Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Gordon "Big Elbows" Bennet has his work cut out for him.
View attachment 735902 "Don't get too close cobber. I can barely hold this killa."
Thank you Draconis, that's our Joey!

Joey had a rather sad ending, see

In my timeline, I'd like to think he lived a rich and fulfilling life, maybe boxing for the Australian Army in Malaya. Not sure if that deserves a story?
 
MWI 41021909 The New Brigade

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Wednesday 19 February;

Newly promoted Brigadier Eric Wilson-Haffenden sat in his office in the barracks at Taiping, reviewing the arrangements for accommodation. He’d been given orders to form the 35th Indian Infantry Brigade, with the Seaforth Highlanders, 5/14 Punjab and 5/7 Rajput’s battalions attached.

The Rajput’s had only recently arrived from Hong Kong in the same convoy as his small cadre of brigade headquarters staff, and all were still settling in. They had a new commander, Lt Col Roger Cadogan-Rawlinson, promoted from Major from within the battalion. The 5/14 Punjab had been in Malaya since the start of war, originally based at Penang as its garrison battalion, were now old Malaya hands. Like the Rajput’s, they had lost a lot of experience officers and men, milked to create new formations in India, and so were now in desperate need of training. One plus, however was their CO, Lt Col Cyril Stokes, who was a good trainer of men, and was going to be a big help to him.

The Seaforth’s had been the garrison battalion in Penang, but a recent convoy arrival from Bombay into Penang had brought the 1st battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, who were the new Penang garrison battalion, along with the 1st battalion, The Leicestershire Regiment who were joining the 15th Indian Brigade in Sungai Petani. The other units that arrived, the 8th Aux Battalion, Indian Pioneer Corps were off to a training camp just outside Kula Lumpur, while the 6th Medium Regiment RA (18th and 19th Batteries with 16 x 6-inch Howitzers) was heading for Rawang, just north of Kuala Lumpur.

The barracks in Taiping was bursting, built for one battalion, they were more than full. Works were already underway to expand with more huts but a lot of the brigade would have to remain under canvas. And as yet others, like a signal unit and the 59th Field Coy Madras S&M IE engineers were still to come. His headquarters staff was minimal, he was assured their shortages would be made up, from India, the UK or here, officers by promotional transfers and some newly trained ECO’s from the OCTU, while finding other ranks for a headquarters posting never seemed a problem.

They would be part of the 11th Indian Division, under Major General Murray-Lyon, assigned to defend northern Malaya, along with the 6th and 15th Brigades. Everything seemed so embryonic, little artillery, no tanks, few trucks with everything running off the railway. And the RAF, who’s airfields they were meant to protect were noticeable by their absence. Anyway, he had a lot to do, Murray-Lyon wanted to come down and see them all on Friday, and he had to put some order to this mess before then. And then no doubt there would be a brigade exercise to plan.

However, Wilson-Haffenden was very clear about how he wanted his brigade to work, having been part of the old Emu Force that had arrived in 1940, to become the 12th Indian brigade. He’d been part of the Brigadier Paris, Lt Col Stewart school of practicing jungle warfare, making the brigade, as it was, second to none. The 35th would be a chip off the old block under his tenure!
 
MWI 41022222 The Anglo Dutch Australian Conference

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Saturday 22 February;

The three KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger) officers, sat down, a drink in hand, boots up on stools, tunics undone, relaxing. It had been a hard day at the conference for them all, the British continually pressed for help, reiterating they were the shield the Dutch East Indies sat behind. “I say old chaps, care for another” mimicked Hendrik, as he offered the Gin bottle around. “Oh rather, please do” replied Hein in his best British impression. “Call me Tiger” said Gerardus, and at that they started laughing, breaking some of the tension they had all felt. Gerardus finished his drink and put the glass on the table, musing “How does Conrad manage get on with them so well?” “Easy” said Hein, adding “He can be just as much of an arse as they are” The laughter broke out again.

The trouble was they needed help from the British and Australians more than was needed of them it seemed. The aggressive approaches from Japan regarding favourable commercial trade deals, controlling rights to oil fields etc were a worrying development but the desired public declaration of a guarantee of security to the NEI was not forthcoming. The USA wouldn’t, because of the promises Roosevelt had made, when seeking re-election in keeping the country out of war, while the British, stretched as they were, were anxious to keep in step with the Americans. This meant they had to try to hold off Japan’s increasing demands, while at the same time appear to be neutral.

