marathag
Banned
Would the British be happy with a Germany and A-H eliminated by France and Russia as Great Powers in 1914?
I'm not so sure since this War is due to Russian and French warmaking
Your favorite reason why Britain would DoW Germany anyway if Berlin went east-first in 1914
- Thread starter raharris1973
- Start date
I'm not so sure since this War is due to Russian and French warmaking
You know you just poked the hornet's nest with a stick with that one, right?
Unreasonable? Perhaps. Unexpected? Shouldn't have been, considering that the plot that killed Franz Ferdinand led up into the upper echelons of Serbian Army Intelligence...
Well... we've been around the block on this one a time or two before
I'm not entirely convinced that Germany was the only great power that considered a full mobilization as tantamount to a DoW by 1914...The Germans were in an unenviable strategic position to begin with, faced with the certainty of a two-front war... from their viewpoint, it would've been foolish and dangerous to delay one moment longer, once it became clear that war was inevitable.
Who cares if they were expected? They were unreasonable. Serbia was never going to agree to all of them.
The goal of Franz Josef and Conrad von Hotzendorf from the beginning was to provoke Serbia into an unavoidable war.
marathag
Banned
Force them to submit, and no longer be a threat.
After all, it wasn't like the Austrians were going to ethnically cleanse Serbia like the Serbs did to the Albanians and Bulgarians in the previous Balkan Wars with their newly acquired territory, right?
Except they knew Serbia wouldn’t submit. No sovereign country in the world is going to agree to a demand to subsume their entire legal system to another country, especially when they have a major power backing/protecting them. They knew their demands would result in war.
Aphrodite
Banned
Only for Germany did mobilization mean war. That doesn't make her an aggressor, it's just her military position. The other powers, particularly Russia, would be happy to take their time after mobilization.Well... we've been around the block on this one a time or two before
The Germans were in an unenviable strategic position to begin with, faced with the certainty of a two-front war... from their viewpoint, it would've been foolish and dangerous to delay one moment longer, once it became clear that war was inevitable.
Once Russia begins mobilization, Germany must make a decision quickly. Do we counter mobilize and go to war or do we tell the Austrians to cut a deal. This is the last chance for peace.
We know what to do because we know how it ends, they don't. Backing down has some serious consequences as well.
Wasn't the entire legal system, it was one very specific investigation and prosecution...
IMO the Serbs knew that their response would likely lead to war as well... and the ambassador from that major power backing/protecting them had virtually guaranteed as much, even if he was overstepping his bounds by doing so...
Russia was obligated to take her time because she had to... the infrastructure, military organization (or lack thereof), and vast size of the country dictated that, at the time...
Nicky II had the chance to back down from full mobilization... he didn't. Once that happened, that last chance for peace was pretty much shot.
Riain
Banned
True, Russia mobilised as fast as they could: 2 armies in 2 weeks, another 4 armies in 4 weeks and another 2 armies in 6 weeks. Apparently by 1917 the French funded and influenced strategic railway construction program would considerably speed mobilisation. However Russia is big and troop trains still have to travel long distances which takes time.
Considering that they created the situation, and started the dooms day clock ticking, it's hard to think about them as the aggrieved party. From the start of the crisis the AH Government wanted it to end in war with Serbia, and the German General Staff wanted a war with Russia. The German generals went so far as to lie to their own head of state, and told him there was no time for negotiations, and that war was the only alternative to national disaster. Generals locking their country into a ridged offensive plan, based on beating the other side to the punch don't serve their country well. Germany had many options in 1914, the necessity to attack was in their own minds. If war is what your looking for chances are that's what your going to find.Well... we've been around the block on this one a time or two before
The Germans were in an unenviable strategic position to begin with, faced with the certainty of a two-front war... from their viewpoint, it would've been foolish and dangerous to delay one moment longer, once it became clear that war was inevitable.
Aphrodite
Banned
Disagree here. If the Kaiser sent Nicky a note with an acceptable proposal, the crisis ends. Instead he sends an ultimatum he knows will be refused.
Saying you have the last chance doesn't mean you're at fault. Everyone pushed the crisis to the brink and it went over the cliff.
Too often we make value judgments to actions that aren't there. No one at the time thought there was anything immoral about starting a war. It didn't really need a reason either. The Spanish American War is about the worst excuse for a cause- we accidentally blew up our own ship. No one had a problem with it.
