Twenty-five years service life is perfectly reasonable for a mass production wooden boat of that period, of ordinary quality i.e. not teak and cedar.
 
A key difference between the Type SC1s you describe, and the Normandie class of chasseurs, was that the SC1s were wooden with gasoline or in some cases diesel engines, while the Normandies were steel with small steam powerplants.

By WWII, most of the SC1s were unserviceable due to hull and structure aging. The French still had eight nominally in service, but all were at the end of their service lives. I think USA still had a few in service as well. The Normandies OTOH were in pretty good shape.

Agreed, boats of this size are very useful inshore.
I was referencing that when Philippines began their own pre WW II military development something of this type would have been useful to build, Replace the Y gun with a.50 cal AA mg, or a 37mm gun. and diesel engines.
 
Further to the post by @pdf27 above about HMS Scarab's movements, https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1942.htm confirms that she was on station in the Persian Gulf on 31st Jan, 28th Feb and 31st March 1942.
That whole site is a mine of information (which is both good and bad - lots to find, but lots to search through). One page in particular might be of interest, as it covers the preparation for war and the first couple of months of the war itself, including the loss of HMS Repulse and PoW, then the loss of Singapore, plus some personal commentary by the admiral on what happened. It's here: https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm
A couple of extracts which caught my eye as relevant to your TL:
Sunday 7th December 1941:​
Telegraphic discussion with H.M. Minister in Bangkok and the Foreign Office as to the line to be taken in regard to the possible violation of Thai neutrality culminated in an impassioned appeal from Sir Josiah Crosby that we should take no steps to occupy any Thai territory, before the Japanese did so. After consultation with the Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, Commander in Chief Far East decided not to put Operation MATADOR in force for the following reasons.
1). That the reports of Japanese forces and deductions as to their destinations were at the best doubtful owing to bad conditions.​
2). That in any case, if directed against the Kra Isthmus these forces would get there before our own; and​
3). Because the Japanese movements might well be intended to induce us to violate Thai neutrality.​
Saturday 13th December 1941:​
Telegram from B.A.D. Washington 2115/12 indicated that United Stated Asiatic Fleet was now to withdraw from Philippines towards N.W. Australia rather than south westward towards Singapore. This was a complete change from the plans formed before hostilities (in A.B.D. Conference, etc) and gravely prejudiced the chances of holding Malaya.

Really enjoying this TL and the discussions - thanks everyone.
It all seems a bit CYA to me. If only those damn Yanks had sortied without Force Z, they might have been sunk instead !?!

Apparently ADM Phillips didn't get them memo cancelling MATADOR? It's fairly likely the B.A.D. may have gotten the word
that MATADOR would not cause heartburn about 3 DEC 41. Perhaps, even from Secretary Hull himself.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The two gunboats the author listed were not "Insect" class. The Insect class where Great War gunboats initially planned for use on the Danube and did have the characteristics cited. The Dragonfly class were a modern replacement for the Insects, but were armed with two 4" guns and 3.7" howitzer, which was replaced in some units with a quad pompom. Three of the five built, including the flagship variant SCORPION, were lost in the East Indies fighting. One was lost at Dunkirk and one survived as an RNVR drill ship until 1968.

Gator
Hi bb61gator, it's all getting a bit confused here.

As you say, the Insect class gunboats were built during WW1, and had a main armament of two single 6-inch guns, one forward, one aft. Quite a few were still around in the second world war, and were used to good effect at Tobruk. HMS Scarab, the ship mentioned in my timeline, had a very quite WW2, and was scrapped in 1948

And as you also say, the Dragonfly class gunboats were built in the late 1930s, for service on the Chinese rivers. Wiki suggests that Scorpion was an up gunned variant, but I believe she was just fitted with flagship accommodation, as you say.

Both classes of gunboat will be heard about quite a bit in forthcoming posts in my timeline.
 
I was wondering on how the RN's ASW capabilities are going to be against the Japanese subs and how much more capable than what the IJN is expecting? Given the fact that the RN has been fighting U boats since autumn of 39 and this is 2 years on, how will the lessons learned work here in the Far East?
 

