AHC and WI: No Bolshevik Russia

You do realize that Russia was in no shape to fight even before the war and that years of an immensely unpopular war did havoc to popular support as well. The Civil War was well underway before the treaty of Brest-Livotsk if anything that gave the Boshevik's breathing room. I still would doubt the SR's being ascendant, they would still have to deal the Kadet's. The possibility of the Bolshevik's not wanting to play ball, as well conservative elements, and the possibility of nationalist uprisings.

See, I hear a more complex story -- one where Russian troops actually manage to hold their own fairly well on the Eastern Front (thru 1916 anyway), where Russian society had been on the verge of revolution even prior to the Great War, which only made things worse with shortages and the like. And I never thought of the liberals, of all people, being a chief rival to power for the SRs -- the Bolsheviks, obviously, as well as the Whites (to some extent or other, depending on events), but the Kadets? As to the "Bolsheviks not playing ball", wasn't most of their leadership, Lenin aside, more open to working with other socialists factions?

Now, am I saying the PG, Kerensky, et el, made all the right calls, particularly with regard to the war's prosecution? Absolutely not. My last post was just noting that it's a little trickier than saying "stop the war". Maybe, for example, they could have more aggressively sought an armistice? Maybe not gambled everything with the summer offensive, or even just executed said offensive better? Or maybe something else entirely. These are the kind of details I'm hoping this thread can cover.
 
IMO a great deal of the blame has to go with what might be called the center-left wings of both the SR Party (represented by Chernov http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Chernov) and the Mensheviks (represented by people like Martov http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_Martov). They refused to split from the dominant right wings of their parties. Let's say that Martov and his "Menshevik Internationalists" had split from the right-wing Mensheviks, and that the left-wing SRs (not only those who later formed the Left SR party but maybe even center-left "mainstream" SRs like Chernov, who, after he left the Provisional Government had became increasingly critical of its failures to implement land reform and to move toward ending the war) had split from the Right SRs. (In OTL the Left SRs did not split from the SR party until after the October insurrection, and those who split did not even represent all left-wing SRs, let alone the left-center ones). Perhaps then Bolshevik rule could have been prevented by giving the workers and peasants (most crucially, the "peasants in uniform"--i.e. the soldiers) an antiwar and revolutionary but democratic alternative.

As it was, the Mensheviks and SRs were handicapped by the fact that in each case the right wing of the party was dominant, and the left wing did not want to split with it (except, as I noted, some of the extreme left-wing SRs, and even they split only after October). The Right Mensheviks and Right SRs opposed an all-socialist government and insisted on supporting Kerensky (himself nominally an SR though he regarded himself as being above parties) and on maintaining a coalition with the Kadets. In the case of the Right Mensheviks, this was due to a dogmatic Marxism (the Mensheviks were always more "orthodox" about their Marxism than the Bolsheviks): Since by all orthodox Marxist standards, backward Russia was not ready for socialism, it was essential not to alienate the bourgeoisie from the revolution. As for the SRs, they were curiously willing to follow the pro-war, pro-coalition-with-the-Kadets Mensheviks. It has to be remembered of course that hatred of Germany was an old theme in Russian Populism, of which the SR Party was the heir. (Russian Populism had thought that the Russian people were democratic at heart and that the Tsarist bureaucracy had been copied by Peter the Great from the Germans. Chernov was less naive on this matter, but still the SR's had an attachment to the Allies that was hard to give up even when it was clear that Russia could do no more fighting.) Oliver Radkey in *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October 1917* (New York and London: Columbia UP 1958) notes that the Mensheviks' concept of revolution was "as though made to order" for the right SR's, "whose zeal for war led them above all else to desire a class truce, which could only mean the bourgeois hegemony of the revolution postulated in Menshevik theory" (p.467). But Radkey also adds (pp. 466-7):

