Malaya What If

[Driftless]

Was the brutal nature of American war command, a descendant of the abysmal performance of many US Army General Officers in the US Civil War?

There was an issue of National Lampoon, which I've always remembered. It had an entry, " I Am An American Fighting Man'". It refers to being lead by several dozen of the worst Generals in modern history. It may seem harsh, but unlike the Somme, there is no romance about Fredericksburg, Antietam or The Crater. Interesting enough, I believe that
Ambrose Burnside, Class of (18)47 was involved in all mentioned battles.

I don't know if this connects or not, but my understanding of the West Point curriculum on tactics in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries contained disproportionate focus on ACW battlefield tactics. That's the environment that Pershing and MacArthur were educated in, though Mac and Blackjack apparently clashed in WW1 and after.

This is a bit of a sidebar to the Author's main storyline, so I'll retreat to the sidelines again.

 

[Butchpfd]

I don't know if this connects or not, but my understanding of the West Point curriculum on tactics in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries contained disproportionate focus on ACW battlefield tactics. That's the environment that Pershing and MacArthur were educated in, though Mac and Blackjack apparently clashed in WW1 and after.

This is a bit of a sidebar to the Author's main storyline, so I'll retreat to the sidelines again.

IIRC, clashed is a serious understatement. Another reason it was good that Mac Arthur and Patton never crossed paths during the war. I also believe that Nimitz would ave gleefully drowned MacArthur whenever they met! He probably would have traded Douglas for his late brother Arthur, in a Hotel st minute!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Saturday 29 November;

In the mid-afternoon meeting, it had been made clear to both Lord Gort and Admiral Layton, that the Washington talks were very much in danger of coming to an end, with no agreement, and that sensible precautions needed to be taken. The officer who had briefed them, Capt Marr-Johnson, of the Military Special Intelligence Party, was something of a mystery to most, with no significant title or position of command, but both leaders were under no illusion that his briefings were not to be taken lightly. They were also told that the US commanders, MacArthur and Hart would probably have also been given a similar briefing, but the Dutch would not have that information.

They had quietly agreed at the American, Dutch and British staff conference, back in April, that in the event of a probable impending outbreak of war, the Allies, namely the Americans, British, Dutch and Australians, would implement a series of coordinated measures aimed at, in the very least, of providing themselves with good reconnaissance of Japanese Naval intentions and a tripwire by way of submarine picket lines. This still didn’t commit either the USA nor Britain to guaranteeing the security of the Dutch East Indies, but all parties were under no illusions about the importance of mutual support and cooperation.

A call to Adm Hart found him in total agreement as to the need to invoke the reconnaissance agreements, and Gen Brereton, the new commander of the USAAF was very positive about the urgency to being ready. Using their good personal relationships with the Dutch, Gort called Ter Poorten, while Hart had a long telephone conversation with Adm Helfrich, who after conferring with each other, quickly agreed.

With everyone in agreement, specific units were placed on notice, all leave cancelled, with personnel recalled, while supplies and munitions levels were increased at unit level. In hangers across South-East Asia, efforts were doubled to prepare the maximum number of aircraft readied for operations. The dockyards of Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila and Soerabaja were prioritising the resupply and readiness of the submarine fleets. In the next few days aircraft would be moved to advanced airfields, with support services, and submarines begin departing to take station on their picket lines.

 

[Undeadmuffin]

*war drums tempo increasing*

 

[patch_g]

Reading this last update is like seeing the black clouds of the thunderstorm that's been forecast start to roll across the sky, and you're just quickly making sure you've got everything undercover, secured, and all the windows properly shut.

 

[Draconis]

Reading this last update is like seeing the black clouds of the thunderstorm that's been forecast start to roll across the sky, and you're just quickly making sure you've got everything undercover, secured, and all the windows properly shut.