Driftless

Donor
I was wondering on how the RN's ASW capabilities are going to be against the Japanese subs and how much more capable than what the IJN is expecting? Given the fact that the RN has been fighting U boats since autumn of 39 and this is 2 years on, how will the lessons learned work here in the Far East?
That should be a strong point for the RN. On the other hand, there's going to be more of a Japanese air presence over parts of the South China Sea and maybe the approaches to the Malacca Strait, that may impinge on RN ops. On the third hand (!), There's also more of a Commonwealth air presence as well, so some 3-D and 4-D* chess coming up.

* 4-D = right place, right time estimates.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
While there is no doubt that the Japanese will have a strong aerial presence over the South China Sea, it’s going to be very stretched by its commitments over land and along the frontlines. And with the improvements to their air component that the British have made, they are going to have their hands full. British experience in the Mediterranean and North Sea, has shown that level bombers are next to useless against ships at sea that have the ability to manoeuvre. It is only torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighter bombers that are effective , and unless your dive bombers have the right bombs and the crews been trained in maritime attacks. As was shown at Dunkirk, dive bombers that were effective against land targets, were next to useless against shipping. Plus it has to be remembered that the bigger the target the greater the chance of hitting it, miss your aiming mark on a ship 800 feet long by a 100 feet, odds are you will still hit it. Miss your aiming mark on a ship that is 150 long by a 100 feet, odds are that you will miss it, and such a small ship is also a very difficult target for a torpedo. If the majority over the second rate ships are of the west coast and only the first rate ships are of the east coast, then the west coast ships stand little chance of being attacked from the air, while those ships of the east coast and operating in the South China Sea. Stand a good chance of seeing very little aerial attacks themselves, unless they are major units, basically cruisers and above, as the Japanese try to balance their commitments to Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines. And as the majority of the aerial units are Army not Navy, given the choice who do you think they will make the greatest commitments too, adding the Army’s land campaign, or trying to sink a couple of small warships to aid the Navy.

RR.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Arrived Colombo 6th November 1941 - https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/13121.html
Left Colombo in company with Seamew on the 12th December 1941 - http://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/escort-for-hms-revenge.95457/
Transferred to Persian Gulf December 1941 and arrived in Basra in January 1942 - http://frankstaylorfamilyandroyalnavyhistory.net/HMSScarab/HMSScarabWW2.html

I can't find any mention of Seamew between this and her being scrapped in Basra in 1947, so I strongly suspect they went together from Colombo to Basra: it's ~10-12 days of steaming but they'd need at least 2 refuelling stops on the way. That means a 12th December departure date is consistent with being transferred directly to Basra and arriving in January.
Hi pdf27, thank you, consider penance paid in full 👍
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The hull form for the Insect class was picked up from the earlier Humber class - originally a class of riverine monitors built for the Brazilians but bought by the RN when the Brazilians put them up for sale. They were responsible for despatching the German cruiser Konigsberg in the Rufiji river. Pic shows HMS Mersey being repaired whilst beached. View attachment 861249
Hi Admiral Jellicoe, I didn't know of this operation, thank you for educating me, for others otherwise ignorant of the facts, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rufiji_Delta
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Further to the post by @pdf27 above about HMS Scarab's movements, https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1942.htm confirms that she was on station in the Persian Gulf on 31st Jan, 28th Feb and 31st March 1942.
That whole site is a mine of information (which is both good and bad - lots to find, but lots to search through). One page in particular might be of interest, as it covers the preparation for war and the first couple of months of the war itself, including the loss of HMS Repulse and PoW, then the loss of Singapore, plus some personal commentary by the admiral on what happened. It's here: https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm
A couple of extracts which caught my eye as relevant to your TL:
Sunday 7th December 1941:​
Telegraphic discussion with H.M. Minister in Bangkok and the Foreign Office as to the line to be taken in regard to the possible violation of Thai neutrality culminated in an impassioned appeal from Sir Josiah Crosby that we should take no steps to occupy any Thai territory, before the Japanese did so. After consultation with the Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, Commander in Chief Far East decided not to put Operation MATADOR in force for the following reasons.​
1). That the reports of Japanese forces and deductions as to their destinations were at the best doubtful owing to bad conditions.​
2). That in any case, if directed against the Kra Isthmus these forces would get there before our own; and​
3). Because the Japanese movements might well be intended to induce us to violate Thai neutrality.​
Saturday 13th December 1941:​
Telegram from B.A.D. Washington 2115/12 indicated that United Stated Asiatic Fleet was now to withdraw from Philippines towards N.W. Australia rather than south westward towards Singapore. This was a complete change from the plans formed before hostilities (in A.B.D. Conference, etc) and gravely prejudiced the chances of holding Malaya.​