"Yet it was not just the right wing which held the PSR in thralldom to Menshevism. The center was also responsible for this fateful dependency of the larger party upon the smaller, even to the extent of abandoning its own concept of the revolution. Chernov says the SR's were twice late in respect to coalition, first with its formation, and then with its liquidation. But he also tells us, on an earlier occasion when the impression of the overwhelming catastrophe sustained by his party was fresh on his mind, that at the time of the July crisis the question of a socialist government had been posed and had been decided in the negative, partly because the Mensheviks refused to join. A break with Menshevism was by no means desired by many adherents of the center, leftist in inclination. Presumably he numbered himself among these members--he was always friendly to Menshevism. It was at the Tenth Petersburg Conference, however, that he spoke more frankly than on other occasions. He admitted that SR tactics had been framed with reference to Menshevik tactics--sometimes excessively so. He admitted that for the Mensheviks, with their concept of a bourgeois revolution, coalition had been a goal, whereas for the SR's it was only a means. When Tsereteli at the Democratic Conference termed 1905 a failure but this revolution a success, because of the achievement of coalition, Chernov had realized that their paths were fatefully diverging. Need he have waited so long? And why, after the truth finally dawned upon him, should he have thought of Tsereteli as minister of foreign affairs in a government headed by himself?"

We have to remember that even in OTL Lenin had to face serious opposition within the Bolshevik party from those who favored a peaceful transfer of power to the soviets instead of insurrection, and who afterwards wanted a coalition government of all the parties in the soviet. In this ATL the hands of the "moderate" Bolsheviks would be strengthened considerably: the argument "we can't work with the SRs or Mensheviks because they are pro-war and pro-Kadet" would be harder to maintain had there been large left-wing Menshevik and SR parties. Also, the Constituent Assembly would presumably be allowed to meet, and assuming that the split took place long enough before the elections, there would presumably be a lot fewer Right SRs in it, and more Left Mensheviks and Left SRs, so the divergences between Constituent Assembly and soviets would be far less than in OTL (especailly since the soviets themselves would be less dominated by the Bolsheviks).

This post was originally inspired by a reading both of Radkey's books on the history of the SRs and of a review by Boris Kagarlitsky of *Martov: Politician and Historian* by I. Kh. Urilov (Moscow: Nauka, 1997) http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1997/295/295p25.htm [1] I also notice that Orlando Figes comes to a similar conclusion:

"Only a democracy that contained elements of this social revolution had any prospect of holding on to power in the conditions of 1917. The [Menshevik and SR] Soviet leaders, because of their own dogmatic preconceptions about the need for a 'bourgeois revolution', missed a unique chance to set up such a system by assuming power through the Soviets; and perhaps a chance to avert a full-scale civil war by combining the power of the Soviets with that of the other public bodies, such as the zemstvos and the city dumas, under the Constituent Assembly. This sort of resolution would have been acceptable to Bolshevik moderates such as Kamenev, to left-wing Mensheviks such as Martov and to any number of left-wing SRs. Undoubtedly, this would have been a precarious resolution. neither Lenin nor Kerensky would have accepted it; and there was bound to be armed opposition to it from the Right. Some sort of civil war was unavoidable. But such a democratic settlement - one which satisfied the social demands of the masses - was perhaps the only option that had any chance of minimizing the scale of that civil war. It alone could have stopped the Bolsheviks." *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924*, p. 812.

Admittedly, there is the problem that even left-wing SR's and Mensheviks, though they realized Russia could not fight the Germans any more, would find it hard to swallow Brest-Litovsk--something even many Bolsheviks had a hard time accepting. IMO, though, this would not be fatal to the sort of socialist coalition government I am proposing here, for a simple reason--*even if they encountered no resistance whatever*, the Germans in 1918 were in no condition to occupy all of Russia. (In OTL, "General Max Hoffmann, the German commander on the Eastern Front, noted bitterly in his diary that despite the fact that his forces faced no opposition whatever, he would have to call an end to their advance. 'I should have no objection', he wrote, 'to pushing farther and farther eastwards. I should like to get to India except that the distances grow more immense, and our army does not.'" http://tinyurl.com/ov8844y) Their first priority, after all, had to be, not the occupation of Russia, but taking Paris before the Americans troops arrived en masse. So they might take Petrograd, maybe even Moscow (though I doubt it) but the socialist government can retreat eastward. Any puppet government the German set up in European Russia will most likely collapse after the Germans lose the war.