War is just part of their world
Germany was facing a two front war against the 2nd and 3rd strongest military powers of the world. One of its few and biggest adventages were that it could mobilize faster. Once mobilization starts any day lost is diminishing that adventage. If Germany waited for a Russian declaration of war it would have ment that they give up on this adventage completely. With every day they waited they were in a weaker postion militarily. If a military threat in the early days of the crisis - when it was the strongest possible - did not suffice for Russia to desist and seek a diplomatic solution than Germany in a much weaker strategic position (because it waited) would have no real chance to use diplomacy effectively - if Germany did not go to war in the first day of august in best case scenario it would have suffered a complete diplomatic defeat and in the worst one started a war in a much weaker position. As I see it both side failed to back down and accept a diplomatic compromosie solution.
Wrong. Russia was the first GP ordering a full mobilization - including for example the Warsaw military district wich is not deep inside its territory. Russia was mobilizing troops that were specifically intended to face - and more precisly attack Germany before the german ultimatum and mobilization. Russia also started to mobilize its forces in secret and lied about it for days - something that made taking anything the russians said in good fait practically impossible.
And hereI thought the situation was created by the Black Hand having assassinated FF. But now I see that the germans and Austrians would have gone to war regardless, obviously.
Agree but I want to again point out that the crisis started with the Black Hand - which was heavily intervoven with the serbian military - facilitating the murder of FF.
I think the germans decided not to back down in this conflict - if that meant war so be it. This makes them fully responsible for the war. But Germany did try to localize the conflict to the Balkans - though as we know pre-WWI german diplomacy has been accused by much but competence was never on that list. It was not out to attack Rusia from the get go but it was willing .
Was that a lie? Did Russia not start to mobilize his forces in secret - including forces ment to attack Germany?
Fully agree.
No it had not. One of the main party at fault for that was the german military who had a single warplan which is IMO a criminal level of misconduct. Also as I stated earlier I do not think Germany was looking for a world war. Do you have any evidence indicating that Germany would have declared war on Russia even if Russia stopped its mobilization? It agreed to back austrias war on the Balkans and took the chance that if the other side did not back down it will result in a world war.
They're not.
The German ultimatum to Russia didn't even include the word 'war' only that Germany would order 'full mobilisation', oh and you have 12 hours to reply. However, at the same time the Germans activated Kriegsgefahrzustand: all railway lines and depots were commandeered; the press controlled; martial law proclaimed; troops ordered to return to their garrisons and reserves called up – every measure executed short of actually moving the troops to the border.
Jules Cambon wrote: The whole theory of German blamelessness rests on the fact that it was Russia who first ordered mobilization, thus forcing her adversaries’ hands. The one thing overlooked is that no comparison could be drawn between Russian and German Mobilization; that while one took several weeks to complete, the other required only a few days; that there existed in Germany a formidable institution in the ‘Imminent Danger of War’, tantamount to mobilization in advance.
Its worthwhile reproducing this helpful timeline from 1914: The Year the World Ended by Paul Ham.
Timeline of Russian mobilisation in 1914
St Petersburg, 25 July: Russia secretly decides to order ‘preparatory’ mobilisation, in response to Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia.
Berlin, 27 July: German foreign minister Jagow assures the Entente powers that Germany would not mobilise if Russia’s partial deployment were directed only at Austria.
Vienna/Belgrade, 28 July: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.
Berlin, 28 July, morning: Bethmann-Hollweg advises the Kaiser to write to the Tsar, initiating the Willy–Nicky telegrams, a diplomatic strategy designed to brand Russia the aggressor. German war minister Erich von Falkenhayn, with the Kaiser’s support, orders troops on manoeuvres to return to their garrisons. German ‘partial’ mobilisation secretly begins.
St Petersburg, 28 July, afternoon: The Russian Government, in response to the Austrian declaration of war, informs Berlin that it intends to mobilise the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan. It promises its partial mobilisation will pose no threat to Germany Russian military experts object to ‘partial mobilisation’ because it threatens to derail their plans for full mobilisation.
London, 29 July, morning: Britain sends an official ‘warning telegram’ authorising the secret, partial mobilisation of the fleet. The First Squadron continues to Scapa Flow, and the Second and Third Squadrons are held at their bases.
Berlin, 29 July: In a long, hair-raising memorandum to Bethmann-Hollweg, Moltke presses for German war readiness in response to any Russian move, disavowing Jagow’s earlier assurances of restraint. Russia, he writes, has ‘cunningly contrived’ to provoke Germany to instigate hostilities, by gradually mobilising. If Germany fully mobilised, Russia and her French ally could then claim Germany started it, ‘and the mutual butchery of the civilised nations of Europe will begin’. He concludes, ‘The military situation is becoming from day to day more unfavourable for us, and can, if our prospective opponents prepare themselves further, unmolested, lead to fateful consequences for us.’
