guessing wrong. An East first strategy does not require the level of finesse of the Schlieffen Plan. I understand after the war a high level German railway official claimed a last minute pivot East was within the German rail networks capacity (cannot recall the source or evidence to support claim).

The Russians could not afford wait-and-see, putting their mobilisation on hold until the German choice was confirmed.

 

[Athelstane]

Assuming Belgium maintains its neutrality, how easy would it have been for the British to seize Belgium ports against determined Belgium resistance?

Well, Antwerp is out since you have to go through Dutch waters to reach it (and it was heavily fortified anyway, effectively a riverine rather than coastal port), so I assume we're talking about North Sea coast itself, which really means only three ports worth talking about: Nieuwpoort, Ostend and Zeebrugge.

None offer great geographic advantages for defense against seaborne attack, and none really had extensive coastal defenses. Most Belgian fortification monies went into defense against land attack, mainly in the Meuse fortresses and around the "national redoubt" of Antwerp, the ultimate Belgian fallback position. The Royal Navy wouldn't lack for gunfire support or logistics, so it wouldn't too hard to take them - though it would be a considerable investment of resources and men to make them defensible against Belgian (let alone German or French) attempts to recapture them.

Belgian foreign minister Leon Arendt actually feared a British effort to take Antwerp or the coastal ports by surprise attack by way of "protecting" Belgium and drafted a position paper in 1911 which became important to Belgian planning, but I see no evidence that this manifested itself in substantial effort to secure these ports against British assault. Most energies were focused on the possibility of German attack.

To say anything beyond that would require an acquaintance with sources on prewar Belgian fortifications, but I don't have access to any right now.

 

[Athelstane]

Would it just as likely be like a high stakes game of rock-paper-scissors, with Russia guessing wrong. An East first strategy does not require the level of finesse of the Schlieffen Plan. I understand after the war a high level German railway official claimed a last minute pivot East was within the German rail networks capacity (cannot recall the source or evidence to support claim).

You're thinking of General Herman von Staabs (often mispelled as Staab, thanks to the mistake in Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August), Chief of the Railway Division of the General Staff before the war.

 

[Tallil2long]

On Britain seizing Belgian ports.

Capturing Antwerp against any real resistance probably entails a not-insignificant ground campaign. The other ports could be taken much more easily, but it still means war between Britain and Belgium.

Which gets complicated. Both are presumably still neutrals in the Entente-CP war, so Britain invading Belgium neither justifies France jumping in, nor does it place Belgium in Germany's coalition.

It would, however, give both those warring parties an opportunity to strike into Belgium while she is otherwise engaged. If this happens, Britain and France will probably emerge as allies, with Belgium presumably either cozying up to Germany, or getting ground into dog meat by both sides.

In either event, it makes Britain the violator of Belgian neutrality and the 1839 Treaty. And it makes Britain responsible for what will likely be vastly greater Belgian death and destruction than OTL. And somehow I doubt this concept will appeal to the British voting public, if a consensus to join even the Entente-CP war has so far failed to emerge.

 

[Riain]

Would it just as likely be like a high stakes game of rock-paper-scissors, with Russia guessing wrong. An East first strategy does not require the level of finesse of the Schlieffen Plan. I understand after the war a high level German railway official claimed a last minute pivot East was within the German rail networks capacity (cannot recall the source or evidence to support claim).

The Russians could not afford wait-and-see, putting their mobilisation on hold until the German choice was confirmed.

My assumption is that apart from the eastern plan being updated for 1914 everything else is the same, which means that Russia starts partial period prior to war on 24 July, full period prior to war 26 July, partial mobilization 28 July and full mobilization from 30 July. Germany only ordered mobilization on the afternoon of august 1 and it would take some time for the enemy to see which way the deployment was going. So Russia would be, depending on how you look at it, a week into their mobilization before they realize Germany is coming to get them. This might be enough time to tell 1st and 2nd armies to go on the defensive but not enough to send the trains to a different location.

 

[Athelstane]

On Britain seizing Belgian ports.

Capturing Antwerp against any real resistance probably entails a not-insignificant ground campaign. The other ports could be taken much more easily, but it still means war between Britain and Belgium.

Which gets complicated. Both are presumably still neutrals in the Entente-CP war, so Britain invading Belgium neither justifies France jumping in, nor does it place Belgium in Germany's coalition.

It would, however, give both those warring parties an opportunity to strike into Belgium while she is otherwise engaged. If this happens, Britain and France will probably emerge as allies, with Belgium presumably either cozying up to Germany, or getting ground into dog meat by both sides.

