Marineflieger Kommando: MFK - Hitlers Fleet Air Arm

[Tangles2]

Here's another AH Naval Thread for your consideration, Comment, and hopefully enjoyment.

Part One.

Extract: - The Politics of Rearmaent: The Development of German War Fighting Capabilities During the Interwar Period. Prof. Steve Corus, University of Illinois Press 1987.

Occurring concurrently was the simultaneous and rapid build-up of the German Army and Air Force which demanded substantial effort and resources. That the army had higher priority for high tensile steel armor plate for tanks helped limit building plans for the expansion Raeder hoped for under the Nazi’s. That the Luftwaffe had a near-complete monopoly on all German military aviation, including naval aviation, was a source of great interservice rivalry with the Kriegsmarine as well as limiting the scope of naval aviation.

That any form of nascent naval air arm was able to avoid being quickly absorbed by Hermann Göring's newly established Luftwaffe, simply came down to Hitler in his role as absolute head of state and the armed forces. As he controlled the German Navy absolutely despite being a man with little or no knowledge of sea power, he was simply able to decree that a naval aviation force (Marineflieger Kommando - MFK) be formed separate from the Luftwaffe to provide units intended to serve aboard the future aircraft carriers and capital ships and provided the Kriegsmarine with some airpower from bases on land. Hitler had closely followed the developments in the RN/RAF conflict in the UK during 1931-33 and had been struck by the similarities between that and the evolving Interarms tensions developing in the German military. The basis for this autocratic decree was his own desire for an aircraft carrier to be laid down as a further symbol of growing German might, rather than any real recognition of the merits of a carrier-based aviation component for the navy.

Numerous historians have speculated the specific reasons for this autocratic decision, and it is commonly considered that without this, that it is highly probable that the progress on the Graf Zeppelin would possibly not have proceeded, in much the same manner as the non-conversion of HMS Tiger whilst the RAF had still controlled aviation matters in the UK. With a lack of suitable aircraft, coupled with the reluctance of the Luftwaffe to support the Kriegsmarine in the carrier's construction, it is probable that at best, work would have been delayed until well after hostilities commenced in WW2. That this arrangement came to be a success can largely be attributed to the initial officer appointed to occupy the post of the new arm, Generalmajor (Luftwaffe rank) and later Konteradmiral Walther Wever.

Marinefliegerkommando (MFK) 1933-39

The appointment of the undoubtedly capable and unusually suited Wever to this role by Hitler decree, quite literally arose from an accident in history. Wever had served as a respected and highly capable staff officer for the OHL, Army High Command, during WW1, and postwar had played a key role in the evolution of the new air force to the point where he was appointed as the nascent arms Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. His role in the initial molding of the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine and strategic plans, and establishing links with the technical and industrial contacts, was pivotal during the formation of the Luftwaffe as part of German rearmament plans. This ensured his familiarity with virtually all the key players both industrial and within the services during this period, when he was severely injured in an air crash in 1933.

On 3 May 1933 Wever flew from Berlin to Rostock to discuss design issues of new Heinkel aircraft in person with the company’s founder Ernst Heinkel at the company’s Rostock headquarters. On his return journey the Heinkel He 70 Blitz aircraft that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks. Unaware that aileron gust locks had been fitted after landing and not removed by the Heinkel field groundcrews he took off. The aircraft was barely airborne when these caused the wing to dip, and the Heinkel stalled and crashed from a low altitude. Though failing to explode, the crash killed his flight engineer and severely injured Wever who was trapped in the wreckage for some time. Fortunate to survive and rendered unfit for flying duties, this chance occurrence resulted in his availability to guide the early development of the new arm. (1)

Widely recognized as an unusually capable and intellectual staff officer, Wever had been one of the early air power theorists behind doctrinal development for the Luftwaffe at this time, particularly as a proponent for strategic bombing. Beyond these acknowledged attributes and little recognized at this time, was that his greatest skill was his ability to handle people. He remained friends to many key personalities in the evolving and intensely competitive Reich arms industry and was not only known and respected, but also proved skillfully able to balance many of the key competing factions and personalities of German Rearmament. This would later lead to him being later widely acknowledged as the father of German naval aviation.

1. IRL on 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden to give a lecture. On his return journey as detailed the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that he was piloting had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and the aileron gust locks had not been removed. The aircraft took off, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartwheel, crashed and exploded, killing Wever and removing one of the more visionary and capable Luftwaffe leaders of the period. A key supporter of the strategic bombing concept his untimely death left the Luftwaffe lacking clear planning direction. Though not subordinated to the army support role, the use of air power in support of ground forces came to dominate for tactical and operational missions and aircraft designs after his death. Many historians regard his death and the subsequent failure to develop some form of strategic bombing capability as a key Luftwaffe weakness during WW2.​

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The Sea Lion has wings begins.

