Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Driftless
Donor
The high cruising speed of the liners greatly reduced the opportunity of submarine attack. That speed and some frequent random course alterations helped.
This is true, but there was no submarine threat in the Indian Ocean/Far East until Japan entered the war. No U-boat was sent round the Cape of Good Hope until late 1942, so the only threat was the German auxiliary raiders. But the same reasoning applied there, a liner convoy cruising at 21.5knts (the speed of Nieuw Amsterdam, the slowest ship in the convoy) would have to make some major mistakes to be under any threat from a raider which could not exceed 20knots even flat out.
Once there was an actual sub threat in the Indian Ocean the view was that 21.5 knots was just a bit too slow, some of the newer Axis subs could go faster than that on the surface, so the slower liners got convoyed from then on. The Queens with their 30knots+ cruise were still sent out on the occasional unescorted convoy as they were deemed 'safe' from even the best sub or raider at that speed.
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And of course tragically Queen Mary ran down the AA cruiser Curacoa when she inadvertently crossed her bows
Living in Leiden, whose university is twinned with Oxford & regarded as THE university to attend & where membership of some of the fraternities is the passport to a nice carriere via the old boys&girls network, I can confirm that, despite appearances, the class system is alive & kicking in the Netherlands. Quite frankly stuck-up bunch of nobs in many cases.
The other thing to consider with Dutch troopships is why would they need more than one or two? The KNIL was locally recruited and NCOs and in many cases officers were long term residents whose families had married locally. The need to ship battalions and batteries every few years does not exist.
This. The Dutch don't need troopships because they are not going to move large forces over the ocean. The KNIL was created specifically so the main (and conscript) army in the European Netherlands could stay there.
MWI 41111816 The IJA and IJN Work Together
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 18 November;
They both sat back, and gave each other a small a bow of acknowledgment, a slight smile on Vice Admiral Ozawa’s face, and a bigger one on Lieutenant General Yamashita’s. The plans of co-operation were noted and signed, as the ‘Saigon Agreement’, copies in the hands of aides of both the staffs of the Malaya Invasion Group and the Twenty Fifth Army.
Twelve days ago, back in Tokyo, Yamashita had been granted an audience with Emperor Hirohito, and given command of the newly forming 25th Army. His appointment came not without some political arm wrestling on the part of Count Hisaichi Terauchi, the general commanding the Southern Expeditionary Army Group, which controlled the newly forming 25th Army, along with the 14th, 15th and 16th Armies. Terauchi knew he needed good capable generals, and Yamashita was one of their best. However, Yamashita’s report, on returning from a six-month mission to Germany and Italy, had in part, urged for changes to the Army command structure which the new Prime Minister, Tojo, was strongly opposed to, indeed Tojo had banished him to a command in Manchuria, such was his hostility to the proposals. Fortunately for Yamashita, Terauchi had his way, but there would be many with their knives out, including Yamashita’s Chief of Staff, Operations and Planning, Col Tsuji, and Lt-Gen Takuma Nishimura, CO of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division, just waiting for him to fail.
Terauchi’s insistence on having the best units available assigned meant the veteran 5th and 18th Divisions were Yamashita’s main force, admittedly with one regiment taken from the 18th for operations in Borneo. The other two divisions given to him were the Imperial Guards Division currently in Indo China and the 56th Division. Yamashita held a poor view of the Guards, who hadn’t seen any combat, and had tried to swap them with one of Iida’s 15th Army divisions, and when unsuccessful, even tried to rotate them with the 56th back in Japan, but planning was too advanced and he was forced to accept them. The timetable was set at 100 days for the capture of Malaya, and the fall of Singapore.
But what made the 25th Army special was the other units that had been added. Firstly, there was the 3rd Tank Group, with four tank regiments, then there was a large number of independent artillery units, and lastly extra engineer units covering everything from ship to shore landing operations, bridge building and river crossing, railway repair and maintenance, and combat engineers. After having accepted his order of battle, and reviewed the plans for operations devised by Tsuji, it was time to find agreement with the Navy, as to who went where and when.