In either event, it makes Britain the violator of Belgian neutrality and the 1839 Treaty. And it makes Britain responsible for what will likely be vastly greater Belgian death and destruction than OTL. And somehow I doubt this concept will appeal to the British voting public, if a consensus to join even the Entente-CP war has so far failed to emerge.

It's really hard to imagine Britain moving into Belgium save in the context of a situation where some other great power has already invaded - and thus, presumably, a Belgian request for assistance.

 

[BooNZ]

You're thinking of General Herman von Staabs (often mispelled as Staab, thanks to the mistake in Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August), Chief of the Railway Division of the General Staff before the war.

Yes, that was probably him. Thanks for that and the detail on the Belgium channel ports.

It's really hard to imagine Britain moving into Belgium save in the context of a situation where some other great power has already invaded - and thus, presumably, a Belgian request for assistance.

The driver for the question was that if a sane France was to contemplate a pivot into Belgium/Ardennes, it would need to be with the explicit approval and participation of the British. To proceed, the British would want to be reasonably confident the channel ports could be taken and held against the Germans - in my opinion.

 

[Riain]

Britain is not going to do anything other than protest for forms sake if their treaty partner France moves into Belgium and increases British security. It only matters to Britain if the threat country Germany moves into Belgium and reduces British security.

 

[BooNZ]

Britain is not going to do anything other than protest for forms sake if their treaty partner France moves into Belgium and increases British security. It only matters to Britain if the threat country Germany moves into Belgium and reduces British security.

How does France stumbling into the Ardennes without the approval of Belgium or the tangible support of Britain increase British security? Rather it would be an open invitation for Germany to pivot West (in defense of neutral Belgium) and send 2-3 armies smashing through the French flank (i.e. a delayed Schlieffen Plan with no BEF, no Belgium defenders and a depleted French army).

 

[BooNZ]

Enlightened British Diplomacy

The smartest thing the British could do in this scenario is broker an early peace deal between France and Germany, before the inevitable collapse of Russia. Being the first mover, the peace is likely to be cheaper, Britain is in Germany's good books and France's credibility/diplomacy is in tatters. Germany spends all its treasure bleeding Russia (a traditional colonial rival of Britain) dry - IMHO

 

[Riain]

How does France stumbling into the Ardennes without the approval of Belgium or the tangible support of Britain increase British security? Rather it would be an open invitation for Germany to pivot West (in defense of neutral Belgium) and send 2-3 armies smashing through the French flank (i.e. a delayed Schlieffen Plan with no BEF, no Belgium defenders and a depleted French army).

British security is served by having the Germans being attacked and hopefully defeated as far from Britain as possible, or at the very least having the trench lines near the Belgian-German border rather than on the Channel coast. The Germans don't have 3 or 4 armies available to March into Belgium in late August ITTL, those armies are busy defeating the Russians in Poland. IOTL the next army German to form was the 9th in Silesia in September, made up of Corps from the Western Front and the 8th Army, so I suppose the reverse can happen in the west.


As for the smart thing, nobody suspected the war would play out like it did, even the Russians with their experience against the Japanese in Manchuria thought 1000 shells per gun was very generous. It would (and IOTL did) take time for the lessons to sink in and they're not going to sink in before other more active measures like going into Belgium try and fail.

 

[BooNZ]

British security is served by having the Germans being attacked and hopefully defeated as far from Britain as possible, or at the very least having the trench lines near the Belgian-German border rather than on the Channel coast. The Germans don't have 3 or 4 armies available to March into Belgium in late August ITTL, those armies are busy defeating the Russians in Poland. IOTL the next army German to form was the 9th in Silesia in September, made up of Corps from the Western Front and the 8th Army, so I suppose the reverse can happen in the west.

Successful attacks against the Germans were few and far between in the opening 18 month - even with favourable terrain, odds, equipment and doctrine - none of which would be available in an early French advance through the Ardennes.

The French were in no position to March into Belgium in August 1914 - OTL the French lacked even sufficient maps of the Ardennes. OTL the Germans used less than 4 armies to turn the French on the frontier, so would have the best part of an army to hold the French Fifth in Ardennes. After crushing 2-3 Russian armies in the East, the A-H military would be intact and the Germans could easily spare a couple of Eastern armies for an offensive in the West - the reverse of what tended to happen OTL.

As for the smart thing, nobody suspected the war would play out like it did, even the Russians with their experience against the Japanese in Manchuria thought 1000 shells per gun was very generous. It would (and IOTL did) take time for the lessons to sink in and they're not going to sink in before other more active measures like going into Belgium try and fail.

