WI: The Wegener thesis became the basis of the Kriegsmarine strategy in WW2?

[Deleted member 94680]

The manpower and resources for the BBs gets put towards finishing the Hippers.

Mmm ok it doesn’t work like that but whatever.

Once the Hippers are done in 1938 because of the extra workers and materials put towards their completion, the light cruiser construction can start.

Just like magic. Took OTL Kreigsmarine three to four years to get a Hipper ready.

Lt Cruisers should be finished by late 1939.

About a year to build, what, 4 light cruisers? Light cruisers the Kreigsmarine have never built before? I’m assuming it’s meant to be the M-class by the way. Impressive.

And the Kriegsmarine isn't getting smaller.
U-boat production is ramped up, only Type IX is built and a host of small warships are built

A host. Ok. So what doesn’t get built instead of this ubernavy?

 

[Ian_W]

A host. Ok. So what doesn’t get built instead of this ubernavy?

Looks like More Targets for the County- and Tribal classes.

In any case, it's a German navy that cannot threaten the Western Approaches, so it's All Good, Chaps.

I mean, if they'd paid attention to what those ex-RFC chaps were doing with Swordfish aircraft and torpedoes, we might have a problem ... do you know they've been practicing night attacks ?

 

[Deleted member 94680]

I mean, if they'd paid attention to what those ex-RFC chaps were doing with Swordfish aircraft and torpedoes, we might have a problem ... do you know they've been practicing night attacks ?

Then what, launch them from land? That’s hardly a threat to the Approaches, either.

 

[Ian_W]

Then what, launch them from land? That’s hardly a threat to the Approaches, either.

If the French collapse, as they came close to in 1914 last time, and the Germans have an effective land-based torpedo bomber that can effectively operate at night, then things might get dicey around Dover and the South-East, as the RN will be unable to guarantee interception of any German force.

 

[McPherson]

The point is what the British and Germans might do. Not the Americans or Japanese did in a “synonymous” theatre. All of which is at least a year later than the timeframe where the “Wegener campaign” would be waged. It’s only you that keeps mentioning the Pacific, it’s not exactly relevant. Unless you have a source that shows Wegener was influenced by 1940s American Naval operations?

It’s just that I think we should be discussing German plans or capabilities, not something a different nation did half a world away a year later than the period under discussion in a completely different set of circumstances.

The point of "lessons learned" is to take what is navally contemporary (1935), see what is teachable, noticeable and applicable.

1. PLAN ORANGE contained the bombing, mining and submarine blockade elements of an island nation adjacent to a continent. This was first promulgated in 1906 and continuously updated.
2. First iteration of the Singapore Bastion Defense was 1923. The British knew then it was not going to work.
3. British plans for the Germans (distant blockade) was first proposed around 1910.
4. WWI the British tried 3. and earned an instant submarine war. Note Plan Orange predicted this would happen in a similar setting?
5. Round 2 of WWI was coming and many people with at least two neurons to rub together knew it.

1935 warplans, Orange, Black, Red. USN

 

[Deleted member 94680]

The point of "lessons learned" is to take what is navally contemporary (1935), see what is teachable, noticeable and applicable.

American Pacific War campaigns can't be lessons learned in 1940.

1. PLAN ORANGE contained the bombing, mining and submarine blockade elements of an island nation adjacent to a continent. This was first promulgated in 1906 and continuously updated.
2. First iteration of the Singapore Bastion Defense was 1923. The British knew then it was not going to work.
3. British plans for the Germans (distant blockade) was first proposed around 1910.
4. WWI the British tried 3. and earned an instant submarine war. Note Plan Orange predicted this would happen in a similar setting?
5. Round 2 of WWI was coming and many people with at least two neurons to rub together knew it.

The Germans didn't and won't have access to the War Plans of the American Navy. The British distant blockade worked and was always going to work, even the Imperial German Navy knew it. What does Singapore have to do with anything?

