Best Argentine Falklands Strategy

[Mumbles]

You'd that Harrier cannons were a significant factor, but the data does not bear this out for jet to jet combat.

Not really, I was making the point that the SHAR had a much better chance of a guns kill on a fast jet than an A-4P/Q to the point of the latter being practically useless in the role in comparison. I'm not claiming they were a significant factor outside of that comparison, but noting that they were used with success as an attacking option nonetheless.

That a Falklands era SHAR would be reduced to cannon only after expending both sidewinders is somewhat irrelevant - so would any cannon armed fighter after expending all it's AAM's, and one outcome of the Falklands was to double the amount of sidewinders that could be fitted to a SHAR. That SHAR guns kills were relatively rare is more of a reflection of the kind of engagements than anything else which is why I said it was a statement of outcome rather than potential - if only the cannon were available (for whatever speculative ASBish reason) 100% of the SHAR kills would have been by using them. Taking the speculation further, had missile defeating furballs developed the ratio of AIM-9L to Aden 30mm kills would likely be quite different. In the event sidewinder suiting tail chases were the rule for most of the engagements and that's reflected in the statistics.

There is also the fact that to an extent the SHAR was fuel limited as well, not as drastically as the Argentines, but still enough to be a factor. Being able to mount four sidewinders as they later did would have been handy in 1982, but it wasn't the only limiting factor (and there were several) in whether or not a kill was made - SHARs broke off pursuits on occasion due to lack of fuel rather than running out of sidewinders.

 

[Riain]

A lack of combat persistence was a major lesson for the sea harrier force coming out of the Falklands, in addition to adding twin sidewinder rails the drop tanks were increased from 100 to 190 gallons, which added 20-25 minutes flight time to the 75 minutes available in the Falklands.

They got ex hunter 220 gal tanks but found the fuel sloshed back and forth, so they cut a section out and bought the sloshing under control and gained 190 gals tanks. This is precisely the sort of thing that shows why Britain was virtually a shoe in to win.

 

[Glenn239]

Not enough range

Daggers were used as bombers, and their Shafrir IR missiles did not weigh more than iron bombs.

 

[Glenn239]

Not really, I was making the point that the SHAR had a much better chance of a guns kill on a fast jet than an A-4P/Q to the point of the latter being practically useless in the role in comparison.

Concentrating on the bolded part, and ignoring the Daggers for a moment, even A-4's with AIM-9B's would have been superior to no escorts because they would have forced Harriers to maneuvre defensively during air attacks and therefore, since offensive maneuvre would be curtailed and an occassional Harrier knocked out, cut down on the overall number of kills.

I'm not claiming they were a significant factor outside of that comparison, but noting that they were used with success as an attacking option nonetheless.

Cannons were not a significant factor in jet to jet combat - most of the Harrier's lethal capacity against jets was in its two AIM-9L shots.

That SHAR guns kills were relatively rare is more of a reflection of the kind of engagements than anything else...

The lack of cannon kills reflects the geniune hard-wired difficulty to hitting a jet with cannon shells, in comparison to hitting it with a self-guiding smart munition.

Taking the speculation further, had missile defeating furballs developed the ratio of AIM-9L to Aden 30mm kills would likely be quite different.

IR kills always heavily outnumber cannon kills, and since the introduction of modern IR missiles, (of which AIM-9L was one of the first) the disparity has only become more lopsided.

In the event sidewinder suiting tail chases were the rule for most of the engagements and that's reflected in the statistics.

It is because Argentine tactics were defective that the Harriers got so many 'perfect' tail-chase shots inside the certain-kill zone. On the other side of the coin, because Argentine jets never attempted to attack, Harrier pilots losing track of matters 'in their six' were never shot down for it.

 

[Glenn239]

This is precisely the sort of thing that shows why Britain was virtually a shoe in to win.

Another thing the Argentine navy might have done was make sure their German submarines and torpedoes were up to date in their maintenaince.

 

[Riain]

Another thing the Argentine navy might have done was make sure their German submarines and torpedoes were up to date in their maintenaince.

While Argentina might have done that Britain did do it, and chased the Argentine navy back into port.

As for the fitting of AIM9B to Skyhawk, as others have said the Argentine Skyhawks lacked the outer wing pylons for missile carriage and lacked the fuel to do any air to air manoeuvring over Falkland Sound. The Dagger was in a similar boat, even if they carried the Shafir they lacked the fuel to do any self defence manoeuvring. There's not much point in defending yourself only to crash into the sea on the way home.

 

[juanml82]

Daggers were used as bombers, and their Shafrir IR missiles did not weigh more than iron bombs.

It's as Riain said. As a bomb truck, they can make one run at a target rich environment, attack the first thing they saw and return to base.
If, instead, they are tasked with shooting down aircraft, they need to maneuver and they'll use fuel they don't have.

