Chapter 2
“I did not come into politics to change the Labour Party. I came into politics to change the country.”
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(Taken from “Labour; Drift and rediscovered purpose, 1924-1939” by Simon Greene, CUP 1982)
“Mosley’s resignation speech- a parliamentary triumph- was a long-premeditated claim to leadership designed to appeal to the political centre. Henceforth he constantly spoke about “energetic leadership” and “decisiveness”. Working with an increasingly significant parliamentary following, Mosley continued to emphasise his original policy of Keynesian monetary reform, loan-financed public works and massive “state action”, all of which would be accompanied by a general reorganisation of the cabinet and civil service intended to improve governmental efficiency…
…Interestingly considering his later criticism of the concept of “National Government” in 1931, in his period out of office Mosley was careful to cultivate contacts with figures from across the political spectrum- Macmillan and Oliver Stanley from the Conservatives, and the likes of Nicholson and Sinclair from the Liberals. There was even talk of a cross-party “young alliance” against the older generation of politicians, although this was a pipedream and inevitably came to nothing… Such talk does demonstrate however that Mosley’s radicalism was part of the general post-war shift in British politics, as the rising stars of the 1920’s increasingly chafed at the relaxed style of their Edwardian forebears…”
(Taken from “The Crisis of 1931” by George Barlow, Picador 1990)
“From May 1930, Mosley formed another small group of parliamentary rebels, and attempted to use the extra-parliamentary Party to impose his policies upon the cabinet… To some extent, these pressures could be ignored or contained. The TUC, ILP and Mosleyites tended to be mutually antipathetic, although from November the latter two had forged links and attempted to coordinate their efforts, albeit in an ineffectual way…
Criticisms from all three groups aggravated existing uneasiness within the Labour party. While Party loyalty and the recognition of parliamentary difficulties kept discontent in check to a certain extent, ministers were subjected to a constant stream of complaint from the parliamentary Party, the NEC and Party committees… The near success of a Mosleyite motion at the Party conference in October[5] and its originator’s subsequent election to the NEC confirmed both Party discontent with government unemployment policy and the existence of a major potential threat to the leadership…
After his victories at the Party conference, Mosley found himself in a position that his impulsive nature naturally rebelled against… He could be reasonably confident in the fact that he commanded great support in the Labour Party, and his confidants constantly rammed home the point that all he needed to do to progress was to continue his opposition to MacDonald and patiently wait until the Government drifted into a crisis…
Mosley’s impatience was never far beneath the surface however, and in an ill-advised speech at Edgebaston in February 1931 he lashed out at the cabinet, calling Snowden a “dull, lethargic mediocrity” amongst other terms. His comments angered many within the party and enraged the government, who saw his criticism as ungentlemanly and a direct challenge to the Prime Minister. In April Mosley’s impatience reached its peak, when he even went as far as seriously considering abandoning the Labour party and forming a movement of his own[6]… While Mosley was quickly dissuaded from his quixotic plan by being convinced that his grass-roots support would not follow him outside Labour, the incident shows how his instincts even at this stage were towards decisive action, even to the point of being self-defeating. It was a character trait that would dog Mosley throughout his political career…”
(Taken from “The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century British Politics”, Eds. June + Peterson. Longman, 1999)
“MAY REPORT, THE: Report issued in July 1931 by the Economy Committee on National Expenditure, chaired by Sir George May. The committee warned that in 1932 the government would have a budget deficit of £120 Million, a gap that would have to be closed by radical budget cuts. Publication of the report caused an economic and political crisis in Britain, and led directly to the fall of Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour government as the retrenchment proposals irrevocably split the cabinet.”
(Taken from “The Crisis of 1931” by George Barlow, Picador 1990)
“After an ‘impassioned appeal’ by MacDonald for acceptance of his proposals, each Cabinet Minister was asked to express his or her view. In the event, ten ministers supported the unemployment benefit cut… Ten were opposed. With such an even split, the Cabinet immediately agreed upon resignation. It was decided that the King should immediately be informed, and advised to summon a Baldwin-Samuel-MacDonald conference the following morning…MacDonald arrived at the palace at 10.15 pm, looking “scared and unbalanced”. The King urged him not to resign, but instead to consider the national alternative, although he admitted that it seemed unlikely that the Conservatives and Liberals would acquiesce to such an arrangement[7]…
…Macdonald then telephoned from the palace to arrange a meeting that evening with Baldwin and Samuel, before returning to Downing St…. The Conservatives and Liberals arrived around 11 pm. Baldwin had brought Chamberlain, who attempted to convince the uncertain MacDonald to remain in a “National Government”. Although MacDonald would likely have few parliamentary supporters, he could ‘command strong support in the country’… Samuel strongly supported Chamberlain, while Baldwin said nothing. Only after the meeting when pressed by Chamberlain did he express approval, adding that he had remained silent because the appeal to MacDonald seemed hopeless…. Ironically it was Baldwin’s attitude that finally decided Macdonald. Interpreting his silence as indicating disapproval[8], MacDonald despondently informed the palace that he intended to resign the following day, and the prospect of a Conservative-Liberal emergency government became a reality on the 25th…”
(Taken from “Labour; Drift and rediscovered purpose, 1924-1939” by Simon Greene, CUP 1982)
“The resignation of MacDonald and the abrupt entry of Labour into opposition necessitated a general reorganisation of the Party. At a meeting called on the 25th August MacDonald’s resignation was accepted. The contest for the Party’s leadership seemed destined to be between youth and experience, the extroverted radical Mosley being pitted against Arthur Henderson, a veteran widely regarded as a ‘safe pair of hands’.
In the event however, the long-promised showdown between Labour’s establishment and radical wings never materialised. Henderson was naturally inclined not to seek the leadership[9], and his belief that the Party could not be reformed in time to avoid a crushing defeat at the next election made him go as far as to tell friends that the position would be a ‘poisoned chalice’. Against the advice of his allies then Henderson indicated to Mosley on the evening of the 30th that he would not contest the leadership. The following day the Party returned Mosley as leader by a huge margin… Amongst the general jubilation a single delegate rose and began shouting ‘An English Hitler!’ He was swiftly silenced by his neighbours…”[10]
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[5] OTL, Mosley put his ‘manifesto’ to the Labour conference of 1930- it was rejected by a relatively narrow margin of 1,046,000 for compared to 1,251,000 against. In this Timeline (ITTL) Mosley’s greater influence and popularity in the Party is enough to make things closer, 1,112,000 for to 1,185,000 against.
[6] Of course in February 1931 OTL Mosley did exactly this, setting up the “New Party”. ITTL he has rather better advice, and realises that he has a far greater chance of achieving his objectives within the Labour movement.
[7] OTL, George V overplayed the receptiveness of Baldwin towards National Government, which made Macdonald feel that it was a practical alternative. Here the King is a more reliable messenger, which discourages a Prime Minister already far more aware of the potential party schism he could cause then OTL.
[8] The meeting occurred OTL, but here MacDonald is already more inclined to dismiss National Government as unworkable, which colours his perceptions somewhat.
[9] OTL the only reason he did it really was because he felt he was the only option in the dire straits Labour found itself. That’s not the case ITTL.
[10] No, the heckler was not an 8-year old Jewish kid from Frankfurt…. I can promise however that Walter will make a conference-based cameo towards the end of the TL.