 

[Deleted member 94680]

If the French collapse, as they came close to in 1914 last time, and the Germans have an effective land-based torpedo bomber that can effectively operate at night, then things might get dicey around Dover and the South-East, as the RN will be unable to guarantee interception of any German force.

This is true, I suppose. But will the Germans plan for a French collapse of such a magnitude to begin building said torpedo bomber in sufficient numbers to take advantage? Also, as has been pointed out, if the Dover/South-East area gets "dicey", then the British can re-route to avoid being in range. Come a large-scale operation by the Germans, the risk will be taken as the stakes will be sufficiently high. That and fighter cover will be an issue as I'm fairly certain the marinebomber won't be able to fend for itself.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Hmm

I'm dubious, to say the least, about the Norway plan, for reasons given by other posters. When could it be implemented?

The O class BCs - when could they be fitted with 15" guns? AIUI the Germans were unable to build these until significantly later than the construction of "The Twins". Waiting until these are ready means none until late 1940.

The Hippers - when can they all be completed by without taking resources from the army and air force?

Ditto the pocket battleships, although delaying the BCs until they could be armed with 15" guns might make room for a couple more by 1939. To which the RN can respond with the measures McPherson and I discussed.

When can this mighty surface fleet be ready to surge into the North Atlantic ? My guess would be 1941 and it do

Good luck getting Goering to let the KM have its own torpedo bombers and long range reconnnaissance aircraft. About as difficult as the RN getting the FAA back earlier and control of Coastal Command. Which could be a rational response by the UK to such moves by Germany.

Armed Merchant Raiders and extra submarines seem to be the most cost effective part of the Wegener Thesis. But there are operational responses to such threats available to the RN and UK.

ps Is the Anglo-German Naval Agreement made in this scenario? And does it differ from OTL?

 

[Ian_W]

This is true, I suppose. But will the Germans plan for a French collapse of such a magnitude to begin building said torpedo bomber in sufficient numbers to take advantage? Also, as has been pointed out, if the Dover/South-East area gets "dicey", then the British can re-route to avoid being in range. Come a large-scale operation by the Germans, the risk will be taken as the stakes will be sufficiently high. That and fighter cover will be an issue as I'm fairly certain the marinebomber won't be able to fend for itself.

In order ... Torpedo planes make a lot of sense to fight the Russians in the Baltic. After all, it's what we'd use.

We can't re-route around an enemy landing attempt.

Yes, the risks will be taken, and enemy torpedo aircraft who can operate effectively at night arent the sort of risk we want to take.

Fighter cover - on both sides - will be ineffective, because it will be at night.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

In order ... Torpedo planes make a lot of sense to fight the Russians in the Baltic. After all, it's what we'd use.

We can't re-route around an enemy landing attempt.

Yes, the risks will be taken, and enemy torpedo aircraft who can operate effectively at night arent the sort of risk we want to take.

Fighter cover - on both sides - will be ineffective, because it will be at night.

Fair points.

What bits of the LW get sacrificed for these specialist units? Does that affect the Fall of France.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

In order ... Torpedo planes make a lot of sense to fight the Russians in the Baltic. After all, it's what we'd use.

We can't re-route around an enemy landing attempt.

Fighting Russians in the Baltic comes after defeating the British, doesn't it? Or are you spitballing reasons an ATL Kreigsmarine might build these marinebomber aircraft?

As for the landing attempt, that's what I was implying when I said "large-scale operation" as I didn't know what variant (or scale) of USM was being thought of.

What bits of the LW get sacrificed for these specialist units? Does that affect the Fall of France.

Can't say for certain (there appears to be quite the leeway on knock-on effects in the proposed TL) but at a guess, I'd say the OTL divebomber units? Less Stukas for more 'Mabos'?

 

[McPherson]

American Pacific War campaigns can't be lessons learned in 1940.

The Germans didn't and won't have access to the War Plans of the American Navy. The British distant blockade worked and was always going to work, even the Imperial German Navy knew it. What does Singapore have to do with anything?