 

[usertron2020]

It's as Riain said. As a bomb truck, they can make one run at a target rich environment, attack the first thing they saw and return to base.
If, instead, they are tasked with shooting down aircraft, they need to maneuver and they'll use fuel they don't have.

I wonder if we have a lot of people talking past each other due to the silence of Ignore lists? That, or too many people are not reading the whole of this thread, because the issue of the lack of lag time over the target for the Argentines has been addressed repeatedly.

 

[Crowbar Six]

The Argentinians were never going to convince the Islanders to cooperate with them or willingly take over the Islands, even in the post Junta period, simply as there is/was no guarantee that Argentina was going to remain a democracy. South America has a long history of democracies being taken over by the Military or by dictators of various political flavours so no one is going to gamble on the government of the day staying in power; particularly when the consequences could involve one way trips in airliners, prolonged episodes of recreational dentistry or daytrips to soccer stadiums on non-match days.

If the Argentinians wanted to seize the Islands now they would need to rebuild their armed forces, assuming they actually had the cash to spend. If they were the obvious first step would be to build a professional navy, they would need a modern surface fleet with at least 20+ modern frigates and corvettes armed with AShM and SAMs, 6+ modern diesel/AIP subs with AShM capability and a number of LST's for landing troops ashore. For aircraft they would want a modern heavy fighter in the SU27 class which would be capable of providing both Air- Superiority and Fighter Bomber roles, they would need some 75+, a form of AEW capability (Embraer R99 would be favourite) and some SAM 10/12/20 to cover the airbases and ports. Just having the toys isn't enough, they would need to get serious about being PROFESSIONAL in that they would need to actually learn not just how to use the equipment but employ it effectively otherwise they just become expensive targets. A force like that would raise the risks of regaining the Islands after a successful attack tremendously and may actully deter an attempt.

 

[jsb]

If the Argentinians wanted to seize the Islands now they would need to rebuild their armed forces, assuming they actually had the cash to spend. If they were the obvious first step would be to build a professional navy, they would need a modern surface fleet with at least 20+ modern frigates and corvettes armed with AShM and SAMs, 6+ modern diesel/AIP subs with AShM capability and a number of LST's for landing troops ashore. For aircraft they would want a modern heavy fighter in the SU27 class which would be capable of providing both Air- Superiority and Fighter Bomber roles, they would need some 75+, a form of AEW capability (Embraer R99 would be favourite) and some SAM 10/12/20 to cover the airbases and ports.

Why would they build a navy ? (do they want to play with SSNs again ?)

I would think just going with SU27s (lots of later ones) + inflight refuelling/AEW/ASW + transports for the troops who will have to capture the island.(say a fleet of C130s ?)

JSB

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The argentine army was totally outclassed. There is a good argument that 3 commando brigade could have done it better for the British by themselves and with less casualties. British commanders seem to have thought so - there is a lot of criticism of having to wait for 5 brigade, of 5 brigade not being combat ready, at least some of it seemingly valid (bluff cove happened, in part to save 5 brigade walking). Think about that for a minute. If 3 brigade had done it by themselves think about the troop ratio... We're in 19th century colonial war territory.

This is a very good point - the Guards were not even on the rotation for Combat duties IIRC - a 3rd Battalion of Paras more light armour some more artillery and maybe a battalion of infantry for Guarding the bridgehead.

But its 1982 - and the Guards have decided that the young Turks are getting too much of the limelight. And this was a period of change in the British Military lots of cuts proposed and the last thing the Paras and Marines needed was upsetting the Guards Mafia

Julian Thompson delayed the 2nd attacks in order to allow them to see action - you quite right the Marines and too a slightly lesser extent the Paras where more than capable of carrying out a 2nd night of assaults.

Can you imagine the audacity of such an act?

Conventional wisdom says that you have to have 3 : 1 advantage in infantry in order to successfully attack and 3rd Brigade (4 Battalions with a 5th back at the bridge head) was probably 1:3 against in troop strength so a 9th of the troops they needed and yet I don't suppose there is anyone on this thread who would claim that they could not have done it in 2 nights of assaults.

 

[Crowbar Six]

Royal Marines are tough sods. My brother was in the RNR in the 80's and they had a RM reserve unit co located with them. One of the Marine Sergeant Majors has been in the Falklands and retired not long after and signed up for the reserves. He used to attend two training nights a week and ran 9 miles from work carrying full kit, did his drill and them ran home with his pack another 15 miles which included two steep hills, he never missed a drill either which is not bad for someone who was 45.

That is the difference between professional soldiers and randomly selected poorly trained draftees.

 

[Mumbles]

It's as Riain said. As a bomb truck, they can make one run at a target rich environment, attack the first thing they saw and return to base.
If, instead, they are tasked with shooting down aircraft, they need to maneuver and they'll use fuel they don't have.