The meeting in Saigon had started with the usual element of mistrust, with no desire to understand the other’s problems. Ozawa had set out the concerns of the Naval Staff, fear for the safety of their ships, and the proposal being that any contested landing areas be softened by prolonged bombardment of British defensive positions, and pre-emptive air attacks on airfields, and other strategic installations.
The Army’s view was different, they were advocating the advantage of surprise, the need to give no warning to the defenders, and strike quickly. The two sides were at a stalemate. And then Yamashita began to modify his stance. In part it was an acceptance of the logistics required to mount such an attack. The original plan had called for five divisions. Yamashita had quickly reduced that down to four, purely on logistical grounds.
Now they both began to give more. Taking note of intelligence reports that the British forces were very poorly trained, under equipped and fixated on defensive positions, Yamashita took the risk that they could manage with just three divisions. He would achieve his objectives by adopting the plan put forward by Tsuji, using the tactics of a “Driving Charge” pushing hard and not allowing his enemy to settle or gain the initiative. This would be delivered by having both of his west coast divisions, 5th and Imperial Guards, motorised as much as possible, with the infantry riding bicycles. Plenty of tanks and artillery would overcome strongpoints, while the large number of engineers would quickly restore destroyed bridges, as well as providing an element of riverine amphibious capability.
Ozawa responded with a promise of delivering half of two veteran divisions in one single wave, over a number of separate points along the coast. Next Ozawa promised a second wave delivering the rest of the first two divisions within ten days, while Yamashita conceded the third division would arrive later, overland from Indochina, through Thailand. Ozawa responded with a promise to continue to supply him through the port of Singora, once captured. And lastly, Ozawa agreed that his ships would risk total annihilation, by conducting the landings with no prior bombardment or air attack, on the agreement that Yamashita accepted the same for his forces once they landed. Their game of Go was over.
They both sat back, and gave each other a small a bow of acknowledgment, a slight smile on Vice Admiral Ozawa’s face, and a bigger one on Lieutenant General Yamashita’s. The plans of co-operation were noted and signed, as the ‘Saigon Agreement’, copies in the hands of aides of both the staffs of the Malaya Invasion Group and the Twenty Fifth Army.
Twelve days ago, back in Tokyo, Yamashita had been granted an audience with Emperor Hirohito, and given command of the newly forming 25th Army. His appointment came not without some political arm wrestling on the part of Count Hisaichi Terauchi, the general commanding the Southern Expeditionary Army Group, which controlled the newly forming 25th Army, along with the 14th, 15th and 16th Armies. Terauchi knew he needed good capable generals, and Yamashita was one of their best. However, Yamashita’s report, on returning from a six-month mission to Germany and Italy, had in part, urged for changes to the Army command structure which the new Prime Minister, Tojo, was strongly opposed to, indeed Tojo had banished him to a command in Manchuria, such was his hostility to the proposals. Fortunately for Yamashita, Terauchi had his way, but there would be many with their knives out, including Yamashita’s Chief of Staff, Operations and Planning, Col Tsuji, and Lt-Gen Takuma Nishimura, CO of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division, just waiting for him to fail.
Terauchi’s insistence on having the best units available assigned meant the veteran 5th and 18th Divisions were Yamashita’s main force, admittedly with one regiment taken from the 18th for operations in Borneo. The other two divisions given to him were the Imperial Guards Division currently in Indo China and the 56th Division. Yamashita held a poor view of the Guards, who hadn’t seen any combat, and had tried to swap them with one of Iida’s 15th Army divisions, and when unsuccessful, even tried to rotate them with the 56th back in Japan, but planning was too advanced and he was forced to accept them. The timetable was set at 100 days for the capture of Malaya, and the fall of Singapore.