Paris, 29 July: Poincaré and Viviani arrive back in Paris, and immediately urge Russia not to give Germany any pretext for general mobilisation.
Berlin, 4 pm, 29 July: The German General Staff receives the disquieting news that Belgium means to resist invasion. Brussels calls up reserves, doubling its effective strength to 100,000, and reinforces fortifications and border defences.
St Petersburg, 29 July, day—evening: Russia receives news of Austria’s bombing of Belgrade. Sazonov angrily informs the Austrian ambassador, ‘You are only wanting to gain time by negotiations and are meanwhile advancing and bombarding an unprotected city.’ That night, Sazonov, the minister for war Vladimir Sukhomlinov and the chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Yanushkevich order full mobilisation: ‘in view of the small probability of avoiding a war with Germany [we must] prepare for it in every way … the risk could not be accepted of delaying a general mobilisation later by effecting a partial mobilisation now’. Sazonov telephones the result to the Tsar. Nicholas, with extreme reluctance, signs two mobilisation ukases, one for partial, the other for general, to be used as events dictate. He thus gives the military a free hand to act as they see fit.
St Petersburg, nearing midnight, 29 July (the timing is disputed): Sazonov makes a perfunctory offer to Berlin to suspend all ‘military preparations’ if Austria halts at Belgrade and withdraws the harshest terms of its ultimatum to Serbia. Germany refuses.
St Petersburg, before midnight, 29 July: The Tsar, extremely agitated, telephones the war minister to downgrade the general mobilisation order to ‘partial’. The reason, he says, is that he has received an offer from the Kaiser to mediate between Vienna and Belgrade. Wilhelm’s closing words – ‘of course, military measures on the part of Russia … would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardise my position as mediator’ – persuade the Tsar to reverse the general mobilisation order. ‘I will not become responsible for a monstrous slaughter,’ Nicholas exclaims. The Russian Army is furious. ‘[M]obilization,’ Sukhomlinov argues, ‘is not a mechanical process which one can arrest at will, as one can a wagon, and then set in motion again.’ But the Tsar insists, and the partial mobilisation order is enacted at midnight (though it is questionable whether the general obeys).
Berlin, 1.45 am, 30 July: The Tsar unwisely informs the Kaiser that ‘the military measures [partial mobilisation in four cities] which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations’ and were in no sense meant to interfere with the Kaiser’s role as ‘mediator’. Wilhelm interprets this as ‘full mobilisation’ and writes angrily in the margin that the Russians were now:
a week ahead of us … I cannot agree to any more mediation since the Tsar … has secretly mobilised behind my back. It is only a manoeuvre, in order to hold us back and increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end!
It wasn't illegal, there were clauses in every warship contract for foreign countries that the ship could be seized. The Turks were offered terms that they declined. The Brits also had intelligence that the Turks had signed a treaty with Germany and were going to sail the ships across the North Sea to Germany. This was credible as the crews were half what was needed and lacking in specialists (the Turks were offering Newcastle shipfitters contracts to sail the ships operating and maintaining complicated machinery) to be able to sail to Constantinople.
The British had known about German plans to invade Belgium the week before the German ultimatum was issued and that it was an obviously a deliberate attack on France.
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Well "happy" is a big word! War between European great powers messes with the status quo and brings economic ramifications no matter what. But they'd be happier with it than the other way round since they are politically closer to France than Germany at this point, and they would be in a better situation to exploit it if they at the winners table.
I do suspect you will see GB trying to keep support to be more of the economic and naval type than millions of soldiers for as long as possible though!
even of you were right*, it's not going to matter that much certainly won't once victory in won. No matter the timing of secret mobilisation and Germany declaring marshal law and commandeering all trains, this will be presented as Germany invading Russia at the behest of AH (which it will be able to do beating Russia to the punch)
*and no you are not, but given after umpteen threads this still come up lets not bother go for umpteen+1, although I will say not going through Belgium would be one less black mark against the CP's name on the international stage!
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With the German diplomatic "competence" I could imagine the equivalent of a Zimmerman telegram being sent in support of an Irish rebellion. Giving the British an obvious Causus Belli.
What your really saying is that everyone had to step back, and let Germany, and AH do whatever they wanted to do, and have no military reaction to rising tensions. 1914 wasn't a totally unique situation in world history. If countries believed they needed to attack any potential hostile power anytime they mobilized forces, or raised their alert level there would've been many more wars, and the world today would be a nuclear wasteland.
marathag
Banned
Isn't shooting cannons considered part of being at War? It was declared the day before, and Serbs hadn't declared the city 'Open' that there would be no resistance as to spare the Civilians?