[1] "It should be noted that the polemic carried on by the right-wing social democrats against Martov in 1917 was no less aggressive than that of Lenin in other years. The prospect loomed of a split between the left and right Mensheviks, but at the crucial moment Martov and his supporters did not make the break.

"In this case Martov and the left Mensheviks fell into the same trap into which left-wing social democrats have blundered repeatedly in the years since. Recognising that the policies of the right-wing leaders of the party were fatal, but unwilling to break with them, they shared eventually in the party's defeat, opening the road to power for more radical forces."
 
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What made the "armed insurrection of the masses" inevitable?
The dual power situation just couldn't last. The Bolsheviks actually held back workers and sailors from Kronstadt from launching an armed insurrection before October (I think June or July, I forget). At some point, the workers in the cities were going to down tools and then defend themselves proactively with arms. Calling the situation a 'coup' misses the mass of workers who were mobilising against the Constituent Assembly. The bolsheviks just harnessed that movement better than any other organisation.

Chernov and Spiridonova would be prime candidates for a genuinely socialist SR movement. But the SRs in general were a fractured mess, half infiltrated by the Okhrana and half bickering amongst themselves when they weren't bickering with the other parties.
 

Many, many thanks! This is excellent analysis, and it goes a long way toward answering the OP. The only question is, given the OTL tendencies of left and center SRs and Mensheviks to be "led" by their right wing comrades, what is the best PoD after the February Revolution to fix this (either by having them split, or getting them in line)?

Here's a thought I had reading your post -- the SRs, even their center-left faction, were "dependent" on their coalition with the Mensheviks, correct? And the Mensheviks, in turn, were working with the PG to prosecute the war, despite opposition from their nominal leader, Julius Martov, correct?

Well, supposing Martov got "his" party to oppose the war -- either by arriving in Russia earlier, and preventing members from joining the PG; or possibly, in July, getting party delegates to support peace negotiations with the Central Powers (a motion which OTL failed); or maybe something else. However he does it, the effect is either the Mensheviks oppose the war as a whole, or the Right members don't go along with it, and split the party (as you propose). If this happens, will the SRs (Kerensky aside) now "go along" with the more revolutionary anti-war Mensheviks? Does this, from the Bolsheviks perspective (Lenin aside), make coalition with the SR and company look more promising, thus preventing their October Revolution? Is this the PoD we're looking for?
 
I had a question about the consensus of this thread. As I understand both my own readings on the period and what has been said here, the situation in Petrograd, and by extension Russia as a whole, was inherently unstable, and the dual power sharing arrangement was ultimately unsustainable. Public opposition to the Provisional Government had already manifested in Petrograd in July. None of the other parties had the organization or unity to emerge dominant in either Petrograd or Russia as a whole by extension. As I understand the consensus of this thread Given the context, barring internal changes within the non- Bolshevik Parties in the Soviets, or on the part of Kerensky, the Bolsheviks were likely to emerge dominant regardless of what Lenin did.

And yet, if the end of the status quo was inevitable, the October Revolution does not appear to have been, given the opposition to that course of action within the Bolshevik Party. According to what I have read on the subject, Lenin played a crucial role in galvanizing the party to take power in what became the October Revolution. I also recall that Lenin had had several close calls prior to that point. Perhaps I am underestimating the incompetence of the Provisional Government, but a situation in which Lenin is taken out of commission in 1917 does not strike me as prohibitively unlikely. I admit I could be mistaken or relying on questionable background material. If Lenin was truly untouchable after he arrived in Petrograd, there is still the earlier divergence of preventing Lenin's return from exile to begin with.

If we pressume for the moment that Lenin could indeed be removed from the picture, and that he was indeed the dominant figure in the Bolshevik Party coming to power at least when and how it did historically, what happens in his absence?

I realize this question is slightly offtopic, but I thought it was close enough to this one not to create a whole new thread for it.
 
I realize this question is slightly offtopic, but I thought it was close enough to this one not to create a whole new thread for it.