But what made the 25th Army special was the other units that had been added. Firstly, there was the 3rd Tank Group, with four tank regiments, then there was a large number of independent artillery units, and lastly extra engineer units covering everything from ship to shore landing operations, bridge building and river crossing, railway repair and maintenance, and combat engineers. After having accepted his order of battle, and reviewed the plans for operations devised by Tsuji, it was time to find agreement with the Navy, as to who went where and when.
The meeting in Saigon had started with the usual element of mistrust, with no desire to understand the other’s problems. Ozawa had set out the concerns of the Naval Staff, fear for the safety of their ships, and the proposal being that any contested landing areas be softened by prolonged bombardment of British defensive positions, and pre-emptive air attacks on airfields, and other strategic installations.
The Army’s view was different, they were advocating the advantage of surprise, the need to give no warning to the defenders, and strike quickly. The two sides were at a stalemate. And then Yamashita began to modify his stance. In part it was an acceptance of the logistics required to mount such an attack. The original plan had called for five divisions. Yamashita had quickly reduced that down to four, purely on logistical grounds.
Now they both began to give more. Taking note of intelligence reports that the British forces were very poorly trained, under equipped and fixated on defensive positions, Yamashita took the risk that they could manage with just three divisions. He would achieve his objectives by adopting the plan put forward by Tsuji, using the tactics of a “Driving Charge” pushing hard and not allowing his enemy to settle or gain the initiative. This would be delivered by having both of his west coast divisions, 5th and Imperial Guards, motorised as much as possible, with the infantry riding bicycles. Plenty of tanks and artillery would overcome strongpoints, while the large number of engineers would quickly restore destroyed bridges, as well as providing an element of riverine amphibious capability.
Ozawa responded with a promise of delivering half of two veteran divisions in one single wave, over a number of separate points along the coast. Next Ozawa promised a second wave delivering the rest of the first two divisions within ten days, while Yamashita conceded the third division would arrive later, overland from Indochina, through Thailand. Ozawa responded with a promise to continue to supply him through the port of Singora, once captured. And lastly, Ozawa agreed that his ships would risk total annihilation, by conducting the landings with no prior bombardment or air attack, on the agreement that Yamashita accepted the same for his forces once they landed. Their game of Go was over.
@Fatboy Coxy, Depending on how deep you want to get into events in NOI (Netherlands East Indies), the following link might be interesting for you....
My superficial understanding of this, open to correction by some of your Dutch readers, is that the Moluccans were amongst the first contacted by the Dutch in the initial colonial period, while they were already resisting the expansion of the Muslim conquests of the archipelago, thus they were more open to co-operation with the Dutch, indeed a sizeable proportion adopted Dutch reformed Christianity.
The Moloccans in particular & the Ambones in general would provide a solid core for the KNIL, the civil service & private industry middle management levels, as well as a number of military units with a warrior ethos akin to that of the Maori.
After WW2 they generally fought on the side of the Dutch against the so called republicans, and when the dust settled they were a problem.
Their treatment was similar to what I learnt when living in France from descendants of the Kabille soldiers who served for France in the Algerian war of Independence.
Around 1951 or so they were "deployed" to the Netherlands Home Army with their immediate family with them. On arrival in the Netherlands they were literally discharged from military service on the quayside, social housing was provided in the Southern Netherlands (remember this is 1950's Europe!) but further they were pretty much left to find their way in a strange country where they understood the language but little else.
One of the reasons behind this...
en.wikipedia.org
Until today this is a running sore for the descendents of the Moluccan community. They maintain their seperate identity, have their own version of the Hells Angels, clash with Dutch justice department frequently, had a minor civil war with the local Moroccan crimi... community a few years ago.
At the same time back in Ambon, there is a living resistance to being part of Indonesia which resultes in violence from both sides frequently. There is a Government in Exile in the Netherlands but not recognised by anyone as far as I know.