And so, their agreements with the Allies were small, and slow in coming. In November 1940 they had made some agreements for arms supplies, exchanging liaison officers, the secret exchange of naval ship deployments, and the as yet unacted agreement of mutual use of military airfields, with refuelling and rearming arrangements. Now Helfrich had agreed to give information on minefield dispositions and re-routing Dutch merchant shipping to and from the US West Coast through the Torres Straits to minimise Japanese interference. And further talks would examine what military assistance could be lent to each other, depending on where an axis of attack might appear.

Strategically the Dutch had already undertook to develop the harbour at Tjilatjap, on the southern coast of Java, to handle more freight. The effort being put in was impressive, with a lot of infrastructure being built, including a new coastal artillery fort, warehouses, quays, piers, barracks and a hospital. The channel was dredged, and new navigation and mooring buoys positioned. It wasn’t perfect, the rail network serving Java would create bottlenecks, but being on the southern coast it would be a lot safer from any potential Japanese attack.

But the other help they needed, defending their many islands, was very slow in coming. They now had an agreement that the RAAF would use the airfields on Ambon and Timor, and would undertake to base a flight of Hudson bombers on each, with some maintenance support. Talk of how the airfields would be defended was not concluded, in part with the Australians having very little to offer and in part of the sticking point of who commanded who.

What else had been resolved was that the Australian 8th Division would now be all going to Malaya, the 23rd Brigade quite soon and the 27th sometime later in the year. Also agreed was the standardisation of codes and ciphers, exchange of radio frequencies, station calls of ships, shore installations and air bases. And lastly the four parties, the Americans included, had agreed to disclosed to each other the frequencies and station calls of ships and shore installations and air bases.

Lt Gen Gerardus Berenschot, CinC of the KNIL, looked at his two companions, and thought, despite the agreements made, both Hendrik and Hein’s commands would be hard pushed if war came.

Maj Gen Hendrick van Oyen, Commander of the ML – KNIL, the air wing of the Army, could look forward to the numerous new aircraft on order that he would be receiving, and the glamour of flying, was attracting a large number of young men to volunteer for pilot training to fly them, and he had new secret airfields being built for them, but all this took time.

While for Maj Gen Hein ter Poorten, Chief of the General Staff KNIL, expansion of the land forces was so much harder, many of the indigenous peoples of the Dutch East Indies, were considered unreliable, the extremely poor literacy hampered recruiting technical grades, and the mix of weapons used was bewildering, while the European Dutch found service in the KNIL uninspiring.
 
while the European Dutch found service in the KNIL uninspiring.
Not to mention the small wrinkle that the Netherlands are currently under German occupation, which means no regular troops from home and that any patriotic young Dutchmen not under occupation are probably heading for the Free Dutch forces in Britain, not for the backwater that is the DEI.
 
MWI 41022411 The SSRNVR

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 24 February;

The Straits Settlement Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (SSRNVR) had been formed in Singapore on 27 April 1934 by the British colonial government in Singapore, to assist the Royal Navy in the defence of Singapore. Initially it was a weekend club, sailing races, and a smart uniform for parading on those solemn occasions, a small pool of men to call upon in time of war. Most of the officers of local merchant shipping lines also joined, if they weren’t already in the RNR. In 1935, the British Admiralty presented Singapore with an Acacia class sloop, HMS Laburnum, to serve as the Reserve's Headquarters and drill ship, berthed at the Telok Ayer Basin. With her engines removed, addition offices could be provided for the administration of the force.

It was slow to grow, in 1938, the SSRNVR was expanded with a branch in Penang, but this was still mostly a pool of European officers, and no crew. With the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, the crewing issue was resolved with the recruitment of Malay’s into the Royal Navy Malay Section. These, together with SSRNVR officers called to active service provided additional crews for the Royal navy, the problem, aside from training them, was what ships were they going to crew.

