Twenty-five years service life is perfectly reasonable for a mass production wooden boat of that period, of ordinary quality i.e. not teak and cedar.
I was referencing that when Philippines began their own pre WW II military development something of this type would have been useful to build, Replace the Y gun with a.50 cal AA mg, or a 37mm gun. and diesel engines.A key difference between the Type SC1s you describe, and the Normandie class of chasseurs, was that the SC1s were wooden with gasoline or in some cases diesel engines, while the Normandies were steel with small steam powerplants.
By WWII, most of the SC1s were unserviceable due to hull and structure aging. The French still had eight nominally in service, but all were at the end of their service lives. I think USA still had a few in service as well. The Normandies OTOH were in pretty good shape.
Agreed, boats of this size are very useful inshore.
It all seems a bit CYA to me. If only those damn Yanks had sortied without Force Z, they might have been sunk instead !?!Further to the post by @pdf27 above about HMS Scarab's movements, https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1942.htm confirms that she was on station in the Persian Gulf on 31st Jan, 28th Feb and 31st March 1942.
That whole site is a mine of information (which is both good and bad - lots to find, but lots to search through). One page in particular might be of interest, as it covers the preparation for war and the first couple of months of the war itself, including the loss of HMS Repulse and PoW, then the loss of Singapore, plus some personal commentary by the admiral on what happened. It's here: https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm
A couple of extracts which caught my eye as relevant to your TL:
Sunday 7th December 1941:Telegraphic discussion with H.M. Minister in Bangkok and the Foreign Office as to the line to be taken in regard to the possible violation of Thai neutrality culminated in an impassioned appeal from Sir Josiah Crosby that we should take no steps to occupy any Thai territory, before the Japanese did so. After consultation with the Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, Commander in Chief Far East decided not to put Operation MATADOR in force for the following reasons.1). That the reports of Japanese forces and deductions as to their destinations were at the best doubtful owing to bad conditions.2). That in any case, if directed against the Kra Isthmus these forces would get there before our own; and3). Because the Japanese movements might well be intended to induce us to violate Thai neutrality.Saturday 13th December 1941:Telegram from B.A.D. Washington 2115/12 indicated that United Stated Asiatic Fleet was now to withdraw from Philippines towards N.W. Australia rather than south westward towards Singapore. This was a complete change from the plans formed before hostilities (in A.B.D. Conference, etc) and gravely prejudiced the chances of holding Malaya.
Really enjoying this TL and the discussions - thanks everyone.
Hi bb61gator, it's all getting a bit confused here.The two gunboats the author listed were not "Insect" class. The Insect class where Great War gunboats initially planned for use on the Danube and did have the characteristics cited. The Dragonfly class were a modern replacement for the Insects, but were armed with two 4" guns and 3.7" howitzer, which was replaced in some units with a quad pompom. Three of the five built, including the flagship variant SCORPION, were lost in the East Indies fighting. One was lost at Dunkirk and one survived as an RNVR drill ship until 1968.
Gator
That should be a strong point for the RN. On the other hand, there's going to be more of a Japanese air presence over parts of the South China Sea and maybe the approaches to the Malacca Strait, that may impinge on RN ops. On the third hand (!), There's also more of a Commonwealth air presence as well, so some 3-D and 4-D* chess coming up.I was wondering on how the RN's ASW capabilities are going to be against the Japanese subs and how much more capable than what the IJN is expecting? Given the fact that the RN has been fighting U boats since autumn of 39 and this is 2 years on, how will the lessons learned work here in the Far East?
Hi pdf27, thank you, consider penance paid in full 👍Arrived Colombo 6th November 1941 - https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/13121.html
Left Colombo in company with Seamew on the 12th December 1941 - http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/escort-for-hms-revenge.95457/
Transferred to Persian Gulf December 1941 and arrived in Basra in January 1942 - http://frankstaylorfamilyandroyalnavyhistory.net/HMSScarab/HMSScarabWW2.html
I can't find any mention of Seamew between this and her being scrapped in Basra in 1947, so I strongly suspect they went together from Colombo to Basra: it's ~10-12 days of steaming but they'd need at least 2 refuelling stops on the way. That means a 12th December departure date is consistent with being transferred directly to Basra and arriving in January.
Hi Admiral Jellicoe, I didn't know of this operation, thank you for educating me, for others otherwise ignorant of the facts, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rufiji_DeltaThe hull form for the Insect class was picked up from the earlier Humber class - originally a class of riverine monitors built for the Brazilians but bought by the RN when the Brazilians put them up for sale. They were responsible for despatching the German cruiser Konigsberg in the Rufiji river. Pic shows HMS Mersey being repaired whilst beached. View attachment 861249
Hi FriendlyGhost, that was a bit harder for you, pdf27 got in with the info first, but you more than recovered with some other excellent work, like your footwork, consider your penance paid in full too 👍Further to the post by @pdf27 above about HMS Scarab's movements, https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1942.htm confirms that she was on station in the Persian Gulf on 31st Jan, 28th Feb and 31st March 1942.
