Thanks, that was very interesting. So, between Burma, Malaya, and Singapore there were 169 Buffalo's. We replace them with 169 Hurricane IIB's. We construct an interconnected radar network around Singapore Island. Now you have a better chance of getting to a higher altitude than the incoming bombers. Do you go after the bombers or fighter escorts? Your outnumbered on most raids by 2 or 3 to 1, and most of the Japanese pilots have more flight, and combat hours how do you do over say 30 days?
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
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Fatboy Coxy
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Hi ArtosStark, Thank you for these, I already had the first one, but didn't have the second one.
Fatboy Coxy
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Hi Igkmas, thank you for your support, and especially sharing the detail about your dad. If you feel like sharing anything about his life in the 8th Division, I, along with many others no doubt, would love to hear of it, in any shape of form you might chose.
So, how badly is the RAF outnumbered? Over the North the RAF had 12 Buffalo's, do they now have 12 Hurricane IIB's? The Hurricane's are stripped on day one? With only an intelligence assessment on a captured fighter they decide dogfighting is hopeless, so they give it up? They use big wings with 12 fighters? They figure out the Thach Weave before Thach, and even before the first shot is fired? Does Park write a book called Park's Combat Tactics over Malaya before the start of the war that sounds like Major Tomas McGuire's book Combat Tactics in the Southwest Pacific Theater? McGuire had to get actual experience so he couldn't write his book till May 1944. How do they know what is coming after them? In the OTL it was all a surprise to them.
I am not sure if that reflects the numbers in this tl - and its not a like for like replacement
I would say that while the lower ranking Japanese Pilots would likely have more experience the British flight and Squadron leaders would have far more experience than their average Japanese equivalents having been fighting the Germans and Italians (and possibly the Vichy?) for a couple of years in a far higher intensity war than Japan had experienced in Manchuria and China and the British did it often while outnumbered.
The AVG and RAF pilots in Burma during the defence of Rangoon even with the British pilots being equipped with Buffaloes (30 in total) tended to get the better of the IJA pilots - with that air campaign ended when Rangoon was evacuated.
As with all the air campaigns there would be an element of 'seeing the elephant' for the first time when they first meet and the campaign would evolve with changes in tactics and overall strategy over these 30s days.
So what should happen is the British and commonwealth fighter pilots 'should' like with the BoB ignore the fighters and go for the bombers as that is their job and having an altitude and performance advantage over most of the IJA fighter estate 'should' be targeting the bombers.
But war is never simple and boys will be boys and we will likely see numerous mistakes made on both sides with for example Hurricane pilots trying to dogfight their short sighted bandy legged Japanese opponents who are in rubbish aeroplanes until word gets around that its actually like fighting a CR42 and the IJA are quite good pilots and best not to unless you have the jump on him.
The Japanese would be desperately trying to evolve tactics and using the relative small numbers of Oscar as much as they can to match or over match the Hurricane to drive down bomber losses.
What it would finally look like over 30 days? Don't know - but i would hazard a guess that ITTL it would be far better than OTL for the British Empire and Allies - with heavier than OTL losses for the Japanese at a level they had not suffered before
Would that be enough? That's for the OP to decide.
The lack of knowledge is so great that it is hard for me to even know were to start. The entire point of the Dowding system is to allow you to mass your forces were the enemy is rather than have to have a lot dedicated to CAP in areas where there are no enemy aircraft. You therefore get local superiority over a raid rather than inferiority everywhere. A lot of the Japanese fighters will be allocated to things like CAP over their forces and the Japanese in any case did not do multi hundred aircraft raids in Malaya.
Stop taking OTL for what is where and even what is available, this is an ATL, things will be different. Park is not just going to allocate his aircraft identically to the commander OTL ( and he have his airfields defended by the army unlike OTL ). Thach actually worked out his weave pre Pearl and as the British are actively trying to find out at what the IJAAF/IJN are doing, things will be less of a surprise to them.