 

[Tangles2]

Part Two

Raeder, initially strongly opposed the transfer and appointment, would only with reluctance acquiesce to what he considered the intrusion into navy matters. He would later grudgingly come to acknowledge the application and dedication Wever demonstrated to the new arm. Goering, though limiting the strength of the new arm to 300 aircraft, still considered Wever as essentially a Luftwaffe officer which helped minimize obstructionism between the two services. Despite his removal from the Luftwaffe, through his contacts and friendship with key figures such as Kesselring, Udet and Jesschonneck, he continued to maintain close association and involvement with aviation developments. This association, combined with support from industry figures such as Heinkel, who still felt guilty due to his role in his injury, would be vital in the development and introduction of new aircraft specifically for the new arm.

Initially, with two badly broken ankles and deemed unfit for further flying duties, Wever would use his extended recovery period to read voraciously and familiarize himself with warfare at sea and naval aviation, particularly those of the rapidly evolving RN and RNN. With the appointment and able support of Kommodore Hermann Boehme as deputy, he was responsible for much of its rapid capability development up to WW2. Beyond the initial priority of facilitating the new aircraft carrier under construction, he developed the new arms doctrine emphasizing the employment of aircraft to attack shipping. He promoted specific skill training in this role and other naval specific abilities such as overwater navigation and conducting flying operations in all types of weather, as well as arranging for men to be sent to Japan to study carrier tactics and examine aircraft types suitable to attack shipping. Goering’s insistence that the number of operational aircraft does not exceed 300 was largely to limit naval aviation eating into aircraft production for the expanding Luftwaffe. Within that cap Wever was to have a surprising degree of latitude in developing that force structure, so that by the outbreak of war in addition to actual aircraft deployed on ships the new MFK included a significant land-based component. There would remain a great degree of interoperability between the two arms, with as the war developed a number of Luftwaffe airwings being employed in anti-shipping roles and undergoing MFK training and virtually indistinguishable from those of the MFK.

The MFK initially operated Catapult-launched spotter planes, reconnaissance aircraft, torpedo bombers, and air-sea rescue seaplanes as land-based components supporting Kriegsmarine operations. Most of these were largely Luftwaffe developed designs.

Wever was however the instigator of several key developments for the new arm. Upon assumption of his new role, immediately after Raeder’s approval of plans for the new fleet carrier, he was to push for provision of a training carrier for aircrew and aviation personnel. Jokingly referred to as his second job, it became identified in the nascent MFK as Project J2 for this reason and led to the acquisition and conversion of the 10,000-ton Banana Boat Hansel for this role. Conversion was completed in 1934 producing a diesel-powered unarmored hull, fitted with a wooden flight deck, two elevators and a catapult. Initially completed unarmed, it represented the Kreigmarine’s first true aircraft carrier. Essentially an unarmed training platform as completed, though fitted with arresting gear, catapult, elevators and hanger, it was used purely for training. Providing deck qualification and aircrew training, the fuel and munitions storage were miniscule, the bare minimum required for training purposes. The carrier would subsequently undergo two refits in 1938 and again in 1943, to address weaknesses and increase its utility, it would eventually be employed for limited operational tasking in the Baltic after 1944.

Not actually commissioned into the Kreigsmarine until 1935 after the signing of the Anglo-German naval treaty, it would be named Oswald Boelcke after the famous WW1 fighter ace and commander of Jasta 2, due to the MFK project number. It would play a continuous and vital role training aviation personnel throughout its service, and eventually survive WW2. Later fitted with a light anti-aircraft armament and able to carry up to 22 aircraft it was similar to small training carriers being developed by other navies at this time. Its basic nature, and limited air group restricted its employment to Baltic waters. It would become active in providing support to Eastern Front operations in the Baltic from 1944 onward, before being one of the remaining Kreigsmarine vessels evacuating civilians to ‘voluntarily transfer’ to the Finnish Navy prior to VE day in 1945.

DKM Oswald Boelcke - CVT/CVE - November 1943
4 x 4.1-inch (105mm), (2x2)8 x 37mm (4x2), 20 x 20mm (5x4), 22 Aircraft,9,800 tons 18 knots.​

​

Oswald Boelcke as employed in the Baltic1944-45. Completed unarmed to provide training for the MFK, it would be fitted with AA armament during WW2. Used operationally in the Baltic with Fw190 & Ju187s, by late 1945 its tole was largely as a 'fighter farm' with an all Fw190M air group to provide localized aircover for Kreigsmarine movements.​

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Jokingly referred to as his second job, it became identified in the nascent MFK as Project J2 for this reason and led to the acquisition and conversion of the 10,000-ton Banana Boat Hansel for this role.

