Fatboy Coxy
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I wouldn't worry about drop bears, apparently an umbrella will suffice according to Chris Hemsworth
Thank you Draconis, that's our Joey!Gordon "Big Elbows" Bennet has his work cut out for him.
View attachment 735902 "Don't get too close cobber. I can barely hold this killa."
Not to mention the small wrinkle that the Netherlands are currently under German occupation, which means no regular troops from home and that any patriotic young Dutchmen not under occupation are probably heading for the Free Dutch forces in Britain, not for the backwater that is the DEI.while the European Dutch found service in the KNIL uninspiring.
Your introduction is wonderful, keep it up and you may become a professional writer. Writing for your own pleasure and enjoying it, is the best way to begin a writing career. Also, I note how you begin with an acknowledgement of how small changes in history lead to larger and larger changes; essential for writing good alternate history.My story will be about whether Britain could have held Malaya/Singapore in 1941-42. There are or have been some storylines that flirt with the question, or paint it with a broad stroke, against a background of a much bigger picture. But I want to write in more detail about how things could have gone
My timeline will begin with some small changes, but without wholesale changes to the general direction of the war. But obviously, as a stone cast in a still pond spreads ripples, so my little changes will undoubtedly bring about changes in future events.
I’ve never written like this before, just posted on forums, or written reports in my real life, and so I wrote privately for myself originally, quite expecting this would just be a fad, a faze I’d quickly grow tired off. But it didn’t, and despite my very slow progress, I found I’ve had fun writing the stories, and want to share them with you.
I’ve struggled with a style, and looking at my stories see different styles, or just as worrying, the same formatted style. I’ve written them with my own enjoyment in mind, and readily concede they are at times very factual, or offer too much detail in the narrative, and may be quite boring, but I like detail. In addition, there are a lot of historical facts, which I hope I’ve got right and a lot of technical, tactical or even strategical points that I’m sure will offer up comment.
I take my hat off to Zheng He, Galveston Bay and Fester to name but three who inspired me to write, and I thank them for the enjoyable hours I’ve spent reading their storylines. If mine could be half as good I’d be happy.
Place names in Malaya and Singapore are historical, as is Burma (Myanmar) and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), however, I have used current names when writing about events in Thailand, simply so the reader has a better chance of following the narrative while looking at Google maps. There are a lot of characters, many real, some of whom will find themselves in very different theatres of war, but there are also quite a number of fictional ones too. I hope no one is offended about what happens to the historical people, I have no intention to give offence. Other events are written with a broad stroke of the pen, to give some timeline reference, forgive me if they appear over simplistic
Hopefully I will post a couple of times a week, I’m not a quick writer. I welcome comment and criticism, provided its constructive, and will readily accept the errors I have no doubted made, being pointed out, so without further to do, I will begin.
The KNIL was the regular army in the DEI actually, as the colonial government was adamantly against conscripting the native population. In fact, the Dutch army in the motherland was actually constitutionally forbidden to be deployed outside of Europe. The conscripted ' totoks' (Europeans born in the colony) were indeed next to useless.Not to mention the small wrinkle that the Netherlands are currently under German occupation, which means no regular troops from home and that any patriotic young Dutchmen not under occupation are probably heading for the Free Dutch forces in Britain, not for the backwater that is the DEI.
I read a story that during the Atje war, after Van Heutz took command, platoons or smaller units were send in to the field/forrest only armed with Klewang and Kris ( cutlass and dagger). The only fire arms were the pistols/ revolvers of the officers and NCO's. Tis was a kind of close combat counter guerilla tactics.The soldiers of the KNIL were no cowards in man-to-man close quarter fights
The Korps Marechausse te Voet (not to be confused with the Royal Constabulary) was fighting in that manner in Atjeh right up until and including WWII.I read a story that during the Atje war, after Van Heutz took command, platoons or smaller units were send in to the field/forrest only armed with Klewang and Kris ( cutlass and dagger). The only fire arms were the pistols/ revolvers of the officers and NCO's. Tis was a kind of close combat counter guerilla tactics.
True, very true, and often overlooked in TLs that assume that just churning out more tanks/planes/guns is all that's needed.I mean, no matter how small it looks like, it all (almost painfully) slowly adds up. The mentions in the last chapter really reinforce the issue of just how much supporting infrastructure is needed even before the first bullet has been fired.
In short, it was effectively a colonial police force, intended to maintain order, hunt bandits and put down local uprisings rather fight a full-scale war against a hostile army. They might, to an extent, be able to fight a 1940s war without tanks, planes or heavy artillery - particularly in close terrain like the Indonesian jungle - but no army can fight even a 1914 war without machine guns, mortars and field artillery. The force multiplier is just too great, and as you point out, the morale effects of being continually shelled without having anything to fire back with are horrible.
