Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles

If Britain takes a France-style approach to decolonization, it could go anywhere from them successfully holding onto more minor islands around the world and relatively speaking being in a better spot by the 21st century to them bankrupting themselves trying to hold on to more than they can handle and completely fading to irrelevancy.
So, differents approach aside, do you consider that France has 'completely faded to irrelevancy'? Cause, I don't think that it could be considered so...
 
So, differents approach aside, do you consider that France has 'completely faded to irrelevancy'? Cause, I don't think that it could be considered so...
France didn’t bankrupt itself in its neocolonial shenanigans IOTL, but a Britain that isn’t as close to the US and engaging in expensive foreign adventuring is going to be financially struggling worse than OTL and it was already in a really tough spot in the 70s and 80s.
 
France didn’t bankrupt itself in its neocolonial shenanigans IOTL, but a Britain that isn’t as close to the US and engaging in expensive foreign adventuring is going to be financially struggling worse than OTL and it was already in a really tough spot in the 70s and 80s.
Yes and no, if their internal politics go exactly as OTL then yes they will be worse off, but a lot of people I've seen on this forum have implied that the 40s, 50s, and 60s were a time were the British government did practically everything it could to destroy its own economy. There's many long threads on how they could have done better, so even if they aren't as close to the US in this timeline, that doesn't guarantee they will be worse off and more struggling.
 
If Britain takes a France-style approach to decolonization, it could go anywhere from them successfully holding onto more minor islands around the world and relatively speaking being in a better spot by the 21st century to them bankrupting themselves trying to hold on to more than they can handle and completely fading to irrelevancy.
I suppose should specify that I don’t see them trying to pull an Algerian war anywhere. I don’t think the Suez crisis turns into something bigger either, assuming it happens at all ITTL. Even if the US and UK have worse relations the Brit’s aren’t dumb.

In my mind they’d be much more focused on trying to keep areas that are strategically or economically relevant, mainly islands although I could see attempts at trying to keep Guyana and especially Belize in the fold. Malta for example is one I could see the Brits doing their best to keep and integrate because of its strategic value. Particularly if they don’t keep their bases in Cyprus ITTL, it could serve the role for them. Various pacific and Indian Ocean island would give them strategic reach and EEZ’s in areas. It would also mean they don’t have to rely on the US for bases that far out.
 
Yes and no, if their internal politics go exactly as OTL then yes they will be worse off, but a lot of people I've seen on this forum have implied that the 40s, 50s, and 60s were a time were the British government did practically everything it could to destroy its own economy. There's many long threads on how they could have done better, so even if they aren't as close to the US in this timeline, that doesn't guarantee they will be worse off and more struggling.
There is an obvious butterfly TTL in British politics that should not be forgotten. Namely that thanks to no Channak crisis TTL the Lloyd George liberals were relatively better off. Enough to get Alternative voting passed in time as the price for being in coalition with Labour in 1929. Then there was no National Liberal split. So you both have a relatively Liberal party, a relatively weaker Conservative party and a somewhat more representative electoral system...
 
@Lascaris

Well let us consider the following . The US has precious few assets right now in the Middle East. The Saudis are their main clients, and they already control the Holy Cities (I assume the Hejaz-Saudi War of 1925 has taken place as OTL). If the Hashemites, with the US probably sees as a UK client attacks the Saudis I can see that been seen by US Senators and the Establishment as a British attempt to kick out the US from the Middle East. With Turkey probably being pro-Soviet, and Greece pro-UK (remember no Greek Civil War means no collapse of the UK position in Greek politics, necessitating US intervention) they have little to use that is worth the hassle. The Saudis are worth the hassle.

Now, let us assume the Brits do try a more independent policy from the US. This is likely going to show up in British policies in the Balkans, and Middle East, as well as a British opposition to de-colonization OTL style. This will create friction. The US can react with policies ranging from backing the Saudis, to going as far as being less willing for the kind of integration you had OTL (i.e NATO morel like a traditional alliance vs. integrated command). This might go as far as meaning the US opts for a Bavarian State rather than unification of the western occupation zones.

Ultimately the point will come were the British might decide to call the American bluff on curtailing support, and the Americans might react "badly". This might mean a more chaotic early cold war.

What I am saying is that Britain going more unilateral is going to trigger a more adversarial reaction by the US considering the conditions in key regions of importance. The question is not whether the British think they can look (or others do so) down the Americans, but whether they can. And I do not think that is the case ATL.

On British politics. Did the Irish Crisis resolve differently? Because my view is that it was that that mainly undermined Lloyd George rather than Chanak.