A recurring theme on this thread (admittedly from a minority) is that the Germans would crush the Russians and then turn on the French via Belgium. I was merely stating after the French had shot their load all over the Frontier and were fully spent, the chances of an Entente victory would be non-existent. Better for the British to broker a peace to save the West than go balls deep in a daft scheme that would guarantee German boots in Belgium - at a minimum.

 

[Riain]

Firstly, the 5th French army by 23 August had not been engaged, nor was it opposite the Ardenees, it was the 4th Army that went into the Ardennes IOTL. ITTL the 4th Army went into the Argonne and though Luxembourg, leaving the 5th Army to go around the Ardennes and get into position near the Leige defile or whatever the French deem is needed. Secondly the French had far from shot their bolt by late August 1914, for startes they had barely started putting their large number of reserve divisions into action. IOTL after the reverse in the Ballte of Mullhouse the French detached VII Corps (I think) from 1st Army added another active division a cavalry divison and 4 reserve divisions and created the short lived Army of Alsace as early as 14 August. Similarly by September they created the 6th Army around Paris by using reserve divisons among others. These are not the actions of a country that has shot its bolt, indeed the idea that France would sue for peace after 2 weeks of fighting where most of the Army has not even participated strikes me as bizzare.

 

[BooNZ]

Firstly, the 5th French army by 23 August had not been engaged, nor was it opposite the Ardenees, it was the 4th Army that went into the Ardennes IOTL. ITTL the 4th Army went into the Argonne and though Luxembourg, leaving the 5th Army to go around the Ardennes and get into position near the Leige defile or whatever the French deem is needed. Secondly the French had far from shot their bolt by late August 1914, for startes they had barely started putting their large number of reserve divisions into action. IOTL after the reverse in the Ballte of Mullhouse the French detached VII Corps (I think) from 1st Army added another active division a cavalry divison and 4 reserve divisions and created the short lived Army of Alsace as early as 14 August. Similarly by September they created the 6th Army around Paris by using reserve divisons among others. These are not the actions of a country that has shot its bolt, indeed the idea that France would sue for peace after 2 weeks of fighting where most of the Army has not even participated strikes me as bizzare.

The French politicians prohibited even planning a pre-emptive move through Belgium. The British rebuffed approaches on the subject. Such embedded policies are unlikely to change in only a couple of weeks. As previously stated, Joffre, French doctrine, Russian commitments and OTL choices all point to a continuation of offensives until the French have either shot their bolt or Joffre is removed. That is the point where peace would be better than choosing to escalate the conflict to the Ardennes -IMHO

 

[Tallil2long]

Riain,
Agreed -- France will only seek peace once Russia is about to go down, and she herself has suffered a few hundred thousand more casualties. This will take much, much longer than two weeks. Two years, perhaps.

If the French invade Belgium, a CP force will be immediately available to fight them: that would be the Belgian Army, forced into Germany's camp by Entente violation of her neutrality.

It won't matter for a short hook through the Ardennes (the Belgians won't try hard to defend there, and the Germans can probably scrape up enough troops to hold there anyway), but it would matter a great deal in the context of a French wide swing through central Belgium.

Let's bear in mind that the French had no equivalent of the German and Austrian super-heavy siege guns, so taking Liege and Namur is likely to be an extended process. Further, the Belgian Army probably won't be as badly outnumbered by French Fifth Army (plus reserve divisions) as it was OTL by the German right wing, so they'll likely put up a better defense.

Unless the French invasion occurs immediately (which seems unlikely), Belgium will also have had more time to get her forces prepared.

A French invasion of Belgium will be an act of desperation, and I do not think it likely to be decisive. What it would do is give the Germans another ally, and a broader front on which to legitimately attack once the armies return from Russia. Bad idea.

 

[Riain]