Fatboy Coxy
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Hi Belisarius II, what Igkmas says is very much in the vein of how I feel about parts of your posts. You do post worthy points, and often factually correct, but occasionally make sweeping statements, which gloss over facts, and can be easily taken as wrong, if we read the words correctly. An example of my frustration with some of your wording is in post 2512, see below
Where you're not wrong, is in saying the main thrust of the Japanese attack came down the western side of the Malayan peninsula, but you dismiss the Kota Bharu landings as a diversion. This is incorrect, initial Japanese landings along the Thai and Malayan coastline were all about securing the airfields at Gong Kedak, Kota Bharu, Pattani and Singora (Songkhla), and establishing a good foothold on the peninsula. Air support was being flown from Indo China, 300 miles away, and the seizure of these local airfields provided an enormous benefit to the Japanese. Indeed the building of RAF airfields in Kota Bharu, Gong Kedah and Kuantan received criticism at the time from Lt Gen Bond, the Army commander at the time, for being so vulnerable to amphibious landings. The Japanese did consider not attacking the Kelantan airfields initially, but Yamashita and the IJN were concerned about the threat those airfields offered if left alone.
I agree, turning the loss of Singapore into a victory, or draw (whatever that looks like) is a heavy lift, and I couldn't see how such a thing could be done later than August 1940.
And yes your posts do add value, I'm happy for people to challenge me on my stance, but as I've said before, with alternative history, every change you make, takes you further away from the possibility of it happening. We do need to base a lot of this on facts, but again, a minor change in the historical path, can change a fact. And we're not always going to get it right, I've already made mistakes, some I have been able to change, some I have to shrug my shoulders and say forgive me, and I'll soldier on.
And finally, as you say, we learn from each other.
Fatboy Coxy
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Hi Cryhavoc101, and others, I'd also add the fact that a lot of these aircraft are going to be operating off grass airfields, many affected by the South China Sea monsoon season, meaning wet grass runways. Some aircraft will manage ok, others like the Spitfire, would have great problems, if what I have read about her build and undercarriage are true. And then a second factor arises as the fighting progresses, maintenance, yea a very boring, unglamorous affair, but if not done, accident rates rise alarmingly. Doing this in a nice hanger, with all the benefits that brings is a big difference to working under a canvas sheet in a grass field.
MWI 41100314 The Hospital Tour
Fatboy Coxy
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1941, Friday 03 October;
Brigadier Charles Herbert Stringer reached the last bed, and spun around on a heel, to face his host, Col Denham, DADMS of the Australian Imperial Force, Col Pigdon, CO of the 2/13 Australian General Hospital, and Matron Drummond. The Hospital staff had arrived by train from Singapore over the weekend and had only been in Malaya 18 days. “Gentlemen, Matron, you are to be congratulated on the hard work I know you have all put in. The Hospital is in excellent shape, in less than a week you have transformed this place, and I know your still lacking in staff and supplies, I will ensure that all your needs are met, as much as it is my gift to do so” They were standing in Alor Star’s general hospital, and had taken over 80 of the 130 beds there, with an additional 70 more being added under canvas, in the adjacent gardens.
For Stringer it was the last leg of a very busy week. He was Deputy Director of Medical Services (DDMS) for Malaya Command, responsible for all medical services in Malaya, and had been working towards a fully integrated network of hospitals. He had arrived early morning, having left Taiping on a night train, the journey of just over 100 miles had taken him over 6 hours, which was very illustrative of the trials of a single-track railway. However, the carriage he was in provided sleeping accommodation, and he had slept pretty much all the way.
A week’s inspection of the force’s hospitals had started in the Alexandra, in Singapore, a 550-bed hospital for British Military Forces, and later in the day in the 12th Indian General Hospital in Tyersall Park, another well-run, long-established hospital for Indian troops.
A day later he was in Malacca, visiting the Australian 2/10 General Hospital, which had taken over part of the civil hospital months ago and then with newly built huts and tents expanded to 600 beds. This was the area where the Australians had originally been based, and a large number of units in training were still located there.
And another day on found him in Tanjong Malim, 50 miles north of KL, inspecting the 17th Indian Combined General Hospital, installed in the Sultan Idris Teachers College, serving the 9th Indian Division and other units in the Kuala Lumpur area.
The following day he had been in Taiping, visiting the 20th Indian Combined General Hospital, there for the 11th Indian Division, which was another recently arrived unit.
And yesterday he had been in Penang, where the 27th Indian Combined General hospital had been recently installed in Penang General Hospital, again taking control of many of the beds.
This was his final leg, before back to Singapore. He had learnt a lot, everyone needed more. More staff, more supplies and more beds if the worse happened. With more wooden huts being built, Chinese and Malay nurses being hastily trained, and locally procured supplies he was doing the best he could to meet those needs. He just wondered if it would be enough if the worse was to happen?