That is going to make the RN sit up and take notice. They've long wanted Trade Protection Carriers and this provides a template for them. The Admiralty will also assume that in time of war this supposed Training Carrier will be used as a commerce raider.

 

[Tangles2]

Note above is the final state, in 1934 it's just a banana boat hull with a wooden deck and won't actually be named or commissioned until the 1935 treaty is signed. At this stage also the RNN is getting it's Hawkins class CVL reconstructed, watched closely by the RN, who plan to do this to their own Hawkins in due course. At this time the IJN Hosho is perhaps the nearest analog or the Langley, though both are probably nearer a true carrier in terms of their capabilities. In reality at this stage its analog in terms of intent is the USN Wolverine and Sable employed as training platforms on the Great Lakes early in WW2. At this stage Wever is very much the outsider transferred to the Kreigsmarine. He's not going to make waves by pushing for new ships, but however he is able to push this successfully as a trainer and its role to develop capability without impacting on the competitive resource battle ongoing between the services. TWikki link USS Wolverine.

 

[Astrodragon]

so what AREN'T the Germans building instead of this?

 

[Garrison]

Note above is the final state, in 1934 it's just a banana boat hull with a wooden deck and won't actually be named or commissioned until the 1935 treaty is signed. At this stage also the RNN is getting it's Hawkins class CVL reconstructed, watched closely by the RN, who plan to do this to their own Hawkins in due course. At this time the IJN Hosho is perhaps the nearest analog or the Langley, though both are probably nearer a true carrier in terms of their capabilities. In reality at this stage its analog in terms of intent is the USN Wolverine and Sable employed as training platforms on the Great Lakes early in WW2. At this stage Wever is very much the outsider transferred to the Kreigsmarine. He's not going to make waves by pushing for new ships, but however he is able to push this successfully as a trainer and its role to develop capability without impacting on the competitive resource battle ongoing between the services. TWikki link USS Wolverine.

You do understand that Wolverine was something built to support an existing infrastructure of carriers and was produced by a nation that had an abundance of resources? A Kriegsmarine carrier force is just shuffling the deckchairs on the Titanic, it is not going to affect the war, except possibly making the performance of the Kriegsmarine even worse than OTL.

 

[Tangles2]

You do understand that Wolverine was something built to support an existing infrastructure of carriers and was produced by a nation that had an abundance of resources? A Kriegsmarine carrier force is just shuffling the deckchairs on the Titanic, it is not going to affect the war, except possibly making the performance of the Kriegsmarine even worse than OTL.

Remember its a different timeline, and here Wever is a Luftwaffe officer shuffled into the hot seat by Hitler. Hitler at this time is in the midst of a massive rearmament program, and all three services are in competition for resources. Hitlers real interest, with no real understanding of naval strategy, is that large new capital ships representing large and visible icons of German rearmament. The Graf Zeppelin tentatively will represent one of these icons, without Hitler really conceptualizing a role or working to ensure its effective employment. Look at his treatment and rage at the loss of the Bismarck IRL.

Put in a situation where he is in charge of developing a new arm and unsure if he will ever have the resources or chance to make it a workable institution, this step is logical IMO. Facing constraints the future of the Graf Zeppelin itself is contingent on getting approval and sufficient resources for completion, with both the Luftwaffe and Herr in contention for those same scarce resources. The solution here that Wever is using a commercial hull which neither of the other arms is obstructionist about, as it does not impugn on their own expansion agenda. Wever as an outsider is also not seen to be intruding on the Kreigmarines' own construction agenda, not interfering if you will.

What he is however doing is laying the foundation to provide a training base for advancing the skills of an employable arm in the future. That the viability of a carrier arm is debatable yes, but also the MFK represents the opportunity to develop aviation capability that is answerable to its own operational needs. The majority of its assets ITTL are land-based Luftwaffe designs, operating from land basses frequently shared with Luftwaffe facility's. It is part of an incremental process that is to not only facilitate a carrier arm (should it eventuate) but also to ensure that it is developing a Kreigsmarine aviation branch answerable to it and its specific service needs, not one wholly reliant on the whims and availability of Luftwaffe support. T

 

[Garrison]

Remember its a different timeline, and here Wever is a Luftwaffe officer shuffled into the hot seat by Hitler. Hitler at this time is in the midst of a massive rearmament program, and all three services are in competition for resources. Hitlers real interest, with no real understanding of naval strategy, is that large new capital ships representing large and visible icons of German rearmament. The Graf Zeppelin tentatively will represent one of these icons, without Hitler really conceptualizing a role or working to ensure its effective employment. Look at his treatment and rage at the loss of the Bismarck IRL.

Unless its a timeline where you've magically fixed the German economy the question is as @Astrodragon posed, what are they giving up to build carriers? In 1934 the Kriegsmarine is in its infancy and the Reich is all but broke, what programs are being cancelled so money can be spent on this training carrier?

