Marineflieger Kommando: MFK - Hitlers Fleet Air Arm

Tangles2 · May 3, 2024

Here's another AH Naval Thread for your consideration, Comment, and hopefully enjoyment.

Part One.

Extract: - The Politics of Rearmaent: The Development of German War Fighting Capabilities During the Interwar Period. Prof. Steve Corus, University of Illinois Press 1987.

Occurring concurrently was the simultaneous and rapid build-up of the German Army and Air Force which demanded substantial effort and resources. That the army had higher priority for high tensile steel armor plate for tanks helped limit building plans for the expansion Raeder hoped for under the Nazi’s. That the Luftwaffe had a near-complete monopoly on all German military aviation, including naval aviation, was a source of great interservice rivalry with the Kriegsmarine as well as limiting the scope of naval aviation.

That any form of nascent naval air arm was able to avoid being quickly absorbed by Hermann Göring's newly established Luftwaffe, simply came down to Hitler in his role as absolute head of state and the armed forces. As he controlled the German Navy absolutely despite being a man with little or no knowledge of sea power, he was simply able to decree that a naval aviation force (Marineflieger Kommando - MFK) be formed separate from the Luftwaffe to provide units intended to serve aboard the future aircraft carriers and capital ships and provided the Kriegsmarine with some airpower from bases on land. Hitler had closely followed the developments in the RN/RAF conflict in the UK during 1931-33 and had been struck by the similarities between that and the evolving Interarms tensions developing in the German military. The basis for this autocratic decree was his own desire for an aircraft carrier to be laid down as a further symbol of growing German might, rather than any real recognition of the merits of a carrier-based aviation component for the navy.

Numerous historians have speculated the specific reasons for this autocratic decision, and it is commonly considered that without this, that it is highly probable that the progress on the Graf Zeppelin would possibly not have proceeded, in much the same manner as the non-conversion of HMS Tiger whilst the RAF had still controlled aviation matters in the UK. With a lack of suitable aircraft, coupled with the reluctance of the Luftwaffe to support the Kriegsmarine in the carrier's construction, it is probable that at best, work would have been delayed until well after hostilities commenced in WW2. That this arrangement came to be a success can largely be attributed to the initial officer appointed to occupy the post of the new arm, Generalmajor (Luftwaffe rank) and later Konteradmiral Walther Wever.

Marinefliegerkommando (MFK) 1933-39

The appointment of the undoubtedly capable and unusually suited Wever to this role by Hitler decree, quite literally arose from an accident in history. Wever had served as a respected and highly capable staff officer for the OHL, Army High Command, during WW1, and postwar had played a key role in the evolution of the new air force to the point where he was appointed as the nascent arms Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. His role in the initial molding of the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine and strategic plans, and establishing links with the technical and industrial contacts, was pivotal during the formation of the Luftwaffe as part of German rearmament plans. This ensured his familiarity with virtually all the key players both industrial and within the services during this period, when he was severely injured in an air crash in 1933.

On 3 May 1933 Wever flew from Berlin to Rostock to discuss design issues of new Heinkel aircraft in person with the company’s founder Ernst Heinkel at the company’s Rostock headquarters. On his return journey the Heinkel He 70 Blitz aircraft that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks. Unaware that aileron gust locks had been fitted after landing and not removed by the Heinkel field groundcrews he took off. The aircraft was barely airborne when these caused the wing to dip, and the Heinkel stalled and crashed from a low altitude. Though failing to explode, the crash killed his flight engineer and severely injured Wever who was trapped in the wreckage for some time. Fortunate to survive and rendered unfit for flying duties, this chance occurrence resulted in his availability to guide the early development of the new arm. (1)

Widely recognized as an unusually capable and intellectual staff officer, Wever had been one of the early air power theorists behind doctrinal development for the Luftwaffe at this time, particularly as a proponent for strategic bombing. Beyond these acknowledged attributes and little recognized at this time, was that his greatest skill was his ability to handle people. He remained friends to many key personalities in the evolving and intensely competitive Reich arms industry and was not only known and respected, but also proved skillfully able to balance many of the key competing factions and personalities of German Rearmament. This would later lead to him being later widely acknowledged as the father of German naval aviation.

1. IRL on 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden to give a lecture. On his return journey as detailed the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that he was piloting had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and the aileron gust locks had not been removed. The aircraft took off, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartwheel, crashed and exploded, killing Wever and removing one of the more visionary and capable Luftwaffe leaders of the period. A key supporter of the strategic bombing concept his untimely death left the Luftwaffe lacking clear planning direction. Though not subordinated to the army support role, the use of air power in support of ground forces came to dominate for tactical and operational missions and aircraft designs after his death. Many historians regard his death and the subsequent failure to develop some form of strategic bombing capability as a key Luftwaffe weakness during WW2.

Tangles2 · May 3, 2024

Part Two

Raeder, initially strongly opposed the transfer and appointment, would only with reluctance acquiesce to what he considered the intrusion into navy matters. He would later grudgingly come to acknowledge the application and dedication Wever demonstrated to the new arm. Goering, though limiting the strength of the new arm to 300 aircraft, still considered Wever as essentially a Luftwaffe officer which helped minimize obstructionism between the two services. Despite his removal from the Luftwaffe, through his contacts and friendship with key figures such as Kesselring, Udet and Jesschonneck, he continued to maintain close association and involvement with aviation developments. This association, combined with support from industry figures such as Heinkel, who still felt guilty due to his role in his injury, would be vital in the development and introduction of new aircraft specifically for the new arm.

Initially, with two badly broken ankles and deemed unfit for further flying duties, Wever would use his extended recovery period to read voraciously and familiarize himself with warfare at sea and naval aviation, particularly those of the rapidly evolving RN and RNN. With the appointment and able support of Kommodore Hermann Boehme as deputy, he was responsible for much of its rapid capability development up to WW2. Beyond the initial priority of facilitating the new aircraft carrier under construction, he developed the new arms doctrine emphasizing the employment of aircraft to attack shipping. He promoted specific skill training in this role and other naval specific abilities such as overwater navigation and conducting flying operations in all types of weather, as well as arranging for men to be sent to Japan to study carrier tactics and examine aircraft types suitable to attack shipping. Goering’s insistence that the number of operational aircraft does not exceed 300 was largely to limit naval aviation eating into aircraft production for the expanding Luftwaffe. Within that cap Wever was to have a surprising degree of latitude in developing that force structure, so that by the outbreak of war in addition to actual aircraft deployed on ships the new MFK included a significant land-based component. There would remain a great degree of interoperability between the two arms, with as the war developed a number of Luftwaffe airwings being employed in anti-shipping roles and undergoing MFK training and virtually indistinguishable from those of the MFK.

The MFK initially operated Catapult-launched spotter planes, reconnaissance aircraft, torpedo bombers, and air-sea rescue seaplanes as land-based components supporting Kriegsmarine operations. Most of these were largely Luftwaffe developed designs.

Wever was however the instigator of several key developments for the new arm. Upon assumption of his new role, immediately after Raeder’s approval of plans for the new fleet carrier, he was to push for provision of a training carrier for aircrew and aviation personnel. Jokingly referred to as his second job, it became identified in the nascent MFK as Project J2 for this reason and led to the acquisition and conversion of the 10,000-ton Banana Boat Hansel for this role. Conversion was completed in 1934 producing a diesel-powered unarmored hull, fitted with a wooden flight deck, two elevators and a catapult. Initially completed unarmed, it represented the Kreigmarine’s first true aircraft carrier. Essentially an unarmed training platform as completed, though fitted with arresting gear, catapult, elevators and hanger, it was used purely for training. Providing deck qualification and aircrew training, the fuel and munitions storage were miniscule, the bare minimum required for training purposes. The carrier would subsequently undergo two refits in 1938 and again in 1943, to address weaknesses and increase its utility, it would eventually be employed for limited operational tasking in the Baltic after 1944.

Not actually commissioned into the Kreigsmarine until 1935 after the signing of the Anglo-German naval treaty, it would be named Oswald Boelcke after the famous WW1 fighter ace and commander of Jasta 2, due to the MFK project number. It would play a continuous and vital role training aviation personnel throughout its service, and eventually survive WW2. Later fitted with a light anti-aircraft armament and able to carry up to 22 aircraft it was similar to small training carriers being developed by other navies at this time. Its basic nature, and limited air group restricted its employment to Baltic waters. It would become active in providing support to Eastern Front operations in the Baltic from 1944 onward, before being one of the remaining Kreigsmarine vessels evacuating civilians to ‘voluntarily transfer’ to the Finnish Navy prior to VE day in 1945.

DKM Oswald Boelcke - CVT/CVE - November 1943
4 x 4.1-inch (105mm), (2x2)8 x 37mm (4x2), 20 x 20mm (5x4), 22 Aircraft,9,800 tons 18 knots.

Oswald Boelcke as employed in the Baltic1944-45. Completed unarmed to provide training for the MFK, it would be fitted with AA armament during WW2. Used operationally in the Baltic with Fw190 & Ju187s, by late 1945 its tole was largely as a 'fighter farm' with an all Fw190M air group to provide localized aircover for Kreigsmarine movements.

Tangles2 · May 5, 2024

Part Three

The other significant impact that Wever would have would be on aircraft types introduced into service for the MFK. While the majority of Luftwaffe airframes would be largely suitable for land-based wings, those specifically intended for carrier operations required suitable modification to undertake this role.

In early May 1934, the Me109 had won selection as the new Luftwaffe single-seat monoplane fighter. Despite significant pressure from Goering for a navalized version to be also adopted for the MFK, Wever successfully contested this move. Despite its undoubted edge in performance, he believed it was nevertheless fundamentally unsuited for employment in the carrier role, largely due to its very short range and fragile narrow track undercarriage. The losing alternative, the Heinkel He112 with a less powerful engine could not match the Me109 performance, but had greater range and more robust undercarriage, areas that most concerned Wever. Concurrently to this Heinkel was also developing a new high-performance fighter, the HE-100, to outperform the Me109, which initially showed great promise. Despite its potential it was to be hampered by a failure-prone cooling system, and complex fuselage and wing structure that slowed production. Wever, to a degree playing on the guilt still felt regarding his injury, approached Heinkel seeking development of a simplified naval fighter combining elements of both aircraft. The result would be the He113 ‘Dolphin’ that would become the first dedicated carrier fighter design specifically for the MFK. (2)

By basically combining the fuselage of one with the more powerful engine and a much-simplified folding wing form of the other, the new airframe proved to be a robust and improved union over the previous pair. With Ernst Heinkel’s support for Wever’s insistence on a far simpler and less complex product, avoided much of the complexity and reliability issues that plagued earlier designs. Reverting to a larger external radiator reduced speed by about 20kmh but solved the cooling problems of the more powerful engine and the larger wing also increased fuel capacity which gave the new aircraft a range of 1200 km on internal fuel. Fitted with external drop tanks this rose to 1600km, unprecedented for a single seat fighter at this time, and ideal for the long-range maritime role the MFK envisioned. Fitted with four 20mm cannon and arrestor gear for carrier operations it proved heavier and slower than the Me109, and did not match its agility and acrobatic capabilities. Nevertheless, it was in all other aspects far better suited for maritime employment and entered production as the new single seat fleet fighter for the Kreigsmarine. Operationally in WW2, it would prove to be approximately the equal of the Hurricane and Goshawk in performance during the opening stages of the war and, though unable to match the maneuverability of the Dragonfly and Spitfire, it was found capable of out-diving both in combat. In terms of production its numbers were limited, with approximately 290 serving in the MFK. But for the opening 18 months of the conflict, it was the sole axis single seat fighter capable of very long-range operations and in this role, it was to play a vital role in operations against Britain.

The second aircraft where Wever’s involvement in development was important, was the new maritime dive-bomber selection. With Wever’s injury the Luftwaffe strategic focus had switched to tactical employment to support ground operations, emphasizing the employment of new types like the Ju87 Stuka in this role. Wever’s departure and the Luftwaffe failure to progress towards a strategic bombing force had seen Ernst Udet in particular champion the development of the short-range Stuka. While privately unhappy at this change in direction Wever had remained silent in his opposition on the understanding that Udet would support development of a navalized version for the MFK. The existing Ju87 airframe with its short range and fixed undercarriage was unsuitable for carrier employment. The MFK would require it to act as a scouting aircraft in addition to any anti-shipping missions it would undertake. Changes would include folding wings, arrestor hook, retractable undercarriage and more powerful engine. Initially deemed the Ju87M (Maritime) version, such was the degree of change that it was designated as a totally new type, the Ju187. (3) Intended for patrol and anti-shipping missions the Ju187 airframe had an additional oil tank and increased fuel capacity and plumbed outer wing stations to carry two 300-liter under-wing drop tanks, greatly increasing its range. While retaining the distinctive ‘gull’ wing of the earlier design great attention was paid to clean up the aerodynamics and reduce drag, including a retractable undercarriage and narrower wing form. While retaining a crew of two, changes included deletion of the forward firing machine guns and siren and fitting with a more powerful engine, folding wings and tailhook. During this process Wever would face a constant struggle opposing superfluous alterations and design changes, many he considered both ridiculous or wildly impracticable, such as a rotating tail fin, to achieve the desired aim of the MFK. The final production model would prove to be capable of nearly 500kmh (80kmh faster than the Ju87). Over 500 would eventually be produced in various versions for the MFK and nearly triple that number for the Luftwaffe, is an indication of the improved design. While proving considerably less vulnerable than its predecessor, eventual operational experience would prove that despite improved performance dive bombers remained very vulnerable to determined fighter opposition, requiring their own fighter support to operate when opposed. Regardless, the adoption and employment of the Ju187 formed the second carrier specific system operated by the MFK and a primary offensive weapon during the opening phases of WW2.

Unfortunately, despite his success in these two instances, Wever would fail in developing any alternate to the existing MFK torpedo bomber, the Fiesler 167. This outdated biplane design, roughly analogous to its British contemporary the Fairey Swordfish, was already obsolete when it entered service. Used in service with the MFK in very limited numbers due to the lack of any viable alternative, it was named the Goose by MFK pilots and never undertake any operational carrier deployment. After the loss of the Graf Zeppelin, a torpedo carrying variant of the single-seat Fw190 fighter would eventually be developed as an alternative, and deployed in small numbers to replace the Fi167 Goose operationally. It would not be until late 1944, with the advent of the Fw290, that the MFK would get a specialized modern carrier capable torpedo bomber. By that time realistic employment options for the type had disappeared and eventually fewer than 40 of the type would be produced and serve with the MFK, despite its otherwise excellent design and performance.

Though less directly involved Wever would impact on one final significant aircraft design that would become operational and be employed by the MFK early in WW2. Previously while still in the Luftwaffe, Wever had initiated the strategic so-called "Ural bomber" program to develop long-range strategic aircraft to strike deep into the Soviet Union. With his injury and transfer, emphasis on strategic aerial operations lapsed as a Luftwaffe priority in favor of more tactical aspects of airpower. There remained however as a legacy of this project several large four engine prototypes. One of these the Ju90, although underpowered, had evolved into a 40-seat civilian airliner design, which entered limited production and was being operated by Lufthansa.