Just how far you planning on taking this TL? Did you know what you were getting into 😂. Blunted Sickle Mk2 🤔
Hope I'm not making your writing too complicated. 👍
My superficial understanding of this, open to correction by some of your Dutch readers, is that the Moluccans were amongst the first contacted by the Dutch in the initial colonial period, while they were already resisting the expansion of the Muslim conquests of the archipelago, thus they were more open to co-operation with the Dutch, indeed a sizeable proportion adopted Dutch reformed Christianity.
The Moloccans in particular & the Ambones in general would provide a solid core for the KNIL, the civil service & private industry middle management levels, as well as a number of military units with a warrior ethos akin to that of the Maori.
After WW2 they generally fought on the side of the Dutch against the so called republicans, and when the dust settled they were a problem.
Their treatment was similar to what I learnt when living in France from descendants of the Kabille soldiers who served for France in the Algerian war of Independence.
Around 1951 or so they were "deployed" to the Netherlands Home Army with their immediate family with them. On arrival in the Netherlands they were literally discharged from military service on the quayside, social housing was provided in the Southern Netherlands (remember this is 1950's Europe!) but further they were pretty much left to find their way in a strange country where they understood the language but little else.
One of the reasons behind this...
1977 Dutch train hijacking - Wikipedia
At the same time back in Ambon, there is a living resistance to being part of Indonesia which resultes in violence from both sides frequently. There is a Government in Exile in the Netherlands but not recognised by anyone as far as I know.
Just how far you planning on taking this TL? Did you know what you were getting into 😂. Blunted Sickle Mk2 🤔
Hope I'm not making your writing too complicated. 👍
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It's nice to see Yamashita portrayed as a human being. He was their best.
I read somewhere or other that he had personal bodyguards to protect him from assassination attempts from the Imperial Guards.
Same problem Yamamoto* had, they both favored Strike North. Yamamoto was moved from the Navy Department to Head of the Combined Fleet to make it harder to assassinate him. His famous quote about dictating peace in the white house gets misinterpreted. He meant that Japan would have to conquer the US in order to get peace and he argued that it was impossible.
Yamashita ** wasn't a fan of Government policy either.
* Yamamoto opposed the Japanese invasion of northeast China in 1931, the subsequent full-scale land war with China in 1937, and the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1940. As Deputy Navy Minister, he apologized to United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew for the bombing of the gunboat USS Panay in December 1937. These issues made him a target of assassination threats by pro-war militarists.
The Japanese Army, annoyed at Yamamoto's unflinching opposition to a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo treaty, dispatched military police to "guard" him, a ruse by the Army to keep an eye on him. He was later reassigned from the naval ministry to sea as the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet on August 30, 1939. This was done by acting Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai to make it harder for assassins to target Yamamoto. Yonai was certain that if Yamamoto remained ashore, he would be killed before the year ended.
** In 1922, upon his return to Japan, Major Yamashita served in the Imperial Headquarters and the Staff College, receiving promotion to lieutenant-colonel in August 1925. Yamashita unsuccessfully promoted a military reduction plan, the Ugaki Army Reduction Program, aimed at reforming the Japanese army by streamlining its organization and pushing education, despite facing fierce opposition from factions within the Army.
Yamashita was promoted to lieutenant-general in November 1937. He insisted that Japan should end the conflict with China and keep peaceful relations with the United States and Great Britain, but he was ignored and subsequently assigned to an unimportant post in the Kwantung Army.
The Japanese Army, annoyed at Yamamoto's unflinching opposition to a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo treaty, dispatched military police to "guard" him, a ruse by the Army to keep an eye on him. He was later reassigned from the naval ministry to sea as the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet on August 30, 1939. This was done by acting Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai to make it harder for assassins to target Yamamoto. Yonai was certain that if Yamamoto remained ashore, he would be killed before the year ended.