Like in the UK and around the rest of the world, following the pattern of the First World War, merchant ships were requisitioned, in all shapes and sizes. Their use was dictated by what type of ship they were, and what the Navy needed. Minesweepers, a much sought-after class, used fishing boats, equipped to winch in their fishing nets meant they could be easily converted to deploying contact sweeps. They used a paravane, which was like an underwater glider, towed by a steel cable, keeping the line taunt, and at an angle away from the ship, allowing a sweep of between 100 and 200 yards, to either the port or starboard side of the ship. The towed cable would snag the mooring line of the mine, rub along it until it reached the paravane, whose jaws would cut it, allowing the mine to float free. Once surfaced it was denotated by gunfire.

This morning, two whalers were tied up along the East Wall of the Naval Stores Basin, having just completed their provisioning yesterday, their fitting out, along with a few other modifications, now finished. Apart from the contact sweeps, they had been given a single Lewis machine gun, with a pivot provided either side of the wheelhouse, a second was desirable, but shortages dictated otherwise, and a couple of rifles, for detonating mines. And that, apart from a Naval Radio, was it, excepting, of course, the crew.

Two Lieutenants stood on the dockside, adjacent to those ships, both with the insignia of the SSRNVR on their naval uniforms. Behind them, on parade, stood a Sub Lt, a couple of Petty officers and ship’s crew, mostly Malay’s. Lt Butcher was now the commanding officer of HMS Jarak, while 50 yards along the quay, stood Lt Smyth, commander of HMS Klias. Thomas Drew, Rear Admiral Malaya, was here inspecting them, pleased to have another couple of auxiliary minesweepers join the fleet.

Just past them was a couple of small launches, Rhoda alongside Sylvia, also joining the fleet today. Their respective commanders Lt Inns RNVR, and Lt Draycott SSRNVR, stood at attention, their small crews behind them. They part of a total of eleven ex-customs launches being taken over by the Navy, and although they had all been given notice of requisition at the same time, their transfer was being done in stages. At 48 foot long, they were small launches, ideal for the customs work in harbours, carried a crew of four, shore based. The Navy’s needs, however, were so much more, and each boat was having an extensive refit, taking four to five weeks, as accommodation for a crew of six was provided, as well as extra fuel tanks, radio and a position forward for a single Lewis machine gun.

With a side arm for the commanding officer, and a couple of rifles, they would be used for harbour boarding inspections, coastal and riverine patrols, and a multitude of other small boat roles. The extra weight reduced their speed down to 12 knots, but they were never fast, and even with the increased fuel bunkerage, they only had a few days operational range, while being cramped, wouldn’t make them the most popular of boats to serve in, but they would do a job.

For the men of the SSRNVR and Malay section, these were the types of ships they would serve in, undertaking the boring, mundane, routine work necessary for a Navy at war. Little glory could be expected, unless it was a valiant action, against all odds, which they’d be unlikely to survive. Their fleet of small ships would grow, and to feed the voracious needs of crewing those ships, many men would serve in a number of ships, as their gained experience would bring promotions and transfers, the Navy always creating crews for new ships with a mixture of newly trained and a few experienced hands, even if it was only nine months.
 
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MWI 41022611 The Flying School

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Wednesday 26 February;

Keith Park walked along the row of parked aircraft, a Leopard Major, a Tiger Moth, another Tiger Moth, a Hawk Major and finally a Miles Falcon, with their pilots and ground crew paraded in front of them. They were the Kuala Lumpur Flight of the EFTS (Elementary Flying Training School) which along with similar flights at Penang, Ipoh and Kallang (Singapore) made up the majority of the Malayan Volunteer Air Force. With him walked Group Captain Reginald Lewis Nunn, the part time commander of the MVAF, and also the Director of the Public Works Dept, Group Captain Frank Watts, and following them, Flying Officer Stanley, the Flight CO.

Watts was with them, because in anticipation of the outcome of the review into best use of the volunteers, and in recognition that his daytime job was getting busier, Group Captain Nunn was stepping down from commanding the MVAF, to focus on the Public Works Department, and Watts would take over. Indeed, a new RAF Wing, number 42 (Support), would be formed, with 4 AACU Sqn and the Comm’s Flight also joining.

The training school had been in existence since August last year, providing 16 places for two-month elementary flying training, before cadets were enrolled in the RAF and sent to Canada to progress with their training, along with a Malayan initiative of training over 28-year-olds for enrolment in the MVAF, a three-week course followed by voluntary weekend flying training at one of the four flying flights.