The German advance through Belgium had to get around the flank of both the 5th Army and the BEF, in the event of Germany going east the French will only have to get around the German flank so a short route through southeast Belgium to the Liege area would do. However after 3 weeks of war all around Belgium will be much better prepared than OTL so could possibly put up a much better fight and Germany wouldn't be far away from forming the 9th Army as per OTL.The point about the guns is interesting, the French do have numerous guns in service both with the field army and in fortresses that could be pressed into service quite quickly after plan 17 failed, that would be something they could try before suing for peace. Another thing is to stay in the fight until all 10 Russian armies strike a blow (or fail to as the case may be) and another is to try to gain other allies which are hovering on the edges.
All in all I believe that going east is not the best option for Germany in the circumstances, even given hindsight. Indeed given hindsight I'd get Germany to do better, if not to take Paris and knock out France at least win the Race to the Sea in order to win the loong war.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The German advance through Belgium had to get around the flank of both the 5th Army and the BEF, in the event of Germany going east the French will only have to get around the German flank so a short route through southeast Belgium to the Liege area would do. However after 3 weeks of war all around Belgium will be much better prepared than OTL so could possibly put up a much better fight and Germany wouldn't be far away from forming the 9th Army as per OTL.The point about the guns is interesting, the French do have numerous guns in service both with the field army and in fortresses that could be pressed into service quite quickly after plan 17 failed, that would be something they could try before suing for peace. Another thing is to stay in the fight until all 10 Russian armies strike a blow (or fail to as the case may be) and another is to try to gain other allies which are hovering on the edges.
All in all I believe that going east is not the best option for Germany in the circumstances, even given hindsight. Indeed given hindsight I'd get Germany to do better, if not to take Paris and knock out France at least win the Race to the Sea in order to win the loong war.

The French 9th army was formed by pulling troops from existing formations, so the French would have to weaken their other armies to form a brand new one lacking the same level of army support/services that the others have. And its not like the Germans wouldn't have reserves to use to defend their flank in an attempt to move through Belgium. They had the North Coast defense force that historically ended up at Antwerp, the 6 Ersatz divisions that screened forts and attacked in Lorraine during the Marne, and various odds and ends that could be formed into another army. Plus the Ardennes is ideal defenders terrain, or at least ideal terrain for the Germans, who used it very well to utterly crush the attacking French divisions IOTL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rossignol

And it took the French months to turn the fortress artillery into field guns because they basically had to make carriages for them. Then they lacked recoil mechanisms, so could only generate 1/4th the shells per minute of a regular artillery piece due to needing to be re-aimed after every shot and were generally older guns anyway. Most of the fortress guns won't show up until Winter. They'd likely be more focused on expanded production of their 155mm Schneider howitzers that were modern.

 

[BooNZ]

...
All in all I believe that going east is not the best option for Germany in the circumstances, even given hindsight. Indeed given hindsight I'd get Germany to do better, if not to take Paris and knock out France at least win the Race to the Sea in order to win the loong war.

What were the compelling arguments for going West and presumably persisting with the Schlieffen plan?

On another thread, Wiking made some compelling arguments regarding the potential success of the Schlieffen Plan, but IMHO the limitations of logistics meant the plan was always going to seriously struggle to get as far as it did.

 

[Tallil2long]

The French 9th army was formed by pulling troops from existing formations, so the French would have to weaken their other armies to form a brand new one lacking the same level of army support/services that the others have.

Snip.

Did you mean the French 6th Army?

In any event, the army-level formations the French put together in the first two months of the war did pretty well on the defensive, or attacking on home territory near Paris. But yeah, flinging such a new and probably understaffed formation into an attack through difficult terrain in Belgium is very much more challenging than what they were called upon to do OTL.

If the French try this, expect serious C3 errors and potentially catastrophic bungling. This happened OTL even among French regular corps and army formations (around Rossignol, for instance). It might also be relevant to bring up the tremendous administrative chaos that occurred in 1918 when inexperienced American staffs tried to bring troops forward during the Argonne offensive -- a new and understaffed French army trying to attack through the Ardennes would risk similar results for similar reasons.

It might be noted that one of the main reasons Michel proposed to brigade reserve units with regular divisions (which would have created tremendously unwieldy double-size divisions) was because of a serious French shortfall in staff officers -- and indeed, officers of all sorts.

 

[trajen777]

The difficulty facing France was the need to attack to help Russia and at the same time having an army based upon non trench warfare. With Russia reeling and their frontal offensive in AL stopped with massive losses they would have 3 real choices

1. Continue to attack in AL to pin German troops
2. Rebuild their army (they did so at the end of 1917 early 1918 - by actually having enough hi angle firing guns to cause heavy causalities) however the need to refit their fortress guns to field guns would take serious time. Their are many books that i have read (will try to reference) that focus on the early years of of the war and the French ignoring the need for howitzers but instead focusing on the 75 mm (excellent gun) which was ill suited to trench or fortress warfare. Its shell trajectory was not high enough to descend over hills or plunge into trenches or fortresses. So to create a force with such artillary would bring you into early 1917. Its range was also outclassed by the German artillery.
3. Attacks into Belgium would be stopped at the fortresses and keep GB for sure out of the war