1941, Wednesday 12 November;
Park sat in the Filter Room at Glugor, along with Air Commodore Wann, watching the training plan play out. As of today, all Wann’s bomber squadrons were declared operational, although more training would be welcomed. Four Battles flying south from Alor Star had been picked up by the recently operational AMES 244 TRU up on Kedah Peak, and reported in. Thanks to a pre-existing trail up Kedah Peak, which the Army had widened into a narrow road to allow access to the top for its Observation Posts, overlooking the Gurun defensive line, Park had been able to site 244 TRU up there. They had connected into the newly laid telephone lines laid by the Army, and had a functioning radar net, while the work on the Penang radar site above Georgetown continued.
Two Hurricanes of RCAF 416 Fighter Sqn from Bayan Lepas had taken off to intercept. Previously, using the COL radar at Bukit Huma, northern end of Penang, although they were flying higher than Kedah Peak, the radar plot would have been distorted by the mountain’s refection, and contact with the Battles would have been lost for a while. However, now they were plotted all the way, and according to the plan the Battles were met by the two Hurricanes seaward, around Kedah Peak, and intercepted successfully.
The work on building the facilities for a radar station on Western Hill, Penang, was proving to be very difficult, and was reliant on using the funicular railway, or a pack mule train, and then creating a jeep track to the site. The site itself, gave an almost 360-degree vision, although Kedah Peak partly masked the north-east. They planned a fixed telephone line down to the Filter station at Glugor, which also had connections with Bayan Lepas, Butterworth, Sungai Petani, Alor Star and Kuala Ketil airfields. The completion date had been moved backward three times now, Park was still unsure of when he would have the station finished. The COL site on the south of the island, on Batu Maung was also proving difficult to complete, but both sites wouldn’t be receiving their radar units until sometime in the new year.
Further news was the airfields at Butterworth and Kuala Ketil had become operational in mid-October, and Wann took the opportunity to rebase his forces. The arrival of HMCS Prince David in mid-October had carried enough aircrew, to enable both RCAF 406, and its spawn, 416 to be at full complement, and they had been at pains to ensure there was a balance of experienced pilots between the two. With this completed, he’d made both squadrons operational, but was well aware they both needed a lot more training. He’d based RCAF 416 Sqn at Bayan Lepas, on Penang, with RCAF 406 Sqn basing at Kuala Ketil, the new airfield east of Sungai Petani, which, although it had a decent grass runway, all its other facilities were still very basic, and they’d be living in tents. Both were part of RAF 151 Wing, with RAF 81 Sqn, moving to Alor Star.
The Battles Wing, 7 RCAF, was somewhat scattered, with both RAF 226 and RCAF 404 at Sungai Petani, and RCAF 414 at Ipoh, while his Blenheim Wing, 44 RAF, had both RAF 34 and 62 Sqns at Butterworth and RCAF 407 and RAAF 454, both at Taiping. It had been planned that RAF 60 Sqn, currently in Burma, was to transfer to Malaya to undergo live ammunition target practice, but with the developing situation, this was cancelled and they would get some target practice when a new range in Burma was constructed in the new year. With all these aircraft in the north, he’d felt it appropriate to form a third section of the RAF 81 Repair & Salvage Unit, which he had based at Butterworth.
Air Commodore Vincent, RAF 224 Group (Singapore), had taken over responsibility for the air defence of Eastern Malaya, and RAAF 457 Sqn was now based at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah, to provide a fighter aircraft presence. RNZAF 486 had been temporarily moved to Kuantan, RAF 134 backfilling from Batu Pahat, while the recently formed FAA 895 Sqn, with its carrier enabled Brewster Buffalos was also taking on Singapore Air Defence duties, from its base at Sembawang.
The other thing Park had been pushing hard on, was fighter tactics. A war with Japan was looking increasingly likely, and Park was concerned about his force’s ability to continue to operate due to attrition. Painfully aware of how daily combat could quickly reduce a force, and realisation that reinforcements would be slow to come, Park was keen to preserve what he had. Although he had an expanding air force, the majority of his pilots were extremely raw, lacking experience, and he’d seen how easily combat in the ‘Battle of Britain’ had eaten them up.
Air Commodore Vincent had set up a small working group, of experienced BoB vets, to look at this and had identified a number of points.
1. Timely use of advanced radar warning would give the fighters time to gain the height and positional advantage.
2. Operating in finger four formations made it easier for new pilots to remain in formation.
3. Both old and new Japanese fighters although slower, were more agile, the newer model frighteningly so, if intelligence reports were to be believed.
4. Adoption of the swop and climb tactic, much like the Germans had used in the BoB, and continue the British tactic of concentrating on the bombers.
By adopting these tactics, Park hoped for his pilots to be as effective as possible, while at the same time limiting their losses.
Supporting this force was a ground organisation that was improving all the time on its aircraft recovery and repair, but Park knew he had to do more on the rescue of pilots parachuting out of their aircraft. He was working with the Army on special teams that could be sent out into the jungle to help search for them, while over the sea, he was working with the Navy on identifying small ships, and where they might be based, to conduct rescue missions. All of this, however, was still at a very embryonic stage.
Another problem that was being addressed was the ground to air coverage that the TR 90D high frequency radio telephone sets fitted in his aircraft gave. These only had a maximum range of 40 miles, in Britain, the problem had been overcome by the use of mobile radio tenders, lorries fitted with additional radio sets, parked up and connected to a telephone line, which were in direct contact with the ground controller, who repeated his instructions. However, the RAF in Britain had been converting over to VHF sets, and a number of the old redundant radio tenders had been dismantled, the radio equipment, minus the vehicles, being shipped out. His RIMU (Radio Installation & Maintenance Unit) based at Ponggol, Singapore, although primarily a radar maintenance unit, had begun installing some of that equipment into freshly arrived Canadian built trucks, converting one a week, the first one was now installed at Mersing, helping provide extended radio control coverage over some of the eastern side of Johore.