The airfields in Singapore, including Kallang, would soon start to become congested, partly due to newly arrived or raised squadrons, and partly with airfields being restricted while grass runways were dug up and filled in with concrete. Consequently, Park had wanted to shift the flying school from Kallang to Kuala Lumpur, just leaving a small flight of five aircraft for the weekend flyers. However, Kuala Lumpur airfield was also being extensively developed. Lots of hutted accommodation was being built, along with maintenance sheds, hangers and hard stands, while the runway was a mess at the moment, the old grass runway, all scrapped away, extended, and now the first layer of heavy aggregate was being laid.

This meant a change of plan for now; the school was being shifted to Port Swettenham. The shift would be done over a couple of months, the old cadets finishing in Singapore, the new ones starting in Port Swettenham. The facilities at Port Swettenham airfield were being developed, additional buildings and hard stands but the runway would remain grass. This would also see a gradual transfer of the training aircraft. During his time with the volunteers, he was impressed by not only their enthusiasm but by the wealth of technical skills and experience of the older fliers. He couldn’t say anything to them now, but there were plans afoot to make much better use of the volunteers in general.

After tea, he was driven into Kuala Lumpur to visit RAF 153 Maintenance Unit, located just north of KL, alongside the railway. The railway line was having sidings built and a number of large sheds, to house the newly forming RAF 153 maintenance unit, which would concentrate on aero engine overhauls and rebuilds. And attached to 153 would be a new RAF Technical Corps, where young Chinese students fresh from trade school, would be recruited and trained as either maintenance engineers for 153, or as ground crew, learning to be riggers, fitters etc.
 
My story will be about whether Britain could have held Malaya/Singapore in 1941-42. There are or have been some storylines that flirt with the question, or paint it with a broad stroke, against a background of a much bigger picture. But I want to write in more detail about how things could have gone

My timeline will begin with some small changes, but without wholesale changes to the general direction of the war. But obviously, as a stone cast in a still pond spreads ripples, so my little changes will undoubtedly bring about changes in future events.

I’ve never written like this before, just posted on forums, or written reports in my real life, and so I wrote privately for myself originally, quite expecting this would just be a fad, a faze I’d quickly grow tired off. But it didn’t, and despite my very slow progress, I found I’ve had fun writing the stories, and want to share them with you.

I’ve struggled with a style, and looking at my stories see different styles, or just as worrying, the same formatted style. I’ve written them with my own enjoyment in mind, and readily concede they are at times very factual, or offer too much detail in the narrative, and may be quite boring, but I like detail. In addition, there are a lot of historical facts, which I hope I’ve got right and a lot of technical, tactical or even strategical points that I’m sure will offer up comment.

I take my hat off to Zheng He, Galveston Bay and Fester to name but three who inspired me to write, and I thank them for the enjoyable hours I’ve spent reading their storylines. If mine could be half as good I’d be happy.

Place names in Malaya and Singapore are historical, as is Burma (Myanmar) and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), however, I have used current names when writing about events in Thailand, simply so the reader has a better chance of following the narrative while looking at Google maps. There are a lot of characters, many real, some of whom will find themselves in very different theatres of war, but there are also quite a number of fictional ones too. I hope no one is offended about what happens to the historical people, I have no intention to give offence. Other events are written with a broad stroke of the pen, to give some timeline reference, forgive me if they appear over simplistic

Hopefully I will post a couple of times a week, I’m not a quick writer. I welcome comment and criticism, provided its constructive, and will readily accept the errors I have no doubted made, being pointed out, so without further to do, I will begin.
Your introduction is wonderful, keep it up and you may become a professional writer. Writing for your own pleasure and enjoying it, is the best way to begin a writing career. Also, I note how you begin with an acknowledgement of how small changes in history lead to larger and larger changes; essential for writing good alternate history.
 
Not to mention the small wrinkle that the Netherlands are currently under German occupation, which means no regular troops from home and that any patriotic young Dutchmen not under occupation are probably heading for the Free Dutch forces in Britain, not for the backwater that is the DEI.
The KNIL was the regular army in the DEI actually, as the colonial government was adamantly against conscripting the native population. In fact, the Dutch army in the motherland was actually constitutionally forbidden to be deployed outside of Europe. The conscripted ' totoks' (Europeans born in the colony) were indeed next to useless.