Really enjoying this TL and the discussions - thanks everyone.
Hi FriendlyGhost, that was a bit harder for you, pdf27 got in with the info first, but you more than recovered with some other excellent work, like your footwork, consider your penance paid in full too 👍
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
While there is no doubt that the Japanese will have a strong aerial presence over the South China Sea, it’s going to be very stretched by its commitments over land and along the frontlines. And with the improvements to their air component that the British have made, they are going to have their hands full. British experience in the Mediterranean and North Sea, has shown that level bombers are next to useless against ships at sea that have the ability to manoeuvre. It is only torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighter bombers that are effective , and unless your dive bombers have the right bombs and the crews been trained in maritime attacks. As was shown at Dunkirk, dive bombers that were effective against land targets, were next to useless against shipping. Plus it has to be remembered that the bigger the target the greater the chance of hitting it, miss your aiming mark on a ship 800 feet long by a 100 feet, odds are you will still hit it. Miss your aiming mark on a ship that is 150 long by a 100 feet, odds are that you will miss it, and such a small ship is also a very difficult target for a torpedo. If the majority over the second rate ships are of the west coast and only the first rate ships are of the east coast, then the west coast ships stand little chance of being attacked from the air, while those ships of the east coast and operating in the South China Sea. Stand a good chance of seeing very little aerial attacks themselves, unless they are major units, basically cruisers and above, as the Japanese try to balance their commitments to Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines. And as the majority of the aerial units are Army not Navy, given the choice who do you think they will make the greatest commitments too, adding the Army’s land campaign, or trying to sink a couple of small warships to aid the Navy.

RR.
Hi Ramp-Rat, as always your synopsis of my timeline is very good, but I would want noted one thing about the Japanese forces. Both the IJA and IJN could be very focused on a single minded goal, regardless of the others need. I expect the IJN's aircraft to be VERY focused on the Royal Navy's assets, their first line units are as good as anyone's and they like to hit hard in numbers. It is true, as you say, that any IJN failing will not be picked up by the IJA, but they have to fail first.
 
MWI 41112318 Totensonntag, Sunday Of The Dead

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Sunday 23 November;

Following the actions on the 21st, overnight, both sides revaluated their situation, and adjusted their operations. Cunningham, badly misinformed, believed that with 170 German tanks destroyed or damaged, and the German attacks driven off, he now had the initiative again, and would work on prising open the Axis grip around Tobruk. Maj Gen Scobie, commanding the Tobruk garrison would consolidate his position, widening the corridor, by taking the strongpoint Tiger, although the other two objectives, Tugun and Dalby Square continued to hold out.

Heath’s XIII Corps was doing well too, the 4th Indian Division, having reached Sidi Omar, had begun rolling up the Axis defenders holding the frontier, from the rear, while the New Zealand Division, under Freyberg were already east of Sollum and Bardia, the 5th Bde capturing Fort Capuzzo, and their 6th Brigade was on the Trigh Capuzzo heading for Tobruk, along with Matilda tanks of the 1st Army Tank Bde.

Meanwhile, Norrie’s XXX Corps would take a breather in the morning, the 7th Support Bde had taken a battering, and the 7th Armoured was reduced to a cadre strength. Both the 4th and 22nd Armoured Bdes were still capable, and were close to joining them. The 5th South African Bde, having moved up to assist in the final breakthrough to Tobruk, had seen their first attack on point 178 repulsed.

But Rommel wasn’t badly bruised, indeed, he was pleased to have stalled the Tobruk breakout, and believed he had heavily defeated British units around Sidi Rezegh, as well as both the Armoured Bdes to the south. What he couldn’t allow for now, was for the British to entrench infantry on the two escarpments between Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk.
Leaving the 15th Panzer Division to rest and regroup, he ordered the 21st Panzer Division to attack.