 

[Nevarinemex]

View attachment 866318View attachment 866318

 

[vetinari]

Something to remember about the difference between the American and British approaches to dealing with underperforming officers, and how the situation pre war, affected the response during the war. Not only are Britain and American two nations divided by a common language, they also have a very different approach towards decent. Pre war a British officer could be eccentric, such as Montgomery but still tolerated within the club, we Brits do love our eccentrics. Where as the Americans are far less tolerant of those who fall outside their societal norms, you only have to look at the difference between the regime at West Point and Sandhurst. I remember reading J Masters autobiography, in which a fellow cadet at Sandhurst, ‘borrowed’ a steamroller and drove it into London to spend a night on the town, unlike a cadet at West Point who would have been dismissed the service in disgrace, he was told to pay the owner of the steamroller for the hire, fined and subjected to punishment. Most of the directing staff were admiring of his initiative, and would no doubt have regarded him as a young man to keep an eye on. It was possible in the British Army to make a fool off yourself or make a mistake, yet still be given a second or third chance, not so in the American Army which tended to be you have one chance and one chance only. The prime example of this is from the First World War, by all accounts John Monash wasn’t a very good junior officer, and didn’t shine in the middle officer ranks, as a junior general he was just about competent. But their was something about him that was recognised by his own commanders and later the British high command, that saw him nurtured during his progression up the ranks, and allowed to fully learn his role, and thus for him to become one of the greatest British Generals of WWI. Could Lucas have turned out to be a competent Corps commander and possibly an Army commander in Northern Europe, had he been given a second chance, maybe, but the American Army didn’t either work that way, or like the British Army have such a restricted pool of talent to draw upon.

RR.

Jphn Monash a "British General"? He was an Australian, through and through! Do not mistake it! Ever!

 

[Nevarinemex]

Wrong era. However, dark skies and weapex to boot!

 

[Driftless]

View attachment 866318View attachment 866318

The links seem to be broken for me.

 

[vl100butch]

1941, Saturday 29 November;

A call to Adm Hart found him in total agreement as to the need to invoke the reconnaissance agreements, and Gen Brereton, the new commander of the USAAF was very positive about the urgency to being ready. Using their good personal relationships with the Dutch, Gort called Ter Poorten, while Hart had a long telephone conversation with Adm Helfrich, who after conferring with each other, quickly agreed.

With everyone in agreement, specific units were placed on notice, all leave cancelled, with personnel recalled, while supplies and munitions levels were increased at unit level. In hangers across South-East Asia, efforts were doubled to prepare the maximum number of aircraft readied for operations. The dockyards of Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila and Soerabaja were prioritising the resupply and readiness of the submarine fleets. In the next few days aircraft would be moved to advanced airfields, with support services, and submarines begin departing to take station on their picket lines.

S-Boats with the Mark X aren't the newest, but can still make things difficult for the Japanese...Brereton actually getting prepared for war could make a BIG difference!

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Perversely, this is why Rommel HAS to attack, in my opinion: His logistics sucked while the British had enough to bury him on attrition alone. If he stays on the defense he at best only delays his inevitable defeat. If he attacks he may pull off a miracle and win a victory that knocks his enemy out of the fight for good. So, he had to attack. That it suited his personality was icing on the cake.
We criticize Romney endlessly for not pulling off that feat, but praise Yamashita for doing so. That's hindsight being 20/20 and ignores the logistical realities both were operating under. Realities neither general could ignore, do anything about, and being on the defense actually made worse for them.
Personally, as you say I think the quality of the opponent also had alot to do with the respective outcomes as well. Percival wasn't up to the task, while The Auck was. Though, boy, the quality of his subordinates often seemed barely adequate for the job. But then, it seemed the Allies had alot of weeding out to do in these years. It seems it wasn't until 1943 that the Brits and US had finally found a slate of competent commanders in all arms to lead their forces.

It take 3.5 year minimum to go from a small peacetime army (such as the US and British Armies) to a competent Continental style force

There is no short cut, no Hollywood solution, no special sauce, no racial trait, no special super duper weapons or equipment that can speed this process up.