Actually, it could be right on topic -- if the Bolsheviks aren't pushed by Lenin, do they still make a play for dominance (or a revolution, or coup, whatever you want to call it)? If they don't make such a play, can a still socialist Russia emerge, or does this just guarantee the Whites come to power? We're not necessarily looking for a perpetual balancing act between the Soviets and the PG, we're not even trying to prevent "All Power to the Soviets" (as long as they're not Bolshevik dominated). It may be "no Lenin" means the SRs have time to get their act together.
 
With no PoDs prior to March 1917, how can the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Mensheviks, some other (leftish) socialist party, or some combination thereof, be the ones to govern (or "govern") Russia in the years following the Revolution, instead of the Bolsheviks? At first glance, this should be doable -- FWIG the SRs held majorities in the Soviets, and won the parliamentary elections in November 1917, the Mensheviks were more influential than the Bolsheviks, and even Kerensky was a Trudovik (a breakaway party from the SR).

So, maybe Lenin is killed at Finland Station or isn't transported east? Or something else? However his faction's takeover is prevented, how does this alternate Russian Revolution run its course? How is the Russian war effort affected (or is that one of the conditions for stopping Lenin's Bolshevik faction)? Is it possible for the Revolution's leaders to at reject -- at least at first and in theory -- the "vanguardism" and/or "democratic centralism" of Leninism? Or can that only guarantee the failure of the Revolution (falling to right wing militarists, etc)? (I'm also somewhat drawn to the ideas of Nardonik remaining influential longer.)

(Note: I ask this as someone less than perfectly versed in leftist ideology and Russian political history; so, from those who are, forgiveness if I make mistakes here or struggle with some concepts.)

The OP raises some legitimate questions, which in my mind are worth exploring.

The Mensheviks and Right SRs did have majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, but the Bolsheviks prior to the October Insurrection would sweep up both.

There's a book by the revisionist historian Alexander Rabinowitch on the July Uprising that lays out why it was the Bolsheviks and not the moderate socialists who'd taken power in 1917.

The book in question is Prelude to Revolution. Basically, a mass of workers, soldiers, and sailors poured into the streets demanding the implementation of Soviet power. As the Mensheviks and Right SRs at that moment had more or less controlled the Petrograd Soviet, it was assumed by the people in the streets that those two particular parties would have to seize power away from the Provisional Government.

They didn't. The July Uprising petered out, as most spontaneous demonstrations tend to do throughout modern history, and the Bolsheviks were blamed by the moderate socialists for supposedly having caused the unrest.

Even the admittedly anti-communist historian Orlando Figes admits in A People's Tragedy that the July Uprising was not a Bolshevik coup or even a Bolshevik-led event. Instead, it was a popular grassroots movement sprinkled here and there with Bolshevik activists that genuinely hoped that the moderate socialist leadership in charge of the Petrograd Soviet would embrace Soviet rule at the expense of the Provisional Government regime.

In Figes other book entitled Peasant Russia, Civil War, it is made clear that by postponing the question of revolutionary land reform until after the Constituent Assembly met and made its decision on division of the land the Right SRs specifically were left in the dust of mass throngs of peasants seizing land violently from landlords long before the October Insurrection and even longer before the Constituent Assembly's first and only session in 1918.

If the Mensheviks bankrupted themselves in the eyes of workers, soldiers, and sailors (who would after the July Days protests gravitate more and more towards the Bolshevik Party), then the Right SRs did so in the eyes of the peasantry, their traditional constituency.

Furthermore, the Right SRs and Mensheviks, despite having bankrupted themselves, only wound up in control of the CA and therefore in "control" of Russia only happened because the splinter Left SR Party's chosen candidates weren't placed on their own separate list. Rather, they were bunched together with the Right SR candidates on the same list that was designated as the Right SR list.

As such, although most of the peasantry had gone over to the side of the radical socialist Left SRs, they nonetheless voted in record numbers for the Right SRs in utter confusion upon examining the bungled party election list.

The CA would be dissolved with the vast majority of Russians-workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors-not caring at all and instead throwing all of their effort behind supporting Soviet power all the more so now that the moderate socialists had been decisively (and fairly embarrassingly) defeated.

Soviet Power was Bolshevik power to a large extent, not to discount the role of the SRs in realizing and hammering out Soviet power that is.