** In 1922, upon his return to Japan, Major Yamashita served in the Imperial Headquarters and the Staff College, receiving promotion to lieutenant-colonel in August 1925. Yamashita unsuccessfully promoted a military reduction plan, the Ugaki Army Reduction Program, aimed at reforming the Japanese army by streamlining its organization and pushing education, despite facing fierce opposition from factions within the Army.
Yamashita was promoted to lieutenant-general in November 1937. He insisted that Japan should end the conflict with China and keep peaceful relations with the United States and Great Britain, but he was ignored and subsequently assigned to an unimportant post in the Kwantung Army.
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Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
While our authors latest post is basically a rehash of the events OOTL, and the forces allocated to the interment Japanese assault south, is I assume the same, as they were IOTL. I did note one thing, the failure of the Japanese intelligence services to recognise the changes that have occurred macro and micro in the British and Dutch situations. On the macro changes that they have ignored is the devision of the British command structure in the East, into two, with the Far East command not being a sub command of India, but a totally separate structure that it is itself responsible to London. This change more than any other, is going to have a significant impact on events in future, and has had a major effect on the proceeding months, and the preparations being made by the British and the Dutch for the Japanese assault. The Japanese view of the British and Dutch, is far more relevant to the situation as was IOTL, than the situation as is ITTL, and they are basing their plans on a belief that opposition that will rapidly fail. Their intelligence services are still telling the leadership, that the British are poorly trained, under equipped and fixated on holding onto defence positions. The fact that while the British and Dutch forces are still not as well equipped as their fellows in Europe and the Middle East, they are in general better equipped than they were IOTL. The British in particular are far better trained than they were IOTL, and not so dedicated to retaining fixed positions, and thus far more prepared to be flexible in defence. In addition the Japanese are making a major mistake of setting a fixed and complex timetable, which has very little ability to absorb any delays, or the resources to allow a rapid change in plans. The devision that is due to provide reinforcements by progressing overland from FIC, once it has started on its march, is basically committed to completing its march, as the Japanese do not have the resources to allow it to stop, turn around and be shipped ether to the Malayan front or elsewhere. And if the British are able to delay its progress in any way, even by just a few days, the strain on the devisions that are already in contact with the British forces, might cause them to stall their assault, and the problem then becomes how do the Japanese start their offensive again. Every little delay in achieving their goals, is going to progressively impact them, and increase the possibility of them failing to achieve against the British and subsequently the Dutch their goals. Note events in the Philippines, will have little impact on those in Malaya, Burma and the DEI, at first, it is only after the conquest of the Philippines, that the Japanese may have units to spare to reinforce their assault in Malaya or the DEI.
RR.
RR.
MWI 41111919 Surprised
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Wednesday 19 November;
4pm, it was a routine sighting, another merchant ship to close with and check. But it was a little odd, had she just changed course? and she was putting in a decent speed 14-15 knots, more than he would have expected. Nevertheless, all would be revealed soon, he increased speed to 25 knots and the distance began to melt away.
The warship was steadily closing on them, could they bluff or would they fight. The captain sent his men to action stations, but on the exterior, they looked as before, a merchant cargo ship.
They had been trying with the signal lamp, repeatedly sending NNJ (You should make your signal letters) but had no response. Closer now they used flags and signalled VH (You should hoist your signal letters). The captain had the main armament manned.
4.30pm, they were close to 16,000 yards away, just off the stern, and still closing. The merchant, signalled back, but the funnel obstructed her flags, they signalled to her “Make your signal letters clear”.
The range was down to under 9,000 yards now, the warship still approaching from the stern. The signal officer lengthened the halyard allowing the flags to swing out to starboard, allowing the warship to read then. PKQI, and hoisted the Dutch merchant ensign.
So, she’s Dutch, the Straat Malakka, but somethings not right. Maybe she’s a raiders prize, First Lieutenant, I want a ship’s boarding party ready but kept out of sight, we’ll try and capture her before they scuttle, if she is. Ask where’s she bound.