Brigadier Charles Herbert Stringer reached the last bed, and spun around on a heel, to face his host, Col Denham, DADMS of the Australian Imperial Force, Col Pigdon, CO of the 2/13 Australian General Hospital, and Matron Drummond. The Hospital staff had arrived by train from Singapore over the weekend and had only been in Malaya 18 days. “Gentlemen, Matron, you are to be congratulated on the hard work I know you have all put in. The Hospital is in excellent shape, in less than a week you have transformed this place, and I know your still lacking in staff and supplies, I will ensure that all your needs are met, as much as it is my gift to do so” They were standing in Alor Star’s general hospital, and had taken over 80 of the 130 beds there, with an additional 70 more being added under canvas, in the adjacent gardens.
For Stringer it was the last leg of a very busy week. He was Deputy Director of Medical Services (DDMS) for Malaya Command, responsible for all medical services in Malaya, and had been working towards a fully integrated network of hospitals. He had arrived early morning, having left Taiping on a night train, the journey of just over 100 miles had taken him over 6 hours, which was very illustrative of the trials of a single-track railway. However, the carriage he was in provided sleeping accommodation, and he had slept pretty much all the way.
A week’s inspection of the force’s hospitals had started in the Alexandra, in Singapore, a 550-bed hospital for British Military Forces, and later in the day in the 12th Indian General Hospital in Tyersall Park, another well-run, long-established hospital for Indian troops.
A day later he was in Malacca, visiting the Australian 2/10 General Hospital, which had taken over part of the civil hospital months ago and then with newly built huts and tents expanded to 600 beds. This was the area where the Australians had originally been based, and a large number of units in training were still located there.
And another day on found him in Tanjong Malim, 50 miles north of KL, inspecting the 17th Indian Combined General Hospital, installed in the Sultan Idris Teachers College, serving the 9th Indian Division and other units in the Kuala Lumpur area.
The following day he had been in Taiping, visiting the 20th Indian Combined General Hospital, there for the 11th Indian Division, which was another recently arrived unit.
And yesterday he had been in Penang, where the 27th Indian Combined General hospital had been recently installed in Penang General Hospital, again taking control of many of the beds.
This was his final leg, before back to Singapore. He had learnt a lot, everyone needed more. More staff, more supplies and more beds if the worse happened. With more wooden huts being built, Chinese and Malay nurses being hastily trained, and locally procured supplies he was doing the best he could to meet those needs. He just wondered if it would be enough if the worse was to happen?
Not that this TL is seeing any Spitfires - not directly anyhow etc but.....
During the BoB many sector stations were 'grass runways' and nearly all Satellite fields were all grass and both the Spitfire and Hurricane were intended to operate from Grass fields not concrete per se (given the above that would make sense) - in fact grass was preferred because it was not as hard on the undercarriage!
One of the advantages of a all grass strip was it allowed the fighters to take off in pretty much any direction 'en mass' and an unintended advantage was that they are harder to spot if you are an attacking baddie.
The Army Air Corps base at Middle Wallop remains as it was in the 30s an all grass field (its where the Apaches live)
Many of the main stations were provided with 'hard runways' later in the war primarily to allow them to operate larger aircraft - bombers and such like.
(In many cases the hard core was taken from bombed towns and cities - something both poetic and tragic about that)
Here is a gaggle of them taking off from a grass strip - Spitfire is a classy gal but she can rough it if she has too
Now obviously water logged fields would be a problem but not one that is limited to Spitfires (Water Logged airfields delayed Barbarossa) and would require metalled runways or if time permitted concrete ones.
Oscar - barely a hundred produced by the start of the war, and using the initial engine and 2 bladed propeller, struggle to see that they will have a significant impact.
This in itself has indirect effects.
It will impact Japanese tactics and morale - if you expect to be intercepted, then the fighters will be told to stay with the bombers etc
It will also raise operational questions - do the British have many more aircraft than we do, so we need to be more cautious and launch fewer larger raids; do they have spies who tell them where and when our raids are going to be, so need to have many more smaller raids; do we need to focus on their airfields more?
‘’Spitfires George......the greatest plane ever build........Rolls Royce Merlin engines the sweetest sound you could hear out here.’’
