Best Argentine Falklands Strategy

Riain

Banned
Delay and denial are Argentina's only hope, when the winter sets in Britain will struggle to complete the reconquest of the islands. This of course will require the commitment of almost all of Argentina's high-end assets and elite units, and the will to use and lose them.

Britain's big anti ship weapon was the nuclear submarine, but the way the Burwood Bank impacted on the HMS Conqueror showed the limits to submarine mobility. So the Argentine navy could operate in green waters around the island and the British would have a job of work to neutralise them.

The Army needed well trained units with good artillery and light armour support, and the Air force needed to enhance the Port Stanley runway.
 
Britain's big anti ship weapon was the nuclear submarine, but the way the Burwood Bank impacted on the HMS Conqueror showed the limits to submarine mobility. So the Argentine navy could operate in green waters around the island and the British would have a job of work to neutralise them.
Transiting the green waters to get to the Falklands would be an issue - Splendid lost contact with 25 de Mayo's group when it turned away, and Conqueror sank Belgrano with heavy loss of life - Argentine ASW just wasn't up to getting across the exclusion zone against RN SSNs.

The Army needed well trained units with good artillery and light armour support, and the Air force needed to enhance the Port Stanley runway.
The operation was carried out in utmost secrecy and at the shortest notice to minimise the chance of British response; mobilizing a larger force - especially one with significant engineering support for runway extension - dramatically increases the risk of Britain being able to get SSNs on location to interdict the initial invasion, or more wacky responses like multiple-Victor-tanking (a la Black Buck) C-130s with the Parachute Regiment to Stanley.

Hmm. I say that, but it occurs to me that I don't actually know if the RAF Hercules do IFR in 1982? ISTR that the Stanley runway was too short for VC-10s.
 
Don't invade. Offer to enter UN arbitrated negotiations over the status of the Islands and/or access to the resources.
 
Tell the pilots to go for the Sea Harriers at the expense of any other target.

Get the attack aircraft to drop there loads and go for a missile or guns kill etc.

Ok it may be a waste of bombs but the UK aircraft arent going to last too long even if you are half way succesful, then no UK air cover for the carriers or the Falklands. Its a long way to bring reinforcements (the UK did fly aircraft down) and if you keep attriting they are going to run out sooner or later.
 
The UK were perfectly happy to talk and talk and talk but not willing to make any concessions to the Argentinians. One of the reasons why the Junta were so keen to invade was, simply put, they knew they weren't going to get it any other way.

The Argentinian Navy were neither particularly well equipped or trained. For example, the Belgrano damage control parties were unable to close many water tight doors as there was too many layers of paint on the doors so they couldn't be dogged; Conqueror's skipper was surprised how fast she sank. Many Brooklyn class cruisers survived severe combat damage in WW2 and survived due to good damage control; The Argentinians did not have good damage control.

Their airforce was equipped with Mirage fighters, they knew that if they entered combat with Sea Harriers at medium/low level they would burn through their fuel at a horrific rate, even at high level they were limited to only a few minutes in the patrol area. The Harriers were also equipped with AIM 9L Sidewinder which were all aspect heat seekers which could lock on from directly ahead, the Argentinians had older Sidewinders and French Matra 530 missiles which could only lock on from the rear quarter. The RN pilots also had an opportunity to practice against French Airforce Mirage fighters so they had their tactics worked out in advance playing against first rate opposition. The Argentinian pilots flew lower hours in type per year than the RN and it showed.
 
Tell the pilots to go for the Sea Harriers at the expense of any other target.

Get the attack aircraft to drop there loads and go for a missile or guns kill etc.

Ok it may be a waste of bombs but the UK aircraft arent going to last too long even if you are half way succesful, then no UK air cover for the carriers or the Falklands. Its a long way to bring reinforcements (the UK did fly aircraft down) and if you keep attriting they are going to run out sooner or later.
Remember what the Sea Harriers are there to do - not kill Mirages, but to defend the fleet from air attack. If the second they get a radar lock on an incoming bomber that bomber drops it's bombs, that's effectively a kill so far as the ships and men down below are concerned.
Worse, the Argentines are at the limit of their fuel. That means the Mirages and others only have a few minutes to kill the Harrier before they have to return or crash through lack of fuel. The Harrier pilots were exceptionally good at this sort of thing (it's worth remembering that the US Navy Top Gun school was originally set up largely by Royal Navy pilots at the request of the USN - and the RN never lost those skills when it moved to a STOVL force), so it would be a rare Argentine pilot who could score a kill in the 2-3 minutes of air combat that is all their fuel would allow if the RN jets were trying to refuse combat (as they might well do so once bombs have been dumped).
 
I will have to look up the exact quote and the person it's attributed to, but up until the invasion, the general attitude in Whitehall was "We may surrender to seduction that we will fight to defend from rape".

In otherwords, if the negotiations could be sweatened enough and kept under the radar, the Falklands could have been given away.

But The Junta had to screw it all up so now there's no chance.
 