1. How the Americans planned to fight can be lessons learned. If the IJN had figured out Orange and the British had figured out (and knew they had zero chance and understood it likely would never be used.) with Red, how could the British not understand the lessons implied?
2. Singapore demonstrated the RN had war planners who were basically clueless.
3. British WWI plans ignored the submarine.
4. British WWII staff naval planners accepted submarine warfare but initially vastly underestimated the threat and did not understand the naval geographic component. (To be fair, the USN was unready, too, but the planners WERE aware and had warned of the problem.)

Not going to rehash Plan Cuckoo for Coca Puffs from Outer Space or why it will not work. (See above.)

Anti-ship strike western approaches?

German torpedo bombers that would be viable?

Blohm & Voss Ha 140, tactical radius with torpedo is 300 km.
Dornier Do 22, tactical radius with torpedo is 800 km.
Dornier Do 217, tactical radius with torpedo (experiment) is 700 km.
Focke-Wulf Fw 200, operational LRMP (capable of torpedo or bombs) is 1500 km.
Heinkel He 115, operational with torpedo to 700 km tactical radius.
Junkers Ju 88 A-4/Torp and A/17, tactical radius anti-ship strike is 600 km.

The only planes survivable to reach the western approaches (presuming the fall of France.) are the:

Dornier Do 22, tactical radius with torpedo is 800 km.
Dornier Do 217, tactical radius with torpedo (experiment) is 700 km.
Focke-Wulf Fw 200, operational LRMP (capable of torpedo or bombs) is 1500 km.
Junkers Ju 88 A-4/Torp and A/17, tactical radius anti-ship strike is 600 km.

Night naval fighters?

Dornier or Junkers
Dornier Do 22
Junkers Ju 88

The best German potential anti-ship strike platform overall is the Dornier Do 217. FATSO nixed it.

Failing something like a dedicated Beaufort, Havoc or Marauder, the Germans have very slim pickings in the RIKKO department in 1939.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Fighting Russians in the Baltic comes after defeating the British, doesn't it? Or are you spitballing reasons an ATL Kreigsmarine might build these marinebomber aircraft?

As for the landing attempt, that's what I was implying when I said "large-scale operation" as I didn't know what variant (or scale) of USM was being thought of.



Can't say for certain (there appears to be quite the leeway on knock-on effects in the proposed TL) but at a guess, I'd say the OTL divebomber units? Less Stukas for more 'Mabos'?

Maybe, though I think some medium bombers like the He111 or others are more likely. Sacrificing Stukas might mean no breakthrough at Sedan.

Ps what airplane would have been used as the torpedo bomber? A variant of the Ju88, something new or a conversation of older bombers? Or is that a TBD issue for a TL author,?

 

[McPherson]

Maybe, though I think some medium bombers like the He111 or others are more likely. Sacrificing Stukas might mean no breakthrough at Sedan.

Ps what airplane would have been used as the torpedo bomber? A variant of the Ju88, something new or a conversation of older bombers? Or is that a TBD issue for a TL author,?

The only planes survivable to reach the western approaches (presuming the fall of France.) are the:

Dornier Do 22, tactical radius with torpedo is 800 km.
Dornier Do 217, tactical radius with torpedo (experiment) is 700 km.
Focke-Wulf Fw 200, operational LRMP (capable of torpedo or bombs) is 1500 km.
Junkers Ju 88 A-4/Torp and A/17, tactical radius anti-ship strike is 600 km.

The best German potential anti-ship strike platform overall is the Dornier Do 217. FATSO nixed it.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Thanks - had missed your post earlier. Looks like Goering was to the KM what the Air Ministry and Treasury were to the RN.

I don't know much about the Do-217 but would it have been easier to adopt the Ju-88 variant than set up another production line? Was the Fw-200 not vulnerable to fighters from CAM & MAC ships. let alone proper CVEs.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Maybe, though I think some medium bombers like the He111 or others are more likely. Sacrificing Stukas might mean no breakthrough at Sedan.