On a more general issue
Concerning Abduallah and his ambitions. He has a bigger army ATL, but not that bigger. He faces multiple potential fronts (Kurdistan, Assyria, Syria) and that would dissipate his forces. He will be expected to take the lead against Israel and will lose political capital there. I also would not underestimate the Saudis. In another name, I am not sure he would be able to exert his will as many assume. And I cannot see him easily defeating the Saudis while also fighting the Israelis. I am sure his ambitions (and feel that it is a make or break moment for his future power) will lead him to pick up multiple fights at the same time, and that will be his downfall.
 
Another point. While we assume the Soviet occupation of the Straits might trigger a quicker Cold War, it might also not. It might be an impetus for the US and the Soviets to more carefully manage conditions and to avoid friction. Especially if the US is pissed off at the the UK, and considers the UK trying to drag it into a new war. Let us consider. There is no Greek Civil War. There might be a Yugoslav Civil War, but there might also not be. Right now one major issue for the Soviets is resolved (getting a presence in the Straits), and beyond that the other main issue of the Soviets remaining is getting the security buffer they want in Eastern Europe and presence in Germany. The US will not likely oppose a Soviet demand for a security buffer in Eastern Europe, though the British might. I am not sure I would bet on the US taking the side of the British on this. Especially a Britain that as I said seems to have a good position in the Middle East and the Southern Balkans. So we might also not get a big US-USSR tension as early as OTL.

I do thing you still get the Korean War (largely because Stalin and Mao did not control Kim, and secondly became Rhee was also itching for a fight and the US was not controlling him), but whether you get Berlin will largely depend on how the Brits, the US and the Soviets are standing to each other when Germany collapses. If the USA decides to go for a three or four Germanies option, that largely removes Berlin as an issue. The Soviets did prefer OTL a neutral and united Germany, but if they can get a recongnized East German state as part of a general resolution of the German Question based on making multiple German states, they probably will take it, plus Poland, Hungary, Romania ,and Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria can work as a neutralized state ala Austria, since they already have a presence on the Straits.
That radically decreases the possible falshpoints.
I am not saying it will happen, anti-Soviet views were as prelevant in the US establishment as much as anti-UK ones, and Stalin is Stalin, but it could happen. This might mean a later date of start of the hard core Cold War, which does open the possiblity for the kind of US-UK antagonism I described before.
 
Of course the British, being British can undermine their own position by pissing off the Greeks, and thus opening up space for the US to supplement their influence. This could be due to a) The UK refusing Greece, Cyprus b) the UK pushing for militarization of Bulgaria and incorporation into Western Institutions. I think the Greeks and Soviet would prefer an non-aligned, neutralized Bulgaria (the Greeks for historical reasons and also for further enhancing their position vis a vis the UK by denying it an alternative local ally), the Soviets because they already have control of the Straits, would like to have a free hand with Romania, and thus the Danube river, and will have a friendly Turkey supporting their position on the Straits.
 
Let me also add why I think the Saudis are not to be underestimated. 1) Ibn Saud is to put it bluntly out of the league of Abdullah. Once can fairly castigate the Saudis for many things, but Ibn Saud is the last great mediaeval conqueror King. His is ruthless, but pragmatic and controls a very unified state. The Ikhwan were the Fremen or Aiel if you want of the real world. However much the Hashemite army is modern, I question if it has the grit to defeat the Saudis. 2) They enjoy more legitimacy and unity (especially after 1929 when he brought to heel the most rebellious and radical of the Ikhwan) compared to the Hashemites.

So between the combination of leadership and troops I just cannot see the Hashemites winning such a war.
 