5pm, Tell them Batavia. Their asking for port of origin and cargo? Signal back Freemantle with Piece Goods. Tell the W/O to transmit distress signal QQQ, latitude and longitude, time as per GMT, and give the name Straat Malakka.
Bring her alongside, distance 1500 yards, main armament and torpedoes train on target. Shut down Walrus and secure the catapult. Signal the secret callsign.
5.30pm, Whats she signalling now, IK, prepare for typhoon, what the hells that, Christ, I bet it’s a secret sign, we have to fight. Run up the ensign and clear the decks for action. 4, 5, 6 seconds, guns ready, open fire.
My god what’s he doing, the ensign man, oh bloody hell, he’s a raider, that’s a gun showing! Open fire main batteries, sound action stations. Fuck, we missed her, how, Guns get a grip of your people now!
Nein, nein, gunnery officer, all guns aim at their bridge, fire again, yes better, hit, and another, yes again. Put another salvo into their bridge. Torpedoes away, excellent, open fire with the AA guns, play on their 4 inch and torpedo tubes.
First lieutenant, sir the bridge has gone, everyone dead, and the gun control tower, director is out of action, you’re in command. Ok get a message to the main batteries, local control, also message to the engine room, full power, we need to run.
Shift aim, all guns, front two turrets. Sir we’ve been hit, rear gun, and we have a fire in oil tank F, damage control parties dealing, and I hope to get the gun back in action soon.
First Lieutenant, guns A & B are out of action, Y turret has jammed, only X firing. Torpedo, port beam, she going to hit, ahhh.
Torpedo hit, wow big hole, she’s turning, heading into us, she’s going to ram us. Fire on her waterline, hit, yes and again, yes, she’s going to miss, will pass us astern.
Engine room whats happened, how bad, oh bloody hell, what speed can you give me, is that all, yes, I have steerage. X gun unable to fire, jammed on a bearing. Starboard tubes bearing, fire, one, fire two. Engine room yes, the chiefs gone, and his second officer, well do what you can, Christ what a mess.
Torpedo’s in the water, quick, hard a port, chief give me full power, yes everything. Guns keep firing, hit those rear turrets, their passing astern, phew, just, whats that noise, chief, yes, engines have failed, you can’t fix them, firefighting hoses are failing, no pressure. Mein Gott, we can’t control the fire.
6pm, First lieutenant, they’ve stopped firing, they look adrift. Yes sir, we still have steerage, about 2 knots. Last fire at the rear of the ship out, magazines flooded, but we can’t get to the front of the ship yet, fire below bridge still out of control.
6.30pm, we can’t control the fire, its only a matter of time before it sets off the magazines or mine hold. Prepare to abandon ship, get the wounded up, ready the boats and lift rafts.
We’re down at the bow, a lot, much more and the sea will be breaking over her. We’re winning the fight with the fire. The doctor reports his out of morphine, he has no where else to put the wounded, can he bring some up on deck.
Everyone off sir, but we’re drifting apart. She’s taking her time going down. Ahh spoke to soon, the fire must have reached the mine hold. She was a good ship, she did well. I guess we just hope for someone to come along, prison for us, if we survive.
Whats that noise, oh my god the bows come off, we’re going down fast, urghhh.
4pm, it was a routine sighting, another merchant ship to close with and check. But it was a little odd, had she just changed course? and she was putting in a decent speed 14-15 knots, more than he would have expected. Nevertheless, all would be revealed soon, he increased speed to 25 knots and the distance began to melt away.
The warship was steadily closing on them, could they bluff or would they fight. The captain sent his men to action stations, but on the exterior, they looked as before, a merchant cargo ship.
They had been trying with the signal lamp, repeatedly sending NNJ (You should make your signal letters) but had no response. Closer now they used flags and signalled VH (You should hoist your signal letters). The captain had the main armament manned.