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Unless its a timeline where you've magically fixed the German economy the question is as @Astrodragon posed, what are they giving up to build carriers? In 1934 the Kriegsmarine is in its infancy and the Reich is all but broke, what programs are being cancelled so money can be spent on this training carrier?

Germany could do without some of the Strength Through Joy cruise and sail training ships.

Strength Through Joy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Garrison]

Germany could do without some of the Strength Through Joy cruise and sail training ships.

Strength Through Joy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Well since the former wasn't funded via the Kriegsmarine I imagine any money saved would still be spent on propaganda activities, assuming it didn't turn into just anothet way to syphon money into party funds. As for the latter pretty much every navy had those during the period.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Well since the former wasn't funded via the Kriegsmarine I imagine any money saved would still be spent on propaganda activities, assuming it didn't turn into just anothet way to syphon money into party funds. As for the latter pretty much every navy had those during the period.

I was thinking more of the yard space, workers and of course the needed materials to build them rather than cash and the Nazi's could find that if they wished. As they said at the time Guns Before Butter.

 

[Garrison]

I was thinking more of the yard space, workers and of course the needed materials to build them rather than cash and the Nazi's could find that if they wished. As they said at the time Guns Before Butter.

But since they had neither the question remains and neither of these items would come remotely close to funding a carrier program, certainly not in 1934.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Germany could do without some of the Strength Through Joy cruise and sail training ships.

Strength Through Joy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hope not - the troopship that brought my old man back from Korea was a former Nazi cruise ship (IIRC the Orantes).

 

[CaptainCalvert]

Unless its a timeline where you've magically fixed the German economy the question is as @Astrodragon posed, what are they giving up to build carriers? In 1934 the Kriegsmarine is in its infancy and the Reich is all but broke, what programs are being cancelled so money can be spent on this training carrier?

Money was seriously short. In mid1934, shortly before the Night of the Long Knives, supplementary funding for the Luftwaffe [1] was being collected by nazi supporters at public events.
This was not quite under duress, but there was considerable pressure to be seen to contribute, people who didn't contribute were at high risk of being noticed. After the Night of the Long Knives, failure to contribute would have been even riskier.
And this at a time when the Luftwaffe was the glowing poster-boy of rearmament.

[1] officially, anyway. Some might well have ended up in already fat pockets and secret bank accounts

 

[Astrodragon]

I was thinking more of the yard space, workers and of course the needed materials to build them rather than cash and the Nazi's could find that if they wished. As they said at the time Guns Before Butter.

It's well known that Unicorns are expert shipbuilders...

 

[Tangles2]

Between the war Government funding.
The Reichsbank basically funded the rearmament program, in effect using MEFO bills to write cheques that it never intended to cash, massively subsidizing state industries. The us of the MEFO scam is well documented and I could use variations of this to notionally fund the purchase of an existing hull such as the hypothetical Hansel. Less well known where the preceding OFFA bills used by the Weimar Republic to fund works development and public employment schemes. Never as rampant in its scam it nevertheless helped fund things like the post-WW1 replacement of shipping for firms like DDG Hansa and Hamburg Amerika, mainly to keep employment in ports like Hamburg. There are numerous options in the early 1920s I looked at but none quite fit so I raised a 'Notional' example to be acquired through a MEFO arrangement, but if you start looking there is an array of options. Norddeutscher_Lloyd had half a dozen 9-10,000 GRT ships constructed 1920-22, partially funded by Weimar OFFA bills of which several where later hired/sold under the 'Strength through Joy' party mechanism for various reason, including rorts of the international and US bond trade. Or I could have used the 1922 Munchen (later General Stueben) which caught fire and sunk in New York 1930. Salvaged and repaired in Germany, I could have used a MEFO rationale to acquire her, but at over 14,000 GRT I felt it too large. So, as you can see there are a wide range of options in the AU to subsidize a merchant acquisition using the various mechanism in place in the Reich, all fiscally irregular, but also all part of the generic massive rearmament of Germany. If you have some input, I would be quite happy to massage details or listen to suggestions. But it is this fervid and unsound financial wheeling and dealing that you would be looking to fund a very, very, basic CVT platform. Just depends how deep and how fancey the house of cards you want to build in the scenario. T

 

[Tangles2]

Well since the former wasn't funded via the Kriegsmarine I imagine any money saved would still be spent on propaganda activities, assuming it didn't turn into just anothet way to syphon money into party funds. As for the latter pretty much every navy had those during the period.