@Lascaris

Well let us consider the following . The US has precious few assets right now in the Middle East. The Saudis are their main clients, and they already control the Holy Cities (I assume the Hejaz-Saudi War of 1925 has taken place as OTL). If the Hashemites, with the US probably sees as a UK client attacks the Saudis I can see that been seen by US Senators and the Establishment as a British attempt to kick out the US from the Middle East.
That's a reasonable supposition... IF the Hashemites attack the Saudis. But would Abdullah do so?
With Turkey probably being pro-Soviet, and Greece pro-UK (remember no Greek Civil War means no collapse of the UK position in Greek politics, necessitating US intervention) they have little to use that is worth the hassle. The Saudis are worth the hassle.
There is no Greek civil war but the British position in Athens has been likely eroding since 1941. By 1944 it is American Lend Lease that is keeping Greece afloat not Britain and the Greek political establishment is very much aware of this. If anything the Greeks will not be particularly different from say Australia in this regard. Which would leave a lot of British residual influence, post-war granted... unless the British manage to poison it over Cyprus. Which they cannot be taken for granted that they will not.
Now, let us assume the Brits do try a more independent policy from the US.
If someone present a reasonable set of causes for the British to do so. The British are not going to act differently just for the shake of acting differently. Something has to make them act differently.
This is likely going to show up in British policies in the Balkans, and Middle East, as well as a British opposition to de-colonization OTL style. This will create friction. The US can react with policies ranging from backing the Saudis, to going as far as being less willing for the kind of integration you had OTL (i.e NATO morel like a traditional alliance vs. integrated command). This might go as far as meaning the US opts for a Bavarian State rather than unification of the western occupation zones.
A Bavarian state... the French and Soviets would likely want one, the British at least not opposed to it, I'm getting the impression the only thing stopping it OTL was American opposition and even that wasn't to be taken for granted. It's one of these thing that look tantalizingly plausible but no-one is really clear where it got derailed.
Ultimately the point will come were the British might decide to call the American bluff on curtailing support, and the Americans might react "badly". This might mean a more chaotic early cold war.

What I am saying is that Britain going more unilateral is going to trigger a more adversarial reaction by the US considering the conditions in key regions of importance. The question is not whether the British think they can look (or others do so) down the Americans, but whether they can. And I do not think that is the case ATL.
They can't which is why I ask again... what would cause them to try?
On British politics. Did the Irish Crisis resolve differently? Because my view is that it was that that mainly undermined Lloyd George rather than Chanak.
Ireland and the whole Honours scandal both of which happened. But Chanak triggered the immediate fall from power instead of the coalition surviving a little longer till elections in summer 1923 which lead to a Liberal instead of a Labour minority government as seen in part 23. So the Liberals are somewhat better off, they have gotten since 1930 electoral reform (part 36) as their price for supporting Labour's first government in 1929 but British politics are otherwise broadly similar after all the Conservatives had crushing majorities in the 1930s.
On a more general issue
Concerning Abduallah and his ambitions. He has a bigger army ATL, but not that bigger.
Roughly twice the size of his 1948 army at the moment... which is not any crushing duperiority when the British had to arm and train the Palmach and you have a whole Israeli division around...
He faces multiple potential fronts (Kurdistan, Assyria, Syria) and that would dissipate his forces. He will be expected to take the lead against Israel and will lose political capital there. I also would not underestimate the Saudis. In another name, I am not sure he would be able to exert his will as many assume. And I cannot see him easily defeating the Saudis while also fighting the Israelis. I am sure his ambitions (and feel that it is a make or break moment for his future power) will lead him to pick up multiple fights at the same time, and that will be his downfall.
Abdullah would likely need to cut a deal with at least someone. Adding more enemies while you need to deal with Kurds and Assyrians want Syria and conflict with the Israelis is just around the corner would be... inadvisable?
 
I disagree that the US has no other option than the Saudis in the Middle East. They already have a stronger relationship with Iran than OTL. The Saudis aren’t the only game in town anymore. They might not appreciate Abdullah invading but again, as long as the oil keeps flowing and Iran stays an ally I’m not sure they care enough to get involved.

Him winning is another matter entirely. But I don’t think the US does much more then sell discounted war surplus.
 
Iran has to be "shared" with the USSR and the UK, even if the Iranians themselves do not thinks so. The Saudis need not be shared with anyone.
 
Part 145
Near Erzincan, May 4th, 1944

The surviving men of the 117 and 118 Jäger Divisions and the 264 Infantry divisions went into captivity under the watchful eyes of NKVD men. The three German divisions had held on for three days after the Turkish armistice before being forced to lay down their arms. A handful of men had melted away and been hidden by Turkish civilians. For most this had not been a viable option. Much further south the men of the 188th and 334th Infantry divisions were luckier, unlike their comrades they had surrendered to the French and British.

Smyrna, May 6th, 1944

The men of the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Brigade boarded the passenger ships that would carry them to Volos. Their tanks had already been loaded in freighters while other units of the III Armoured Division had already preceded them across the Aegean. Two out of the three corps of the Army of Asia Minor, were starting to redeploy to European Greece. The third would remain in place for the time being, till the Turkish army was fully demobilized and the Allied Control Commission took control of the situation.