It had early been established that the MFK needed a long-range aircraft to act as a maritime reconnaissance/patrol platform. With his its strength cap limiting numbers, Wever was aware only a limited number of options would be available to the MFK for this role. Pragmatically Wever linked this MFK requirement to provision of a larger long-range military transport for the Luftwaffe. By linking its employment to the role of the Fallschirmjager, the Luftwaffe parachute forces, (a favored project of Goering,) it served to make development of this capability attractive despite the otherwise general lack of enthusiasm for such airframes. With this approach Wever succeeded in getting Goering’s support to produce an improved Ju90 version as a joint project, later designated as the Ju190 and named the ‘Albatross’. (4)

His friendship with his Luftwaffe successor Albert Kesselring enabled him to have considerable input into the final design for the joint project. While the Luftwaffe troop transport version would account for over 80% of the nearly 800 Ju190 airframes eventually produced, its actual final structure was to a large degree shaped by parameters Wever laid out for the maritime version. The fuselage remained essentially unchanged from the Ju90, capable of carrying 38 fully equipped Fallschirmjager (compared to 17 in the existing Ju52), though the windows were replaced by 8 small portholes a side. The major change was a much cleaner aerodynamic wing form. Not only of greater span (19%) and area (11%), but it nearly doubled the fuel capacity. The landing gear was strengthened, and the vertical tail fins enlarged. Fitted with much more powerful 1,200 kW (1,600 hp) radials, the result was an astonishing improvement in performance, at the cost of a comparatively limited bombing capability and defensive armament.

The suffix letter "M" was affixed to the maritime version which would be initially be plumbed to accepted two of the standard Luftwaffe 300L drop tanks outboard of the engines if required. When clean this gave the initial M version an unprecedent range at that time of over 5000km, which along with a maximum speed of 500kmh and operational ceiling of 6000m, far superior to existing contemporaries and ideal for its intended maritime patrol role. This was achieved by limiting the defensive armament and crew size to five and restricting the bombing requirement in the anti-shipping role. Though still vulnerable as allied air defense of convoys improved during the war, its higher performance made it far more difficult to intercept than its Luftwaffe counterpart the Fw200 Condor. Late versions would be fitted with the Hohentwiel radar, successfully used to locate Allied convoys at ranges of up to 80km from altitude, allowing the Ju190 to track convoys while remaining out of range of anti-aircraft fire and relying on its performance to avoid successful air intercept. Final versions of the Ju190 would also later be fitted with two 2000L auxiliary underwing fuel tanks located between the inner and outer engines, providing an astonishing 22 hours plus endurance. In all nearly 160 Ju190M would be operated by the MFK well into 1944, with its more powerful Luftwaffe successors the Ju290 and 390, being introduced into the MFK to replace it from late 1942 onward. Its initial development and prioritizing the range and performance at its inception, and commonality with Luftwaffe transport versions boosted production numbers, and gave the MFK a significant weapon during the battle of the Atlantic.

The He113 Dolphin was the MFK primary fighter aircraft from 1937 onward displaying its distinctive radiator and tailhook.

The Ju187 showing the obvious MFK modifications with folding wings, retractable undercarriage and tailhook,

Already obsolescent in 1938 the Fi167 ‘Goose’ was the sole MFK carrier capable torpedo bomber at the outbreak of WW2 and was never deployed operationally as such.

With clean lines, more powerful engines & enlarged wing area, the Ju190M was to be a highly successful long-range maritime patrol aircraft for the MFK.

2. This fighter design for narrative purposes is essentially an amalgamation of the three IRL Heinkel fighter designs produced in the late 1930s. All would reach at least the flying prototype stage or enter limited production with less than 200 flying examples being completed all up. All demonstrated various design strengths and weaknesses as detailed which despite their potential led to their non-adoption. ITTL the Dolphin represents a union of their design strengths to best provide a viable carrier capable single seat fighter alternative specific to the new MFK.
3. IRL the Junkers Ju 187 was highly impractical dive bomber design to succeed the ageing Ju 87 cancelled in 1943. The earlier Ju 87 Stuka had proved very vulnerable to enemy fighters and its replacement was designed under the designation Ju 187. While the projected aircraft kept some of the features of the earlier Ju 87, such as the inverted gull wing and two-man crew, it was to have retractable landing gear as well as improved armor and armament. Unfortunately, the concept included some unnecessarily complex and wildly impractical ideas such as rotating vertical tail. In theory when rotated down, the tail would give the air gunner, armed with a rear turret, an unobstructed field of fire. It is not known how the aircraft would have handled with the tail rotated. Considering the vulnerability of the type and its poor projected performance, the project was cancelled by the Reich Air Ministry in autumn 1943.

4. For narrative purpose this aircraft is an intermediate step between the IRL Ju90 and 290 airframes. IOTL the Junkers Ju 290 was a large German, four-engine long-range transport, and maritime patrol aircraft produced in limited numbers and used by the Luftwaffe late in World War II. Developed directly from the earlier slower and far smaller Ju 90 airliner, which had small numbers converted for military service, and was intended to replace the relatively slow Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor which by 1942 was proving increasingly vulnerable when confronted by RN/RAF aircraft.

Tangles2 · May 5, 2024

Part Four

INTERLUDE ONE: - A Day in the Office in Hitler's Reich.

Marinefleigerkommando (MFK) Annex
Ground Floor, Benderblock Building - Berlin 7 May 1937

Having seen his deputy and aides to the exit and exchanging a brief word with his yeoman in the outer office, Konteradmiral Walther Wever having closed his door, in turning, was suddenly struck by the distinct lack of any urgent paperwork needing his attention on his desk. Caught unexpectedly short by this unusual situation, he paused in sudden recognition of just how unusual this was given his workload over the last few months. Yielding to the pause at the unexpectedness of this reprieve he briefly stood at a loss, before impulsively turning to walk to the outside view of the office window. Situated on the ground floor of the headquarters building, the view presented could hardly be said to be inspiring, particularly in comparison to some of the other senior departments of the OKM. Not that the view had been the original impetus for its selection for his offices. Mobility-imposed restrictions as the result his accident had been of far more initial importance at the time, and the lack of stairs to negotiate a prime selection criterion in acquiring office space to work from for the new department.

Looking out into a drab grey courtyard surrounded on three sides by buildings, the view could not be said to be animating at the best of times and could hardly be less applicable at the moment. With a dull grey overcast of cloud looming low overhead, a constant steady drizzle of rain from above had already created large shallow puddles in several areas, their dappled surfaces whipped by the gust eddies swirling in the surrounding buildings. Definitely a day for indoors he mused to himself, watching as a drab navy sedan pulled up with a splash at the rear entrance to this wing. As he looked on, its driver rushed out into the rain to hold the door for his embarking passenger Kommodore Boehm, while another rating acting as doorman struggled to control an umbrella flexing in the wind gusts whilst trying to shield that officer as he hurried to his ride. He couldn’t help but smile slightly as the two aides trotted unprotected in his wake, trying to shield their leather dispatch cases from the rain, all three in their heavy dark winter greatcoats. Acknowledging Boehm’s brief glance back up to his window with a nod, he watched the wintery view as the doors slammed before the vehicle splashed its way out of view heading towards the transport waiting at Tempelhof airport.

The thought of the upcoming flight in a cold wet Aunty Ju was enough to deter anyone on a day like today, and he expected Herman to heed his advice not to feel obliged to depart immediately if the weather remained so foul. Much of the meeting during the early part of the day had been final confirmation of the document details prepared in collaboration for the upcoming Oberkommando presentation, before he and his deputy had signed off on it. This done and left alone as their staff had departed to commence the dissemination process to the nominated parties, the two of them had fallen into a much more easy and personal interchange, discussing some of the more closely held considerations only possible between good friends. The two had worked together now for over three years since his appointment as first head of the MFK, and the association had long progressed beyond the leader/deputy collaboration into true friendship. The discussion had concluded with a final personnel admonition as they parted not to press his chances with the weather. That it was forecast to improve, did not present any urgency to hurry, and he was far happier if Hermann played it safe rather than risk an accident.

Posted as his deputy in 1933, Hermann Boehm had bought an insider’s perspective to assist Wever in his new and unfamiliar role as type commander in the Kreigsmarine. Having entered as a cadet in the Imperial Navy he was a product of that same background in common with all senior appointments in the Reichsmarine after the 1920s. This was a key ingredient for Wever, providing invaluable insights into the internal dynamics facing him as an outsider after his appointment. From this background and his undoubted skill as deputy in that key staff posting, had rapidly evolved the partnership from mutual respect to beyond that of subordinate to its current status as trusted friend. The last 20 minutes of their meeting were involving confidences only possible with such a close understanding. Aware that the policy document was committing himself and the MFK to a position that was bound to create some internal dissent, possibly very strong, they covered methods to best respond to several possible reactions. That was one reason for decision to dispatch Hermann to pay a flying visit to Rostock after they concluded. Ostensibly it was to review the status of the seaplane base extensions there, but in reality, it was to temporarily distance him from association with any immediate response arising from their combined submission just finalized.

In reality, Wever was not really seriously worried about such a possibility, but as an exercise in real-politick it seemed prudent to remove his deputy’s presence from immediate view. Separation when presenting a dissenting outsider perspective to the still powerful older Kaiserliche Marine cliché of the navy, would not hurt his deputies standing in that group, and seemed prudent for the long-term perspective. Secondly, he did actually want Hermann to personally restate some observations to Ernst Heinkel at his Rostock headquarters if possible, regarding the needless complexity that seemed a fixation to some of his top design group regarding the new MFK projects in hand.

This internal musing was suddenly unexpectedly disturbed by a spontaneous flashback to his own last disastrous visit to the Heinkel Rostock Headquarters. The sudden vivid recollection of profound helplessness and agony stunned him momentarily in its very unexpectedness. The memory of hanging inverted by his harness and staring helplessly at pool of flammable petrol just inches below his face as the groundcrew struggled to free him from his crashed aircraft, remained both traumatic and deeply unsettling. Though far less frequent than in the immediate accident aftermath, and many months since its last occurrence, he was nevertheless transfixed by its visceral impact and lost in the moment, trying to shake free its resurgent impact of this stark memory. The reflexive recollection of his sheer feeling of helplessness still remained overwhelming and left him transfixed, until suddenly recognition of a querying voice in his presence shook him free of the memory.

Jolted from his sightless reminiscence out the window, the voice of his flag-lieutenant startled him back into the present. Adding to his discomfort as he turned to face the doorway, the sharp stab of pain from his lower legs made him stumble slightly, and realize how long he must have been standing unmoving for this to occur. Seeing this and his slight wince prompted an uneasy response from his Flag-Lieutenant standing there.
“Are you alright sir?” he queried worriedly, “I knocked twice to no response before entering,” he explained, “And you didn’t respond at first.”
“No, no, I’m fine Karl,” he dissembled briefly, “I was just a million miles away in recollection,” before stiffly making his way back behind the desk, hoping to disguise any discomfort. “How did the delivery go. Was there any indication of an immediate response?” he then asked, as he gratefully flopped into the large leather chair behind the desk and swinging to face his subordinate directly as he stepped fully into the room. “No Sir. Admiral Rolfs was unavailable, though his Chief of Staff signed for the main copy personally. The Grand Admiral is out of the building for the rest of the day apparently, and the supplementary copies on the document list are all in the secure delivery register and I would expect them to be delivered within the next 48 hours.”

Only with this response did Admiral Wever acknowledge how superficial the unthinking question was given the timeframe, making him pause, before glancing at the clock on the wall to see how long he had been distracted. “Is there anything changed on my agenda this afternoon to be considered?”
“Nothing before your 1630 appointment with General Kesselring at the Ministry of Aviation, which is confirmed, and a vehicle will be here in a bit over an hours’ time at 1600 to transfer you. At this time, I will be accompanying you unless you wish to make any changes. That timing remains open-ended, so there is nothing further indicated at this stage for the rest of the day,” he concluded.

Leaning back into the deep leather upholstery he paused considering his response. “Knowing the General, the meeting will extend on into a dinner invitation afterwards I suspect. That could end up dragging on, but that decision will be at his mercy. At this stage plan on accompanying me with the briefing papers we discussed earlier, but when I get a better timeframe on our plans, I’ll let you know. If possible, I will try and release you early, but that will largely be out of my hands.”
“Thank you, Herr Admiral.”
“Now as you might have noticed my legs have decided to play up at the moment. I plan to put them up for a bit, so unless there is something else, can you arrange for me not to be disturbed until shortly before our departure time”.
“Understood Herr Admiral, if there is nothing more?” he enquired with a nod and slight wry smile. It was open knowledge and “putting your feet up,” had become a bit of an ongoing insider joke amongst his staff, as the Admiral did actually require to occasionally elevate his feet to alleviate the injury related cramping issues.

With a brief wave of dismissal, he swung his chair to face the extension on one side of his desk raising both feet, even before the door finished closing behind his aides departing back. Hooking the toes of both shoes under the heavily laden first shelf of the bookcase backing deliberately placed there for this purpose, then gingerly tilting back in his chair, letting the tension slowly stretch out the tightened muscles of the lower legs. Irrespective of how untidy it may look, the sheer effectiveness of the simple act at easing his discomfort made such thoughts irrelevant to him. The enduring legacy of badly breaking both of them in the plane crash years earlier at Rostock was that any prolonged period of standing now caused the traumatized tendons to tighten badly and ache. This had been the one permanent legacies of his injuries and rendered him unfit for further pilot duties. His long rehabilitation struggle had found that this elevated stretch was the best remedy to restore circulation and reduce the throbbing ache incurred in such situations. Leaning back with his eyes shut and kneading the bridge of his now, he once again considered how lucky he was at this moment, not only to have survived in the first place, but his continued service and unlikely transition into his current role.

Still slightly distracted at the extent of his lapse, the first in a long time, he used the moment of introspection to examine his own mental state, wondering if there had been the trigger. After some brief thought he didn’t feel that there was an immediate obvious cause beyond concern for his friend’s flight and a worry for a trip to Rostock in bad weather perhaps.

He found his own immediate concerns were now more dominated by his decision to commit in paper a clearly defined outline of contentious issues in the proposed Plan Z, the planned re-equipment and expansion of the Kriegsmarine to be presented to Adolf Hitler shortly. Putting down on paper a clearly detailed precis of perceived strategic and domestic flaws and questioning both the assumptions and timeframes involved in its development was going to create considerable agitation within the senior ranks of the OKM. In doing so he had no doubts that presenting this that there was the risk of damaging the future of the MFK and his own removal as its head was highly possible. His ultimate decision to present such a clearly defined opposition case can be directly linked to his own personal epiphany and acceptance of the consequences of this action, whatever they may be.