Note also the Strength through Joy (KdF) funding was a through party auspices (i.e. MEFO Funded), but it also includes hiring of at least half a dozen vessels, all of this basically funded by the Reichsbank MEFO bills. Secondly it was a system of state sponsored money market fraud, and manipulation of the international exchange system, which provided Germany an arbitrage opportunity allowing them to fund their rearmament program. Although German exchange resources had been depleted during the great depression, the German government was not short enough on foreign exchange to completely stop paying bond coupon payments. Instead using foreign exchange to fund activities abroad. As an arbitrage opportunity, in defaulting on their debt, they would subsequently decrease the value of the debt and repurchase the bonds with the "allegedly nonexistent foreign exchange at a fraction of their face value". There's a whole raft of information on variations but its noticeable that several vessels acquired by KdF where then to sold to foreign shipping firms, enabling that valid foreign exchange to be offset against rearmament costs. So it wasn't just for construction that the KdF was linked to the rearmament scam. T

 

[Tangles2]

so what AREN'T the Germans building instead of this?

Unless its a timeline where you've magically fixed the German economy the question is as @Astrodragon posed, what are they giving up to build carriers? In 1934 the Kriegsmarine is in its infancy and the Reich is all but broke, what programs are being cancelled so money can be spent on this training carrier?

OK' Here's a brief and very broad-brush outline of the Interwar German ships for critique, (or house of cards to be knocked down if you want). Believe it or not do welcome all these destructive, pernicious and soul-destroying comments (Sob ), to polish my attempts. (Pain is weakness leaving the narrative, yeah! )

Firstly, ITTL during WW1 there was no attempt to reactivate the German pre-dreadnaughts immediately on the commencement of WW! (See my AH: An alternate Jutland thread, Alternate Battle of Jutland 1916 - The Battle of the Battlecruisers. Unlike IOTL, effectively are no pre-dreadnaughts to retain to counter the Soviet DN Baltic threat. Britain, by 1920 maintaining a sizeable and unpopular RN presence there, (20+ vessels including carrier and cruisers), indicated a preference to let Germany retain the three Derfflinger class battlecruisers as sufficient counter to the Russian threat, but representing no meaningful risk to its own naval dominance, countered by the French possible interest in acquiring one of the Derfflinger-class of the interned High Seas Fleet as part of its reparations. All is rendered irrelevant by the scuttling of the interned High Seas Fleet in Scapa Flow in June 1919.

A treaty addendum to allow the rigorously supervised construction of the two new capital vessels proceeds instead. With two available incomplete Derfflinger hulls halted post Jutland in 1917, the original design is altered to 6 x 13.75-inch guns in three twin turrets, to counter the Soviet Dreadnaughts. (Some 16 of these guns had been made for the unbuilt Mackensen ships and while three of these had been used as railguns on the Western Front, thirteen units remained available for incorporation in the new vessels). This gave the new ships sufficient strength to engage the existing soviet threat, whilst being inferior to the British RN. Keen to have some representation of national pride (and provide badly needed postwar employment in German shipyards) the Weimar republic (using OFFA bills funding) completed vessels (subsequently the Mackensen class), which are the sole major vessels of the Weimar Navy after their construction 1920-22.

So instead of the pre-dreadnaughts of IOTL these two represent a radical departure from OTL because of the changed 1916 events. and are simply products of my fervid imagination of the flow on from this change and for narrative inclusion and a basis for any developing ambition for later expansion. Thats an original baseline change that has no IRL equivalent.

OK, those two represent the Blue-Sky additions, or simply the replacement for the six (Versailles notional) pre-dreadnaughts of IOTL if you want to look at it that way. Next comes the broadest of broad-brush adjustment of which I'm sure you'll have fun with. IOTL there are 14 hulls laid down or commencing construction for Germany, 3 x Deutschland PBs, 5 x Hipper CAs, 2 x Scharnhorst BBs, 2 x Bismarck BB's and lastly 2 x Graf Z CVs. Of these only 10 reach commissioning, with the others stopped at various levels of completion (Seydlitz 95%, GZ 85%, Lutzow, 80%, and CS <40%).

In the AU tendered by me what will eventually occur will be a construction program of 14 hulls all up(same number different makeup) of which construction will have been stopped 1938 when OKM loses out in the resource tussle, on 3 at the time of hostilities (Seydlitz 95%, Lutzow and CS 80%) which will remain moribund until Operation Rheinubung. With Raeder navy head the construction of the PBs stops at two, Deutschland, Graf Spee when revealed the French Richelieu class can run these down. What follow is a six ship P/D class analog is laid down, a rough plan is shown below.