There is a reason the British start winning battles in late 42 - that's roughly the 3.5 year mark

Its Officers are educated, its NCO corps has caught up with the expansion, the Soldiers of its Divisions and Corps have learned to fight as one rather than as individual Brigades (which was still the case at Gazala) and most of the useless people have been found out and weeded out and meritocracy of a war time military has found the good people and promoted them.

The German army of 1939-1943 had the advantage of starting earlier than the other armies in Europe and the Japanese army had been fighting for years in China - they were already there and fighting against opponents that were not.

Once the allied armies caught up we see the Axis armies getting kicked in the face repeatedly as their opponents quality nears or matches (and overmatches in some cases) there own but with the advantage that the Allies have more 'stuff' and more people.

 

[JWilly48519]

We talk a lot here about logistics.

And we're told about convoy arrivals, and the movement of their cargoes from the ships, to the docks, to the warehouses, and eventually away from the harbor toward the various bases and the units for which the cargo items are intended.

But some of that material, from at least the most recent convoy, probably is still in the harbor-area warehouses, or even still being unloaded.

And any warfighter knows that, in the event of war, the Japanese will try to the best of their ability to strike British supplies...certainly including harbor-area warehouses, and any supply ships at quayside.

With everyone in agreement, specific units were placed on notice, all leave cancelled, with personnel recalled, while supplies and munitions levels were increased at unit level.

Most definitely, Gort also should speak with his staff to assure that they and their teams have done everything possible to move the highest-priority supplies away from the most obvious bombing targets, and that that prioritized movement goes on 24/7 until done. It would be bad to learn after the fact that stocks of AA ammo and replacement aircraft engines were bombed in harbor warehouses, but shipments of winter hats and gardening tools were moved to safety in advance.

 

[Butchpfd]

S-Boats with the Mark X aren't the newest, but can still make things difficult for the Japanese...Brereton actually getting prepared for war could make a BIG difference!

Depends if Brenton pays attention to Hart or MacArthur. Either way no revetments,, no dispersal, and no ship recognition training.
Will MacArthurs orders still include no flights closer then just sight of Formosa, stay at high altitude?

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Jphn Monash a "British General"? He was an Australian, through and through! Do not mistake it! Ever!

It all depends what you mean by the term British, at the time someone such as Monash all thought born in Australia would have considered himself British. Unlike Scots, Irish, Welsh, English, Australian, Canadian, etc, etc, being British even more then than now was essentially a state of mind. Remember it wasn’t until the sixties that Australians had different passports and you and the New Zealanders switched from pounds which were at parity to Dollars which were originally set at two to the UK Pound. As a young man I would receive New Zealand postal orders for my birthday from my uncle in New Zealand, which I could cash at my local Post Office for their face value. So Monash who was born in Australia was at one and the same time Australian and British, in the same way that I who was born in England am both English and British.

RR.

 

[vetinari]

It all depends what you mean by the term British, at the time someone such as Monash all thought born in Australia would have considered himself British. Unlike Scots, Irish, Welsh, English, Australian, Canadian, etc, etc, being British even more then than now was essentially a state of mind. Remember it wasn’t until the sixties that Australians had different passports and you and the New Zealanders switched from pounds which were at parity to Dollars which were originally set at two to the UK Pound. As a young man I would receive New Zealand postal orders for my birthday from my uncle in New Zealand, which I could cash at my local Post Office for their face value. So Monash who was born in Australia was at one and the same time Australian and British, in the same way that I who was born in England am both English and British.

RR.

Australians identified as "Australians" from about 1850 onwards. Monash was of German Jewish descent. If he thought of himself as anything other than Australian, it was as a Jewish man of Australian descent. You cannot claim him as "British" without a quote/reference where he stated he was "British". Tsk, tsk, tsk...

 

[ctayfor]

I recall a conversation in the early 1970s with my father, who was a WW2 RNZAF veteran in which we discussed this very dichotomy. He, as a 52-year-old at the time, considered himself British, from New Zealand. I, as a 19-year-old, considered myself a New Zealander who was also British (in a citizen-of-the-Commonwealth sort of sense). I don't believe that the Australian general view was more than 120 years different from the New Zealand one.