This resolve had its roots in his own personal and in many ways far more disturbing moment of clarity. In the privacy of his home over the pre-Christmas period his frustrations with the situation and dynamics facing him in his role in the service hierarchy had come to head, triggering a raging tirade in the presence of his wife. It had collapsed mid-harangue with the realization who he was shouting at and how badly he had frightened Elsa, having reduced her to tears in the process. This loss of control and the helpless target of his rant was profound in its impact, more damning and damaging to his own self-image in his own mind, than anything since his accident.

In the tearful and painful aftermath of reconciliation in trying to compensate for his unprecedented outburst of shouted abuse, her revelation of the violence of his attack on the party and powerful figures had deeply frightened her as to its content and possible consequences. That night in bed with his life-partner he had had to face his own frustrations that had triggered the vehemence of his outburst. In exposing his doubts, and realization of the deep frustration in the directions and consequences facing Germany and his service, he determined that his only way ahead as an individual was to reconcile this pressure. To be firmly resolute and present his case statement of the underlying issues, and outlining the problems and possible solutions, regardless of the personal cost going forward.

The forced acceptance of the constraints of his situation with German industry, the MFK and Wehrmacht overall had triggered the outburst, with his increasingly repressed dismay reaching the point where the blaze of emotion was almost inevitable. In hindsight, even at the cost to himself, it was a blessing to resolve the internal conflicts in his motivation and accept the personal conviction to go ahead in this course, whatever may come. The following months to today had defined this calm conviction and acceptance had been the cornerstone of the preparations and ultimately validated the need to forcefully state his case to the forum of his peers. To use an apt naval simile, having run his colors so clearly up his mast, all that remained was to see and accept the ramifications. Any outcome was now out of his hands.

His reverie was finally broken by a knock at his door, and his flag lieutenant’s announcement that their transport was ready. As usual his ingrained military response after years of service made him start every time, he was caught in such an undignified situation with his legs up. Shaking his head at this instinctive Pavlovian guilt he swung his feet to the floor and then moving to collect his heavy coat and cap being held ready, glancing out the window, still grey and gloomy but no longer raining. “Who knows” he found himself silently musing as they left “Maybe things will improve like the day,” before stoically girding himself to undertake the next step in the long self-imposed path ahead.

Tangles2 · May 6, 2024

Part Five

Chapter ## - Origin and Evolution of the MFK

The origin of the MFK's formation is intimately linked to Adolf Hitlers rise to power and establishment of the Reich Aviation Ministry (Reichsluftfahrtministerium or RLM) in the early 1930s. This included appointment of his trusted deputy and former WW1 ace Hermann Göring, as Kommissar for aviation controlling the RLM. With this, Göring's control over all aspects of aviation became absolute, establishing the base for the subsequent creation of the new branch of the armed services, the Luftwaffe. From this foundation, and as Hitler’s designated deputy and one of the most powerful figures in the pre-war Nazi Party, he was to gain complete control of aviation matters in Germany including the Luftwaffe, which he came in many ways to regard and treat as a personal fiefdom.

Hitler ruled the Nazi Party autocratically by asserting the Führerprinzip (leader principle), calling on absolute obedience of all subordinates to their superiors, even for a trusted deputy like Goring. He viewed the Nazi state as a pyramid, with himself—the infallible leader—at the apex. His leadership style was to place subordinates into contending positions where their duties and responsibilities overlapped and often clashed, resulting in his being the final arbiter for decisions. In this way, Hitler fostered distrust, competition, and infighting among his subordinates to consolidate and maximize his own power. The formation of the MFK can be recognized in this context as a continuation of this principle with regard to the expanding armed forces. By creating a body that is both separate from, and in competition with both the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe, he introduced another point where he could have direct input and ultimately the final word if required, in the growth of military power under his control.

His appointment of Walther Wever by Fuhrer decree, fortuitous as it may seem to be, is a direct continuation of this practice. By appointing a former senior Luftwaffe officer into a high position in a new service he essentially placed an outsider high in the command structure of the Navy. At the same time this posting placed Wever into a position where he is in direct competition for resources of his old service. This was a classic example of the competing tensions introduced into the Nazi state by Hitler and an insight into the foundations of the National Socialist government, marked by the jockeying for the power between rival groups and individuals that was its feature.

That the MFK as a body was to be successful and eventually be acknowledged as an effective separate branch of the armed forces can largely be attributed directly to the appointment of Walther Wever as its first commander. While his availability for this role was quite literally accidental, it was the personal attributes, leadership skills and application that he would bring to the role that led the MFK to prosper in the discordant atmosphere of 1930s Nazi Germany. His interpersonal skills and ability to successfully navigate the internal disunity and pitfalls of this environment was to be the defining feature in the development, contribution and longevity of the MFK to the German war effort of WW2.

Organization and Chain of Command

Even before the Nazi Party rise to power in the early 1930s the Reichsmarine of the Weimar Republic had been working covertly to circumvent the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. Part of this process was the development of a hidden skeleton framework of a new operational and administrative organization which would become the Naval High Command of the new Kreigsmarine in late 1934. Under this structure two of the new hidden key ‘type’ commands were the U-boat Arm and the Naval Aviation Arm, both of which had been abolished as part of the Versailles Treaty restrictions.

Technically a ‘type command’ was an administrative office of the Navy which oversaw the development, deployment, and subsequently operational activities of that specific vessel type of German navy. Due to the covert initial nature of these two type commands the key officers appointed type commanders, Karl Dönitz to commanded the German U-boat force, and Walther Wever as Naval Aviation (Carrier) Force Commander, came to exercise near total independence in their specific role, both holding an enormous degree of autonomy and authority, both operationally and administratively, within their own specific area of responsibility. The arrangement, though not formalized until the signing in 1935 of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement meant that both officers played a major role in the force composition and structure of each command during their initial rapid expansion as part of the German rearmament program under the Nazi’s.

Command Appointment

Appointed as the first commander of the Marinefliegerkomando-MFK, (Naval Aviation Command) Walther Wever was effectively cross transferred by Fuhrer Directive from his former rank as Generalmajor in the Luftwaffe into the Aircraft Carrier Type Command of the Navy, even in the actual absence of such type vessels, with the rank of Konteradmiral, a similar navy two-star berth. That there was no such carrier in commission or under construction was irrelevant at the time of appointment, as his primary role was to both define and develop a nascent rump naval air arm for the navy, separate to Hermann Göring's newly established Luftwaffe. That his previous role before injury and transfer had been effectively as Luftwaffe Chief of staff, made him uniquely qualified to provide the navy both theoretical and practical knowledge of air warfare and intimate understanding of the concealed activities such as pilot training efforts, ongoing at this point. His status as a former senior Luftwaffe officer, along with his complete familiarity with Luftwaffe personalities and projects (and perhaps more importantly being respected and liked at the time) vastly simplified the potentially divisive interaction between the two services, both undergoing a massive expansion in size and capabilities at this time. This, aside from the independence it granted him in developing the MFK itself, helped facilitate the smooth interaction between services when subsequently in 1935 Germany unilaterally declared its withdrawal from armament limitations.

It still remains largely unclear as to what motivated this selection by Adolf Hitler and appears to have been unheralded and a surprise to other regime figures of the time. While a well-known staff officer and noted strategic thinker within service circles, Wever was not a Nazi supporter, and had only ever had a single prior meeting with Adolf Hitler. Wever later recalled it as being brief, and had only a faint memory of discussions including the relative merits and costs of a single Staffel of bombers in comparison to that of a battleship, and little more. However short the meeting, it appears to have struck a chord with the Fuhrer that stayed in his memory and be recalled after news of his accident. To this day there exists very little in the way of documentary support or preliminary indication of the imminence of this step, with several prominent Nazi’s recollecting surprise at the announcement in historic records. Despite its subsequent success it still remains the perception that this largely seems to have been an impulsive decision by Hitler in response to the news of his accident and survival. Irrespective, the effects of his selection would prove both definitive and enduring.

Within both services the unexpected appointment was initially regarded with some reservation. Raeder personally was strongly opposed, regarding it as intrusive into internal navy matters presented as it was without consultation, and only reluctantly accepted it as it could not be undone. In time this would change as he recognized Wever’s application and work ethic as he applied it in his new role. That he was a deep and analytical thinker, prepared to analyze at a strategic level, fitted well with Raeder’s own views on the global employment of naval power. Initially perceived as an outsider by many in the officer corps, he was largely disconnected to some of the post-war internal divisions still lingering within the navy. His subsequent dedication to evolve naval aviation as independent arm specifically for the use of the Kreigsmarine, separate from the Luftwaffe, established his integrity and eventual trust he gained within the service. That early on he went to great lengths to broaden his understanding of warfare at sea and naval airpower yet refrained initially commenting on more purely ‘naval’ matters, such as the design of the new aircraft carrier, accelerated this acceptance.

In a similar manner he would continue to retain the high regard of many senior figures within the Luftwaffe, despite his transfer. Goring, once satisfied that there would be a cap on aircraft numbers furnished to the new service, appears to have continued to treat him largely as a known subordinate in many interactions, despite the service change. That his removal facilitated the Luftwaffe shift to a more tactical focus and its employment in shorter range direct support functions, would benefit Goring and strengthen his interactions with the Army. Also, that his replacement in the role of Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, Albert Kesselring, was to remain a trusted associate and lifelong close friend, would only serve to further foster the close cooperation between the two services that was to follow.

By the very accidental nature of his appointment, it is possible to conceive of a different outcome to that which occurred, in which negative consequences easily led to a divisive and dysfunctional interservice relationship developing. The success of the MFK in the face of these obstructions, and the longevity of his command appointment, was ultimately the true indication and tribute to leadership skills and stability he bought to the position. The noted postwar historian Ian Kershaw regarded him as perhaps one of the premiere and capable military politicians of WW2 and the pre-war period and was later to write “No other figure would prove as adept in balancing and resolving the conflicting dynamics and agendas of pre-war Germany, yet still retain widespread respect whilst achieving his own objectives.” As he later aptly summarized regarding this appointment; “Never was a more capable and outstanding round peg been better suited for the round hole in which it was placed!”

Tangles2 · May 7, 2024

Part Six

Organization of the New Service.

To make the MFK an effective aerial-warfare branch involved a careful balancing of the features and requirements of both services to reach the functional compromise that evolved and create an organizational structure acceptable to both the Luftwaffe and Navy. Specifically intended to provide an independent air element to support the navy in maritime tasks, yet not be subordinated the air force, required recognition the duality of the forces involved. While technically to provide the aviation capacity of seaborne forces, the majority of the new organization was supported by land-based infrastructure and aircraft types, to a large degree shared in common with the Luftwaffe. As a result, the MFK organization that evolved employed many common Luftwaffe organizational terms such as Staffel and Gruppe, whilst the actual size and structure was often markedly different to those of a similar designation Luftwaffe unit.

As established the MFK, like the U-boat arm, though technically a type command, had a high degree of independence, and in effect it acted in many ways as an operational directorate immediately below the level of the Naval High Command (OKM). Even in the absence of operational aircraft carriers, it was tasked specifically to provide dedicated aviation support to Fleet Operations and perform a wide range of operational and tactical roles similar to both the RN Fleet Air Arm and RAF Coastal Command of Britain. In terms of overall tasking these functions were broken down into several specialized autonomous roles, centered specifically on maritime-related aviation duties. The roles were identified as five operational branches. They were:

Trägergruppe (TrGr) – (literally "Carrier group") Consisting of aviation elements intended for the planned German aircraft carriers including aircraft, personnel, training, and aviation support specific for employment on these vessels.
Bordfliegergruppe (BFGr) – (literally "onboard aircraft group"). Consisting of seaplanes and other aviation support functions for deployment on surface vessels such as battleships and cruisers.
Küstenfliegergruppe (KuFlGr) (German: "coastal aircraft group"). A coastal reconnaissance/operations Gruppe. These units fulfilled a similar role to RAF Coastal Command, largely equipped with floatplanes as well as a small number of land-based aircraft. Tasked to undertake anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and search and rescue (SAR) roles and perform a secondary duty to attack shipping.
Seeaufklärungsgruppe (SAGr) – Units specifically tasked to fulfil the maritime reconnaissance role and provide tactical and operational surveillance for naval operations. And lastly,
SeeKampfgruppe (SKGr) - (literally “sea combat group”) These were specialist land-based units specifically trained for maritime strike support to act in the anti-shipping role for the navy, (usually employing dive and torpedo-bombers.)

The role of these Gruppe evolved to differ from Luftwaffe Gruppen. In effect, because they were orientated to develop specific aviation skill sets, they became in function to be much nearer that of a combined doctrinal development/operational readiness school for each role. In particular great lengths were taken to evolve specific maritime training elements such as carrier landings and operations, maritime strike coordination, over-water navigation and conducting flight operations in even the most extreme weather conditions.

By the nature of their employment the MFK organization tended to a more flexible structure with great variations in unit size from a similar Luftwaffe designation. The embarked Trägergruppe ‘Graf Zeppelin’ in 1941 consisted of two ‘Staffel’ each of 20+ He113, and Ju187, while an equivalent Luftwaffe unit usually fielded only 9-12 aircraft. Embarked carrier groups bore the vessel name, rather than a unit number. As the main MFK training platform ‘Trägergruppe Boelcke’ changed structure many times over the years and in addition to aviation Staffel’s, included specialized semi-autonomous training Staffelen to conduct carrier-specific specialist skills training for key aviation support personnel.

At the command level, the MFK HQ was established in 1933, co-located in the Bendlerblock building in Berlin along with other OKM branches. Subordinate to this would evolve Marinefleigergruppen (MFGr) that acted in the subsidiary regional command role, each responsible for naval aviation within its own defined geographical area of operations. Consisting of several constituent Gruppen (Groups)whose makeup and types varied to meet operational and tactical tasking within that region. Similar in function to the Luftwaffe Fliegerdivisionen command level, this was however a one-star command appointment for the MFK. With the designated rank of Kommodore, the MFGr commander however retained absolute control over all aspects of naval aviation within his command area. However, it remained integrated as a component of the wider Kreigsmarine for personnel, supply and administrative purposes. The tasking of aviation assets under his control prioritized support of Kreigsmarine operations but remained available to support and act in conjunction with Luftwaffe tasking if not otherwise committed. During the initial establishment of the MFK in 1933, it consisted of two Marinefleigergruppen. MFGr-1(West) with its HQ at Kiel/Haltenau and MFGr-2(East) at Rostock in East Prussia. With the continued growth of the MFK a third Marinefleigergruppen MFGr-3 (North) was established at Nordholz/Cuxhaven in 1938 tasked with supporting operations in the North Sea (later to extend to Norway and the Arctic waters). With the success of Germany in the early years of the war MFGr-1 responsibilities would extend to include Atlantic operations from bases in occupied France, while MFGr-2 would become responsible for all Baltic Operations after the fall of Leningrad in 1943.These locations included both flying boat and airfield facilities and MFK units were often supplemented by Luftwaffe elements co-located at these installations. This arrangement served eventually to greatly improve communication and coordination between services, and the shared basing facilities later served as joint operational/training bases for Luftwaffe units assigned to patrol and anti-shipping tasking.