This is my tentative view of the concept, clearly classed CA it retains the PB main armament, has 4.1-inch secondary, very thin belt, (>4-inch) and high speed to outrun the newer French designs. Though notionally six are approved by the Weimar, the arrival of Hitler and Nazi rearmament plans impact these intents. The first three, Admirals S, H and Blucher) are all completed, roughly parallel to the IRL timeframe. Hitler's intervention results in ships four and five being taken in hand and completed as the Scharnhorst class BB's, utilizing the turrets of ship six. Ship six (Lutzow) is moribund and remains on the stocks about 80% done till 1941. With resource restrictions and the impact of the Anglo-German naval treaty, Raeder pushes to get two 8-inch CAs PE and Seydlitz constructed as lower resource, shorter time frame projects to supplement the changes, with only PE being eventually commissioned, and Seydlitz work halted at 95% as IRL, when the 1938 work priorities kick in. S & G go ahead as IRL as does the GZ though slowly, with it commissioned 1940, The sister ship named Werner Voss (not CS) ITTL, is stopped 1938, same as Seydlitz and Lutzow, at about the 85% level (same point as the IRL GZ was). So, you have three advanced but incomplete hulls on the stocks at the start of WW2. Bismarck is at the same stage as IRL and by late 1939 Tirpitz is commencing fitting out. That's the broadest of broad brush for you all to poke holes in and laugh about, and more detail and context to follow.

This all needs to be taken in regard to the MFK role as being presented, and Hitler's leadership style. Hitler ruled the Nazi Party autocratically by asserting the Führerprinzip (leader principle), calling on absolute obedience of all subordinates to their superiors, even for a trusted deputy like Goring. He viewed the Nazi state as a pyramid, with himself—the infallible leader—at the apex. His leadership style was to place subordinates into contending positions where their duties and responsibilities overlapped and often clashed, resulting in his being the final arbiter for decisions. In this way, Hitler fostered distrust, competition, and infighting among his subordinates to consolidate and maximize his own power. The formation of the MFK can be recognized in this context as a continuation of this principle with regard to the expanding armed forces. By creating a body that is both separate from, and in competition with both the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe, he introduced another point where he could have direct input and ultimately the final word if required, in the growth of military power and resources under his control. It is in this context that Raeder presented his Plan Z in 1938, not expecting it to be realized, but having prepared several positional stances to use as bargaining points with the other services, such as 'sacrificing' BBs to 'allow' increased steel for the Heer or increasing aviation influence on the Luftwaffe for a second carrier. Several contingencies were in hand to adopt, such as increased SS numbers amongst others. With four BB's (Macksen, Yorck, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau) he had option to form BGs to attack the north Atlantic trade of the UK using carrier support to break out and other plans, when Hitler presents the worst of all options. Preoccupied with the Symbolism of Rearmament, he forces the Kreigsmarine to proceed with the Bismarck duo, (the motivation for this is largely the iconic value they represent domestically rather than military utility) denying the flexibility to change this priority to horse trade with other arms and freezing the three hulls on the stocks as a result. The flow Ons are crucial to subsequent Kreigsmarine events of WW2.

So, there you have it a wordy precis on several chapters basically trying to say 'same number of ships, different build, and several stalled on the blocks when war erupts). I hope you laugh and enjoy it like one of those wild movie adaptations which they like to label as 'Based on true events.!' I'll chuck the next portion of the MFK up now for your further elucidation! Look forward to the comeback and enjoy or offer your own kinky what if warship designs. T

 

[Tangles2]

Part Three

The other significant impact that Wever would have would be on aircraft types introduced into service for the MFK. While the majority of Luftwaffe airframes would be largely suitable for land-based wings, those specifically intended for carrier operations required suitable modification to undertake this role.

In early May 1934, the Me109 had won selection as the new Luftwaffe single-seat monoplane fighter. Despite significant pressure from Goering for a navalized version to be also adopted for the MFK, Wever successfully contested this move. Despite its undoubted edge in performance, he believed it was nevertheless fundamentally unsuited for employment in the carrier role, largely due to its very short range and fragile narrow track undercarriage. The losing alternative, the Heinkel He112 with a less powerful engine could not match the Me109 performance, but had greater range and more robust undercarriage, areas that most concerned Wever. Concurrently to this Heinkel was also developing a new high-performance fighter, the HE-100, to outperform the Me109, which initially showed great promise. Despite its potential it was to be hampered by a failure-prone cooling system, and complex fuselage and wing structure that slowed production. Wever, to a degree playing on the guilt still felt regarding his injury, approached Heinkel seeking development of a simplified naval fighter combining elements of both aircraft. The result would be the He113 ‘Dolphin’ that would become the first dedicated carrier fighter design specifically for the MFK. (2)