Is the He111 not the only decent “traditional” medium bomber they have? I imagine the anti-shipping aircraft would be seen as almost in the same mould as the Stukas - a “liaison” aircraft, rather than a purely airforce asset.

I agree as to the effects, but that’s the bind Germany is in, there’s never enough to be able to do it all. They have to rob Peter to pay Paul.

Ps what airplane would have been used as the torpedo bomber? A variant of the Ju88, something new or a conversation of older bombers? Or is that a TBD issue for a TL author,?

Possibly a specialised version of the Ju87? I think the 88 would be too large for the role and conversion (unless they get lucky, aka Swordfish) means an underperforming aircraft. I was envisaging something new, as dedicated aircraft for a specialist role always perform better and that’s what I thought was implied.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

1. How the Americans planned to fight can be lessons learned. If the IJN had figured out Orange and the British had figured out (and knew they had zero chance and understood it likely would never be used.) with Red, how could the British not understand the lessons implied?

How do you learn (post event) from someone else’s plan (pre event) unless they share those plans with you? The combat involved in Orange (or the near-implementation of it) is two years in the future from the timeframe being discussed. Unless the Germans get hold of a copy (unlikely) or the Americans share it (even more unlikely) what does it have to do with the price of apples?

2. Singapore demonstrated the RN had war planners who were basically clueless.

Ah, got you. Fair enough. But the Singapore planning is hardly indicative of British planning as a whole. That and the realities of war prevented the depleted British military allocating what they desired for the Singapore Plan. Almost everywhere else they were able to adapt to changed circumstances reasonably well.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

2. Singapore demonstrated the RN had war planners who were basically clueless.

No.

Singapore Demonstrated that Malaya was 6th in priority after 5 other priorities and in Dec 1941 the British Empire was too stretched

Those being

Battle of the Atlantic
Fighting Germany
Fighting Italy
Fighting Vichy France
Supplying Russia with as much as they could spare (in order to ensure Russia stayed in the fight)

Defending Malaya which was not a Battleground until it was at a time when fighting was going on in NA, EA. the Middle east and convoys where being protected across the Atlantic and into Russia.

Which of those priorities would you ditch for one that may or may not become one?

Nearly 500 tanks (mostly Matilda II and Valentines) and 699 aircraft (including many Hurricane and Tomahawks) had been delivered to Russia by Jan 1 1942 plus an entire RAF Fighter Wing to defend Murmansk.

Many of the tanks defending Moscow over the Winter of 1941/42 were certainly built by communists......but ones that lived in the British Midlands!

I can imagine that even a fraction of those 699 Aircraft and 500 tanks would have made a significant difference to the fortunes of the Imperial forces in Malaya at this time.

But at the end of the day Moscow falling would have a far greater impact on the Allies than Singapore falling ever would.

If there was a mistake made it was reinforcing defeat (18th Division) and trying to defend everywhere (eg Hong Kong, Force Z etc) where the Empire was not strong enough to do so.

 

[McPherson]

Thanks - had missed your post earlier. Looks like Goering was to the KM what the Air Ministry and Treasury were to the RN.

I don't know much about the Do-217 but would it have been easier to adopt the Ju-88 variant than set up another production line? Was the Fw-200 not vulnerable to fighters from CAM & MAC ships. let alone proper CVEs.

The DO-217 would have belonged to the KM like the Privateer eventually belonged to the USN. Bomber barons, what are you going to do? The Focke Wulfe FW200s could carry radar and make contact reports. They also had range and loiter. Use them as eyes.

How do you learn (post event) from someone else’s plan (pre event) unless they share those plans with you? The combat involved in Orange (or the near-implementation of it) is two years in the future from the timeframe being discussed. Unless the Germans get hold of a copy (unlikely) or the Americans share it (even more unlikely) what does it have to do with the price of apples?