Unfortunately the destruction of colonial archives after the defeat of first the colony, then the Japanese and the subsequent Indonesian National Revolution, most primary sources on the performance of the KNIL during the Second World War have been lost. Because of that there isn't really a standard handbook written, certainly not recent. A couple of observations can be made though:

  • The KNIL had always been build for short-range colonial battles. Because of that there were almost no crew-based weapons before the war, and what there was barely had any budget for exercises. Obviously this had an effect on the KNIL's firepower but also on it's staying power in the face of crew-based weapons. The soldiers of the KNIL were no cowards in man-to-man close quarter fights. However, because aforementioned reasons, the first tanks and artillery most of them saw firing for the first time were Japanese, and it made them turn and run.
  • After the Fall Gelb the KNIL wanted to reorganize itself in a mechanized force capable of blitzkrieg style operations. Given the size of Java and the size of the KNIL this was an understandable decision but it does seem to have three negative consequences:
    • It made the KNIL a road-bound force which could perform a-symmetric operations against the IJA.
    • The high command was too tempted by the possibilities of motorized movement that they moved units around during the night a lot, which kept those troops from being rested.
    • The reorganization broke the almost family-like bonds between the officers and their troops. It destroyed morale and especially the capabilities for officers to steady their men.
  • The natives (especially on Java) were on the hand of the Japanese because the colonial government completely failed to engage with the local population in a positive way.
  • The death of the commander of the KNIL Gerardus Berenschot was very much a problem in a war in which contacts with coalition partners were paramount. His successor Hein ter Poorten was a fine soldier but very much a 'ironeater' who didn't engage with allies very well.
 
From small acorns, mighty oaks grow.

I mean, no matter how small it looks like, it all (almost painfully) slowly adds up. The mentions in the last chapter really reinforce the issue of just how much supporting infrastructure is needed even before the first bullet has been fired. In relation to that, are British planning any fortifications to be built, to compensate somewhat for their weaknesses and just how long and what form would those fortifications take?
 
The soldiers of the KNIL were no cowards in man-to-man close quarter fights
I read a story that during the Atje war, after Van Heutz took command, platoons or smaller units were send in to the field/forrest only armed with Klewang and Kris ( cutlass and dagger). The only fire arms were the pistols/ revolvers of the officers and NCO's. Tis was a kind of close combat counter guerilla tactics.
 
I read a story that during the Atje war, after Van Heutz took command, platoons or smaller units were send in to the field/forrest only armed with Klewang and Kris ( cutlass and dagger). The only fire arms were the pistols/ revolvers of the officers and NCO's. Tis was a kind of close combat counter guerilla tactics.
The Korps Marechausse te Voet (not to be confused with the Royal Constabulary) was fighting in that manner in Atjeh right up until and including WWII.
 
I mean, no matter how small it looks like, it all (almost painfully) slowly adds up. The mentions in the last chapter really reinforce the issue of just how much supporting infrastructure is needed even before the first bullet has been fired.
True, very true, and often overlooked in TLs that assume that just churning out more tanks/planes/guns is all that's needed.
The problem for the British is that this all takes time as well as resources - and although Park may not know it, there's not much more than nine months left before the balloon goes up. If the British are too ambitious, they may find themselves when the shooting starts still with a bunch of half-built facilities, half-trained men and half-formed units - or worse yet, complete their shiny new airfields and bases just in time for the IJA to move in.

  • The KNIL had always been build for short-range colonial battles. Because of that there were almost no crew-based weapons before the war, and what there was barely had any budget for exercises. Obviously this had an effect on the KNIL's firepower but also on it's staying power in the face of crew-based weapons. The soldiers of the KNIL were no cowards in man-to-man close quarter fights. However, because aforementioned reasons, the first tanks and artillery most of them saw firing for the first time were Japanese, and it made them turn and run.
In short, it was effectively a colonial police force, intended to maintain order, hunt bandits and put down local uprisings rather fight a full-scale war against a hostile army. They might, to an extent, be able to fight a 1940s war without tanks, planes or heavy artillery - particularly in close terrain like the Indonesian jungle - but no army can fight even a 1914 war without machine guns, mortars and field artillery. The force multiplier is just too great, and as you point out, the morale effects of being continually shelled without having anything to fire back with are horrible.