Ok, let's talk about lack of knowledge. The Dowding System was about creating an IADS for the UK. Here we're talking about one around Singapore Island. Since the Germans didn't invade England Fighter Command basically fought the Battle of Britain in defense of itself. Malaya is being invaded. Most of the Japanese sorties are being generated in support of the ground campaign, not against the airfields around Singapore. Unless Park doesn't want to participate in the battle for Malaya, he has to send his fighters north to join the fight, so he doesn't have the advantages Fighter Command had in the BoB.
His fighter strength will suffer attrition in the land campaign so most of it will be gone by the time the Japanese get to Johor. The most critical decision Dowding made in the Battle of Britain was to tell the Government that no more fighters could be sent to France. If they had the RAF would've started the BoB in a greatly weakened state because most of the Hurricane squadrons would've been destroyed in the Battle of France. That's why Dowding made the droll English kind of statement of, "Thank God we are now alone." Park doesn't have that luxury; he can't pull out of the land war.
Sorry but reality is what it was. If I'm not mistaken all these Hurricane's are a freebee. They're just a surplus number of fighters sitting in the UK with grass growing under them that are shipped to Malaya at no cost to any other theater of war or adding strain on limited shipping resources. Since the British already did know about the Ki-27 Nate and didn't change their fighting doctrine, and the Zero & Ki-27 started out in limited numbers why would they change their tactics on finding out about them? The Thach Weave was an effective tactic, though didn't create an insoluble problem, and as far as I know the RAF didn't use it. The USAAF did, so the RAF might have, I've just never heard of it.
In Malta at the start of the battle they basically had a single Chain Home station, being an Island Malta was an optimum site for such a Radar station and this has to be accounted for when looking at Malaya.
However Malta shows that the 'Dowding system' adjusted for local conditions can be a force multiplier for the fighter defence force.
In OTL such a system did not in realty exist in Malaya as of December 1941.
In an ATL is it possible to have a radar based fighter defence (Dowding style) in operation in Malaya by december 1941, In my opinion yes with the flapping of some butterfly wings, equipment can be made available, It can be emplaced and connected (colonial government given KUA), A competent leadership in place (Park will do), More and better pilots and aircraft ( Just getting CBAF on line in 1939 instead of September 1940 gives an addition 800 plus Spitfires, hence spare Hurricanes).
Now we can argue till the cows come home about how big the butterflies are and how much of an effect they might have but just saying nothing changes is rather pointless, a useful argument is to propose how the Japanese would/could respond to the changes being wrought by the OP.
However Malta shows that the 'Dowding system' adjusted for local conditions can be a force multiplier for the fighter defence force.
In OTL such a system did not in realty exist in Malaya as of December 1941.
In an ATL is it possible to have a radar based fighter defence (Dowding style) in operation in Malaya by december 1941, In my opinion yes with the flapping of some butterfly wings, equipment can be made available, It can be emplaced and connected (colonial government given KUA), A competent leadership in place (Park will do), More and better pilots and aircraft ( Just getting CBAF on line in 1939 instead of September 1940 gives an addition 800 plus Spitfires, hence spare Hurricanes).
Now we can argue till the cows come home about how big the butterflies are and how much of an effect they might have but just saying nothing changes is rather pointless, a useful argument is to propose how the Japanese would/could respond to the changes being wrought by the OP.
NO, we are talking one for all Malaya. Even OTL the radar just being on Singapore Island was due to them starting there and the Japanese turning up before the other stations were finished.
Gosh, not as if reinforcements will come and given a much slower Japanese advance, a lot more of them
No OTL is what it was. Different commanders give different attitudes. Taking the Japanese seriously unlike OTL will mean tactics do change. More energetic leaders and defences are complete, troops both better trained and prepared etc. A bull headed determination that the OTL result is a fixed point is not helping this thread. If you cannot make a constructive input, ,maybe go just view a documentary. The entire point of ATL's is to explore differences not claim everything is inevitable.
You're talking about an IADS for Singapore island. I'm not sure anybody else (including the OP) is. What I'm seeing described is a radar network in the Malayan peninsula using army mobile units (AMES?) of the type sent over to France in 1939-40 and a limited ground control system capable of vectoring fighters onto incoming raids. It's going to be nothing like as flexible and effective as the OTL Dowding system, but vastly better than nothing.