Erzurum, May 7th, 1944

Soldiers from the 68th Mountain Rifle Division begun boarding the train. STAVKA was redeploying most of the units of the Transcaucasus front to its general reserve to rebuild. What the Soviets were calling "Erzurum Strategic Operation" had been a huge success but still had cost the Soviet Union almost 80,000 casualties. Then the combined German and Turkish casualties had been in excess of 133,000 men...

Sivas, May 7th, 1944

The city had seen explosive growth in the past two decades, with large public buildings as befitted the capital of the new Turkey. Now two battalions if the 1st Assyrian Infantry brigade and a regiment of the Soviet 76th Rifle Division, overwhelmingly Armenian, paraded in front of the building of the Grand National Assembly. The choice of units had not been exactly accidental on the British and Soviet part, more a pointed reminder to the new Turkish government of who had won the war, neither the British nor the Soviets forgot what had happened after the Mudros armistice in the previous war. Kazim Karabekir gritted his teeth at the insult and said nothing. The survival of the army mattered more for the nation and this his friend Ismet had secured. Of course military limitations were to be expected when the treaty came. But the country had already escaped the fetters of such military limitations once in the past. It would do so again.

Sevastopol, May 9th, 1944

The city was liberated by the Soviet army. The liberation of the entire Crimea would be complete over the next five days, with113,000 German and Romanian soldiers managing to escape by sea since mid April without the loss of a single Romanian ship.

Camden new York, May 10th, 1944

Two dozen F4U Corsairs landed on USS Alaska as the latest USN fleet carrier begun her trials. In retrospect the decision to convert Alaska and her sister Guam to aircraft carriers had looked a little superfluous, the two ships were not going to be as good as the Essex class carriers entering service in large numbers having only 90% of their airgroup and worse underwater protection. But this still meant each ship could carry 80 to 90 aircraft making them quite useful. Meanwhile American shipyards kept building warships at a pace Japan had no chance to match. Four of the Iowa class battleships would be in service by July. Work on the fifth USS Kentucky had resumed the previous December but it was not expected to complete before mid-1946..

Mersin, May 12th, 1944

The soldiers of the 3e Division Blindee begun to board the ships that would bring them to Piraeus. The French Armee d' Orient was being moved to Greece, although several units from both Greece and Syria were instead going to North Africa to reinforce the new Armee B under De Lattre for the coming the liberation of France. Still De Gaulle had agreed to three infantry and an armoured division remaining in Macedonia to fight alongside the Greeks, Serbs and Poles.

Moscow, May 14th, 1944

Vladimir Triandafillov had been told that Konstantin Rokossovsky kept a loaded gun around at all times to make certain he would not be taken alive if the NKVD came for him for a second time. He could understand the sentiment he mused to himself as the same man who had sent him to the Gulag now handed him his marshal's baton. Life could be full of ironies sometimes. But for now it should do. He was the hero of the day after all. The same night after the celebrations Stalin would give his newly minted field marshal his new task...
 
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Mersin, May 12th, 1944

The soldiers of the 3e Division Blindee begun to board the ships that would bring them to Piraeus. The French Armee d' Orient was being moved to Greece, although several units from both Greece and Syria were instead going to North Africa to reinforce the new Armee B under De Lattre for the coming the liberation of France. Still De Gaulle had agreed to three infantry and an armoured division remaining in Macedonia to fight alongside the Greeks, Serbs and Poles.
I guess that the Armee B is going to participate in ITTL Operation Dragoon, there is not enough time forthem to participate ITTL Operation Overlord.
Smyrna, May 6th, 1944

The men of the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Brigade boarded the passenger ships that would carry them to Volos. Their tanks had already been loaded in freighters while other units of the III Armoured Division had already preceded them across the Aegean. Two out of the three corps of the Army of Asia Minor, were starting to redeploy to European Greece. The third would remain in place for the time being, till the Turkish army was fully demobilized and the Allied Control Commission took control of the situation.
The next logical taget would be to smash the Bulgarians and force them to change sides. Around the end of June, or July the lattest, it can be done.
 
Iran has to be "shared" with the USSR and the UK, even if the Iranians themselves do not thinks so. The Saudis need not be shared with anyone.
I don't know why so hassle about Saudi Arabia: oil was discovered in 1938 and in 1940 they where like the 17th producer of oil in the world. They were growing fast but were much less important than Bahrain, Persia, Irak, Egypt... less than the majority of oil producers.
I think in 1944 would be a country to take into account but not enough to define the future of Middle East.
 
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Bulgarians and Germans in the Balkan front will be soon badly outnumbered.
When will be the next offensive? In June at the same time that Overlord seems too early. Maybe early July.
 
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