  • After the Fall Gelb the KNIL wanted to reorganize itself in a mechanized force capable of blitzkrieg style operations.
Given what they were starting with, this strikes me as optimistic - unless the plan was to build up a core rapid-reaction force that could concentrate in key areas?

  • The natives (especially on Java) were on the hand of the Japanese because the colonial government completely failed to engage with the local population in a positive way.
And this is a killer, because it means that not only do the invaders not have to worry about rear-area security, you do. Concentrate everything against the invader and suddenly your supply lines are withering and the provinces behind you are full of Indonesian Nationalist flags, hold forces back to keep the locals in line and watch the IJA pick off your garrisons one by one. However by 1941 I doubt there was much that could be done.
 
In short, it was effectively a colonial police force, intended to maintain order, hunt bandits and put down local uprisings rather fight a full-scale war against a hostile army. They might, to an extent, be able to fight a 1940s war without tanks, planes or heavy artillery - particularly in close terrain like the Indonesian jungle - but no army can fight even a 1914 war without machine guns, mortars and field artillery. The force multiplier is just too great, and as you point out, the morale effects of being continually shelled without having anything to fire back with are horrible.
The main line of defense for the Dutch East Indies had been the Koninklijke Marine and with the Great Depression hitting the colony hard, the admirals were not inclined to leave anything but scraps for the KNIL.
Given what they were starting with, this strikes me as optimistic - unless the plan was to build up a core rapid-reaction force that could concentrate in key areas?
I haven't been able to find out (yet) how the decision-making process went but there was always going to be a divide between stationary 'fortress' forces and the field army.
And this is a killer, because it means that not only do the invaders not have to worry about rear-area security, you do. Concentrate everything against the invader and suddenly your supply lines are withering and the provinces behind you are full of Indonesian Nationalist flags, hold forces back to keep the locals in line and watch the IJA pick off your garrisons one by one. However by 1941 I doubt there was much that could be done.
In Atjeh it did indeed turn into a full-scale uprising when the Japanese took control of Malaya and an invasion was imminent. Of course that area had only been annexed in the late 19th century and never truly pacified. On Java it doesn't seem anything like that took place though. A lot of Japanese flags and people volunteering to show the Japanese forces the way, giving them intel. The Battle of Java was over pretty fast though, so who knows what would have happened if the resistance would have been more sustained.

The big problem in the Dutch-Indonesian relationship was that the colonial government time and time again underestimated the strength of the nationalist movement and overestimated it's own position. When the war broke out local leaders were more than happy to make a deal about joint defense of the colony, most of the nationalist leaders were in fact anti-Japanese (hell, Sukarno even feared that he would be executed if the Japanese would win the war!). The colonial government refused to hold any negotiations until the Netherlands were liberated, fearing that they would be negotiation from a weak position. And with that lost the whole colony in the end.
 
In Atjeh it did indeed turn into a full-scale uprising when the Japanese took control of Malaya and an invasion was imminent. Of course that area had only been annexed in the late 19th century and never truly pacified. On Java it doesn't seem anything like that took place though. A lot of Japanese flags and people volunteering to show the Japanese forces the way, giving them intel. The Battle of Java was over pretty fast though, so who knows what would have happened if the resistance would have been more sustained.
Even if things stop short of a full-scale uprising, a hostile populace can still cause a lot of problems - an outbreak of sabotage, strikes and general absenteeism in the ports and railways the KNIL depends on for supplies, for example.
The big problem in the Dutch-Indonesian relationship was that the colonial government time and time again underestimated the strength of the nationalist movement and overestimated it's own position. When the war broke out local leaders were more than happy to make a deal about joint defense of the colony, most of the nationalist leaders were in fact anti-Japanese (hell, Sukarno even feared that he would be executed if the Japanese would win the war!). The colonial government refused to hold any negotiations until the Netherlands were liberated, fearing that they would be negotiation from a weak position. And with that lost the whole colony in the end.
Typical colonialist arrogance at the worst possible time, it sounds like. To be honest, I suspect that the colonial government in the DEI was doomed as soon as Japanese invasion became a serious possibility. Even if they had managed to form a united front with the nationalists and resist the invasion I doubt they'd have been able to put the genie back in the bottle in the post-war.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
From small acorns, mighty oaks grow.