I know that when my Dad was recaptured after his fifth escape from POW camp and a German officer called him English, my Dad corrected him and told him he was a New Zealander, in a similar way his Scottish grandfather would have done, but British meant, at the time, someone from the British Empire. John Monash was a generation older than my father and probably had at least as conservative a view.

 

[Ltlconf]

It take 3.5 year minimum to go from a small peacetime army (such as the US and British Armies) to a competent Continental style force

There is no short cut, no Hollywood solution, no special sauce, no racial trait, no special super duper weapons or equipment that can speed this process up.

There is a reason the British start winning battles in late 42 - that's roughly the 3.5 year mark

Its Officers are educated, its NCO corps has caught up with the expansion, the Soldiers of its Divisions and Corps have learned to fight as one rather than as individual Brigades (which was still the case at Gazala) and most of the useless people have been found out and weeded out and meritocracy of a war time military has found the good people and promoted them.

The German army of 1939-1943 had the advantage of starting earlier than the other armies in Europe and the Japanese army had been fighting for years in China - they were already there and fighting against opponents that were not.

Once the allied armies caught up we see the Axis armies getting kicked in the face repeatedly as their opponents quality nears or matches (and overmatches in some cases) there own but with the advantage that the Allies have more 'stuff' and more people.

Not saying any different, though indeed I should've worded it better, as you did. My point was that had Rommel had stayed strictly on the defence as critics say he should've, then due to his severe logistical, personnel, and material defects the Commonwealth forces, even with their command issues, would have eventually buried them. And done it a year or two earlier. By attacking, even though it weakened him long-term, Rommel was able to seize the initiative, keep the Commonwealth forces off balance, and hope that a miracle would drop in his lap. By having that initiative, he'd be in the position to seize and run with it too! Of course that never happened as was VERY unlikely to ever have happened in any case. Frankly, the Commonwealth forces, at their worst, were never bad enough to permit such a disaster.

 

[Sam R.]

I don't believe that the Australian general view was more than 120 years different from the New Zealand one.

I believe I've been summoned.

From the Federation process on-wards Australia's ruling class was split into two mentalities around the issue of nation. Some viewed themselves as British and incidentally Australian (Imperialists), others viewed themselves as Australian and obviously also British (Nationalists). These were not viewed as contradictory positions within the elite. The third major mentality, the labourite mentality, was so riven with the socialist remnants of radical dissent, the reactionary elements of Orange dissent, the reactionary elements of Green catholicism, and the revolutionary elements of Green catholicism that the labourite movement is best considered as majority Nationalist but not necessarily British even if accepting of the reality of a British economic dominion, while not being opposed to a Nationalist but necessarily British mentality.

Monash organised the militia which put down the police strike in Melbourne (Cathcart, National Tuckshop). Monash was deeply integrated into the Australian ruling class and through service the transnational British ruling class. Monash was necessarily both Australian and British, British and Australian because up until a period 1942-1983 Australia was both British and Australian, Australian and British. He was, moreover, both because of his membership in Australia's ruling class, his organisation of the extra-legal defence of the Australian ruling class, and his war service in defence of trans-national Britishness.

It is improper to refer to him, however, as a British general because given his Australian service referring to him as British implies that he had particular positions in relation to the island of Ireland both in the period and currently. It also improperly refers to the unit structure he served in, and puts a cultural mentality ahead of the unit history and organisation. That last one is probably the kicker: unit tradition is rather important in this context. If you've lifted him out of the AIF and installed him in a UKGBI unit and had him run it for a number of major offensives, sure, refer to him allohistorically as British (this is unlikely btw). Otherwise it has probably unintended connotations about what you think your Monash or the historical Monash thought about empire and ireland.

 

[jlckansas]

If Hart was to receive orders from the CNO or higher directing him to start doing patrols, both air, ship, and sub, there would not be much Mac could do about it because of where it originates from someone higher than him. Course in Douglas's mind you would think that even God was below him at times.