The attacks went in and both the 7th Armoured and 7th Support Bdes would have been wiped out, but thanks to the early arrival of the 22nd Bde, and the leadership of Brigadier Jock Campbell, who continually rallied beaten troops, leading them back into the fray, the British survived. The battle was often at close quarters, the swirling dust and smoke obscuring vision. Late afternoon, Gott ordered his Brigades to retreat south, closing around the 5th South African Bde, which was camped close to the southern escarpment, and there they laagered for the night, licking their wounds.

4th Armoured Bde had been slower to join the battle, indeed only the 3rd RTR had arrived in time to help screen the retreat. After sunset, they began to leaguer for the night, the CO Gatehouse left his HQ to attend a conference with Maj Gen Gott, and sometime later, redeploying westward, units of the German 15th Panzer Division, ran into the brigade HQ, capturing over 150 soldiers, tanks, armoured cars and trucks, as well as its signals and XXX Corps codes, compromising British radio traffic.

Sunday morning, Totensonntag, to the Germans, a religious holiday to mourn and remember their dearly departed, began badly for them, as the New Zealand 6th Bde, moving along the Trigh Capuzzo, stumbled across the Afrika Korps HQ, camped along a wadi, capturing most of their signal’s unit, along with their cypher experts, who read the British signals, sending the rest scattering in all directions. Cruwell escaped capture, being with his Panzer Divisions.

That was because Rommel had ordered both Panzer Divisions, along with the Italian Ariete armoured division, after getting permission from Mussolini no less, to use it, to assemble together and launch a three-division attack to wipe out the British XXX Corps south of Sidi Rezegh. Accordingly, Cruwell organising, added 21st Panzer’s infantry and some artillery to the German defenders already on the escarpments, and he redeployed all his armoured units south of the British, to link up with the Ariete Division. intent on sweeping the British away. During the redeployment, parts of the 21st Panzer drove through the British, first the 7th Support Bde, scattering them, and then the 5th South African Bde, disrupting them too.

Joining the Italians, and then re deploying for the attack north into the British, with the German defenders on the escarpments at their backs, took until 3pm. It gave the British some time to regroup and organise, and for the artillery of the South Africans and 7th Support Group to prepare, but the land they were on was rock hard, stopping the South African infantry from effectively digging in.

Over 150 Panzers and Italian M13/40s rolled forward, lorried infantry and towed guns following, almost like a cavalry charge. The British had readied for them, as best they could be, and their artillery was quite effective although not decisive. Soon the Panzers were among the South African infantry, causing carnage, running over positions and destroying guns. Both the British 22nd armoured Bde on the South African left, and what remained of the rest of the British Bdes, on the right, were able to partly step out of the way, and so avoid annihilation, but the South Africans took the full brunt of the attack. Of a roll call of 5,800, less than 2,000 later made it back to Brtish lines, nearly 3,400 were captured, the rest dead, and the 5th South African Bde had ceased to exist.

When Cunningham heard of the loss of the South African’s along with most of the tank force, he was convinced he had lost the battle, and to save what he had left, began giving orders to withdraw both the remnants of XXX Corps and XIII Corps back to the frontier. But as those orders were going out, Auchinleck was being told of his decision, and was quickly on his way from Cairo to Cunningham’s HQ.

And there we’ll leave it for now folks, with the British having been defeated at Sidi Rezegh, and with the real prospect of losing their army.
 
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A good battle report, I always noticed that the Italian army preformed quite capably when commanded by German officers & that it's poor performance was often due to the incompetence of the Italian commanders & politicians pulling the strings.
I remember in 1985, when I went to France for the first time, trying to turn my French O'level into working French, sitting watching TV on a farm on Sunday, with a group of young French lads, an Italian film dubbed into French
I got the impression at the time that the premise of the film was that the Italians would have won the 2nd Battle of El Alemain if it wasn't for the mistakes of the Germans, but that could have been my poor comprehension of French at the time 😂, really should find time to watch it again.
As always good work, carry on carrying on 👍
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Hi Ramp-Rat, as always your synopsis of my timeline is very good, but I would want noted one thing about the Japanese forces. Both the IJA and IJN could be very focused on a single minded goal, regardless of the others need. I expect the IJN's aircraft to be VERY focused on the Royal Navy's assets, their first line units are as good as anyone's and they like to hit hard in numbers. It is true, as you say, that any IJN failing will not be picked up by the IJA, but they have to fail first.