Aircraft Development and Strengths.

The cap limit of 300 aircraft on the MFK was imposed by Goring primarily to limit the diversion of manufacturing resources away from Luftwaffe expansion plans of the early 1930s. This number however came to be allowed a degree of leeway as Goring’s attention centered on numbers affecting the major German aircraft manufacturing firms such as Messerschmidt and Dornier. During this time, some of the smaller aviation companies, such as Arado, Blohm and Voss and Fiesler, suffered lingering financial hardship due to the effects of the Great Depression and a prolonged downturn in orders. In his role in the Nazi regime as Reichskommissar of Aviation, to support these smaller firms the production of select airframes for the MFK were not deemed part of the ceiling cap to promote aircraft production. Thus, the smaller aviation concerns Arado, Blohm & Voss, and Feisler were nominated and their acquisition by the MFK encouraged as they did not count in the numbers cap. The result was that in reality the MFK had an operational strength of approximately 400 aircraft despite the supposed cap of 300 when hostilities commenced.

Despite this size, it only represented about 10% of the nearly 4,000 operational aircraft available to the Luftwaffe as WW2 commenced. Effectively the MFK had barely had the operational equivalent of 3 Geschwader (Allied Wing Equivalent) to the 29 operational Luftwaffe Geschwader when hostilities opened. As at this time with only two functional carriers, Oswald Boelcke (Training) and Graf Zeppelin working up, (representing a total tragergruppe strength of less than 70 aircraft), the vast majority of the MFK force composed of seaplanes or modified Luftwaffe designs employed for MFK functions and often sharing the same land-based facilities.

In broad terms the breakup of the main operational MFK types when hostilities commenced in 1939 was: (* indicates land-based type)

Single-seat Fighters - 90 (He113)
Dive Bombers - 80 (Ju187)
Maritime Reconnaissance - 60 (He190*)
Torpedo Bombers - 60 (Ju88 40*; Fi167 20)
Seaplanes - 120 (Ar196 30; BV138 40; He115 50)

In addition to these a number of other types were operated in the utility support role. These included small numbers each of Fi135 Storch and Do18. With only two carriers, the majority of MFK aircraft remained functionally land-based, and when not otherwise tasked would operate in coordination with the Luftwaffe missions early in the war. With the obsolescence of the Fi167 Goose recognized, the MFK operated the Ju88 adapted to carry out low level torpedo attacks in the anti-shipping role and the number would increase as the war continued. The He115 also had this as a secondary role and occasionally employed as such in North Sea Operations early in the war.

Thanks largely to Wever’s influence, the distinguishing characteristic of MFK aircraft during the opening phases of hostilities was generally a significantly greater range than their Luftwaffe counterparts, that had favored shorter-range tactical designs to support land operations. This would become important after the defeat of France and operations against England exposed the Me110 wings failure as a long-range fighter. Thanks to its endurance the He113, though eventually outclassed, was to contribute significantly as the sole effective long-range single-seat fighter in overwater operations against England until its withdrawal in 1941. Similarly, the range and improved performance of Ju187 over its predecessor, led to the Luftwaffe to later adopt a non-navalized land version to replace earlier models of the Ju87.

That the Kreigsmarine was only to ever employ five aircraft carriers under operational conditions, combined with the loss of nearly all major surface units meant that almost all its strength was land-based during the war. This would be reflected in that the nearly all later aircraft would be navalized versions of Luftwaffe designs, with the result that various Fw190 versions as its single-seat fighter would replace the He113 for the remainder of the war, and the He290 supplanting the earlier He190 in the maritime patrol role. Lacking an effective torpedo-bomber a version of the same single-seat Fw190 would be adapted to this role (as shown below), achieving moderate success despite the degradation of performance involved, before being replaced by the sole new MFK design aircraft of the war.

Lacking an effective torpedo bomber the MFK adopted a single seat conversion as an interim stopgap to fulfil this role. Shown is the1942 pre-production prototype of the Fw-190 torpedo bomber version on trial. (Note the raised rear wheel). Though noticeably degrading aircraft performance when so armed, a navalised version with folding wings, tailhook and retracting rear wheel would nevertheless enter limited production and saw operational service along with the Fw190-M fighter in the MFK as the Fw190-T and could also double in the fighter role as required, offering a degree of flexibility for the later smaller tragergruppe's operationally.

From the base of the Ta152, a twin seat, high performance torpedo bomber was developed, designated as the FW290. (See preceding post #23 this thread) Due to delays this would not enter service until late 1944, well after opportunities to employ it in its design role had long disappeared. Despite its exceptional performance only 40 would be operational for the MFK and with only a pilot it would see limited employment late in the war as a high-altitude interceptor and photo-reconnaissance roles. By the last years of the war the remaining MFK assets were employed in the defense of Germany and securing the Baltic in the face of the overwhelming allied might.

Tangles2 · May 8, 2024

Part Seven

INTERLUDE TWO; - Raising a Big 'IF' at a Planning Conference.

Main Conference Room, Top Floor
OKM Annex, Blenderblock Building
Berlin 11 May 1937.

The results of the sometimes-heated discussions that had taken place since the commencement of the meeting had to date largely been in line with Konteradmiral Wever’s expectations coming into the conference. Little more than preliminary maneuvering and confirmation of the key features already largely known and discussed in the outline detail of Plan Z shortly to presented to Hitler and the OKW. With eight senior admirals of the Kreigsmarine present, not counting himself, Wever had contributed little to date, keeping silent for the moment knowing that his own contribution would undoubtedly disrupt this overall appearance of accord soon. Having already sent out an outline precis to all parties of his case, he was reasonably sure that all the interested parties were largely waiting as well for him to raise what was undoubtedly going to be a contentious counter to the outline plan notionally being finalized at this moment.

Presiding over the meeting from the center of the long table, Generaladmiral Raeder, in his role as Commander in Chief, had said very little to date, allowing Vizeadmiral Rolf Carls his deputy as Flottenchef (Fleet Commander) to run the preliminary phase of the meeting. As Fleet Commander, and highest-ranking administrative officer of the OKM, Carls was a key officer instrumental in drafting Germany's pre-war naval war plans, and collating that with the draft of Plan Z. Beyond giving Wever a level stare as they took their seats, Raeder had given little indication to how he regarded the paper outlining Wever’s stance he knew he had received, allowing Carls to present unhindered the planned submission.

At this point, there was an obvious break, and for the first time Admiral Raeder, spoke up, bringing immediate silence down the table. “I have recently received an interesting submission from Admiral Wever, and I assume you have all received a copy and the opportunity to study his presentation” pausing while there was a general murmur of assent or nodding response from the gathering, “Before opening this up for debate, he has asked to summarize some other additional aspects and possible issues that he felt best not immediately put on paper, but nevertheless, needs to be discussed in confidence amongst us, prior to presenting it a wider forum outside of OKM,” causing some stir down the table, before gesturing, “Admiral, your forum.”

Standing and conscious that all sets of eyes were on him He paused briefly before commencing. “I wish to begin by restating the obvious, that as you are all well aware I am originally from a non-Kreigsmarine or Reichsmarine background and these observations are presented from this external perspective as a result, and that is reflected to a degree in some of the points to be made. Let me clearly state this because external perceptions of our presented Plan Z, particularly with the other services, are going to be of importance if it is to be implemented as part of the wider Wehrmacht planning. Firstly, let me say that Plan Z represents our wish list for forming a fleet capable of challenging the naval power of the Great Britain and to be completed by 1948. If we are successful in attaining acceptance of the plan, then it will be essential that we prioritize the actual construction queue of vessels as it is my assessment that we will not have this full timeframe to complete construction of the numbers designated in this plan. In saying this, I am confident that it is probable that we will be involved in active hostilities with the UK in less than five years, given the current national foreign policy and stated political agenda,” pausing as there was some shuffling and exchange of looks. “I am happy to debate this analysis further or if you wish to investigate this further, but I would recommend that OKM must give this some allowance if we attain approval to proceed.”

“I will state now that effectively I believe that it will be virtually impossible to attain ratification of Plan Z, or if approval is given then that successful implementation will be subverted largely before it can achieve any contribution to the existing force strength of the navy.” Delivery of this flat pronouncement caused an obvious wave of reaction to sweep over almost all present as Wever Pressed on. “I base this on two clear factors, one simply a matter of logistic fundamentals, and the second on recognition that progress in undertaking this program can only be possible with the cooperation, or at least without active interference of the other service. This in my honest opinion is currently highly unlikely, in fact almost impossible to guarantee at the moment, and I can almost certainly guarantee that the opposite will occur to Plan Z as tendered.”

Sweeping his gaze around to meet those of the attendees he now had the total attention of all. “Firstly, the reason for requesting this secure forum and why I have avoided putting of this to paper yet, is it will be a key issue that the other services can use to attack any naval expansion plans we may present, including Plan Z as tendered, and that this OKM will have to be prepared to defend however we proceed.” Meeting directly the gaze of Raeder, he paused, then seeing the nod to go on he continued. “If we gain approval for this level of construction, then subsequently securing the fuel oil necessary to operate the fleet will likely be an insurmountable problem. Fuel consumption will more than quadrupled between 1936 levels and the completion of the program in 1948, from 1.4 million tons now to over 6 million tons. The navy would have to construct some 9.6 million tons worth of storage facilities for enough fuel reserves to allow for less than a year of wartime operations; longer conflicts would of course necessitate an even larger stockpile. Compared to the combined fuel requirements of the Kriegsmarine, Heer (Army), Luftwaffe (Air Force), and the civilian economy, the projected domestic production by 1948 of less than 2 million tons of oil and 1.34 million tons of diesel fuel is absurdly low. Needless to say, if these figures are obtained by either service then the construction program will die still born.” Gesturing his aide, who proceeded to pass out documents to those seated he continued, “Copies of this analysis and the figures used to arrive at these totals are here for your information and confirmation. For all that this is likely to limit any future progress in this plan, I wish to advise that we need to assume that even before presenting Plan Z, we are very likely to lose out it terms of available resources and be placed far below those of both the Heer and the Luftwaffe.”

The reaction to this sweeping statement was far less muted, a murmur of discussion rising over the sounds of papers turning as some of the grouped flag officers studied the presented documents, with others obviously more intent on the developing debate, waiting for a response from the senior figures present. Calmly waiting, Wever held the gaze of Admiral Raeder to see his response, before his gazed flicked to Admiral Carls, before returning. “An interesting summation Admiral, would you care to elaborate further?” with a slight hand gesture to continue as both Flag Officers leant attentively forward.

“I am aware that as a service in the postwar period we have been conflicted over what direction future construction should take. Since Plan Z’s development began it reflects the strategic thinking of this body for the fleet necessary to battle the Royal Navy. This force structure would be required should the current aggressive foreign policy make conflict with Britain increasingly likely. The path ahead in that situation requires the major fleet expansion detailed, at the very time when it is least likely that the resources required to achieve this will be available.” Here, realizing he was leaning forward perhaps too earnestly in his intent, he paused, leaning back to take a sip of water from the glass ahead of him, before resuming. “What we as a service will face is the probability that I believe the Kreigsmarine will be lucky to receive 10 to 15% of any resource allocation of the upcoming armaments expansion program, and far less than called for to implement Plan Z, despite whatever promises are presented," again pausing for emphasis. "It’s on this basis that I think we need to prepare our future direction for planning purposes. As the Americans crudely like to say, ‘How much bang for our buck can we get?' given such limitations should they occur. I have my own thoughts and contributions on how I think we can best achieve this and am happy to present this and discuss possible objectives and defend this statement as well. All I wish to ask from you all now is your consideration on how we ourselves can proceed as a body facing the dilemma of having insufficient or reduced force at a time when we need to maximize its capabilities as outlined in Plan Z. We need alternatives, otherwise we face an insurmountable force imbalance and that can only lead to a repeat of the ignominy of the Great War.”

Deliberately finishing on this stinging reminder, Wever leant back in obvious conclusion, letting the hubbub it had invoked wash over him, observing and being observed in turn by the two most senior Kreigsmarine officers opposite. In some ways it was cathartic to be forthright in such a forum, but also felt a deep calmness in his conviction and acceptance in the rightness of his course, and now simply awaited the outcome of his clearly stated case.

The next few moments passed as obvious debate and discussion washed around the table once the parties involved obviously concluded that he had finished for the moment. Walther peripherally registered mixed reactions, some nodding and some frowning looks amidst the discussions, as Raeder conferred briefly with Carls’s opposite, displaying little immediate reaction, before leaning forward to address him, bringing silence again to the table. ‘Just how certain are you of this outcome Admiral, on what grounds do you base the Assertion?” he queried.

With a slight shrug, Wever replied, “It matters little really at the moment, proof will come in the next few weeks when we all known Generalfeldmarschall Göring will announce the colossal armament program to dramatically increase the size and power of the German armed forces, with all due fanfare. I could specifically cover details, such as strong opposition from elements of the SS,” at this point meeting Raeder’s eye’s he saw him mouth ’Heidrich?’ and nodded briefly in response, before continuing, “Or I could detail feedback from my Luftwaffe associations. Simply put it’s not worth our time at the moment specifically detailing as to all the why’s, many of which you already know very well. Proof will be in the pudding at the time, and if I’m wrong then I’m wrong and I’m sure that this body will respond appropriately,” calmly sweeping his gaze around participants, accepting that this would be career ending if such was to occur. “What I do believe we can do at this time is to shape a response to minimize damage and maximize possible tradeoffs for best effect with cooperating with the Heer and Luftwaffe. For instance, if we go in prepared to ‘sacrifice’ battleship construction,” he said holding up crooked fingers, “we can gain leverage with the Heer as they get ‘additional’ armor for tank construction. Alternately we can offer to put carriers as a construction priority over battleships, again emphasizing the armor sacrifice involved to benefit the army, and probably gain Luftwaffe support in such event. I know this would seem self-serving for the MFK, but this is just one example of the level of horse trading possible and is where I think this meeting needs to be heading. Equally it can just as well be U-boat construction” nodding to Doenitz who was frowning initially, head of the U-boatwaffe, “if that is what will be our most effective course in developing an operational strategy to offset the RN advantages.”

“Presenting the Plan Z is a starting point, our best case shall we say, but it needs to also be seen as our platform to base some serious horse trading from if the situation requires. This is the mindset I think we need to be readying now in response and how we as the Kreigsmarine can best position ourselves. In this, I can detail a number of MFK possible tradeoffs with the Luftwaffe and contingencies which I am prepared to outline, and these and similar ideas are the points we should be detailing in preparation. Also, possibly some operational plans that could evolve to include active Luftwaffe planning and support, realistically involving their participation in some of the heavy lifting in a confrontation with the RN.” Having stated his position, Wever again leaned back, waiting if the other senior figures gathered would take up this stance and run with it.