Their airforce was equipped with Mirage fighters, they knew that if they entered combat with Sea Harriers at medium/low level they would burn through their fuel at a horrific rate, even at high level they were limited to only a few minutes in the patrol area. The Harriers were also equipped with AIM 9L Sidewinder which were all aspect heat seekers which could lock on from directly ahead, the Argentinians had older Sidewinders and French Matra 530 missiles which could only lock on from the rear quarter. The RN pilots also had an opportunity to practice against French Airforce Mirage fighters so they had their tactics worked out in advance playing against first rate opposition. The Argentinian pilots flew lower hours in type per year than the RN and it showed.

In reading of some of the air engagements, the Argentine A-4 pilots either were unwilling to mix in, or didn't have the fuel to do so.
 
Tell the pilots to go for the Sea Harriers at the expense of any other target.

Get the attack aircraft to drop there loads and go for a missile or guns kill etc.

Ok it may be a waste of bombs but the UK aircraft arent going to last too long even if you are half way succesful, then no UK air cover for the carriers or the Falklands. Its a long way to bring reinforcements (the UK did fly aircraft down) and if you keep attriting they are going to run out sooner or later.

Only the Mirage III and Dagger is really suitable for Air to Air combat and the FAA SHAR pilots were mostly ex Phantom top gun types. Very experianced and very well trained.

Its true that the latest missiles gave them an 'all aspect' advantage but its interesting to note that every 'kill' was a rear shot after the SHAR had been manovered in the advantageous position behind the Argentine Aircraft and this was more to do with the pilots training and skill than the Aircraft and marque of Sidewinder!

Ordering the Pilots to "Go for the Sea Harriers" would only lead to more losses among the Arginetine Air force IMO
 

Riain

Banned
Transiting the green waters to get to the Falklands would be an issue - Splendid lost contact with 25 de Mayo's group when it turned away, and Conqueror sank Belgrano with heavy loss of life - Argentine ASW just wasn't up to getting across the exclusion zone against RN SSNs.


The operation was carried out in utmost secrecy and at the shortest notice to minimise the chance of British response; mobilizing a larger force - especially one with significant engineering support for runway extension - dramatically increases the risk of Britain being able to get SSNs on location to interdict the initial invasion, or more wacky responses like multiple-Victor-tanking (a la Black Buck) C-130s with the Parachute Regiment to Stanley.

Hmm. I say that, but it occurs to me that I don't actually know if the RAF Hercules do IFR in 1982? ISTR that the Stanley runway was too short for VC-10s.

The Argentines knew about the invasion when it happened and had about 11 days before a nuclear sub arrived to enforce the MEZ. That leaves plenty of time for the navy to send ships to the islands, as well as good quality army units with sufficient supporting arms.
 
Tell the pilots to go for the Sea Harriers at the expense of any other target.

With no AWACs you can't find the Harriers, so its very much hit-or-miss.

I will have to look up the exact quote and the person it's attributed to, but up until the invasion, the general attitude in Whitehall was "We may surrender to seduction that we will fight to defend from rape".

In otherwords, if the negotiations could be sweatened enough and kept under the radar, the Falklands could have been given away.

But The Junta had to screw it all up so now there's no chance.

There was never any chance of the Kelpers' wishes to remain British being ignored.

Pre-war, that was always the supreme stumbling block to any form of diplomatic settlement. And considering the history of Argentine politics, can anyone blame the people of the Falklands for not wanting to have anything to do with Buenos Aires?

Post-war, the Falkland Islands had been made sacred British soil by the loss of 256 British soldiers, seamen, air men, and Royal Marines.:mad:

The Argentines knew about the invasion when it happened and had about 11 days before a nuclear sub arrived to enforce the MEZ. That leaves plenty of time for the navy to send ships to the islands, as well as good quality army units with sufficient supporting arms.

IDK. Without previous warning (which entails risking British discovery) it takes a long time to load, transport, and offload all that personnel and material. Also, I just realized that if the Argentines mobilize such a force, Chilean Intelligence will go "TILT", further ruining a potential surprise.

The Argentines' biggest problem wasn't weaponry, or even troop quality (the troops of 5 Brigade IIRC managed well against a battalion of Argentine Marines). It was a cultural disdain for certain elements of military supply in the cold South Atlantic. Winterized socks, thermal underwear, waterproof/thermal protected sleeping bags? That sort of thing is not macho.
 
I'm going to go out on a limb here, and say the argentines were lucky to do as well as they did.

The navy had no answer to ssn, and it was only because the British pulled their punches that they didn't suffer worse. Conqueror could have easily sunk belgranos 2 escorts as well, and there were 2 possibly 3 chances to sink their carrier too, which wouldn't were missed because of political reasons (waiting for the Peruvian peace plan, just inside 12 mile limit, etc.), whoch wouldnt have been missed had the shoe been on the other foot. That basically means the Falklands garrison is bottled up, a giant self imposed pow camp.

The argentine army was totally outclassed. There is a good argument that 3 commando brigade could have done it better for the British by themselves and with less casualties. British commanders seem to have thought so - there is a lot of criticism of having to wait for 5 brigade, of 5 brigade not being combat ready, at least some of it seemingly valid (bluff cove happened, in part to save 5 brigade walking). Think about that for a minute. If 3 brigade had done it by themselves think about the troop ratio... We're in 19th century colonial war territory.