Sir while I am in agreement with you that both the IJN and IJA, will be hyper focused on their own respective areas of interest, both have the problem that they can not afford to solely focus on the British. The IJN and its airforce have the RN and the USN to worry about, with the RNN coming in a close second, and they have to decide what it’s priorities are. While the IJA and their airforce have to split their resources between Malaysia and the Philippines, especially their bomber units. Which brings the problem of were you base these bombers, as while you need very little resources to provide for fighters. Basically a clear field and a source for fuel, plus some ammunition for the fighters guns, once you have bombers things get a bit more complicated. You need a much bigger field, and preferably with a much firmer surface, you also need hard standing to park your aircraft on to maintain, fuel and bomb them up, as you don’t want your bombers sinking into the ground. And you need much better infrastructure, to enable you to deliver the fuel, ammunition, bombs and spares, you require to support your bombers. The problem will be trying to get the two sides to cooperate is enormous, and the chances of army aircraft flying over the South China Sea reporting a sighting of a British/American ship, to their colleagues in a timely and accurate manner, is extremely small.

RR.
 
I have to agree with Ramp Rat on the IJA/IJN communications. You literally could have them based on the same airfield or have HQ's in the same city and they would send their reports up the chain of command all the way to Tokyo until it was sent to the other service. Not to mention the fact that they would ignore some things because that was the other sides area of expert or knowledge and they should have known about it.
 
At one point I attended a lecture where the “hook“ was a photo of an IJA escort carrier (Yamashiro Maru) and one of SNLF paratroopers during a mass tac jump. The lecture went on to talk about Japan’s self inflicted impediments to unity of command/effort and simplicity. Another interesting point brought up was the impact of the IJA/IJN divide on the political/military aspects of japan’s strategic decisions throughout the war.
 
I have to agree with Ramp Rat on the IJA/IJN communications. You literally could have them based on the same airfield or have HQ's in the same city and they would send their reports up the chain of command all the way to Tokyo until it was sent to the other service. Not to mention the fact that they would ignore some things because that was the other sides area of expert or knowledge and they should have known about it.
I do remember reading about twenty years ago that the IJN Bombers, who had the range that the IJA lacked, were bombing Cavite. They observed the movement of troops and supplies finally flooding out of Manila towards Bataan. They did not report it as a). their task was naval orientated so land forces were of no interest to them and b). why should the IJN do the IJA job for them, Let them do their own recon.
 
I do remember reading about twenty years ago that the IJN Bombers, who had the range that the IJA lacked, were bombing Cavite. They observed the movement of troops and supplies finally flooding out of Manila towards Bataan. They did not report it as a). their task was naval orientated so land forces were of no interest to them and b). why should the IJN do the IJA job for them, Let them do their own recon.

Very typical of IJN vs IJA, that must have been the follow up raid on Sangley Point going after the fuel tanks and the smaller service craft still docked there.
That would have to be after the 22nd when MacArthur decided to evacuate Manila and declare it an Open City.
Of course Mac Arthur vs the USN, was only marginally better. MacArthur did not tell Adm. Hart about the aba n document of Manila until the late afternoon of the 23rd. Leaving Hart, 2 days to evacuate everything the Navy had stored in the Manila waterfront warehouses, as well as everything salvageable from Cavite and Sangley point. Six months dry stores and extra uniforms for the USN and USMC, the USMC radar at Cavite, ( one of the few things salvaged) a dozen 3"/50 cal dp guns, lumber for navy construction projects, all abandoned. The Sangley Point radio Station destroyed along with spares for the unit on Corrigidor..
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
This is an example of the problem that both the Americans and British had IOTL, the abject failure of the authorities to make preparations in case the defence of the Philippines, Malaya and Singapore, wasn’t successful. However ITTL, while the Americans haven’t taken even the simplest precautions to deal with the result of a Japanese invasion. While the British have what limited resources they have, taken extensive measures to prepare, for a Japanese invasion. Should the Japanese invasion succeed, highly doubtful, they will find very little that they can use, that hasn’t been destroyed. The British have made major preparations for the invasion, and are fully prepared to salt the earth in front of the Japanese, plus continue the resistance after. As for the relationship between the Japanese Navy and Army, which only contributed to the Japanese failure in the long run, it is too well established by now for there to be any chance of a successful reconciliation.

RR.
 
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