Who said anything about the Germans? They were off in their little dream-world. They would have to come up with their own version of Red. I may work one up for them, but don't be surprised if it looks a lot like what the Russians planned to do to NATO during the cold war.

The British needed a competent planning staff all across the board. They did not have one. Granted the American army got two whole years to cobble one together, but the American navy had staffed up and been doing war-plans since the Virginius Incident. That is since the 1870s! They had two goes at it in the Spanish American War and in WWI (North Sea ASW mine barrage was their idea.), and they were fairly successful at the practice. This is not to say the RN could not have done better *(Lyster and Operation Judgement proves they had the people and could plan.) but for a naval campaign, one has to be a bit Mahanic and Clauswitzian. Dennis (US Army, father) and Alfred (US Navy, son) taught the Americans how it was done. One two whammy at West Point and Annapolis. And that is why you have the Victory Program and PLAN ORANGE.

Ah, got you. Fair enough. But the Singapore planning is hardly indicative of British planning as a whole. That and the realities of war prevented the depleted British military allocating what they desired for the Singapore Plan. Almost everywhere else they were able to adapt to changed circumstances reasonably well.

A proper British naval plan for war with Germany starts as soon as the Berlin maniac comes to power. It will feature asymmetric naval warfare options early (mines and bombing of naval bases.) and it will have to rely on geography and AIRPOWER. (See all the maps I drew above?)

 

[McPherson]

No.

Singapore Demonstrated that Malaya was 6th in priority after 5 other priorities and in Dec 1941 the British Empire was too stretched.

The Bastion Defense was RN cobbled together in 1923 as a combination of bluff and deterrent plan. As an actual war-fighting plan it was never viable. It was fleet centered and not combined services/arms. The RAF and the British army were not integrated into it. As such it was founded upon the false premises that the Japanese could be bluffed, that the British would go it alone, and the war would be Anglo-Japanese over influence in southern China, that the war would fleet vs. fleet. It was completely idiotic on so many levels it would take a book. (Andrew Boyd's "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters") to describe how idiotic it was.

By contrast... PLAN ORANGE looked at the real situation in the Pacific, factored in who was where with what and WROTE OFF THE PHILIPPINES as a nonviable outpost, opted for fallback and counterstroke after the Japanese over-extended.

The British meanwhile...

Those being

Battle of the Atlantic
Fighting Germany
Fighting Italy
Fighting Vichy France
Supplying Russia with as much as they could spare (in order to ensure Russia stayed in the fight)

Defending Malaya which was not a Battleground until it was at a time when fighting was going on in NA, EA. the Middle east and convoys where being protected across the Atlantic and into Russia.

Instead of falling back, writing off the Malay Settlements and planning their own stop lines in East India/Burma and the Indian Ocean...

Which of those priorities would you ditch for one that may or may not become one?

with everything else on their plate...

Nearly 500 tanks (mostly Matilda II and Valentines) and 699 aircraft (including many Hurricane and Tomahawks) had been delivered to Russia by Jan 1 1942 plus an entire RAF Fighter Wing to defend Murmansk.

Many of the tanks defending Moscow over the Winter of 1941/42 were certainly built by communists......but ones that lived in the British Midlands!

sent another 50,000 troops and an entire SAG to be destroyed in Southeast Asia IN ADDITION to what they deployed in theater.

I can imagine that even a fraction of those 699 Aircraft and 500 tanks would have made a significant difference to the fortunes of the Imperial forces in Malaya at this time.

I doubt it would have mattered much.

But at the end of the day Moscow falling would have a far greater impact on the Allies than Singapore falling ever would.

Agreed.

If there was a mistake made it was reinforcing defeat (18th Division) and trying to defend everywhere (eg Hong Kong, Force Z etc) where the Empire was not strong enough to do so.

See? Knew you would see it my way.

BTW. A better executed convoy defense plan including LRMP air cover out of Scotland would have helped those arctic convoys.