I mean, no matter how small it looks like, it all (almost painfully) slowly adds up. The mentions in the last chapter really reinforce the issue of just how much supporting infrastructure is needed even before the first bullet has been fired. In relation to that, are British planning any fortifications to be built, to compensate somewhat for their weaknesses and just how long and what form would those fortifications take?
Yes they will, later stories will tell more
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The Korps Marechausse te Voet (not to be confused with the Royal Constabulary) was fighting in that manner in Atjeh right up until and including WWII.

333. On the I4th and I5th January the detachment of Dutch Marechaussee (See Section XXXI) reached Singapore by air from the Netherlands East Indies. This detachment, the strength of which was about 80 all told, consisted of native troops from the N.E.I, with European officers. They were specially trained in jungle guerrilla warfare. Their despatch to Malaya provided another proof of the ready cooperation of our Dutch Allies in this Far Eastern war. After arrival the Marechaussee concentrated in the Labis area of North Johore and, after the Japanese advance, operated against their communications in that district. During the latter half of January, they had considerable success killing a number of Japanese and doing material damage. Later, however, they experienced difficulties from lack of food and from the unreliability of some elements of the local population. Rather more than half the detachment eventually made its way to Sumatra.

Operations Of Malaya Command - Lt Gen Percival's report, The London Gazette
 
MWI 41022709 A Rice Problem

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 27 February;

The steamer had been docked at the wharf for two days now, and she still wasn’t unloaded. As more government contracts were given out for infrastructure construction throughout Malaya, so a shortage of labour was making itself felt. Singapore had managed the situation well, but the smaller ports of Malaya were a lot less organised, and had far smaller pools of labour to draw on. Port Swettenham, was busier than ever, but hadn’t been able to employ more dockers, and the turnaround of shipping was beginning to slow down.

The cargo on this ship was 3,000 tons of sacked padi, unmilled rice, from Burma, destined for the newly built warehouses in Kuala Lumpur, as part of the strategic stockpile that was being gathered. The Food Controller, Norman Jarrett, had been given the task of building a reserve of six months consumption for the population, but a complication was most of the current reserve was held in the north, at least 50,000 tons held in Alor Star, and more at Kangar, which would be in danger of capture, should an invasion happen.

So important was this within the realms of strategic planning, that he had been given a seat on the General War Council, and a level of authority and power over food supplies not seen before. Future shipments would now be stored in the central or southern parts of Malaya, and new mills and warehouses were having to be built, the priority of building supplies for them putting some other plans behind. Furthermore, all rice dealers had to be registered and licensed, provide monthly reports of stocks held and rice sold, paving the way to facilitate rationing, should this become necessary.

Malaya was always short on rice, not growing nearly enough to feed her population, but owing to her wealth due to her tin and rubber exports, she could easily afford to import, principally from Burma and Thailand, about 700,000 tons annually. However, of late the Thai’s were charging more for their rice, and selling less, no doubt under Japanese influence, and so Burma was becoming increasingly more important. This wasn’t a problem for Burma who was producing 5 million tons of white rice annually, but only needed 2 million to feed herself. Consequently, most of the additional imports to build up the surplus were coming from them. Unfortunately, it all had to be shipped out of Rangoon, and hence the unloading dilemma.

Newly arrived by train from Kuala Lumpur was two companies of the 5th Auxiliary battalion of the Indian Pioneers Corps, which with the Engineer’s Batu Caves cantonment expansion nearly complete, were available for deployment elsewhere. They were about to demonstrate their versatility by taking on the task of unloading the sacked rice onto rail wagons. This versatility of employment had caught the eye of Malaya Command, and requests for more of these units had already been made.
 
MWI 41022816 The Pinnacle Of His Career

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 28 February;

Operation Compass, planned as a five-day raid, to push the Italians back from their fortified posts camped around Sidi Barrani, became far more successful than anymore could have hoped, the Italian defence collapsed, and the exploitation that followed saw the destruction of the Italian Tenth Army, 138,000 PoW’s, hundreds of tanks, over 1,000 guns and many aircraft destroyed or captured. It removed the threat to Egypt, while Tobruk and then Benghazi were captured, and the new front was now just past El Agheila. Only exhaustion and lack of supplies stopped the British advance, which saved Tripoli from falling as well.