Without looking around too noticeably, as far as he could discern there appeared more interest generally, some nods or thoughtful expressions obvious, without any obvious eagerness to be the first responder. Observing the two senior figures opposite, He couldn’t help notice as the murmur of discussion quickly quietened as the pause lengthened, other parties at the table now also watching for the response. Scrutinizing their faces, it was obvious both were deep in thought, Admiral Carls with a slight frown on his brow, while Admiral Raeder sat more stone-faced meeting his gaze, but with one finger tapping his bottom lip. Then rocking back with a slight nod before rocking forward. he addressed the table in general. “Interesting,” pausing then addressing the table in general, “then I take it light of this observation,” here obviously mimicking Wever’s earlier crooked figure gesture, “there are now no immediate objections with presenting Plan Z as is, to the upcoming Wehrmacht meeting?” and with a general indication of accent sweeping down the table he continued, “then we shall proceed with that matter unchanged to find out what awaits us then. Since that matter appears now settled, then let us now continue in more general terms to discuss the notions presented so generously by Admiral Wever.”

Wever found himself sharing in the serration of surprise that met this declaration, as Raeder leant forward with a faint twitch of his lips as he directed his full attention to his subordinate opposite. “Perhaps you could outline in broad-brush terms some of the considerations and thoughts you have regarding this, if only to prompt some feedback from the other parties here.”

“You want me to open a general discussion in this forum…, to monologue?” he couldn’t help blurt in his surprise at this response, the last thing he expected.

“Yes. Why not?” Came the response from the General admiral, an undoubted slight grim smile now adorning his face. “Having so unmistakably nailed your flag to the mast, the future is now out of your control. Let us take advantage of this opportunity and see what such forthrightness can generate amongst us,” sweeping his gaze across the gathering. “Be our guest to monologue away freely, and perhaps we shall gain an advantage from such frankness.”

Wever couldn’t help but glance around at the other seated flag-officers, a gamut of mixed expressions visible as they too sought to adjust to the unexpected digression the conference was taking. Then briefly closing his eyes to gather his racing thoughts, unaware he was unconsciously kneading the bridge of his nose, as he strove to marshal them in a coherent manner to be presented. Then opening them he straightened and addressed the room as a whole. “Thank-you, General admiral for this unexpected opportunity to excel,” he opened, generating at least one hoped for snort of mirth from the table. “If this monologue appears unstructured and jumps around, please bear with me, as it covers several areas that appear disjointed, but in context form part of a wider picture. In all frankness I feel it poses questions about how we as a service should proceed and I honestly don’t know a satisfactory solution myself, so in the end I hope any open discourse will leave feedback that leads to some answers,” and having opened with a disclaimer he mustered his hastily ordered thoughts and commenced.

“To begin with, before my accident and transfer, as Luftwaffe chief of staff one of my projects was to contract for a four-engine long range strategic bomber project, “The Ural Bomber”. Besides targeting soviet Russia in accordance with Hitlers Eastern “Lebensraum” directive outlined in Mein Kampf, it was also aimed at the key strategic Caucus oilfields. Datum point,” he said with a nod. “This involves operations against Poland, which will almost certainly result in hostilities against Britain and France. Datum Point. Outside of this in event of war, the only sizeable oil assets likely available easily are from Romania who will probably export but insufficient for Germany’s needs, particularly in time of war. The other option is to undertake operations targeting the Middle East, Iran, Arabia etc. This undoubtedly will result in conflict with Britain. Datum Point. For these strategic imperatives I can only conclude we will inevitably face conflict with Britain and our forces must be orientated to undertake operations aligned with this eventuality.” A brief pause making eye contact around the table and seeing obvious nodding and agreement he continued.

“In continuation from this, with my accident, the Luftwaffe focus has switched to shorter range tactical aircraft, optimized to support Army operations, gaining their support. Datum point. Despite this, they have supported the continuation of one Heinkel four engine design, the Ju190, evolved from the Ural Bomber concept, which we require as a long-range maritime patrol aircraft. This is a key component for any successful planning involving any naval operation in the North Sea and Atlantic. Do I need to elaborate on this aviation requirement?” he briefly paused, and seeing no response continued. “This collaboration and resulting Luftwaffe support only came about as Goering is enamored with a large troop transport for his pet Fallschirmjager concept, and expansion of these and glider forces in event of war. Datum point. Without his support this generated, we wouldn’t be getting the maritime patrol capability for the navy, and as it is we will have to compete to get as many airframes as we can get in competition with Luftwaffe needs. However, key to this, in the event of hostilities indications are that Luftwaffe ground forces could expand to potentially division level forces for employment if he has his way. Datum Point. In such event these could be available to do the heavy lifting to support potential Kreigsmarine objectives. I will expand on this shortly.”

With this declaration Wever, could see the first clear spark of interest in the surrounding faces before continuing. “From this basis, we must assume war with Great Britain, and I hope we can all agree that this will require some form of commerce warfare. I won’t rehash the constant planning we are all well aware with regard to those options against the RN. Future options will depend on the coming conference and what assets we will get. My contention is that with the force imbalances facing our surface forces the best option will be balanced battlegroups as previously hypothesized,” nodding in particular to Raeder opposite. “We will have at least four battleships, Mackensen, Yorck, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, whatever happens. Dependent on the conference outcome, I would like to suggest that given the surface forces construction resources and freedom, that we place two carriers as our next priority,” looking towards Doenitz, holding up one hand to forestall any immediate interjection.

“I say that not just as MFK head, but to outline some options for the Kreigsmarine. To put it in context, you all are aware of the recent friction between the RAF and Royal Navy, yes?” and upon receiving nods continued. “That is going to create problems not just for the MFK but all of us. We now have got some independence from the Luftwaffe and control of tasking for our aviation but have limited aircraft numbers. Look now at what the RN is doing now that it controls their Fleet Air Arm without that restriction. Now that they can get as many as they can they have set out a massive force increase of carriers. Firstly, there is the dominion support from Nieustralis. They have expanded to three their light carrier conversions and both the old battlecruiser hulls are being converted. Within two years there will be at least five operational carriers available to that dominion. As a part of Empire in event of war at possibly two or three at least will probably operate with the RN. Add to this the RN is copying their example with two further Hawkin’s conversions and the Old Tiger undergoing similar rebuilds. Add on top of this is the new classes being laid down, at least one or two. By 1940 there will be at least five to eight additional carriers available to employ against us, in addition to the existing battlefleet, a massive expansion, all undertaken before their first new battleship hull is laid down. This is the actuality we face, not just our force imbalance in battleships. Before this we could possibly have formed surface groups of possibly two battleships and a carrier to break into the Atlantic Sea lanes to attack commerce. The carrier allows us greater freedom of action, for reconnaissance to locate conveys, shoot down search planes, and attack picketing cruisers guarding the passages and prevents them shadowing and reporting our ships positions. Once a breakthrough is achieved it could withdraw, mission accomplished. This is a feasible role even with a limited carrier arm. With the change in the RN force structure and size, it is now easier for the RN to mass 2-3 carriers to overwhelm a singleton, hence from the purely MFK perspective it is best to employ two carriers in support of such a plan.

Doubling the carriers makes successful employment of such a battlegroup more likely, and furthermore makes it proportionally harder for the RN to mass sufficient decks to counter them. That is why if we get approval for part or all of Plan Z I recommend at least two carriers be the lead items of any construction queue for countering the RN growth and still give operational flexibility to our existing battlegroups.” Again, meeting the eyes of his audience, he could see frowns and nods, but obviously fully engaging their interest.

“But this also tenders us options if we get a less satisfactory outcome of the conference,” he continued. “Goering may block plans to expand aircraft number available, in which case we can offer,” holding up inverted fingers, “to ‘sacrifice’ resources in the way of a carrier as a bargain chip to gain other resources for the Kreigsmarine. Also, this can be presented as a sacrifice of armor not required for a battleship for a benefit for the Heer. All bargaining points to horse trade with the other services to get the best result for the Kreigsmarine. If we do get two carriers, then in event of war in reality there is no way that Goering can maintain a cap on MFK airframes, if we have a carrier to employ them on. That is just one option. We can cite steel savings to increase U-boat tonnage,” nodding to Doenitz, “if that is what this body decides. But what we need to prepare for now is how to best shape and use these logics to both prepare a case to maximize our resources against the other demands, and then how best structure what we get for best effect.”

Here, suddenly realizing how dry his mouth had become Wever, paused to take a drink from the glass of water before him, meeting Raeder’s look and asked, “Can I continue to add a few further matters which, while in effect are a digression, also impact on this and that I’d like to elaborate on?”

The Grossadmiral had leaned back contemplatively, before looking around the table, “No. actually this is intriguing, yes?” before continuing, “Please continue to lay out your thoughts, then I think it will be interesting to get some other responses from those gathered,” with a go-ahead gesture.

“OK. That covers part of the issue facing us. Secondly, I wish to elaborate on some operational thoughts which may also shape our force structure we build towards and employ in addition to resources constraints. We will contribute little to any land component of any operation against Russia or France. Looking at other theatres I’ve seen in passing the possible proposals for Plans M and G in the Mediterranean, and both are subject to pre-conditions out of our control. Plan G for Gibraltar involves Spanish involvement, which is unlikely after the current civil war ends. The Malta precondition involves Italian participation, again beyond our influence. The strategic proposal which I’ve tentatively called is Plan I, and my staff is handing out a rough synopsis now, for your perusal and consideration,” gesturing to his flag lieutenant seated against the wall, who then proceeded to start handing out papers from his dispatch case. “This is a rough draft, meant as a discussion document initially, which I was hoping to raise later in this conference,” meeting Raeder’s raised eyebrow opposite, before continuing with his nod.

“The key factor for this is that the preconditions for this plan to proceed are entirely ours to control, and if or how to proceed is not so heavily reliant on outside parties. The objective for this Plan I is for German forces to occupy Iceland and the Faroe Islands to simplify the Kreigsmarine anti-commerce operations in the North Atlantic.” This declaration was met with a quiet response of hushed interest around the table, as Wever continued. “I had originally intended to name it plan IF, after both the target islands, but for some reason Kommodore Boehm, quashed my suggestion,” he concluded, getting at least one bark of laughter and the desired murmur of amusement hoped for as he smiled slightly. “The key instigator for this to proceed would be occupation of Norway beforehand. I know that this has been integral to internal disagreements within the service, and I share worries that you yourself have raised admiral,” nodding to Raeder, “in that this runs the risk of very heavy losses to forces committed to such a task. This is what I mean by describing this plan having this precondition. (1) However, these will be at our discretion instigation wise. With this in mind it raises issues regarding construction options relevant to the post Plan Z resolution, which will be worth consideration now. I would welcome the opportunity to detail the implications of Plan I further, but this starts to include some operational detail which you may feel diverges from the intent of this meeting. For this I would just like to conclude with three other observations regarding resource priorities if I may?”

” Continue Admiral,” Raeder assented with a slight nod.

“Firstly, the U-boatwaffe’” with a brief nod again to Doenitz. “These will prove invaluable in any Atlantic option against British merchant shipping and in Plan I. If we lose out on construction priority, we can probably get a hundred hulls for the resources of one capital ship in terms of steel manufacture. Offering trade-offs to present such a saving to the Heer should be in our planning. Secondly in that event, not only does the size and endurance of those boats need to be increased, but some form of large resupply sub could be developed to further increase endurance. Next, if we lose resources or have limitations in place how do we get maximize any construction we get? In terms of simplicity getting more Auxiliary cruisers will impact our plans without restricting construction. An example is our training carrier Boelcke, which was a banana boat. These are a quick simple conversion that the other services don’t worry about. This extends to increasing the number of support vessels like the new Dithmarschen just completed. If we are to attack North Atlantic commerce then the more, we have the greater flexibility both surface and U-boat operations have. These being civilian construction, will have little impact resource wise on plans and provide greater operational reach. That also extends to other supply ships to be required. Lastly, is the point of intelligence. We will need Admiral Canaris and the Abwehr to devote resources to investigate Iceland, the Faroes and establish means to generate shipping intelligence for effective operational planning.” I threw this in as an adjunct as he knew Raeder distrusted the man.” I will finish now, and I hope those gathered here will consider some of the issues raised. If You wish sir, I am happy to expand more and actually have a great deal more on structure issues which extends to other ships and strategic points implicit with Plan I as presented, but that is supplemental to the original intent of this meeting. It could also be influential in other area’s such the smaller surface combatants like destroyers, and the size and employment of our naval infantry component.” With that Wever settled back into his chair in conclusion, just looking at the two senior figures opposite, and suddenly realizing a feeling a surprising degree of relief, as if a weight had been removed from his shoulders.

There followed a brief pause, as Raeder quickly flicked through a couple of pages placed in front of him, then looked up at Wever, then swept his gaze around the room. “Interesting, actually very interesting,” he commented, then obviously seeing officers engrossed in perusal of the tendered pages announced, “Gentlemen, I think we will take this opportunity while we are to together to pursue this further. To that end I think we shall have a 30-minute break and then perhaps here what other ‘datums’,” he said, holding up crooked fingers in parody of Wever’s early gesture, “that Admiral Wever may wish to elaborate on. Take this opportunity for a break and we will resume at 1430,” then standing and with a nod, leaving the room followed by Admiral Carls.

Taking advantage of the break, Wever left the room with several others to briefly freshen up, deferring approaches from several officers, before returning to resume the meeting shortly before both senior admirals reentered the room. Waiting while they returned, he had realized he felt quite lightened emotionally after the candid presentation earlier, realizing during the interlude how tense he had been given the problematic issues being faced. In his own mind it was in some ways a professional catharsis to offer one of the few strategic ways forward he could see for war with Britain. His own analysis still concluded that a positive outcome was unlikely, but his professionalism had concluded that in reality there were few viable paths forward and that this perhaps was the best available option.

With everyone seated once more, after a brief nod, Admiral Carls took the lead, looking surprisingly animated for the first time. “Why are you recommending this course for us at this time” he posed?

“It’s quite simple really. Given the logic of a war with the Royal Navy and an assumption of us not having anything like the necessary resources for this action, it’s an operational strategy that offers some hope of interrupting the Atlantic supply line, whilst also coopting a hopefully realistic level of Luftwaffe support in attempting this. That combined with the attraction that it’s progress and implementation will be to a far greater degree under our control, or rather the decision if to proceed I should say, is the far greatest attraction it offers to us as a service.”

“You said Hopefully,” interjected Raeder.