4.30pm, they were close to 16,000 yards away, just off the stern, and still closing. The merchant, signalled back, but the funnel obstructed her flags, they signalled to her “Make your signal letters clear”.
The range was down to under 9,000 yards now, the warship still approaching from the stern. The signal officer lengthened the halyard allowing the flags to swing out to starboard, allowing the warship to read then. PKQI, and hoisted the Dutch merchant ensign.
So, she’s Dutch, the Straat Malakka, but somethings not right. Maybe she’s a raiders prize, First Lieutenant, I want a ship’s boarding party ready but kept out of sight, we’ll try and capture her before they scuttle, if she is. Ask where’s she bound.
5pm, Tell them Batavia. Their asking for port of origin and cargo? Signal back Freemantle with Piece Goods. Tell the W/O to transmit distress signal QQQ, latitude and longitude, time as per GMT, and give the name Straat Malakka.
Bring her alongside, distance 1500 yards, main armament and torpedoes train on target. Shut down Walrus and secure the catapult. Signal the secret callsign.
5.30pm, Whats she signalling now, IK, prepare for typhoon, what the hells that, Christ, I bet it’s a secret sign, we have to fight. Run up the ensign and clear the decks for action. 4, 5, 6 seconds, guns ready, open fire.
My god what’s he doing, the ensign man, oh bloody hell, he’s a raider, that’s a gun showing! Open fire main batteries, sound action stations. Fuck, we missed her, how, Guns get a grip of your people now!
Nein, nein, gunnery officer, all guns aim at their bridge, fire again, yes better, hit, and another, yes again. Put another salvo into their bridge. Torpedoes away, excellent, open fire with the AA guns, play on their 4 inch and torpedo tubes.
First lieutenant, sir the bridge has gone, everyone dead, and the gun control tower, director is out of action, you’re in command. Ok get a message to the main batteries, local control, also message to the engine room, full power, we need to run.
Shift aim, all guns, front two turrets. Sir we’ve been hit, rear gun, and we have a fire in oil tank F, damage control parties dealing, and I hope to get the gun back in action soon.
First Lieutenant, guns A & B are out of action, Y turret has jammed, only X firing. Torpedo, port beam, she going to hit, ahhh.
Torpedo hit, wow big hole, she’s turning, heading into us, she’s going to ram us. Fire on her waterline, hit, yes and again, yes, she’s going to miss, will pass us astern.
Engine room whats happened, how bad, oh bloody hell, what speed can you give me, is that all, yes, I have steerage. X gun unable to fire, jammed on a bearing. Starboard tubes bearing, fire, one, fire two. Engine room yes, the chiefs gone, and his second officer, well do what you can, Christ what a mess.
Torpedo’s in the water, quick, hard a port, chief give me full power, yes everything. Guns keep firing, hit those rear turrets, their passing astern, phew, just, whats that noise, chief, yes, engines have failed, you can’t fix them, firefighting hoses are failing, no pressure. Mein Gott, we can’t control the fire.
6pm, First lieutenant, they’ve stopped firing, they look adrift. Yes sir, we still have steerage, about 2 knots. Last fire at the rear of the ship out, magazines flooded, but we can’t get to the front of the ship yet, fire below bridge still out of control.
6.30pm, we can’t control the fire, its only a matter of time before it sets off the magazines or mine hold. Prepare to abandon ship, get the wounded up, ready the boats and lift rafts.
We’re down at the bow, a lot, much more and the sea will be breaking over her. We’re winning the fight with the fire. The doctor reports his out of morphine, he has no where else to put the wounded, can he bring some up on deck.
Everyone off sir, but we’re drifting apart. She’s taking her time going down. Ahh spoke to soon, the fire must have reached the mine hold. She was a good ship, she did well. I guess we just hope for someone to come along, prison for us, if we survive.
Whats that noise, oh my god the bows come off, we’re going down fast, urghhh.