But events elsewhere dictated that this campaign would have to stop for now. Even while Operation Compass had been taking place, the 4th Indian Division was withdrawn, to be sent to Sudan, to save the situation there, although the British weren’t to know that the Italians lacked the resources to continue their advance into Sudan. Fortunately, the hiatus while the 6th Australian Division replace the Indians, only seemed to give the British a second wind, and renewed assaults in North Africa had seen more gains.

Nevertheless, now both the 7th Armoured Division, and the 6th Australian were in need of a refit, rest and recovery. Lt Gen O’Connor was sent back to Egypt to give him a rest too, and Lt Gen Maitland Wilson had taken over XIII Corps, which had been downgraded to a static HQ at Barce, just east of Benghazi, and was now given the title Cyrenaica Command. In addition, he was given the role of Military Governor of Cyrenaica, which having been Italian, was now in need of a new administration to run it.

So, Cyrenaica became a backwater for a while, allowing the British time to replace those experienced formations with the 2nd Armoured and 9th Australian, both of which were untested, but more importantly, most of the tanks of the 2nd Armoured needed overhauls, the unit was understrength, and the Australians were so short on transport, that they left one brigade back in Tobruk. The port of Benghazi was not useable at the moment, the Royal navy needed time to clear the mines and sunken ships, and repair the dockside damage, so supplies were being driven in from Tobruk.

However, events were moving on the worlds stage, and two weeks after taking control, Wilson was recalled to Egypt, to lead a new force bound for Greece. Back in 1939 Britain had given Greece guarantees and now they needed to honour them, troops had to be sent, hoping to forestall a German advance either through Yugoslavia and/or Bulgaria. To aid the gallant Greeks in defence of their homeland, a Corps and more of troops, the best in North Africa, were to be sent, along with most of the RAF in the theatre. Troopships were assembling, stores and munitions stockpiled and troops readied, as Britain’s focus turned to the Balkans.

Meanwhile, back in Cyrenaica, they needed a replacement for Wilson, and sometimes it was all about being in the right place at the right time, and for our Gen Neame, surely that was the case. He was pleased to get a more active command, unlike his First World War experience, up to now, his Second World War one had been a bit of a none event. Despite being made Deputy Chief of Staff, British Expeditionary Force (France) at the outbreak of war, when the chance came to take command of a division in February 1940, even an Indian one forming in Egypt, it was too good to turn down. Six months later, a promotion was offered, Lt Gen, GOC British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and he left the 4th Indian for that. But now he was here in Benghazi, Military Governor of Cyrenaica, and CinC Cyrenaica. A plum job, dropping right into his hat. Watch the border, build up your forces, and who knows, in say, six months’ time, he’d get the orders to finish off the Italians in North Africa.

The Royal Navy was doing its bit on keeping the pressure on the Italians, just days ago, working off Tripoli, their Malta based submarines had been in action, against a small convoy. First HMS Ursula had damaged the merchant ship Sabbia with a torpedo, the Italian naval escort had remained with her, while the second ship of the convoy, Silvia Tripcovich sailed on alone, to be sunk by HMS Upright the next day. And it hadn’t stopped there, three days later, HMS Upright had sunk the light cruiser Armando Diaz, part of the escort for a small German convoy, carrying some of the first troops of the Africa Korps.

With Tripoli being about 450 miles behind the Italian front lines, it would take some time for the Axis to be in a good shape to offer a defence, let alone any attack, other than small raids. The few German troops being sent, were to stiffen the Italian Army, provide a better defence, and even this early in the war, keep her in it. At least that’s what everyone thought, except one man, who had arrived two weeks ago, and was already rushing the few German troops he had, to the front, with a totally different view to it all. And for Lt Gen Philip Neame, the pinnacle of his career had just been reached, it would be downhill all the way from here.
 
Perhaps Gott writes a nice letter of congratulations to Neame on his promotion, along with PS please send any spare Italian kit especially weapons out east!

On a slightly more serious note the Italian kit wasn't much good but considerably better than no kit at all. Hell even the captured M13/40's the British pressed temporarily into service look half decent compared to most Japanese armour and IOTL most of the loot was never used by the British.
 
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