Pausing, Walther found himself kneading his brow, before going on. “Up until say 1935, I would have said almost certainly,” he said, “but in the last few years since the Royal Navy won its fight with the RAF, the situation is changing rapidly and it is less certain now,” again pausing. “We are all well aware of the traditional force imbalance with battleships, their dozen plus against at best up to four of our own. Since 1935 that same level of imbalance is now rapidly swinging against us in naval aviation. I’ve already mentioned the Nieustralis element but now we are starting to look at similar levels of imbalance in carrier forces. Until recently, at best the RN could have had available at best four or five carriers, spread across their Atlantic commitments. Facing that strength dispersed across the area, we could realistically have had a single carrier supporting a surface group, and faced a force imbalance that could still be manageable, but that’s no longer certain. It’s beginning to look like it’s possible that any lone carrier could face a mustered response of three or four to one. Meaning we have a greater need to have say two decks to be effective. Also, it means that no longer can we really consider two single carrier surface forces viable if we have them, which reduces our flexibility. The great appeal for us of Iceland is that it is essentially an unsinkable aircraft carrier if we hold it, but that still doesn’t mitigate what I said about employing our own carrier forces. Secondly, I will say that this will have to occur before Great Britain itself deploys forces to Iceland to preempt such an action by us. If the Tommie's beat us there, then I would suggest that the possibility of successfully implementing Plan I is highly unlikely in the face of an effective armed opposition. " (2)

“Having said that how we progress now will flow from this. If war comes Britain will plan to repeat the distant blockade strategy of the Great War if we don’t change the model of the conflict, with us again lacking the strength to force a direct confrontation. If we pursue the northern option and take Norway, that will force the Tommie’s to change their plan. But it will also free up our offensive options to attack their Atlantic trade. Plan I will go ahead depending on what the Norway occupation costs us. Too expensive in terms of ships and material and it will die stillborn,” he said, seeing acknowledging nods all around, “But that is a precondition on which we will both have direct impact upon, and the final call will essentially be ours, not the other services”.

He could tell this idea in particular met with general approval. “This is where Plan I can be a viable strategic role for the Kreigsmarine if the earlier pre-conditions are met. If we can base the new maritime reconnaissance aircraft there they could range as far as Newfoundland, forcing shipping far to the south and simplifying reconnaissance and access of both surface and submarine forces into the North Atlantic to attack their convoys. Iceland will be our base and it’s where we can realistically plan to hurt the Royal Navy with the forces in hand. We will need to be daring and bold, and the increasing aviation abilities of the Royal Navy can only serve to marginalize this to be honest. Placing aviation forces will require up to two hundred planes, more as the British strength grow, plus those on the Graf Zeppelin and a second carrier if we can get one. The carriers will have an important role to play enabling the freedom of action for our surface forces.”

At this point Carls interjected, “We can’t match the British fleet at sea!” Wever shook his head. “Our air power will even the odds. If the airfields at Bergen and Reykjavik are made operational as quickly as possible it will only serve our purposes. I want the British to try and take it back. It will tempt the British into placing their surface fleet in range of our aircraft. The pilots of the Kriegsmarine have trained for this, and if we involve Goering in the capture of the island with his Fallschirmjager, then the addition of further Luftwaffe aircraft to aid in this is also a given.”

“How certain are we that the Luftwaffe will cooperate,” posed Raeder? “This is where my links with the Luftwaffe have worked to our benefit. Through Kesselring, the production of the Ju190 is already approved. Presented to Goering as a transport carrying twice the number of paratroops as an Aunty Ju of greater range, he has adopted it as a project. That our own quota is now available as a long-range maritime patrol craft for the Kreigsmarine is entirely coincidental,” he finished with a slight smile, meeting a matching range of smirks and grins around the table. “Can we be certain of Luftwaffe support in such an endeavor? Realistically, a 100%? The answer is probably No, but I would still say there is a very high chance of their assistance. Even if this does not eventuate, we will still gain useful aviation assets for the Kreigsmarine. This long-range lift and reconnaissance capability can only be of benefit for us irrespective, more so should the Norway and Iceland options proceed.”

Seeing the groundswell of support of those present around the table he decided to expand further. “As I first proposed this was tendered as Plan IF, the F being for the Faroes. A further extension could include extend part of the operation to occupying the Faroe Islands. They’ll provide a stopping point and another unsinkable base if successful. But this will require us to do the work and prepare our own force structure for this eventuality. This requires a plan and the size of the service troops and special shipping that have been specially selected and trained. The advantages are that its population is far smaller than Iceland and only take a much smaller force to secure. A grass strip can be created on the Faroe Islands as quickly as it can be made. The engineers assigned and how we under take this task are and extra training are work we can begin preparing for now. We already have a possible location on Vagar Island identified, mainly because it is hard to attack from the sea, and it would be difficult for any British force to shell. The hope would be to have aircraft ready to operate from the island group in three to four days, particular if we can quietly conduct a covert check and survey beforehand.”

“That’s very fast” posed Carls, “What if that’s not possible?” “Then Bergen and Iceland will need to pick up the slack. they should slip through without difficulty. The advantage is that it will give us control over the Denmark and other Gaps controlling access to the Atlantic. Being 400km closer it means that the Luftwaffe tactical aircraft as well as ours can then be used against Britain as well. It places Glasgow and Derry within range of our Ju 88s from a completely new direction. At the moment any planes would have to fly right across England to hit targets on the west coast, but if they came in from the north, then we open up another angle of attack. There will be losses and it won’t be easy, but if it works, then the Northern Atlantic access will be controlled by us, forcing all enemy convoys to take a southern route.”

At this point Raeder leaned forward and spoke, “It all sounds promising, but what chances do you hold for long term victory?” Wever reeled at the question. “What do you mean?” “Closer, also means that the British can deploy more assets against there. Is it going to be retainable against the levels of force they might deploy,” he asked? “If the British try and blockade the island we’ll attack them from the air, but if they commit major forces, then probably not, No.” “Then why attempt this extension, isn’t it an over-extension, and as you’ve already indicated we are facing an uphill fight against a force imbalance?”.

Here Wever paused to best phrase his response. “Part of the plan is to find the enemy so the role of the reconnaissance planes in a forward location will be very important. Here we are trying to use airpower, our own MFK included, to counter the Royal Navy and improve our options. If we land in spring it will take the British time to muster forces to try and retake it, easily until summer in the face of a determined force, and we can attrite any efforts they attempt. That is only a short window of time and we could very easily retain it until the onset of winter makes it untenable for an immediate response. This would give us many months of easier Atlantic access to attack the convoy routes, whilst simplifying our own supply issues if it is only of a small size. Yes, it will be likely lost in a longer campaign, but while we hold it, it creates problems for the British. They can’t really proceed on an Iceland solution without clearing the Faroe’s first, all the time costing them resources exposure to our attacks.”

Meeting Raeder’s gaze directly he received a slight nod, before the Grand Admiral responded. “So, Iceland will be an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Assuming we have the precondition met to attempt its capture, and that the Luftwaffe complies, and we seize it quickly and unload your forces, but how will you hold it and get supplies to the Island?”

“Here is why I think we have to start making preparations now, even before we know how the upcoming conference pans out. Beyond the Carriers and larger warships discussed much of our more modest demands can be shaped. We are far more likely to get modest resource needs met even if my thoughts on Plan Z are accurate. For supply, I’d build extra destroyers for fast runs from Norway. Now with my aviation background I’ve studiously avoided any “unsolicited” ship advice,” glancing around faces and seeing acknowledgement of his point, “though I might soon make some carrier designs suggestions as soon as the Japan group return, but I can’t help but hear your professional shop talk about the 34 model destroyers and their bow issues in heavy seas. Here is where Kapitan Roehm,” nodding towards the Destroyer Type commander down the table, “may want to have input into his designs given the scenario we are considering. (3) Lose a bow gun or extend the bow to improve seakeeping for winter in the North Atlantic and increase the range. I won’t provide any useful input, but this is the kind of contingency planning which we can prepare for and requires his input,” getting an acknowledging nod from down the table. “Hopefully we can also fly in supplies with the new Ju190, though Iceland would remain out of range for a return journey for most of our planes, even from Norway. Even if the Faroe’s fall, Iceland will be a tougher nut to crack. I’ll toss out a couple of other considerations. Using bad weather fast auxiliaries should still be possible to keep supplies flowing. Should we look at adding an Auxiliaries Type Command, not only for that role but also Auxiliary cruisers and a resupply for surface forces in the raiding role, again because they are civilian and the other branches aren’t really going to care?” he posed, seeing thoughtful looks around the table. “So, these are some of the resource questions we have to ask and prepare for. Particularly if a land campaign is going to take the lion’s share of the Führer’s interest, and Germany’s military might.”

“The Kriegsmarine had little role or contribution in such an offensive in the west. Norway, Denmark will place demands on us initially but what forces are best? We may be served by aiming for Iceland even if it doesn’t eventuate. It’s only home to perhaps one hundred thousand people with no military. There is a sixty man force that trains on weekends; sort of a branch of the National Police, but that is all. I have no doubt that we can take Iceland, if we decide to proceed and the British don’t beat us there. Then you have to supply Iceland if it proceeds. Fast supply ships and the extra destroyers will have to be built to undertake the task, but they are useful in the preceding or other stages even if the plan isn't implemented. The supply challenge gets worse if the force imbalance in aviation gets greater as I’m beginning to worry about. The island is only home to one hundred and thousand people, though we will evacuate some of the women and children back to Norway. A fast auxiliary like the Altmark can make the trip from Bergen in just over two days using poor weather to mask movements. But increased air opposition means we have to increase force levels on the island and their support stationed there, conversely require an increased logistic support, a cyclical problem.” Here he paused, taking another sip of water, “but this increased threat means we will have to disperse or hide assets on the island as the opposition grows. We can probably keep air superiority for some time, but we’d need to disperse things like fuel supplies and support ships for U-boat operations. The Mine warfare type commander will probably want to Liaise with Admiral Doenitz and select the most secure anchorage to mine and defend, so that we can operate it as a forward base for convoy attacks.” At this point Wever realized he was beginning to repeat himself to a degree and chose to finish. “Sincerely gentlemen, this is what I mean we can think to address and take steps in forward planning, even if our resource needs are not going to be met in the planned conference.” Realizing he was finishing lamely, he simply swept a look around the tables faces, and then leant back in his chair, obviously finished for the moment.

A slight murmur of comment began, including a brief soft exchange between Carls and Raeder opposite, before being cut short when the Grand Admiral again spoke. “Say you pull all this off, and first you have to convince the Führer of your plan, but say you do, what then? Can we beat the British and the French.” Here Wever quite simply bit the bullet and declared, “How? We failed last time and now our leader wants to have another try, and quite simply we won’t have the forces to do it directly this time either. The French and British navies outnumber us considerably, so we have to define what constitutes a victory to us, and then present it to the Fuhrer as such. It simply comes down to how the Kreigsmarine can contribute as part of the wider ground war.” Here, nodding towards Doenitz, who was obviously looking unhappy at this comment, he continued “You have to believe in the Führer. He said that the British wouldn’t defend Poland, but we have to plan as if they do. We are at best incidental to a wider campaign in Western Europe,” said Wever. “It’s my belief that the resource allocation will reflect this, and really, I like the rest of you just don’t want our service reduced to irrelevance in its contribution to a wider war in this regard. We have to have achievable aims that contribute, otherwise the other arms will have complete control and start dictating on how we conduct our operations.” At this point Wever’s mouth snapped shut, realizing he was exposing himself to the forum of officers present. “We deal with the here and now, and job is to find ways to marginalize the Royal Navy as much as possible and hopefully force England out of the war. Can we call this victory, I don’t know? All we can do is to convince the Führer that our plans are viable, and broach the levels of support required to achieve aims in conjunction with his wider plans. Without something I fear for what our ultimate role may be if we can’t be seen as a viable contributor to any war effort.”

All this time Raeder had been observing, and now rubbed his chin before answering. “I can see merit in your analysis, and actually like the idea behind the plans. If the Royal Navy is tempted north and your planes are wait for them, then maybe it will work.” Looking to Carls then back down the table he directed, “We can work with this and develop it further, Agreed?” Seeing a general nodding of agreement, he addressed his deputy directly. “Gentlemen, I think it best we start arranging to develop these points further and send me the details when we can organize a coherent strategy regarding this and possible resource options,” before turning to address Wever directly. “As for you Admiral,” he said with a wintry smile, "I think you have just gained yourself a spot as an aide on my staff for the upcoming meetings,” glancing down the row of faces, “Along with Admiral… Doenitz, I think,” he finished. “Such forthrightness deserves its reward and I’m sure it will be an interesting experience for us all.” With that, he stood, closing the meeting and heading out, followed by his deputy, leaving the room in an animated hum of discussion and Wever, slightly shocked at the final response to his concepts, and wondering what was going to come now.

Controlling Norway as strategic Objective had been recognized before 1915 with the RN adoption of a distant blockade policy. Occupation had long been suggested by strategists such as VAdm Wegener as part of possible strategic plans during the post war period and the importance of ice-free transit of iron ore for German increased its importance. Well aware of its Strategic importance its capture of ports would create gaps in the blockade of Germany and give access to the Atlantic allowing Germany more effective use of its sea power. Initially in balance Raeder saw advantages in having Norway remain neutral allowed the safe passage for merchant vessels transporting ore via Norwegian coastal waters to Germany. In addition, there was the perception (accurate as it occurred) that any Kreigsmarine operation to invade Norway would likely involve very significant losses to any Kreigsmarine force involved. With events like the Altmark incident and planned invasion of Denmark would lead to the invasion proceeding in 1940.
RN occupation of Iceland May 1940
ITTL as a result of this meeting there would be several modified destroyer designs constructed by the Kreigsmarine. Featuring suppression of the super-firing 5-inch and later 5.9inch gun position in the bow, to lengthen the forecastle and reduce weight forward. These changes offered considerably improved seakeeping and greatly increased range.

Tangles2 · May 9, 2024

Part Eight

A Brief Synopsis World War II Operations

The MFK were to play significant roles in Kriegsmarine operations and achieve some notable success before ultimately succumbing to defeat as part of the wider German armed forces. It would play a contributary part along with Luftwaffe aircraft in the destruction of a number of major vessels during the early years and played a key supporting role as a Luftwaffe adjunct, particularly against naval targets, when not tasked with Kreigsmarine missions. It would make major operational contributions in:

Invasion of Norway May 1940
North Sea Operations in support of the Battle of Britain 1940
Key contributions in the Mediterranean Theatre 1940-42 (including operations against Malta and supporting the invasion of Crete.)
Baltic Operations 1941-45
Battle of the Atlantic 1940-44, including Operation Rheinubung 1941
Arctic Operations 1942-43, and
Defense of Germany 1942-45.

At its peak its strength would be just under 80,000 personnel and operate 580 combat aircraft while maintaining two divisions equivalent of anti-air defense ground personnel. By mid-1941 with the loss of the majority of the Kreigsmarine surface fleet its ability to conduct offensive operations had largely disappeared, though its maritime patrol elements would continue to make valuable contributions in the Battle of the Atlantic and would achieve notable successes against Soviet forces in Arctic waters in 1942/43. Facing growing opposition, the MFK was involved in the defensive operations increasingly as losses and shortages, combined with the loss of carrier platforms, reduced its effectiveness. Ultimately the Allies industrial might would overwhelm the armed forces, including the MFK, and lead to the defeat of Germany.

Before the war the MFK had become responsible for Naval anti-aircraft gunnery training. With the outbreak of war, it became a natural continuation for the MFK becoming responsible for the ground-based air defense of its own land installations. As the war progressed the degree and extent of these units grew, and they become to integrated into the wider Luftwaffe air defense network. By the end of the war two of the 29 Luftwaffe Flak-divisions were essentially MFK, manned with Kreigsmarine personnel while under operational control of the Luftwaffe, predominantly tasked with airbase defense.