By basically combining the fuselage of one with the more powerful engine and a much-simplified folding wing form of the other, the new airframe proved to be a robust and improved union over the previous pair. With Ernst Heinkel’s support for Wever’s insistence on a far simpler and less complex product, avoided much of the complexity and reliability issues that plagued earlier designs. Reverting to a larger external radiator reduced speed by about 20kmh but solved the cooling problems of the more powerful engine and the larger wing also increased fuel capacity which gave the new aircraft a range of 1200 km on internal fuel. Fitted with external drop tanks this rose to 1600km, unprecedented for a single seat fighter at this time, and ideal for the long-range maritime role the MFK envisioned. Fitted with four 20mm cannon and arrestor gear for carrier operations it proved heavier and slower than the Me109, and did not match its agility and acrobatic capabilities. Nevertheless, it was in all other aspects far better suited for maritime employment and entered production as the new single seat fleet fighter for the Kreigsmarine. Operationally in WW2, it would prove to be approximately the equal of the Hurricane and Goshawk in performance during the opening stages of the war and, though unable to match the maneuverability of the Dragonfly and Spitfire, it was found capable of out-diving both in combat. In terms of production its numbers were limited, with approximately 290 serving in the MFK. But for the opening 18 months of the conflict, it was the sole axis single seat fighter capable of very long-range operations and in this role, it was to play a vital role in operations against Britain.

The second aircraft where Wever’s involvement in development was important, was the new maritime dive-bomber selection. With Wever’s injury the Luftwaffe strategic focus had switched to tactical employment to support ground operations, emphasizing the employment of new types like the Ju87 Stuka in this role. Wever’s departure and the Luftwaffe failure to progress towards a strategic bombing force had seen Ernst Udet in particular champion the development of the short-range Stuka. While privately unhappy at this change in direction Wever had remained silent in his opposition on the understanding that Udet would support development of a navalized version for the MFK. The existing Ju87 airframe with its short range and fixed undercarriage was unsuitable for carrier employment. The MFK would require it to act as a scouting aircraft in addition to any anti-shipping missions it would undertake. Changes would include folding wings, arrestor hook, retractable undercarriage and more powerful engine. Initially deemed the Ju87M (Maritime) version, such was the degree of change that it was designated as a totally new type, the Ju187. (3) Intended for patrol and anti-shipping missions the Ju187 airframe had an additional oil tank and increased fuel capacity and plumbed outer wing stations to carry two 300-liter under-wing drop tanks, greatly increasing its range. While retaining the distinctive ‘gull’ wing of the earlier design great attention was paid to clean up the aerodynamics and reduce drag, including a retractable undercarriage and narrower wing form. While retaining a crew of two, changes included deletion of the forward firing machine guns and siren and fitting with a more powerful engine, folding wings and tailhook. During this process Wever would face a constant struggle opposing superfluous alterations and design changes, many he considered both ridiculous or wildly impracticable, such as a rotating tail fin, to achieve the desired aim of the MFK. The final production model would prove to be capable of nearly 500kmh (80kmh faster than the Ju87). Over 500 would eventually be produced in various versions for the MFK and nearly triple that number for the Luftwaffe, is an indication of the improved design. While proving considerably less vulnerable than its predecessor, eventual operational experience would prove that despite improved performance dive bombers remained very vulnerable to determined fighter opposition, requiring their own fighter support to operate when opposed. Regardless, the adoption and employment of the Ju187 formed the second carrier specific system operated by the MFK and a primary offensive weapon during the opening phases of WW2.

Unfortunately, despite his success in these two instances, Wever would fail in developing any alternate to the existing MFK torpedo bomber, the Fiesler 167. This outdated biplane design, roughly analogous to its British contemporary the Fairey Swordfish, was already obsolete when it entered service. Used in service with the MFK in very limited numbers due to the lack of any viable alternative, it was named the Goose by MFK pilots and never undertake any operational carrier deployment. After the loss of the Graf Zeppelin, a torpedo carrying variant of the single-seat Fw190 fighter would eventually be developed as an alternative, and deployed in small numbers to replace the Fi167 Goose operationally. It would not be until late 1944, with the advent of the Fw290, that the MFK would get a specialized modern carrier capable torpedo bomber. By that time realistic employment options for the type had disappeared and eventually fewer than 40 of the type would be produced and serve with the MFK, despite its otherwise excellent design and performance.

Though less directly involved Wever would impact on one final significant aircraft design that would become operational and be employed by the MFK early in WW2. Previously while still in the Luftwaffe, Wever had initiated the strategic so-called "Ural bomber" program to develop long-range strategic aircraft to strike deep into the Soviet Union. With his injury and transfer, emphasis on strategic aerial operations lapsed as a Luftwaffe priority in favor of more tactical aspects of airpower. There remained however as a legacy of this project several large four engine prototypes. One of these the Ju90, although underpowered, had evolved into a 40-seat civilian airliner design, which entered limited production and was being operated by Lufthansa.