- The KNIL had always been build for short-range colonial battles. Because of that there were almost no crew-based weapons before the war, and what there was barely had any budget for exercises. Obviously this had an effect on the KNIL's firepower but also on it's staying power in the face of crew-based weapons. The soldiers of the KNIL were no cowards in man-to-man close quarter fights. However, because aforementioned reasons, the first tanks and artillery most of them saw firing for the first time were Japanese, and it made them turn and run.
Given what they were starting with, this strikes me as optimistic - unless the plan was to build up a core rapid-reaction force that could concentrate in key areas?
- After the Fall Gelb the KNIL wanted to reorganize itself in a mechanized force capable of blitzkrieg style operations.
And this is a killer, because it means that not only do the invaders not have to worry about rear-area security, you do. Concentrate everything against the invader and suddenly your supply lines are withering and the provinces behind you are full of Indonesian Nationalist flags, hold forces back to keep the locals in line and watch the IJA pick off your garrisons one by one. However by 1941 I doubt there was much that could be done.
- The natives (especially on Java) were on the hand of the Japanese because the colonial government completely failed to engage with the local population in a positive way.
The main line of defense for the Dutch East Indies had been the Koninklijke Marine and with the Great Depression hitting the colony hard, the admirals were not inclined to leave anything but scraps for the KNIL.In short, it was effectively a colonial police force, intended to maintain order, hunt bandits and put down local uprisings rather fight a full-scale war against a hostile army. They might, to an extent, be able to fight a 1940s war without tanks, planes or heavy artillery - particularly in close terrain like the Indonesian jungle - but no army can fight even a 1914 war without machine guns, mortars and field artillery. The force multiplier is just too great, and as you point out, the morale effects of being continually shelled without having anything to fire back with are horrible.
I haven't been able to find out (yet) how the decision-making process went but there was always going to be a divide between stationary 'fortress' forces and the field army.Given what they were starting with, this strikes me as optimistic - unless the plan was to build up a core rapid-reaction force that could concentrate in key areas?
In Atjeh it did indeed turn into a full-scale uprising when the Japanese took control of Malaya and an invasion was imminent. Of course that area had only been annexed in the late 19th century and never truly pacified. On Java it doesn't seem anything like that took place though. A lot of Japanese flags and people volunteering to show the Japanese forces the way, giving them intel. The Battle of Java was over pretty fast though, so who knows what would have happened if the resistance would have been more sustained.And this is a killer, because it means that not only do the invaders not have to worry about rear-area security, you do. Concentrate everything against the invader and suddenly your supply lines are withering and the provinces behind you are full of Indonesian Nationalist flags, hold forces back to keep the locals in line and watch the IJA pick off your garrisons one by one. However by 1941 I doubt there was much that could be done.
Even if things stop short of a full-scale uprising, a hostile populace can still cause a lot of problems - an outbreak of sabotage, strikes and general absenteeism in the ports and railways the KNIL depends on for supplies, for example.In Atjeh it did indeed turn into a full-scale uprising when the Japanese took control of Malaya and an invasion was imminent. Of course that area had only been annexed in the late 19th century and never truly pacified. On Java it doesn't seem anything like that took place though. A lot of Japanese flags and people volunteering to show the Japanese forces the way, giving them intel. The Battle of Java was over pretty fast though, so who knows what would have happened if the resistance would have been more sustained.
Typical colonialist arrogance at the worst possible time, it sounds like. To be honest, I suspect that the colonial government in the DEI was doomed as soon as Japanese invasion became a serious possibility. Even if they had managed to form a united front with the nationalists and resist the invasion I doubt they'd have been able to put the genie back in the bottle in the post-war.The big problem in the Dutch-Indonesian relationship was that the colonial government time and time again underestimated the strength of the nationalist movement and overestimated it's own position. When the war broke out local leaders were more than happy to make a deal about joint defense of the colony, most of the nationalist leaders were in fact anti-Japanese (hell, Sukarno even feared that he would be executed if the Japanese would win the war!). The colonial government refused to hold any negotiations until the Netherlands were liberated, fearing that they would be negotiation from a weak position. And with that lost the whole colony in the end.
Yes they will, later stories will tell moreFrom small acorns, mighty oaks grow.
I mean, no matter how small it looks like, it all (almost painfully) slowly adds up. The mentions in the last chapter really reinforce the issue of just how much supporting infrastructure is needed even before the first bullet has been fired. In relation to that, are British planning any fortifications to be built, to compensate somewhat for their weaknesses and just how long and what form would those fortifications take?
The Korps Marechausse te Voet (not to be confused with the Royal Constabulary) was fighting in that manner in Atjeh right up until and including WWII.