After 1940 the limit cap of MFK strength was largely disregarded and the MFK peak combat strength would reach 580 aircraft during 1943-44. With very few ever actually employed upon carriers, the majority MFK units would later conform to Luftwaffe unit organization. The MFK maritime reconnaissance elements of the Seeaufklärungsgruppe would play a key role in supporting U-boat operations in the war in the Atlantic based both in France and Norway in conjunction with Luftwaffe Fw200 Condor aircraft. Other MFK elements would play significant roles as Luftwaffe adjuncts in the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Arctic theatres, especially in anti-shipping tasks, and have significant roles in the defense of Germany and the Baltic in the closing stages of the war.

Notable MFK Achievements.

MFK Top Aces
By VE day in 1945 of the 107 German fighter aces with a score of over 100, a total of eight MFK fighter pilots would have achieved over 100 aerial victories, with five surviving the war. The top ace pilot being Korvettenkapitän Hans-Joachim Marseille with a score of 158 aircraft. As with Luftwaffe aces several MFK aces achieved notable high scores involved in Eastern Front operations, and several would also have significant successes in the Mediterranean and European theatres. The list of top scoring aces with over 100 victories for the MFK was.

158 Hans-Joachim Marseilles
140 Friedrich Miller (KIA 29 May 1944)
136 Karl-Heinz Webber (KIA 7 June 1944)
129 Walter Dahl
114 Werner Schnaer
112 Kurt Burhlgen
102 Seigfried Freytag (MIA 9 April 1945)
101 Ulrich Weinz

Head of the MFK Wever’s own son Walther was also a successful ace serving with the MFK from June 1943. He achieved a total of 44 victories before being shot down and killed by allied fighters on 10 April 1945.

Notable Surface Vessels sunk by MFK
A list of major surface vessels sunk by the MFK during WW2.
(Note: Asterix {*} denotes vessels sunk by joint Luftwaffe/MFK elements.)

HMS Effingham* Carrier Britain Norway April 40
HMS Surrey Cruiser Britain Scapa Flow August 40
HMS Suffolk Cruiser Britain Nth Atlantic April 41
HMS Glorious Carrier Britain Nth Atlantic April 41
HMS York* Cruiser Britain Crete May 41
HMS Fiji* Cruiser Britain Crete May 41
HMS Gloucester* Cruiser Britain Crete May 41
Marat* Battleship Russia Baltic Sept 41
Arkhangelsk Battleship Russia Arctic June 42 (Ex – HMS Royal Sovereign)
Murmansk Cruiser Russia Arctic June 42 (Ex- USS Milwaukee)

This table reflects the decline in anti-shipping operations conducted by the MFK after 1942. By late 1943 the few surviving Kreigsmarine major surface vessels had been withdrawn to the Baltic, and thereafter the MFK role was largely defensive in nature, being employed supporting Kreigsmarine Baltic operations, but largely in conjunction with the Luftwaffe in the defense of Germany. Nevertheless, despite its small size and operational constraints it was employed under, the fact remains that as an arm it was involved in the sinking of four capital ships (2 battleships and 2 carriers) and six cruisers (3 heavy and 3 light) and numerous other vessels despite these limitations. It is an indication of both the professionalism and unrealized potential that German naval aviation provided the Kreigsmarine during the opening years of WW2.

A more detailed Carrier specific synopsis (with Piccies!) will follow in the next post. Enjoy T.

Tangles2 · May 10, 2024

DankStalin said:
I actually curious, from my very little knowledge, I know that in 1944-1945 that as the war tilted against Germany, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe personnel were thrown into the fray as infantry. I am not sure how well they did (though I would imagine poorly, with a huge lack of training & equipment), but does the fact that the Kriegsmarine have 1 or 2 Flak divisions at least give them a bit of training and equipment (manning those flak guns should give them experience, and they would probably use those AA in ground combat which solves a bit of the equipment problem) for the coming storm.

Edit: Just realised after I typed that flak divisions are still a last ditch effort to transform what are AA units into a combat units, so not a surprise if they absolutely mauled. What I was thinking when I typed this is what are the butterflies from having Kriegsmarine personnel integrated into the Luftwaffe flak divisions already. Will they have at least a bit more ground combat training? Will the Kriegsmarine crews have at least leaders who have a tiny bit of experience in ground warfare? Will there be power struggles regarding who controls such units ( the post did say the Luftwaffe have operational control so easy to guess who won) or will the 2 branches with the Marineflieger as a link work more and more together as the final days of the Reich draws closer (to the point that the Kriegsmarine are fine with Kriegsmarine Flak division under luftwaffe control).

The logic was that the MFK having large regional bases and access to both ships and aircraft could provide basic naval AA training initially, particularly in terms of ship based and using the Range finders the ships were fitted with. I mentioned the specific training staffelen on the CVT Boelcke. this was one variety of supplementary use of that platform. Secondly it had the majority of its fixed wing aircraft operating from land bases, frequently sharing or co-located with Luftwaffe facilities. As the war turned, these became more and more subject to air attack, and a growth in the requirement of airfield defenses occurred. Being Kreigsmarine facilities, a growing number of Kreigsmarine personnel were responsible for manning and operating their own airfield defenses. But because this was integrated into the wider Luftwaffe air defense network, the natural synergies of the two services, air interception, radar etc., that despite the different origin of the two sets of personnel manning AA defense's, their employment was later as part of a larger integrated whole network, rather than stand alone for each base.

Note the term Flak division was not in Luftwaffe or Kreigsmarine terms a description of a ground fighting force, or at least not until the very end of the war. A Flak division was mostly a term describing the unified administrative control of multiple air defense assets. Such a division in fighting terms would control varying numbers of AA regiments along with ancillary units like, radar, searchlights etc., optimized into a single integrated formation tasked to provide air defense, usually to provide a higher level of command on a regional basis, and provide C&C, administration, resupply etc. It was not a tactical, ground warfare formation, though the Luftwaffe did have such, most noticeably the excellent Fallschirmjagers. Even there, the Fallschirmjager was a totally different function and body separate to the Flak division, and its employment reflected this.

On that note, Luftwaffe Flak units did frequently get involved in ground operations, but generally not intentionally. Good example would be their use by Hans Luck(?) in Normandy in his role defeating or containing Operation Goodwood. That battery would end up performing fearsome execution on British Tanks, but the guns were coincidentally sited in his location, but tasked initially in a role to provide air defense over Caen, not to provide a specific ground warfare role. ITTL the Kreigsmarine Flak divisions largely were to protect Kreigsmarine naval facilities and MFK ground bases, most particularly those bordering the Baltic.

Tangles2 · May 10, 2024

Part Nine

Synopsis of MFK Carrier operations during WW2
As a branch to provide the offensive arm for carrier operations the final success of the MFK was severely constrained by the fact that the Kreigsmarine would only ever succeed in deploying five in any way functional carriers to conduct combat operations in its decade of existence. Only two of these five hulls were specifically designed as aircraft carriers from the keel up, indicates the issues that impacted on naval aviation effectiveness for Germany during hostilities.

Initial Kreigsmarine plans to acquire a carrier capability were first raised in the early 1930s. Partly this was based on assumption of forming a balanced fleet and partly based on the concept that should Panzerschiffe or long-range cruisers be required to break into the Atlantic to attack British commerce, then aviation support would be essential reconnaissance and to either avoid or disrupt RN patrolling elements covering the North-Atlantic access the vital British Convoy routes.

The first Fleet carrier designs of German naval architects would run into difficulties, exposing the lack of experience in building such vessels, awareness of the realities of carrier operations in the North Sea and the lack of overall clarity in the ships' mission objectives. This lack of clarity led to elements such as medium caliber guns for surface defense that were either eliminated from, or not included in other developing foreign designs. A later MFK delegation in 1935 of officers and constructors visited Japan, obtaining flight deck equipment, blueprints, and inspection the aircraft carrier Akagi under a collaborative agreement. This would result in a design revision subsequently to her delayed sistership, the Werner Voss, but the first carrier Graf Zeppelin would be completed with several inherent design inefficiencies reflecting the initial poor grasp of carrier doctrine.

As the design process was finalized, Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany and unilaterally withdrew from the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and began the systematic re-building of the armed forces. The prestige brought by the Panzerschiffe and following improved P-class vessels under construction, led Hitler order two of these to be modified and completed as the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Preceding the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which permitted Germany to build up to 35 percent of the strength of the Royal Navy in all warship categories. Hitler had covertly already approved the commencement of the first Kreigsmarine carrier and formation of the MFK.

What followed was to disrupt the intended construction plans for the service in the pre-war period. A combination of political infighting between the Kriegsmarine and other services over resources, doctrine disputes within the Kriegsmarine itself and Adolf Hitler's lack of interest in vessels other than battleships, all conspired against carrier construction. Hitler’s approval and prioritization of battleships was more based upon symbology purposes as powerful icons of German Re-armament, rather than a utility-based fleet structure consideration. Though the first designed carrier Graf Zeppelin was started before 1937, support issues came to a head between the services which hampered work, bringing it almost to a halt and impeded further construction after this. A shortage of workers and materials slowed construction to a virtual standstill on many projects, with Hitler’s prioritizations of the Army and Luftwaffe needs impacting at this point. The result was to leave the Kreigsmarine with three large projects halted at a very advanced state (80+%) of completion. Work was only resume on these at a slower rate with the outbreak of hostilities. With subsequent events all three would eventually be completed as carriers, the Werner Voss (Graf Zeppelins modified sister ship) and the cruisers Lutzow and Seydlitz as very basic and elementary carrier conversions.

Initially with only a single available operational platform in the form of the Graf Zeppelin, its employment in isolation exposed it to the risk of being overwhelmed, which is what was to occur on its first operational deployment. The net result of this was that after the disastrous Kreigsmarine losses of the Norway campaign and Operation Rheinubung (including Graf Zeppelin) the Kreigsmarine had lost virtually all its major surface vessels. After some frantic negotiation the three partially complete hulls would be belatedly completed as carriers (two of which were very basic wooden decked conversions) after 1942, and would participate in a single major operation, Operation Silver Gull in Arctic waters. This was the part of the 1942 successful German/Finnish offensive to occupy the Kola Peninsula in northern Russia and capture Murmansk. Though a success, the exposure of the carriers to achieve this led ultimately to the loss of two of the three, Werner Voss and Seydlitz, and damage to the third Lutzow, and subsequent withdrawal of all the surviving Kreigsmarine major surface vessels to the Baltic for the remainder of the war.

In conclusion the Kreigsmarine was only to ever employ five aircraft carriers, three of them very basic conversions, and due to the circumstances of their construction and subsequent employment they were largely denied the opportunity to make any substantive contribution to the German war effort

The five operational carriers of the Kreigsmarine from which the MFK would operate from in WW2. (Note: Only the Graf Zeppelin and Werner Voss were designed from the Keel up in that role. The remaining three were basic austere wooden decked conversions of other hulls to operate MFK aircraft.)

Tangles2 · May 10, 2024

Part Ten

The Five Kreigsmarine Aircraft Carriers 1934-45

1. CVT/E Oswald Boelcke
Ironically the first Kreigsmarine carrier would be its longest serving and sole carrier to survive the war before its scrapping in 1955. Acquired to provide an aviation training platform in 1934 it was a basic conversion of the 10,000-ton merchant vessel Hansel for this role. As completed it was an unarmed diesel-powered vessel without armor and fitted with a wooden flight deck, two elevators and a catapult. Completed initially without any ordnance handling facilities or aviation fuel storage, it would later have these supplemented to a limited degree. Lacking the endurance of other small carriers, it would be adequate for operations in the confined waters of the Baltic. As the navy’s first true aircraft carrier it was not actually commissioned into the Kreigsmarine until 1935 after the signing of the Anglo-German naval treaty and be named Oswald Boelcke after the famous WW1 fighter ace.

It would be continuously employed as the Navy training carrier for the majority of its service and survive WW2. Later fitted with a light anti-aircraft armament and able to carry up to 22 aircraft it was similar to other small training carriers of this period. Due to its basic design and small air group, it operated entirely in Baltic waters. With no other navy carriers and the deteriorating situation on the Eastern Front from late 1944 onward it would be active in limited operational roles providing aircover and support as required, and be one of the remaining Kreigsmarine vessels evacuating civilians from East Prussia. Uniquely, in one of his few actions as Fuhrer after Hitler’s death, Admiral Doenitz would ‘sell’ it to Finland for 100RM two days before VE day. This ‘voluntarily sale/transfer’ would see it remain in the Finnish Navy continuing as a limited training carrier until its disposal and scrapping in 1955.

2. CV Graf Zeppelin

The Graf Zeppelin nearing completion late 1938. (Note the twin 5.9-inch medium calibre mounts that would be deleted in her following sister ship Werner Voss)
One of the two specifically designed large carriers for the navy, it was the sole operational carrier when war broke out in 1939. Despite some less-than-optimal design aspects upon completion, at 33,000tons with good speed and armor and capable of carrying 42 aircraft it represented a capable platform for its intended role. Named after Graf (Count) Ferdinand von Zeppelin, the ship was launched on 8 December 1936, and due to shifting construction priorities its completion was delayed until September 1939. Working up in the Baltic it missed the disastrous losses of the Norway campaign, and first operational deployment was its involvement in Operation Rheinubung in the North Atlantic in May 1941.

Incorporating the four Kriegsmarine large surface units available at the time, battleships Bismarck and Scharnhorst, heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen along with the Graf Zeppelin. The planned intent was to break out into the North Atlantic convoy routes causing damage and disruption to the British convoys, before returning home. The Graf Zeppelin was to accompany the force providing air cover and to engage detected RN covering forces in the Denmark Straight to assist the breakout of the other heavy units. Once this was achieved the Graf Zeppelin was to withdraw to Norway.

Unfortunately, due to signals intelligence and aerial recon, the British Admiralty was alerted, and the majority of the Home Fleet deployed to counter this operation. The resulting Battle of the Denmark Straight is well known. Though successful in sinking both the aircraft carrier Glorious and heavy cruiser Suffolk as intended, the Graf Zeppelin would be sunk by the counter strikes of the three Home Fleet Carriers concentrated to oppose the German breakout. Of the other major German surface vessels, only the Prinz Eugen would survive to return to Norway.

Photo of the last moments of the Graf Zeppelin, sinking in the battle of the Denmark Straights.

Sonar image of the surprisingly intact and upright wreck of the Graf Zeppelin on the Atlantic Ocean Floor 2016.

3. CV Werner Voss

The sister ship of the earlier Graf Zeppelin was one of the deferred Kreigsmarine construction projects of 1937. (2) Postponement enabled several earlier design issues of her earlier sister ship to be corrected and design changes incorporated when work resumed briefly in late 1939. The 5.9-in weapons and magazines where deleted, replaced by additional sponson mounted 4.1-inch guns and AA mounts. This removal enabled an enlarged and improved aviation fuel storage system and greater hangar for additional aircraft. Beyond the obvious replaced medium mounts with AA guns, other visual cues differentiated the two sister ships. A curved ‘Atlantic’ bow for improved sea keeping a longer lower bridge structure and broader funnel without cap being the obvious visual changes.