That leaves it to the airforce/FAA to sink the landing force or carriers.

We can talk about bomb fuses, but however brave their pilots, their technical and maintenance standard was poor - not working ejector seats, inability to repair them, inability to repair inflight refuelling equipment, they didnt actually have the manual for the bombs or fuses (and nobody thought to get it before the war), etc.

Not extending the runway is typical of that kind of thing, not an unexplainable oversight,. Moreover argentine military engineering of all types, including combat engineering was poor (think about how they failed to properly use potential natural fortresses to protect Stanley). In fact, all the support elements of the argentine military were poor (not macho) - they left their troops for weeks in wet hills, didnt feed or supply them properly, didn't rotate or rest them (or give them a chance to dry out), and the officer's response when troops were unhappy was to stake out (or in a few cases shoot), a few malcontents at random.

And even of they did extend the runway, so what? The whole area around the airfield was peppered by British bombs (from harriers as well as black buck), and naval gunfire. Not a great place to park aircraft, spares, fuel, or bombs, especially with no hardened shelters. And how do these items get to Stanley, do they fly them in?

And let's suppose their airforce does better. So what?

Can they realistically stop the landing? Seems unlikely to me - best case seems to inflict more casualties.

What about sink a carrier? Again seems unlikely given the relatively large size damage control, etc even if they score exocet, torpedo, or bomb hits. A mission kill maybe. British answer is to keep fighting - illustrious is on the way, and they had already planned for a possible "stone aircraft carrier" - to build a base for buccs and phantoms, - moreover some of the gloves probably come off, which is not good for argentina - naval shipping in the 12 mile limit gets sunk, phoenix squadron is history, etc.

And don't forget the British had their share of bad luck too - rapier problems with salt water exposure, Atlantic conveyor getting hit before it could offload the helicopters, John Nott as defence secretary, etc., - but they were able to overcome these obstacles.

(of course none of this was obvious at the time, or even soon after)
 
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Riain

Banned
I tend to agree, other than the particular weakness of the Fleet Air Arm, the British armed forces were very powerful and world class in quality, they had 'escalation dominance' (one of my favourite terms). While I think the Argentines could have tried to fight harder they most probably would have lost a big chunk of their navy as well as their air force.
 

Riain

Banned
I'm also wondering about the speed of any British reaction if they did get wind that an invasion was brewing. I think that if the British had attempted to reinforce the islands when the Sth Georgia thing started on March 19 they could have thwarted the invasion, but I think it would take the better part of a week to send a heavy weapons company from Britain to the Falklands.
 

Riain

Banned
About 75 aircraft and 25 helicopters were lost from all 4 flying services, including 39 combat jets. That's a hell of a lot for a smallish air force.
 
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About 75 aircraft and 25 helicopters were lost from all 4 flying services, including 39 combat jets. That's a hell of a lot for a smallish air force.

It's actually worse in fact than on paper, because a lot of their aircraft (especially a4s) were unserviceable even before the war, and by the end of the war, a lot of other aircraft had been cannibalised for parts, or worn out by airframe attrition.

The argentines were so short of servicable combat aircraft by the end of the war that they had to bring f86 sabres out of retirement to guard the Chilean border.
 
It's actually worse in fact than on paper, because a lot of their aircraft (especially a4s) were unserviceable even before the war, and by the end of the war, a lot of other aircraft had been cannibalised for parts, or worn out by airframe attrition.

The argentines were so short of servicable combat aircraft by the end of the war that they had to bring f86 sabres out of retirement to guard the Chilean border.

This makes a lot of sense. The Argentine Air Force's version of the Skyhawk was the A-4Q. But IIRC, they were listed as having up to 200 A-4s before the start of the war. But if many of these aircraft were sitting around in boneyards or else idle on the ground due to their engines and airframes being too old to make the journey to the Falklands and back, it explains why we never saw the "200 plane alpha strike" that many lay people at the time were worrying about.
 
Post-war, the Falkland Islands had been made sacred British soil by the loss of 256 British soldiers, seamen, air men, and Royal Marines.:mad:

It is said in some circles of politics that "Never" is a long time but ends eventually.

Short of ASB intervention, I susoect that the British Government will go on to disprove that it has to end when it comes to their position on the Falklands.
 
Not only the RN but the last of the Vulcans would have been retired in that year so no Black Buck missions. I also think the Victors were due to be retired once the Vulcans were gone but I'm not sure about that.

The thing is with the regard to the planned retirement of the Avro Vulcan in '82 was that it would have been replaced by the Tornado GR1.

Now, how much better would the "Black Buck" missions have gone with Tornado's with there better targeting and EW systems.

I don't know off the top of my head, but as a guess you might get 2 or 3 Tornado's being sent on a "Black Buck" mission instead of 1 Vulcan, especially with regards to the limited air refueling capability available to the RAF.

Has anyone got any idea's about if this could have been done?
 
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