It should be noted here that the Japanese have no form of ground control for their fighter forces, and indeed in the air only flight commanders have radio transmitters. For the RAF all aircraft have radios, and combined with this the ability of ground control stations to tell the pilots in the air where the enemy is forms a very significant advantage.
That's making rather a lot of assumptions:
- That the Japanese will not also suffer from attrition, or that they are able to reinforce while the RAF are not.
- That the RAF are unable to withdraw damaged units from the frontline - which they successfully did in both France and during the Battle of Britain.
- That RAF attrition will be more severe than that of the Japanese.
- The RAF held very significant stocks of spare aircraft in the UK as a contingency. In Summer 1940 for instance the number of Hurricanes in storage (i.e. ready to supply at very short notice to squadrons as attrition replacements) never went below 200.
- With the vastly reduced air threat of summer/autumn 1941 and with Spitfire production improving, shaking loose the number of Hurricanes in this story from stocks held in the UK and UK-based squadrons isn't hard at all. In OTL around 100 were delivered to the Soviet Union by the end of the year - again, these can be diverted to Malaya if there is a political decision to do so.
- Pilots will be diverted from other fronts. The two most obvious are the UK itself, where significant forces were used in what were ultimately very unproductive cross-channel raids, and shipments to the Soviet Union. 151 Wing could be diverted pretty easily, and given the shift in priorities I would be a bit surprised if it wasn't.
My go to for extra capacity for elsewhere is the followingYou're talking about an IADS for Singapore island. I'm not sure anybody else (including the OP) is. What I'm seeing described is a radar network in the Malayan peninsula using army mobile units (AMES?) of the type sent over to France in 1939-40 and a limited ground control system capable of vectoring fighters onto incoming raids. It's going to be nothing like as flexible and effective as the OTL Dowding system, but vastly better than nothing.
It should be noted here that the Japanese have no form of ground control for their fighter forces, and indeed in the air only flight commanders have radio transmitters. For the RAF all aircraft have radios, and combined with this the ability of ground control stations to tell the pilots in the air where the enemy is forms a very significant advantage.
That's making rather a lot of assumptions:
These were all borderline true at best in OTL Malaya - largely because the UK had gotten fixated on other things and left the Far East to rot. That doesn't appear to be the case ITTL.
- That the Japanese will not also suffer from attrition, or that they are able to reinforce while the RAF are not.
- That the RAF are unable to withdraw damaged units from the frontline - which they successfully did in both France and during the Battle of Britain.
- That RAF attrition will be more severe than that of the Japanese.
- The RAF held very significant stocks of spare aircraft in the UK as a contingency. In Summer 1940 for instance the number of Hurricanes in storage (i.e. ready to supply at very short notice to squadrons as attrition replacements) never went below 200.
- With the vastly reduced air threat of summer/autumn 1941 and with Spitfire production improving, shaking loose the number of Hurricanes in this story from stocks held in the UK and UK-based squadrons isn't hard at all. In OTL around 100 were delivered to the Soviet Union by the end of the year - again, these can be diverted to Malaya if there is a political decision to do so.
- Pilots will be diverted from other fronts. The two most obvious are the UK itself, where significant forces were used in what were ultimately very unproductive cross-channel raids, and shipments to the Soviet Union. 151 Wing could be diverted pretty easily, and given the shift in priorities I would be a bit surprised if it wasn't.
A Spitfire Wing sent earlier to Malta and a second much earlier to North Africa - this frees up Hurricane and Tomahawks for use elsewhere - so allowing more units to end up in the far east with better aircraft.
The efforts to create attrition on French based Luftwaffe units (quite correctly given the British Knowledge that the USSR was about to be attacked and then the very heavy losses suffered by the Soviets once Barbarossa started) via 'fighter sweeps' are more focused - large scale concentrated attacks on individual airfields in Northern France with large numbers of bombers with a very heavy escort.
During Barbarossa the exchange rate was something along the lines of 11:1 so every German fighter plane and pilot forced to return to France saves numerous Russian planes and pilots!
This focused strategy as opposed to the fighter sweeps drives down losses over Northern France over OTL and also due to better fighters in Malta and North Africa a better showing verses the German fighter units and by extension less losses again resulting in more pilots and airframes available in Mid/late 41
Also with the OPs initial POD a greater focus on the Far East would with the above result in a greater number of assets sent East than OTL
The cascading effect resulting in a more powerful British Empire Airforce in the region with more experienced pilots and better aircraft over OTL