1942 and the 85% complete hull of the Werner Voss being towed into dock to finish the delayed fitting out process.

Work would eventually resume after the failure of Operation Rheinubung late 1941. Despite several machinery issues which delayed its workup the Werner Voss was included in the planning for Operations Silver Gull, the naval portion of the attack to secure the Kola Peninsula in 1942, with other major Kreigsmarine combatants in April 1942. The concentration of this force was detected by the British, unaware of the actual operational plan and fearing a repeat of the earlier Operation Rheinubung to break out into the convoy routes of the North Atlantic, a maximum effort raid was mounted by RAF Bomber Command against the carriers and cruisers concentrated in Faettenfjord Norway. On the evening of 28/29 April 1942 some 330 Lancasters and Halifaxes of Bomber Command conducted a major attack on this anchorage.

The capsized hull of the Werner Voss in Faettenfjord, Norway undergoing salvage work in 1948.

Unbeknownst to the British the majority of the force had departed the prior afternoon to the raid, moving to Tromso in far northern Norway in preparation for the upcoming offensive. Unfortunately, the Werner Voss had suffered a significant engineering casualty during the move to Norway, and the resulting delay led to it remaining behind and being the sole vessel in the anchorage when raided. As such it bore the full brunt of the attack. It is assessed that it was struck by a least four 1000lb bombs and several smaller bombs causing catastrophic damage. Set on fire, flooding rapidly overwhelmed the ship and it capsized in shallow water, with the upturned hull remaining visible. (3)

The majority of the Werner Voss’s air group survived having earlier been flown off initially upon arrival. They would subsequently participate in Operation Silver Gull as part of the land-based MFK component of Luftflotte 5. They would remain in Norway and continue to operate in Arctic waters until the MFK component was withdrawn to Germany in late 1944. The wreck of Werner Voss remained in place until after the war, with salvage work lasting from 1948 until 1952.

4. CVL Lutzow. (4)

Lutzow was the last of the six P-class cruiser hulls laid down after 1930 and was the oldest of the three 1937 deferred hulls. The initial design was resource intensive and construction delays resulted after vessels four and five were enlarged and completed using Lutzow’s turrets as the Scharnhorst-class battleships. This, included with the Nazi Parties assumption of power and amended construction priorities, resulted in work halting on the Lutzow with the hull only 80% complete in 1937. Work would only resume in 1941 and was completed as a very austere and simple wooden-decked carrier capable of operating 38 aircraft in 1942. After a brief work up in the Baltic it was one of the three carriers assigned to Operation Silver Gull in April 1942.

The 80% complete Lutzow being fitted with a wooden flight deck 1942 as an austere carrier conversion.

Despite its austere layout, with its longer hull and high speed it was to prove very effective in this operation, with its air group contributing to the sinking of both major vessels of the Soviet Northern Fleet, Archangelsk and Murmansk along with other shipping in the opening phases and providing air cover for the successful occupation of the Kola Peninsula. With its objectives concluded, it and the other surface vessels involved would be withdrawn back to the Baltic in late May.

Anticipating this withdrawal the RN mounted a major operation to interdict the withdrawing vessels, concentrating over a dozen submarines in Norway waters and the North Sea, and mounting a large aerial mining campaign on the approaches to Wilhelmshaven. Despite the high transit speed and heavy escort, the British submarine HMS Spearfish attacked the ship on 29 April and scored a single serious hit. The torpedo hit the Lützow's stern quarter, blowing off one shaft and causing major flooding. Nevertheless, it was still able to proceed at over 10 knots and reached the Jade River Estuary shortly before dawn, where it struck an aerial mine causing further flooding and major damage. But for the availability of tugs and close proximity of the port then it probably would have been lost.

Due to the extent and significance of the damage the ship would remain in dockyards hands for repairs, which lasted for nearly a year. During her time in drydock and on the dockside in Kiel, Lützow was twice specifically targeted by large British bombing raids, on both occasions being hit with 500-lb GP bombs. The resultant damage added to repair delays, and it would not be until the second half of 1943 that the Lutzow was again operational.

For the remainder of her service the Lutzow would remain in the Baltic supporting naval and land force operations as the Eastern Front situation deteriorated. On 18 December 1944 Lützow was in Gotenhafen when the RAF executed a major raid targeting the port. Many ships were sunk in the harbor and a single bomb struck the very bow of the ship, but several near misses inflicted considerable underwater damage. Moved to the port of Swinemünde to receive temporary repairs. On 16 April 1945, specifically targeted by bombers from 617 ("Dambusters") squadron carrying 1000-pound bombs and the super-heavy Tallboy bomb. Three 1000-pound bombs hit the ship and of the Seven Tallboys dropped, one exploded between the ship and the shore and tore a one-by-ten-meter hole in hull, while a second penetrated right through the ship, detonating below it and breaking its back just forward of the forward hanger. The front portion broke off and sank rapidly, while the rear portion was only prevented from capsizing by her superstructure hitting the shore. Most of the lower decks were flooded but despite sinking, the water was shallow enough that her main deck was still partially above water. With Soviet forces approaching her crew rigged scuttling charges and destroyed the hull in Kaiserfahrt canal on 23 April 1945. The remnants of the ship were raised from the shallow water in September 1947 and broke her up for scrap in 1948–1949.

Reco. photo of the Lutzow in Moene Canal Sweenemunde, which would result in the Tallboy raid and sinking.

5. CVL Seydlitz (5)

Seydlitz was the second navy heavy cruiser of the Prinz Eugen class, but its completion was stopped in 1938 95 percent complete. The unfinished ship remained pier-side in the shipyard until 1941, when Hitler allows its completion as an aircraft carrier instead. Following Operation Rheinubung Hitler’s order to scrap incomplete vessels reflected his loss of faith in the Kreigsmarine. Only with Goring’s support was this altered for the affected vessels to be completed as aircraft carriers.

Photo of the 95% complete Seydlitz in dock, shortly before commencing conversion to aircraft carrier 1942.

With this, the conversion work began on Seydlitz. Despite the ship being approximately 95 percent complete, and only requiring a very short period to become fully operational by installing her anti-aircraft armament, masts, cranes, and aircraft catapult, the far slower rebuilding work to become a carrier was commenced. Hitler’s decision now required the majority of the superstructure be cut away, to prepare for the installation of a flight deck and an aircraft hangar. In total, over 2,400 tons of material from the ship was removed, replaced by an unarmoured wooden flight deck, hanger, elevators, catapults and arresting gear before the conversion was completed. The work included anti-aircraft armament, island superstructure and reworked funnel installed on the starboard side, with a tall, tubular mast on the forward end of the island, and a minimum air complement was of at least 20 aircraft. Late in the process this was reworked to allow installation of radar and to reduce topweight, a relocated shorter mast incorporated and some 4.1-inch mounts deleted. Her propulsion system, already installed remained the same, providing a very high performance, but all this additional work took time and the ship and crew only had a short workup period in the Baltic before transferring in April 1942 in preparation for the upcoming operation in northern Norway against the Soviet Union.

unnamed.jpg.46c572bd7650aafc3e0be25469aaaa54.jpg

Photo showing some of the 2,400 tons of upper works removed to facilitate the conversion.

Despite the loss of the Werner Voss before the commencement of the offensive, the result was an unqualified operational success for the new carrier arm. Using a deck park and effectively operating 28 aircraft, the Seydlitz and Lutzow air groups together have a major impact. The initial attack on Murmansk harbor would torpedo and sink the light cruiser Murmansk (ex-USN Milwaukee) two northern fleet destroyers and two icebreakers and successfully cover the Luftwaffe parachute assault at Severomorsk. This would be followed by further raids on Archangelsk sinking additional vessels including another destroyer and merchant shipping and finishing off the damaged battleship Archangelsk (ex HMS Royal Sovereign) torpedoed by U-477 when attempting to interfere with the attacks. At the end of May, with the Kola Peninsula and Murmansk occupied and all operational objective achieved, both carriers and other surface ships were withdrawn south to return to the security of the Baltic.

Unfortunately for the Kreigsmarine the RN had sufficient time to mount a major operation to intercept the returning vessels. Though avoiding air interception, a major aerial mining operation had been mounted and nearly a dozen allied submarines deployed in Norwegian waters and the North Sea to engage the withdrawing forces. These measures proved effective and despite a large escort and transiting the gap at night and high speed of 28 knots to avoid submarines, such was the concentration of forces that despite this, three of the ships would be successfully engaged in the attempted crossing on the night of 27 May 1942. Though badly damaged by torpedo attack and mining, both Lutzow and Prinz Eugen would survive and successfully reach Wilhelmshaven to undergo extended time in docks. The Seydlitz was less fortunate. The submarine HMS Triton (6) would launch a full salvo of eight torpedoes at the Seydlitz. Four of these would hit the port side, causing catastrophic damage and the Seydlitz would rapidly capsize and sink in less than 20 minutes taking nearly 900 of her crew with her. This was to mark the unfortunate end of the Kreigsmarine sole successful operational deployment of its carrier arm, and again highlighted Raeder’s pre-war prediction of heavy losses in challenging the power of the RN in the confined waters of the North Sea.

Conclusion

Constrained by the internal dynamics of the Nazi system and industrial restrictions in competition with the other services in pre-war Germany, the Kreigsmarine was never able to effectively build towards any form of desired force structure for the conflict it faced. Decisions made by Hitler in 1937-38 meant the Kreigsmarine lost the freedom to adapt and develop more effective force structures in the immediate lead up to the war. Lacking the means to project force resulted in it having no real realistic strategic role in which it could be employed beyond the European theatre. In the pre-war period, Naval aviation, carrier and submarine construction in particular lagged behind what was required, with the result that when war broke out there was little scope for its potential to be developed. Committing its sole operational carrier in Operation Rheinubung, invited the defeat in detail that occurred when the RN was able to concentrate sufficient force to overwhelm it in isolation. That this induced the Kreigsmarine to finalize several incomplete hulls as basic carriers as a result, and the relative effectiveness of employing them together on the one occasion it occurred, indicates the unrealized potential of that arm had more carriers been available earlier.

While most historians and analysts believe that it would have been unlikely for Germany to ultimately succeed in effectively targeting the British maritime trade. It is often now conjectured that multiple carriers correctly employed in support of existing surface assets in the Atlantic (particularly if in conjunction with the possible variations of Plan I, the occupation of Iceland and the Faroes), the potential existed for the Battle for the Atlantic to have been far more costly and to last longer while making far greater demands upon the RN resources than actually occurred. Even maintenance of a significant force in being in Norway would have required matching forces being retained in the home waters in Britain. Had this occurred it would have denied Britain much of the strategic freedom to release many of its major assets to other theatres as occurred from 1942 onward. Without such a buildup it is highly possibly that events in the Mediterranean and opening phases of the Pacific campaign could have developed far less favorably for the Allies than was to actually occur.

The eventual ineffectiveness of the Kreigsmarine employment in WW2 can be directly attributed to decisions made by Adolf Hitler in the lead up to War. This would highlight the failure of the Kreigsmarine to have an effective force structure for the struggle it faced, particularly carriers and submarines, that would have forced the RN and Britain to prioritize operations in home waters to a far greater degree, and ultimately achieve a greater strategic impact than that which resulted. This assessment applies to the MFK as a component part of the Kreigsmarine and is a reflection of this fundamental fact. While well-equipped and trained, the ultimate weakness of the Kreigsmarine lay in the system that developed it, and its failure to develop the force levels necessary to successfully prosecute effective naval operations against the greater capabilities of Great Britain and the Allies.

1. Ordered as Flugzeugträger A, and launched December 1938 Graf Zeppelin was incomplete in April 1940, when work on her was suspended. In May 1942, with Hitler's authorization, work resumed on the carrier. By late January 1943 Hitler had become so disenchanted with the poor performance of the Kriegsmarine surface fleet, he ordered its larger ships taken out of service and scrapped. Construction on the carrier ended in February 1943 and Graf Zeppelin languished for the next two years in various Baltic ports before being scuttled off Stettin in April 1945 ahead of the advancing Red Army.
2. IRL the sister ship was laid down as Flugzeugträger B in 1938 but work was halted on 19 September 1939 with the outbreak of hostilities. Priority now shifted to U-boat construction and the partially completed hull, still unnamed, sat rusting on its slipway until February 1940, when it was broken up and scrapped.
3. This is based on the IRL Bomber Command attacks on the battleship Tirpitz anchored in Faettenfjord on successive nights 27/28 April 1942. Due to bad weather and navigation issues the majority of the bombers were unable to locate the target and the Tirpitz escaped unscathed for the loss of seven bombers.
4. This is an amalgam of the two Kreigsmarine vessels IRL. The first Lützow was the 5th and final Admiral Hipper class heavy cruiser. was never completed. Launched in July 1939, the vessel was still incomplete when sold to the Soviet Union in April 1940. About 80% complete when towed to Leningrad where it was renamed Petropavlovsk in September 1940. Still unfinished when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the ship was sunk in April 1942, and later raised in September, before being eventually broken up for scrap sometime between 1953 and 1961. With the name available the 1st Panzerschiffe Deutschland was renamed Lutzow at Hitlers direction in 1940 and narrative events reflect incidents in its career. It was torpedoed and severely damaged by HMS Spearfish in April 1940, damaged twice by air attack, and in April 1945, RAF Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs successfully hit the ship moored in the Kaiserfahrt canal, Swinemünde. Hit or near missed the ship was so so damaged it was only prevented from capsizing by her superstructure hitting the shore. The wreck was later broken up during the 1940s.
5. The IRL Seydlitz was the 4th Admiral Hipper Class cruiser launched in January 1939. The outbreak of World War II slowed her construction and fitting-out work and by the time work stopped completely in June 1942, the ship was approximately 95 percent complete with only her anti-aircraft armament, masts, cranes, and aircraft catapult left to be installed. At this point the Kriegsmarine decided to pursue aircraft carriers over surface combatants and the Seydlitz despite its advanced state was chosen for conversion. Renamed Weser, the converted ship was to have had a complement of at least twenty aircraft. The majority of the superstructure was cut away, with the exception of the funnel, to prepare for the installation of a flight deck and an aircraft hangar. In total, some 2,400 tons of material was removed before conversion work ceased in June 1943. The incomplete, hull was seized by the Soviets in 1945 and later broken up for scrap. The conversion design as presented in part Nine of this thread is largely as IRL, but with minor modification ITTL. The tall tubular mast on the forward end of the island is shortened and relocated to take radar installation and the 4.1-in mounts reduced by one.
6. During the night of 8 April 1940, Triton encountered the German cruisers Blücher and Lützow but inexplicable missed with a full salvo of ten torpedoes fired at close range.

Marineflieger Kommando: MFK - Hitlers Fleet Air Arm

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