That whole site is a mine of information (which is both good and bad - lots to find, but lots to search through). One page in particular might be of interest, as it covers the preparation for war and the first couple of months of the war itself, including the loss of HMS Repulse and PoW, then the loss of Singapore, plus some personal commentary by the admiral on what happened. It's here: https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm
A couple of extracts which caught my eye as relevant to your TL:
Sunday 7th December 1941:Telegraphic discussion with H.M. Minister in Bangkok and the Foreign Office as to the line to be taken in regard to the possible violation of Thai neutrality culminated in an impassioned appeal from Sir Josiah Crosby that we should take no steps to occupy any Thai territory, before the Japanese did so. After consultation with the Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, Commander in Chief Far East decided not to put Operation MATADOR in force for the following reasons.1). That the reports of Japanese forces and deductions as to their destinations were at the best doubtful owing to bad conditions.2). That in any case, if directed against the Kra Isthmus these forces would get there before our own; and3). Because the Japanese movements might well be intended to induce us to violate Thai neutrality.Saturday 13th December 1941:Telegram from B.A.D. Washington 2115/12 indicated that United Stated Asiatic Fleet was now to withdraw from Philippines towards N.W. Australia rather than south westward towards Singapore. This was a complete change from the plans formed before hostilities (in A.B.D. Conference, etc) and gravely prejudiced the chances of holding Malaya.
Really enjoying this TL and the discussions - thanks everyone.
Hi Unknown, glad your enjoying it, and yes it isn't far away, ah, but it is, at least another 40 stories before those big bangs!The storm is on the horizon, and is not very far away from breaking...
Waiting for more, of course...
Hi Ramp-Rat, as always your synopsis of my timeline is very good, but I would want noted one thing about the Japanese forces. Both the IJA and IJN could be very focused on a single minded goal, regardless of the others need. I expect the IJN's aircraft to be VERY focused on the Royal Navy's assets, their first line units are as good as anyone's and they like to hit hard in numbers. It is true, as you say, that any IJN failing will not be picked up by the IJA, but they have to fail first.While there is no doubt that the Japanese will have a strong aerial presence over the South China Sea, it’s going to be very stretched by its commitments over land and along the frontlines. And with the improvements to their air component that the British have made, they are going to have their hands full. British experience in the Mediterranean and North Sea, has shown that level bombers are next to useless against ships at sea that have the ability to manoeuvre. It is only torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighter bombers that are effective , and unless your dive bombers have the right bombs and the crews been trained in maritime attacks. As was shown at Dunkirk, dive bombers that were effective against land targets, were next to useless against shipping. Plus it has to be remembered that the bigger the target the greater the chance of hitting it, miss your aiming mark on a ship 800 feet long by a 100 feet, odds are you will still hit it. Miss your aiming mark on a ship that is 150 long by a 100 feet, odds are that you will miss it, and such a small ship is also a very difficult target for a torpedo. If the majority over the second rate ships are of the west coast and only the first rate ships are of the east coast, then the west coast ships stand little chance of being attacked from the air, while those ships of the east coast and operating in the South China Sea. Stand a good chance of seeing very little aerial attacks themselves, unless they are major units, basically cruisers and above, as the Japanese try to balance their commitments to Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines. And as the majority of the aerial units are Army not Navy, given the choice who do you think they will make the greatest commitments too, adding the Army’s land campaign, or trying to sink a couple of small warships to aid the Navy.
RR.
Hi Ramp-Rat, as always your synopsis of my timeline is very good, but I would want noted one thing about the Japanese forces. Both the IJA and IJN could be very focused on a single minded goal, regardless of the others need. I expect the IJN's aircraft to be VERY focused on the Royal Navy's assets, their first line units are as good as anyone's and they like to hit hard in numbers. It is true, as you say, that any IJN failing will not be picked up by the IJA, but they have to fail first.
I do remember reading about twenty years ago that the IJN Bombers, who had the range that the IJA lacked, were bombing Cavite. They observed the movement of troops and supplies finally flooding out of Manila towards Bataan. They did not report it as a). their task was naval orientated so land forces were of no interest to them and b). why should the IJN do the IJA job for them, Let them do their own recon.I have to agree with Ramp Rat on the IJA/IJN communications. You literally could have them based on the same airfield or have HQ's in the same city and they would send their reports up the chain of command all the way to Tokyo until it was sent to the other service. Not to mention the fact that they would ignore some things because that was the other sides area of expert or knowledge and they should have known about it.
I do remember reading about twenty years ago that the IJN Bombers, who had the range that the IJA lacked, were bombing Cavite. They observed the movement of troops and supplies finally flooding out of Manila towards Bataan. They did not report it as a). their task was naval orientated so land forces were of no interest to them and b). why should the IJN do the IJA job for them, Let them do their own recon.