Plus being exposed to all the same attrition risks as the bomb carriers.

 

[Glenn239]

The Dagger was in a similar boat, even if they carried the Shafir they lacked the fuel to do any self defence manoeuvring. There's not much point in defending yourself only to crash into the sea on the way home.

Daggers were used for air to air combat early in the campaign, engaging Harriers in one dogfight, losing one of their number and nearly shooting down one Harrier. Since Daggers were actually used air to air, and IR missiles weigh less than bombs, I think they could have pulled it off - albiet with maybe only a few minutes combat. Then again, they didn't need much time for the bombers to get in and out.

 

[Glenn239]

If the Argentinians wanted to seize the Islands now they would need to rebuild their armed forces, assuming they actually had the cash to spend.

When I said 32 Exocets appear to have been available on warships and might have been used as coastal defence batteries, I meant available at the time, not theoretically.

 

[Glenn239]

"It is unfair to place blame on the Argentine combat pilots for the failure of their high command to provide escorts for the raids, or to concentrate forces during the attacks from mid afternoon once the positions of the targets were known. Even if the Mirage force was needed to protect mainland bases from possible Vulcan attacks, there was still the option of fitting some Daggers with Shafrir infa-red homing missiles to enable them to put up a fight against the Sea Harriers. In the event attacks - a total of about fifty sorties from the mainland - were launched piecemeal with forces of between three and six aircraft, separated by intervals long enought for the ships to prepare for each new attack and for Sea Harriers that had used their missiles to be replaced on the patrol lines.

It is clear, however, that Argentine fighter-bomber pilots had little awareness of how aircraft in a formation could give each other mutual cover using their cannon armament..."

Air War South Atlantic (pg 127)

In terms of tactical formations, this passage suggests something like a formation where the A-4's would have above and behind them a pair of Daggers with Shafrir missiles when inbound. If the escorting Harriers go for the bombers, then the Daggers can shoot them down. If the Harriers go for the Daggers, then the bombers break through unimpedeed.

Daggers and Shafrirs were Israeli Air Force in orgin - and the IAF knows a thing or two about air tactics. The Argentine Navy, if it lacked proper instructors for altering tactics, could have hired ex-Isreali Air Force experts to assist it on the fly.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

"It is unfair to place blame on the Argentine combat pilots for the failure of their high command to provide escorts for the raids, or to concentrate forces during the attacks from mid afternoon once the positions of the targets were known. Even if the Mirage force was needed to protect mainland bases from possible Vulcan attacks, there was still the option of fitting some Daggers with Shafrir infa-red homing missiles to enable them to put up a fight against the Sea Harriers. In the event attacks - a total of about fifty sorties from the mainland - were launched piecemeal with forces of between three and six aircraft, separated by intervals long enought for the ships to prepare for each new attack and for Sea Harriers that had used their missiles to be replaced on the patrol lines.

It is clear, however, that Argentine fighter-bomber pilots had little awareness of how aircraft in a formation could give each other mutual cover using their cannon armament..."

Air War South Atlantic (pg 127)

In terms of tactical formations, this passage suggests something like a formation where the A-4's would have above and behind them a pair of Daggers with Shafrir missiles when inbound. If the escorting Harriers go for the bombers, then the Daggers can shoot them down. If the Harriers go for the Daggers, then the bombers break through unimpedeed.

Daggers and Shafrirs were Israeli Air Force in orgin - and the IAF knows a thing or two about air tactics. The Argentine Navy, if it lacked proper instructors for altering tactics, could have hired ex-Isreali Air Force experts to assist it on the fly.

The problem with 'going for the Harriers' is not knowing where they are - even with out AEW the British ships were able to give the harrier CAP some warning and direct them into an intercept.

The Argentine Pilots devoid of local radar direction are effectively making a fighter sweep at great disadvantage

 

[usertron2020]

Of course they were the biggest target [EDIT:The carriers], but the Argentines lacked the satellite coverage or AWACS to find them and live to tell about it.

With no AWACs you can't find the Harriers, so its very much hit-or-miss.

The problem with 'going for the Harriers' is not knowing where they are - even with out AEW the British ships were able to give the harrier CAP some warning and direct them into an intercept.

The Argentine Pilots devoid of local radar direction are effectively making a fighter sweep at great disadvantage

Can I expect my royalty checks to be arriving in the mail soon?

 

[juanml82]

The problem with 'going for the Harriers' is not knowing where they are - even with out AEW the British ships were able to give the harrier CAP some warning and direct them into an intercept.

The Argentine Pilots devoid of local radar direction are effectively making a fighter sweep at great disadvantage

Argentina had a ground radar deployed in the islands so unless the Harriers are masked by terrain, they could guide pilots flying at high altitude to them.
The problem is, the Harriers would be inside the RN Sea Darts firing envelope, and have no reason to engage anything that's not coming fast and low.