It had early been established that the MFK needed a long-range aircraft to act as a maritime reconnaissance/patrol platform. With his its strength cap limiting numbers, Wever was aware only a limited number of options would be available to the MFK for this role. Pragmatically Wever linked this MFK requirement to provision of a larger long-range military transport for the Luftwaffe. By linking its employment to the role of the Fallschirmjager, the Luftwaffe parachute forces, (a favored project of Goering,) it served to make development of this capability attractive despite the otherwise general lack of enthusiasm for such airframes. With this approach Wever succeeded in getting Goering’s support to produce an improved Ju90 version as a joint project, later designated as the Ju190 and named the ‘Albatross’. (4)

His friendship with his Luftwaffe successor Albert Kesselring enabled him to have considerable input into the final design for the joint project. While the Luftwaffe troop transport version would account for over 80% of the nearly 800 Ju190 airframes eventually produced, its actual final structure was to a large degree shaped by parameters Wever laid out for the maritime version. The fuselage remained essentially unchanged from the Ju90, capable of carrying 38 fully equipped Fallschirmjager (compared to 17 in the existing Ju52), though the windows were replaced by 8 small portholes a side. The major change was a much cleaner aerodynamic wing form. Not only of greater span (19%) and area (11%), but it nearly doubled the fuel capacity. The landing gear was strengthened, and the vertical tail fins enlarged. Fitted with much more powerful 1,200 kW (1,600 hp) radials, the result was an astonishing improvement in performance, at the cost of a comparatively limited bombing capability and defensive armament.

The suffix letter "M" was affixed to the maritime version which would be initially be plumbed to accepted two of the standard Luftwaffe 300L drop tanks outboard of the engines if required. When clean this gave the initial M version an unprecedent range at that time of over 5000km, which along with a maximum speed of 500kmh and operational ceiling of 6000m, far superior to existing contemporaries and ideal for its intended maritime patrol role. This was achieved by limiting the defensive armament and crew size to five and restricting the bombing requirement in the anti-shipping role. Though still vulnerable as allied air defense of convoys improved during the war, its higher performance made it far more difficult to intercept than its Luftwaffe counterpart the Fw200 Condor. Late versions would be fitted with the Hohentwiel radar, successfully used to locate Allied convoys at ranges of up to 80km from altitude, allowing the Ju190 to track convoys while remaining out of range of anti-aircraft fire and relying on its performance to avoid successful air intercept. Final versions of the Ju190 would also later be fitted with two 2000L auxiliary underwing fuel tanks located between the inner and outer engines, providing an astonishing 22 hours plus endurance. In all nearly 160 Ju190M would be operated by the MFK well into 1944, with its more powerful Luftwaffe successors the Ju290 and 390, being introduced into the MFK to replace it from late 1942 onward. Its initial development and prioritizing the range and performance at its inception, and commonality with Luftwaffe transport versions boosted production numbers, and gave the MFK a significant weapon during the battle of the Atlantic.

The He113 Dolphin was the MFK primary fighter aircraft from 1937 onward displaying its distinctive radiator and tailhook.

The Ju187 showing the obvious MFK modifications with folding wings, retractable undercarriage and tailhook,

Already obsolescent in 1938 the Fi167 ‘Goose’ was the sole MFK carrier capable torpedo bomber at the outbreak of WW2 and was never deployed operationally as such.

With clean lines, more powerful engines & enlarged wing area, the Ju190M was to be a highly successful long-range maritime patrol aircraft for the MFK.

2. This fighter design for narrative purposes is essentially an amalgamation of the three IRL Heinkel fighter designs produced in the late 1930s. All would reach at least the flying prototype stage or enter limited production with less than 200 flying examples being completed all up. All demonstrated various design strengths and weaknesses as detailed which despite their potential led to their non-adoption. ITTL the Dolphin represents a union of their design strengths to best provide a viable carrier capable single seat fighter alternative specific to the new MFK.
3. IRL the Junkers Ju 187 was highly impractical dive bomber design to succeed the ageing Ju 87 cancelled in 1943. The earlier Ju 87 Stuka had proved very vulnerable to enemy fighters and its replacement was designed under the designation Ju 187. While the projected aircraft kept some of the features of the earlier Ju 87, such as the inverted gull wing and two-man crew, it was to have retractable landing gear as well as improved armor and armament. Unfortunately, the concept included some unnecessarily complex and wildly impractical ideas such as rotating vertical tail. In theory when rotated down, the tail would give the air gunner, armed with a rear turret, an unobstructed field of fire. It is not known how the aircraft would have handled with the tail rotated. Considering the vulnerability of the type and its poor projected performance, the project was cancelled by the Reich Air Ministry in autumn 1943.

4. For narrative purpose this aircraft is an intermediate step between the IRL Ju90 and 290 airframes. IOTL the Junkers Ju 290 was a large German, four-engine long-range transport, and maritime patrol aircraft produced in limited numbers and used by the Luftwaffe late in World War II. Developed directly from the earlier slower and far smaller Ju 90 airliner, which had small numbers converted for military service, and was intended to replace the relatively slow Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor which by 1942 was proving increasingly vulnerable when confronted by RN/RAF aircraft.