By the time of Brest Litovsk, there was already a fairly stable if somewhat divisive two party Bolshevik-Left SR coalition government in place. The multiparty regime had forced the Menshevik and Right SRs out of the soviets a while after the CA's shutdown with hardly anyone protesting such a controversial decision (the same can be said of the banning of the reactionay Kadet Party, whose support merely melted away after its banning and successful suppression)

Thus, there already was a Soviet government in Russia - making the "government" that the Menshevik and Right SR claimed to have the sole authority to form after having won the CA elections through a legal loophole was a farce.

I would also strongly caution against adopting the "Great Man" theory concerning Lenin. He himself failed to predict that on the 25th of October the armed wing of the Petrograd Soviet, the Military Revolutionary Committee, had managed to galvanize the support of a large but vocal minority of workers and army garrison soldiers in overthrowing the corrupt, conservative, and hopelessly reformist Provisional Government under Kerensky.

Lenin may have got the Bolshevik Central Committee to approve of an uprising on October 10th, but needless to say the planned uprising simply fell by the way side and would never come - meaning that if the CC decision was supposed to be a coup masterminded by Lenin then it was a very, very, VERY, poor one at that.

Red October, the actual insurrection, was carried out entirely from below after press workers told the Petrograd Soviet, the MRC, and Left SRs and Bolsheviks (with Lenin nowhere to be seen, never having been present until midway through the insurrection when he effectively told the MRC to do what it was already doing: that is, going on the offensive against the regime and bringing it down as soon as possible as to better protect the Second Soviet Congress)

The most realistic way for the moderate socialists to take over is through a military coup occurring in 1918 in Petrograd - a very real threat to Soviet power that very nearly succeeded had not a few mistakes by the conspirators tipped the Cheka off about the planned overthrow (somewhat ironically) of the Soviet government, when, like the Provisional Government was vulnerable to attack by an armed force.

The Cheka, as the immediate and necessary successor to the MRC, just barely staved off a successful counterrevolution in the capital.

Had it not done so, had it not been tipped off prematurely, then the moderate socialists along with the banned Kadet Party could potentially do away with the Bolshevik-led Soviet government, dissolve the popularly elected soviets, and reconvene the CA.

Buts that's assuming that the moderate socialists have enough strength to assert themselves into the inevitable political vacuum created by the destruction of Soviet power.

More likely is the rise to power of a conservative, right wing military regime keeping the capital under martial law and moving to pacify Red Moscow assuming that those loyal to Soviet power have enough resolve as to make a last stand and hold out against the impending attack on the city (or domestic unrest, spearheaded by right wing conspiratorial groups that had lost Moscow to the Reds, that take their chance in the ensuing confusion to rip the Moscow Soviet a new one)
 
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The most realistic way for the moderate socialists to take over is through a military coup occurring in 1918 in Petrograd - a very real threat to Soviet power that very nearly succeeded had not a few mistakes by the conspirators tipped the Cheka off about the planned overthrow (somewhat ironically) of the Soviet government, when, like the Provisional Government was vulnerable to attack by an armed force.
It's interesting that it was 1918 that the reformist socialists thought they had the power to topple the bolshevik-led Soviet government. It was also in 1918 that the Anarchist Black Guard debated whether or not to start their own insurrection against the bolsheviks but in the end decided not to as they didn't believe they had the strength. 1918 was a year of tightropes for the revolutionary regime.

Good post overall, btw.
 
OK, I've been reading A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes, and have come up with a few PoD ideas that might help with the OP:

  • Miliukov doesn't send that telegram/note to the Allies, thus keeping the Mensheviks and SRs (for the moment) out of the Provisional Government
  • the PG (somehow) decides against a summer invasion
  • the Soviet takes power during the July Days, depriving the Bolsheviks of their key slogan (and fig leaf for taking complete power)
  • Kerensky doesn't fire Brusilov, thus preventing the Kornilov Affair
  • Lenin dies while on the run following the July Days, thus preventing the Bolshevik dominated uprising (either the coup doesn't happen or the Soviets are allowed to assemble before "given" power)
 
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